FORD FOUNDATION
The Ford Foundation is a resource for innovative people and institutions worldwide. Our goals are to: Strengthen democratic values, Reduce poverty and injustice, Promote international cooperation, and Advance human achievement.

This has been our purpose for more than half a century.

A fundamental challenge facing every society is to create political, economic, and social systems that promote peace, human welfare, and the sustainability of the environment on which life depends. We believe that the best way to meet this challenge is to encourage initiatives by those living and working closest to where problems are located; to promote collaboration among the nonprofit, government, and business sectors; and to ensure participation by men and women from diverse communities and at all levels of society. In our experience, such activities help build common understanding, enhance excellence, enable people to improve their lives, and reinforce their commitment to society.

Asset Building and Community Development Program
The Foundation’s Asset Building and Community Development Program supports efforts to reduce poverty and injustice by helping to build the financial, natural, social, and human assets of low-income individuals and communities.

Environment and Development Affinity Group (EDAG)
The Environment and Development Affinity Group is an association of Ford Affinity Group staff whose mission is to promote global learning and mobilize change in the field of environment and development. It promotes a theory and practice of development worldwide that is compatible with the sustainable and equitable use of environmental assets, including the protection, restoration, and enhancement of environmental quality, and respect for diverse cultural values and vitality. Members of the EDAG support research, convening, peer learning, advocacy, and networking to improve the effectiveness of the Foundation’s grantmaking in the environment and development field.
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For more than 20 years Ford Foundation programs around the world have supported community-based forestry in its many forms and facets. From significant support for joint forest management in India, where communities become the guardians of state-owned forests in exchange for limited sustainable use rights, to programs for improving community management of the 70 percent of Mexico’s forest lands that they control, and community involvement in the low-impact restoration of federal forest lands in the United States, community approaches to forestry have been a hallmark of Ford Foundation work in many countries.

The Forest Trends analysis in this paper highlights the distinct sets of actors who can become engaged in activities designed to improve tenure security; they include activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public law groups, community development and training organizations, policy groups, and government agencies. The range of actions that they undertake include mapping and demarcating lands, mobilizing around their legalization, bringing suits in support of the residents on the lands, lobbying for legislative changes, and building the capacity of local groups to undertake many of these activities.

Drawing from concrete experiences in nine countries, from Bolivia, Colombia and Brazil, to India, Nepal, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as well as South Africa and Tanzania, the study highlights critical “emerging issues” in this field. They include the impacts of increasing decentralization of governance, the overlay of emerging democracy, conflict, and community-based tenure, and the strengthening links between community stakeholders and their global representatives. And the paper concludes with nine strategies for advancing community tenure security, a veritable guidebook for communities and the organizations that seek to assist them.

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The world’s poor are disproportionately located in rural areas and [are] strongly dependent upon forests for their survival.

References:
If, as this paper suggests, “the world’s poor are disproportionately located in rural areas and [are] strongly dependent upon forests for their survival,” what do we know about strengthening the rights that communities have over those forests? What relationship is that likely to have with their ability to convert forests, as natural assets, into the bases for sustainable livelihoods that alleviate poverty? And what have been the most successful strategies used in recent years for strengthening community tenure security with respect to forests?

These are some of the critical issues addressed by Forest Trends in this informative paper. This is the second of a pair of papers on tenure issues related to forest lands developed by Forest Trends at the invitation of the Ford Foundation. The first, A Place in the World: Tenure Security and Community Livelihoods, A Literature Review, by Lynn Ellsworth, draws upon more than 50 years of academic debate and the evolution of four distinct traditions of land tenure analysis to highlight the theoretical discussions that lie behind this fundamentally practice-oriented contribution. It was also published in this series.

Why is this work of special importance to the Ford Foundation? Why undertake this analysis at this point? What importance could it have for other funders and development organizations? Those questions provide the focus for this brief foreword.

For the past five years, much of the work of the Ford Foundation linked to the alleviation of poverty and injustice has been organized conceptually around an asset-building approach in which work at the level of local communities is an important facet. The asset-building approach to poverty alleviation provides a significant departure from other paradigms that focused primarily upon subsidy and transfer programs that temporarily raise the incomes, or the consumption levels, of persons deemed to be poor, without affecting significantly the determinants of that poverty (cf. Sherraden 1991; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; and Ford Foundation 2002). The asset-building approach builds the enduring resources – indeed, the assets – that individuals, organizations, or communities can acquire, develop, improve, and transfer across generations. These assets include (2002, pp. 2-3):

- Human assets such as the education and other marketable skills that allow low-income people to obtain and retain employment that pays a living wage, as well as comprehensive reproductive health which affects the capacity of people to work, overcome poverty, and lead satisfying lives;
- Financial holdings of low-income people, such as savings, homeownership, and equity in a business;
- Social bonds and community relations that constitute the social capital and civic culture of a place and that can break down the isolation of the poor, as well as the webs of interpersonal and intergenerational relationships that individuals need as a base of security and support; and
- Natural resources, such as forests, wildlife, land, and livestock that can underpin communities and provide sustainable livelihoods, as well as environmental services such as a forest’s role in the cleansing, recycling, and renewal of the air and water that sustain human life.

When this approach is applied to communities that are dependent upon converting natural resources into sustainable livelihoods, it becomes a strategy for building the natural assets of these communities. The theoretical bases for building natural assets have been explored by Boyce (2001), Boyce and Pastor (2001), and Boyce and Shelley (2003). Boyce and his co-authors note that the application of asset-building strategies to natural assets is compelling because “strategies for building natural assets in the hands of low-income individuals and communities can simultaneously advance the goals of poverty reduction, environmental protection and environmental justice” (2001, p. 268). It countermands the conventional wisdom that the poor face an inescapable tradeoff between higher incomes and a better environment. And building natural assets can contribute not only increased income but also nonincome benefits such as health and environmental quality.
An historic transition in global forest tenure is currently under way. After years of government resistance, community claims to forest ownership are finally gaining momentum and acknowledgement. Many governments are beginning to recognize the ownership claims of indigenous communities and others and to grant access to lands usurped by colonial powers hundreds of years ago. Now that there is growing opportunity to advance the community rights and forest tenure reform agendas, it is necessary to identify the key strategies for strengthening community tenure. It is equally important to capture and disseminate lessons for practitioners, donors, forward-looking governments and the communities themselves.

In some countries this process of recognizing community rights is well advanced. In Bolivia, the Philippines, Colombia and Canada, for example, court decisions, presidential edicts, and new legislation have in fact granted some communities very strong managerial rights over forests, along with use of these lands. In some cases the rights are strong enough to constitute full private ownership. In Russia and many countries in Southeast Asia and Africa, however, the transition toward recognizing and respecting community rights has just begun. And in many countries that have passed new legislation, cumbersome regulations, lack of enforcement and continued policy bias against community property continue to be major barriers.

In places where it is emerging, respect for community property comes in response to decolonization as maturing nation states enter the global economy and devolve control to a more local level. In this process of devolution, local groups, NGOs and their supporters are key. Their efforts have often been waged in direct confrontation with governments. Nations and advocates of sound forest management are recognizing that secure property rights are fundamental to achieve forest conservation, social justice and poverty alleviation. It is increasingly evident that in order to achieve tenure security, substantial legal reform will be necessary.

Local groups, NGOs and their supporters have employed a wide variety of strategies to advance community rights and tenure reform agendas, and these strategies in large part reflect the range of social and political conditions in each country. Since these groups have been relatively few in number, somewhat isolated within their own country contexts and in possession of limited resources, the lessons learned from them have not been carefully examined or widely...
shared. Most literature has focused on the role of international NGOs or donors, without enough attention to the complementary roles of local activists and outside catalysts or supporters.

This paper identifies the key strategies used by local groups and NGOs to advance community tenure interests. It draws preliminary lessons for practitioners and innovators. We pay particular attention to the case of forests and community property, although the strategies are largely applicable to other natural resources and can be used to strengthen other types of tenure. A companion paper entitled “A Place in the World: Tenure Security and Community Livelihoods: A Literature Review,” provides an historical review of the literature and conversations concerning property rights. Both papers were prepared at the invitation of the Ford Foundation, which has played an instrumental role in advancing the interests of forest communities in countries around the world. The Ford Foundation, other donors active in the field and the many local groups and NGOs supported by them have dedicated themselves to leveraging structural changes in forest tenure and community livelihoods with relatively scarce resources. The two papers were written to help these actors make more informed decisions regarding the utility and limitations of each strategy and the conditions under which each is appropriate.

While the Ford Foundation provided the support for this review, the lessons and conclusions are pertinent to other foundations, international aid agencies and governments. Indeed, for these activities to reach some scale or coherence, increased collaboration and collective action from the diverse actors will be critical. Donors like the Ford Foundation have an unusual opportunity to expand this community of practice.

The papers build upon and complement other initiatives and research projects by Forest Trends. We have completed two related reports: “Who Owns the World’s Forests? Forest Tenure and Public Forests in Transition” and “Making Markets Work for Forest Communities.” The first reviews the legal distribution of ownership and access in the major forest countries, and the second explores the real possibilities of enhancing community livelihoods through forest markets.

We hope that this series of products will help lay the foundation for more targeted action and catalyze new and greater commitment to these critical tenure and market issues. The time is ripe to build a more robust community of forestry practitioners with a clearer sense of common priorities. Genuine progress toward alleviating poverty and conserving the world’s forests depends upon it.

Michael Jenkins
President
FOREST TRENDS

Acknowledgements This paper was prepared by Andy White and Lynn Ellsworth. Danièle Perrot-Maître did the field work for the South African and Philippine case studies and Alejandra Martin conducted the field work for the Brazil case study. The authors appreciate the substantive contributions of Augusta Molnar, Janis Alcorn, Michael Jenkins, Chetan Agarwal, and Danièle Perrot-Maître. The authors are also grateful to Michael Conroy, Gabriel Lopez, Suzanne Siskel, Doris Capistrano, Gary Hawes and Jeff Campbell of the Ford Foundation for their collaboration in conducting the field work and to Owen Lynch, for his input and comments.
Introduction: The Problem of Inadequate and Insecure Community Property Rights Over Community Forests

By Andy White

Tenure security has recently become a central concern for advocates of poverty alleviation, forest conservation and human rights alike. Poverty experts now recognize that the world’s poor are disproportionately located in rural areas and strongly dependent upon forest resources for their survival. Recent studies indicate that about 80 percent of the extreme poor, those living on less than one dollar a day, depend on forest resources for their livelihoods. One billion people depend almost entirely on forests for their medicinal resources, and about the same number depend on forests for their fuel needs.1 The poor are also directly dependent on the many ecosystem services of forests, particularly on watershed services and biodiversity.

More than 100 million indigenous people live in the world’s forests. Without recognizing the rights of indigenous and other communities—and enhancing the security of these rights—communities cannot manage their resources as assets. And without full use of their assets, communities cannot achieve their goals of ensuring cultural vitality and economic development.

The forest conservation community increasingly recognizes that forest degradation is not due to local populations’ lack of interest in protecting or managing resources. It is caused by the historic centralization of control over forest resources and the resulting problems of enforcing property rights while enabling sustainable livelihoods. Globally, communities in forested areas are more likely to suffer inequities and be subject to conflicts as more powerful actors extract forest resources.2 Without secure tenure, there are few incentives for these communities to invest in forest stewardship or to risk taking action to protect community assets. Forest conservation advocates are also becoming aware that forest-based communities are increasingly being reinstated as significant owners and managers of the world’s forests and that this could dramatically affect the future supply of wood products and biodiversity protection. The human rights community is increasingly aware of the justice dimension of forest ownership and its role in conflict reduction and poverty alleviation. It actively supports the recognition of indigenous and other community rights as a global priority through new national legislation and international treaties.

The problem of insecure forest tenure derives largely from the fact that governments still officially claim the vast majority of the world’s forests. This is a legacy of colonial and imperial times when governments legally usurped land from native dwellers and delegated authority to forest agencies.3

Forest tenure remains a critical issue in many countries despite the progress that has been made. Put simply, there are two global challenges. First, in many areas of the world, communities do not have rights to their ancestral lands and the resources upon which they depend. In these cases, formal community property rights are nonexistent or inadequate, but communities often continue to exercise their customary property rights to some degree.4 Second, where communities do have some rights, their rights are almost universally insecure. This situation has long fanned popular discontent. Communities around the world have resorted to road and mill blockades, destruction of forests, sabotage and revolts to protest this injustice.

Historically, it has been NGOs, human rights groups and their
respective donors who have taken the lead in assisting communities in the quest to gain more secure property rights and reform forest tenure. Governments and their multilateral and bilateral donors have, by and large, maintained the view of forests as a national good. They have focused on urban and agricultural areas as well as on establishing public infrastructure for private individual property rights. NGOs around the world employ a wide variety of strategies to encourage governments to consider community rights and advocate for policy change. These strategies are varied. They range from confronting existing laws with legal activism to collaborating with governments in experiential tenure models, to making governments aware of the practicality of devolving control as a means to achieve efficiency, equity, and a sustainable flow of products and environmental services. The knowledge and experience gained over recent years regarding these strategies and the issues and impacts associated with different property regimes are extensive. Unfortunately, this knowledge has been shared only on a limited basis and the lessons are learned from experience. Given the increasing openness of governments to community property and forest tenure reform, there is an unprecedented opportunity to mobilize new and greater interest in addressing these historic issues.

This paper provides a preliminary review of the key strategies that NGOs and their supporters have used to strengthen community tenure security for their natural resources, especially forests. We start by discussing the current global status of forest tenure. We also present a framework for understanding and assessing tenure security and its meaning in the context of community property. We then describe and evaluate the key strategies employed by advocates. We conclude by assessing the implications of these lessons and experiences for community property advocates, practitioners and donors.

Globally, communities in forested areas are more likely to suffer inequities and be subject to conflicts as more powerful actors extract forest resources.

This analysis is based on a series of field visits to India, the Philippines, South Africa, Indonesia and Brazil, where Forest Trends staff met with Ford Foundation staff and representatives of organizations active in advancing community rights. Additional cases from Bolivia, Colombia, Nepal and Tanzania were reviewed. Summary descriptions of key cases from each country are presented in Annexes 1 – 9.

The Special Case of Forests, Communities and Tenure Security

By Andy White and Lynn Ellsworth

At least 7 percent, or some 246 million hectares, of the world’s forests are now recognized as fully owned by indigenous and other communities; and at least 4 percent, or some 131 million hectares, have been legally set aside for these groups by governments. These averages rise to at least 14 percent “owned” and 8 percent “set aside” when only developing countries are included. While these numbers
may appear small, community ownership and access has approximately doubled in the last 15 years. Communities own, or have primary access to, a majority of forests in Papua New Guinea, Mexico and China; they either own or access 10 million hectares or more in Brazil, the U.S., Peru, Bolivia and India. It is also important to note that a far greater percentage of the world’s forest is actively claimed and/or managed by communities. Recent court cases and activism in Indonesia, Canada and Malaysia—three of the top five wood-exporting countries—are increasing communities’ ability to exercise their rights as major forest holders.

Of the governments responding to the need for greater community rights, several, including those of the Philippines, Panama, Mexico and Colombia, have recognized community-based property rights as full corporate private ownership. Many other governments, including those of India and Nepal, are several steps short of granting full private property rights. They are devolving some management responsibility to communities, but the governments are retaining their tenure over community assets. Nonetheless, most practitioners agree that the global trend is increasingly to devolve resource rights to poor people for their greater access and use.7

Tenure security remains a critical issue in terms of devolving management responsibilities without legal tenure reform.8 First, devolution of management responsibilities is considered a positive step, but it falls far short of full ownership, offering many fewer positive incentives for long-term collective action. Second, devolution commonly results in competing ownership claims by varied stakeholders, especially where a government retains legal ownership of the land and forest. It is common that overlapping claims and governmental failure to enforce the rules create an open-access situation—with a consequent decline in forest quality. In those countries where governments have long recognized community ownership of extensive tracts of forest, such as Mexico, local boundary disputes may persist from faulty property delimitation. In other countries like Bolivia and Peru, the problem is less about disputed boundaries and more about the inability of communities to get governments to enforce and protect legal claims. In such cases, forest communities have had informal rights historically, and they are too politically marginal to maintain their newly acquired formal rights.

Forests present special problems to those who advocate for more secure property rights for communities. By their very nature, forests are used extensively by different users for very different products and purposes. Some of their benefits are layered and complex, so it is hard to pinpoint or even sort through ownership. Due to the seasonal
variation in production, varying groups may have rights over the same products at different times. Not all claimants may be locally located residents at any given moment. Migratory pastoralists, hunters, rubber tappers and prospectors all may have reasonable claims to use or access a forest and the resources that lie within it. Downstream water users may also claim rights in an effort to prevent deforestation of watershed forests.

In addition, national government or international interests may lay claims on forests’ environmental services, recreational values or subsoil minerals. New markets are emerging for things like the genetic resources of the forest canopy, the carbon sequestration function of trees, landscape beauty, water filtration, soil conservation and biodiversity protection. When the environmental services of forests are added to the picture, the range of potential property rights claimants increases considerably.

A simple example can be seen in the forest above the small city of Lampung in Sumatra, Indonesia. There, the quality of the water supply depends on the quality of an upland forest. That forest has long been zoned a protected area, but in fact since the 1940s it has been an open-access resource for rice farmers who were brought to the area as plantation workers. The workers created villages in the foothills of the forest, and, as their numbers grew, the workers and their farming families expanded their cultivation into the uplands. This threatened the forest canopy and Lampung’s water supply. But in such a situation, who has valid claims to the forest: the state, the town of Lampung or the farmer-workers? This puzzling situation is common and raises complex equity issues about who owns the right to what. It also indicates that complicated deal making and informed law enforcement are needed in order to solve competing claims to a shrinking resource. Law, however, can create restrictions on private property rights through easements, zoning, permit requirements and other requirements. These restrictions enable the deals and otherwise maintain the state’s interests in public goods. Private rights are rarely unconditional.

A Framework for Assessing Tenure Security

By Andy White

The term “tenure security” is often understood differently by different people. Similarly, the goal of tenure security is often assumed, but it is not clearly, or commonly, understood. Part of the challenge of advancing community interests in tenure reform is adopting common definitions and conceptions of the problem. This section suggests basic definitions and describes the basic elements of tenure security.

In its most basic form, the definition of tenure security is “a defensible claim to a particular place or thing.” This is also the definition of a “property right.” The terms “tenure” and “property” are often used interchangeably, while rights are generally associated with responsibilities. These definitions illustrate that there are two basic components to tenure security, the particular “bundle of rights” and the matter of whether those rights are transferable, defensible or secure. We will address each of these components below.

It is important to recognize that the concepts and the debates over property rights have been framed in international discussions and by modern national experts in largely Western terms, with Western concepts of property rights dominating the legal frameworks in many
countries, including in developing countries around the world. The fact that these legal frameworks often conflict with local, ancestral or customary rights is a major source of the tenure insecurity that predominates today. In many, if not most, developing countries today, individuals and groups operate within a context of “legal pluralism,” where the customary and formal rules often overlap, contradict and occasionally coincide. The challenge of gaining and assuring tenure security is, by and large, a challenge of rationalizing those different sets of rules into law and enforcing that law.

**Rights of Ownership and Access**

According to Western property concepts, property “rights” can be broken down into rights of “ownership” and “access.” In terms of ownership, there are two basic legal categories of property in use in the world today: public and private.11

The public category is further divided into two subcategories: lands administered by government entities and lands allocated to communities or indigenous groups on a permanent or semipermanent basis. In this latter subcategory, the government retains ownership and the right to extinguish unilaterally the rights of local groups to the entire parcel of land. Under this arrangement, local groups typically are not able to sell or otherwise alienate the land. Although the distribution of rights between government and community is different in almost every country, invariably governments retain some right of access, withdrawal of resources, exclusion, and management. Examples of this type include tracts of government lands “reserved” for indigenous peoples in Brazil and the U.S.; the Joint Forest Management (JFM) schemes of India; and areas covered by social forestry leases and other instruments in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia.13 The villages engaged in the JFM schemes of India, for example, have far fewer rights than the villages with collective rights in China.14

The private ownership category is also divided into two subcategories: land owned by indigenous and other community groups and land owned by private individuals and firms. Private ownership is defined as rights that cannot be unilaterally extinguished by the government without some form of due process and compensation. “Owners” of private property typically have rights to access, alienate, manage, withdraw resources and exclude outsiders. It is best represented in countries with Western property traditions by “fee-simple” ownership. Group ownership is simply private land owned by a group. It is often inaccurately called “common” property, when communities usually allocate private rights to households for agriculture and some forestry, while keeping some forest under common management. The group ownership category includes “community-based property rights,” in which the state legally recognizes full community authority to define and allocate property rights within its particular area of ownership.15

These categories may appear academic, particularly the distinction between private group rights and public “reserves,” but the distinctions are important. Private rights are more secure because they are less easily controlled or expropriated by the government. Communities that hold private rights have more leverage when negotiating with governments than those communities with long-term public use rights. The importance of this distinction may become more apparent as the importance of ecosystem services generated by forests grows. Communities with private rights have much stronger claims to the benefits of ecosystem services and other opportunities than communities with rights to public lands.

Rights of “access” allow use of some resources rather than providing
clear legal rights to dispose of them. They are, thus, secondary to ownership rights in terms of legal authority. They are defined by terms that are either imposed by the owner or negotiated between the owner and the individual or group desiring use of the property. Rights of access include use rights defined in spatial or temporal terms.

Elements of Community Tenure Security
Community tenure security can be defined as the confluence of factors that allow a community to make decisions as if its rights of ownership or access are secure and cannot be taken away arbitrarily. In this paper we are considering tenure that falls within the two “community” categories of rights described above—those public lands and resources set aside for communities and those private lands recognized as owned by communities. The issues associated with attaining security for communities with these rights will be similar to those faced by individuals and firms with private land rights, but will differ significantly because of the community dimension.

Some of the characteristics and indicators of tenure security are listed in the box on this page. Although the definition and characteristics of tenure security help explain community tenure security, they do not necessarily help understand how to achieve it. Put simply, the key elements or building blocks needed to achieve community tenure security include: effective internal institutions of the community, legal recognition and support of community rights, the presence of independent judicial arbitration systems, effective regulatory mechanisms and institutions, and a supporting political constituency (see Figure 1).

The relative importance of these elements will vary from place to place, and only one of them—effective internal institutions—is necessary. As illustrated in Figure 1, these elements connect the property

Characteristics of Secure Community Tenure

1. **Security requires that there be clarity as to what the rights are.** Confusion as to one’s rights can significantly undermine the effectiveness and enthusiasm with which those rights are exercised.

2. **Security requires certainty that rights cannot be taken away or changed unilaterally and unfairly.** In almost any situation, of course, there are circumstances where rights can be taken away or diminished, but conditions for doing so need to be fair and clearly spelled out; the procedures for doing so need to be fair and transparent; and the issue of compensation needs to be addressed.

3. **Security is enhanced if the duration of rights is either in perpetuity or for a period that is clearly spelled out and is long enough for the benefits of participation to be fully realized.** If rights are to be in force only for a particular period of time— as in some co-management arrangements or community forestry leases, for example—care should be taken to ensure that agreements are made for at least as long as realistically required to reap the benefits of participation.

4. **Security means that rights need to be enforceable against the state (including local government institutions)** – that is, the legal system has to recognize an obligation on the part of the state to respect those rights.

5. **Security requires that the rights be exclusive.** The holders of rights need to be able to exclude or control the access of outsiders to the resource over which they have “rights.”

6. A corollary to exclusivity is that there must be certainty both about the boundaries of the resources to which the rights apply and about who is entitled to claim membership in the group.

7. Another corollary to exclusivity where co-management concerns government land is that the government entity entering into the agreement must have clear authority to do so. An agreement should reflect only promises on the part of government that the responsible authority is empowered to fulfill.

8. **Security requires that the law recognize the holder of the rights.** That is, the law should provide a way for the holder of the rights to acquire a legal personality, with the capacity to take a wide range of steps, such as applying for credits, subsidies, entering into contracts with outsiders, collecting fees, etc.

9. Finally, and perhaps most daunting, **security requires accessible, affordable and fair avenues for seeking protection of the rights, for solving disputes and for appealing decisions of government officials.**

rights officially held by communities to the relative security of those rights. They are all important. However, tenure will remain secure even if several elements are absent, so long as internal institutions are in place. The importance of the other elements will depend on a number of factors, including the degree to which the government is generally and sincerely supportive of community rights and the degree to which the community interacts with modern economic and financial systems. It is important to recognize that tenure and tenure security are social and political constructs. As such, the precise meaning of tenure and the conditions that make it secure will be completely dependent on local context.

**Effective Internal Institutions**

Community tenure security is strongly influenced by a community’s capacity to define and implement its own rules. Communities define their own tenure systems and develop their own mechanisms to monitor and sanction compliance with those rules. These internal institutions are often consensus-based and guided by assemblies that represent households; they may also be dominated by local chiefs or specialized subcommittees of elders or forest users. Historically, this tradition was widespread before the rise of nation states and internal governance systems and continues to function wherever communities retain collective rights over resources in the world today. In some cases, these institutions create agreements between neighboring communities for common rules on managing wildlife, watersheds or inter-island waters.

As the many scholars and practitioners who have studied so-called “common property” have observed, success is indicated by the degree to which community rules and resource boundaries are accepted as legitimate, are clear cut and enforced, and by whether communities
can practice exclusion, adapt to new situations and deal effectively with external forces, particularly the government. To a large extent, local institutions’ effectiveness can be measured by their effectiveness in handling internal disputes: disputes over whom to exclude, disputes over who gets to make the rules, disputes over resource management rules, and disputes regarding interaction with the government and outsiders.

Where these customary systems interact with formal state systems, security is affected by the degree to which a community acts in a coherent and organized manner and by the degree to which the state recognizes the legitimacy of local rules and enforcement. For example, community success in the Indian JFM schemes is influenced by communities’ ability to exclude outsiders and ensure internal policing with support from the state forest agency.

Legal Recognition and Support
Although many community property systems have existed for centuries relatively independently or even in contradiction to state law, today there are almost no communities sufficiently remote or sufficiently powerful to establish their customary claims without formal legitimacy or protection. For this reason communities often need to modify, or else fit into, state and international treaty law to protect their interests. Local communities alone, for example, cannot define the rules under which they interact with outsiders, nor can they define the limits of state power. In the context of property, it is necessary for state law to recognize local ownership and access rights and to identify those with rights to speak for communities. Nonetheless, tenure is a necessary but insufficient condition for good forest management, as illustrated by the case of Papua New Guinea, where clear legal recognition of community customary property rights is no guarantee of good forest man-

Community Property Rights as a First Step: Papua New Guinea

In Papua New Guinea, 97 percent of land is held under customary ownership and most of that land is forested. While the nation’s constitution lays the groundwork for communities (“landowners”) to benefit from forest resources, the legal framework does not establish processes for how people will benefit or who really represents the community’s interests in negotiations with logging companies. In Papua New Guinea, the dominant pattern is for communities to sell off mining and timber rights to the highest (or only) bidder, who then extracts the resources in an unsustainable manner. Communities do not have the political power to effectively monitor and fine logging companies that do not follow the prescribed logging procedures, thus damaging waterways. Many analysts claim that most forest communities in Papua New Guinea hope to strike it big with a short-term deal with a big foreign timber or mining company. Environmentalists have found that selling a more sustainable model of development to Papua New Guineans has been a difficult uphill task. Corruption is a significant problem at all levels of government. Even local leaders strike deals on their own without much or any community discussion [McCallum and Sekhran, 1997]. Massive and substantive del jure changes in the larger policy framework have had little impact on this situation [Mayers and Bass, 2001].

—Lynn Ellsworth
The U.S. Dawes Act: Imposition of Individual Over Group Rights on Native American Reservations

By 1887, most Native Americans had been grouped into marginal lands called reservations. Some reservation land was still managed locally under an indigenous commons property system. Much of this land was also forested. Also by 1887, western expansion of immigrant homesteaders was raising demand for land and timber. Back east, reformers concerned about the fate of Native Americans proposed to assimilate them into the wider society. They argued that the best approach for doing so was to make out of the often nomadic Native Americans a small-scale peasantry that lived on individualized parcels of land (just like an immigrant homesteader). Reformers who shared this view allied with local economic interests in the West to pass the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887. It divided the reservations into 160-acre allotments for individual tribal members. It stated that after 25 years, certified “competent” allotment holders would be allowed to sell their allotments to anyone. The plan was a fantasy and implementation was poor. Swindling on a massive scale resulted. Consequently, by 1934 when the “New Deal for Indians” announced massive policy changes, Native American tribes had lost two-thirds of their reservation lands because of the Dawes Act. The success of this Act in assimilating Native Americans is widely contested by historians, some of whom describe it as a misguided piece of legislation that resulted in poverty for Native Americans. 

—Lynn Ellsworth

Sources: Dawes Act, 1887; Miller, 2000; Weinberger, 1999; Pisani, 2001.

Regulations, Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions

Official manifestations of rights, such as property surveys and titles, can enhance tenure security and are increasingly important for communities that are engaged in modern markets and formal financial systems. For example, property titles are often required to gain access to credit. Nonetheless, these manifestations are only as meaningful as the real value afforded them by the key social and political actors. Formal adjudication and title registry are a tricky business. Where this process has taken place in the absence of understanding complex natural resources or in the presence of competing claims, well-intentioned surveys and titles have not only failed to deliver tenure security, they actually have increased the levels of conflict.21

Even when a law or policy is in place that establishes community tenure rights, the processes for acquiring the official documents and exercising those rights are often extremely cumbersome and bureaucratic. The political forces opposed to community rights often have sufficient political clout to create administrative procedures and
bureaucratic hoops that make it almost impossible for communities to obtain them. For example, in Tanzania, only one small community forest has actually been gazetted officially as of 1999 despite the publicity about Tanzania’s progress toward community rights over forests.23 In that country, the bureaucratic processes necessary to gazette a community forest are almost impossible to complete. Similar situations exist in Bolivia and in ancestral domains in the Philippines.24

Furthermore, changes in law and regulations can undermine existing collection tenure systems, as in Mexico where changes to Article 27 of the constitution have made indigenous communities more vulnerable to administrative manipulation that could undermine their tenure rights. Government agencies enable indigenous communities ( comunidades) to become ejidos (where village collections include permanent, private agricultural and house plots) in order to access benefits to government loans and subsidy programs. According to regulations for implementing that program, community leaders may make the change without consulting a full village assembly, and the community can be unaware of the impact of this change on local sovereignty and on collective access to forest and pasture tenure security.

Independent Arbitration or Judiciary Means
Another key building block of security can be the presence of an independent third party to sift through local claims for various products and resources. This can be a legal system of customary justice, independent courts, a once-removed arm of local government, or an independent arbitrator of some kind. The independent third party must have the skill to come up with locally acceptable solutions to disputes, and decisions must be accepted as legitimate by the state. The arbitrator also must be relatively incorruptible so that people have faith in the system and use it. Further, the system should not be weighted to favor the

Arbitration Success in Ukraine and Failure in New Mexico

The Carpathian mountain region of Ukraine is filled with churches, many of great architectural beauty. Many communities sought to revive their churches and make use of them again after the collapse of communism. Unfortunately, the issue of who owned the churches and the land around them was far from clear. Communism and its fall created a welter of competing claims to the land and buildings. This frequently resulted in destruction of church property and other forms of localized protest. A group of academics from various disciplines at the local university banded together into an association and traveled the countryside at the request of communities to research and adjudicate on the competing claims. They were supported by a small grant from a local foundation. Their independent and fair-minded approach was very successful. Dozens of property rights claims were resolved, and many churches were preserved in the process (Ellsworth, 1998).

A less positive case of adjudication can be found in New Mexico (U.S.) in the 1850s. When its northern region was annexed to the United States, the indigenous common property regime of the grazing hills was ignored. The land became public property, and the government began allocating it to private individuals. This resulted in an uproar of contested property rights. Adjudication commissions were established to resolve the claims. But according to many historians, “corrupt government officials, including judges, sided with rings of unscrupulous lawyers,” all of whom used the adjudication process to bilk the locals of all property rights, creating resentment that lasts to this day (Knowlton, 1972).

—Lynn Ellsworth
“haves” and politically connected entities rather than the “have-nots” and powerless groups. Examples of successful and unsuccessful adjudication are presented in the box on page 15.

Political Constituency for Community Rights
Communities often cannot defend their interests alone, particularly when most governments historically have refused to acknowledge their claims. Additional legal, policy and administrative assistance is usually necessary, even if legal recognition has been secured and lands have been demarcated and registered. Local communities and their advocates need a sophisticated understanding of law and the political landscape, along with the ability to lobby and otherwise effectively defend their rights. Peaceful but intense negotiation is one of many strategies that have been used with success in Canada and the U.S. by Native Americans seeking reclaiming of property. In many other countries, political action is more effective than legal action due to the lack of rule of law and to inadequate justice systems. Legal action, in these cases, is an essential part of a broader political action strategy.

A political constituency for defending and advancing community interests can include communities, NGOs, religious institutions, associations, unions, and other private sector actors. These coalitions are most effective when all actors work toward a common goal, are careful to keep communities informed, seek guidance from community leadership, and otherwise hold themselves accountable to communities. Political coalitions can benefit from the advice and cooperation of interested individuals who cannot be an active part of a coalition, such as people who work within the government bureaucracy or political parties. Strategic actions undertaken by national and international supporters can also strengthen the political power of the constituency.

Strategies to Strengthen Community Tenure
By Lynn Ellsworth

In this section we describe a number of strategies that have been used with success by NGOs and community-based organizations supported by the Ford Foundation or other advocates for community tenure. Each strategy is described and an illustration is provided. Where applicable we also describe lessons learned.

While all the strategies described here can be useful depending on the context, no single strategy will create all of the elements of tenure security described above. Most of the strategies work best in combination with each other, not in isolation. Also, every strategy has multiple effects and may create new winners and losers, many of whom cannot be predicted in advance.

The effectiveness of a particular set of strategies also depends on the broader political context and the immediate political moment in which the strategic action is taken. Control over decisions about who has access to land and natural resources is a source of political power. Changing that control will of course then create changes in the political landscape.

Strategy 1: Supporting Legal Activism
Public interest lawyers can sometimes use existing laws to support community claims to natural resources, including forests. They can test cases in court, challenge previous court decisions, provide the legal expertise to write new laws and fully use the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that exist in many countries. Activist-oriented
public interest lawyers have been key players behind legal actions to provide communities with tenure security in Australia, Canada, the U.S. and the Philippines. In all of these cases, the communities in question are indigenous communities whose traditional land rights were ignored, diminished or abrogated by government until allies were found to help fight their cause in court.

As the Philippines case shows (Annex 4), public interest legal activism can help improve tenure security. The Philippines’ Indigenous People’s Property Rights Act, drafted with assistance of public interest lawyers and NGOs, was promoted in the Phillipine Congress for nearly a decade and finally passed in 1997. Legal assistance played a critical role after the law was passed. It provided support for the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the law after mining interests challenged the Act as unconstitutional. While the Act is not regarded in the Philippines as the perfect tool for providing security of tenure, many think it is a considerable improvement over the prior situation and constitutes a victory for supporters of community tenure.

In the past decade, both the Ford Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation have supported U.S.-based organizations such as the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), the Environmental Law Institute (ELI) and the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (E-Law). This support has enabled CIEL to help make the international environmental policy arena better reflect the needs of high-biodiversity countries. ELI has provided training for policy makers on legal issues pertaining to biodiversity. E-Law has maintained an extensive network of grassroots attorneys in developing countries. Most national environmental law groups are also human rights advocates, bringing cases regarding constitutional provisions about environmental rights, development schemes that damage local peoples’ livelihoods, and the traditional land claims of indigenous people who have been disregarded by national governments. The Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation have also supported national organizations such as the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, the African Center for Technology Studies and Fundepublico in Colombia, among others. These organizations exchange information to provide credible and politically sensitive advice for tropical country governments and to improve independent monitoring and critique of multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank.

One of the limits to supporting legal activism is the expense it can pose in many countries, especially if prospects of victory are slim. Also, in developing countries, the infrastructure of public interest law is often weak, and activist lawyers willing to work with marginal communities are few. In fact, in many countries, the entire legal activist tradition may be unknown. Corruption is often another problem. In such cases, it may be necessary to build the organizational basis for this approach by financing training, salaries and the costs of specific legal casework, as well as by supporting judicial reform and anticorruption measures within the larger society. Training and case mentorship for would-be public interest lawyers and judges may also be useful. Such activities also can be important to build and strengthen networks of lawyers interested in tenure security. This kind of support to
the public interest law sector is beginning to bear fruit in countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, India and Indonesia.

**Lessons:**
- Winning court cases and getting support for new legislation can take many years. Hence, a ten-year horizon of financial support is realistic.
- The opportunity for legal change is often accelerated when bigger changes take place in the country, such as a transition from a nondemocratic system to a more democratic one, new elections or a cabinet shuffle.
- Success can be the result of a multistranded approach that supports many actors and many players over a long time, using many of the other strategies reviewed here.
- After testing the application of a new law or legal precedent, there is usually a new set of “next generation” legal issues to work on.
- Legal victory in a specific case may not be enough to provide complete tenure security. Larger changes in the policy and organizational landscape may be needed to implement and guarantee newly acquired rights. Legal advocacy must be part of a larger strategy, not undertaken in isolation.
- Compromise is in the nature of rights acquired through legal battles. Failure to achieve the best law or court decision does not mean all is lost. Success comes through a process of building and testing precedents against new cases.
Legal activists tend to have a big-picture view and may not adequately understand the political situation of winners and losers at the local level. Hence legal activism is most effective when it is linked to grassroots reality and local leaders.

**STRATEGY 2: Mapping of Community Lands to Document Customary Rights**

Many NGOs have adopted the method of participatory mapping as a way for communities to raise their own awareness about the status and value of their resources. It can also build community consensus on how to organize to defend tenure security or to make a claim for ancestral or historically owned lands.

Community mapping has been used successfully for years in a wide range of countries and regions from Canada to Indonesia. In this approach, local or international NGOs employ rapid appraisal techniques to develop maps. Local people supply local place names, land-use zones and the corresponding use and access information for the area they are seeking to map. The resulting map is then used as a first step to negotiate tenure rights deals with government agencies and private firms (see Box on page 18). In some cases, the quality of the map created far exceeds anything officially available, particularly in remote or frontier areas. The popularity of this method is explained by the simple fact that the mapping process elicits concrete information on claims, along with a common, objective basis for discussing whether a specific claim can finally be considered. Of course, a majority of community members needs to agree to the map’s content. Mapping should be contrasted to efforts to present a vague claim like “that place belongs to us” without evidence of community consensus. Signatures from all community households often strengthen the map’s legitimacy.

Mapping can be used to demonstrate government corruption, as in the Philippines where an NGO mapped the same areas previously mapped by government teams. The new map demonstrated that government teams inserted their own names as landowners on the maps.

Analysts of participatory mapping caution that it is essential to conduct accurate mapping. It is also important to ensure full participation throughout the community and neighboring communities. Mapping can create local tensions over previously vague boundaries between communities, crystallize existing inequalities, provoke new local disputes, or ignore local visions of space that do not fit on typical dimensions of traditional paper or computer maps.

Supporting mapping often involves paying for training and the organizational costs of the NGOs that provide the training in how to make maps. NGOs also develop political acceptance for using maps to develop tenure rights and support the legal process of claim-making with the relevant authorities. Community-based organizations can do this work as well if the skills exist to do so.

**Lessons:**

- Develop a strategy before mapping so that the map will serve its purpose. Different maps serve different purposes.
- Use the map strategically and with caution. Maps are a powerful political tool, so good political instincts are necessary to use it well.
- Be careful about temporary permits based on claims that are not well substantiated or established. These can lead to short-term behavior by actors who have little confidence that they will gain the rights in the long term.
- Early in the process, evaluate whether or not to involve government. Mapping can become a political hot potato and governments can chose to ban this activity if they perceive it as threatening.
Early buy-in is a good idea in some cases. Some activists have been more successful by building momentum for an independent mapping movement before involving government.

**Strategy 3:**  
*Public Education and Lobbying to Develop a Shared Understanding of Solutions to Tenure Problems*

Public education and lobbying can be an effective means of establishing a political constituency for community rights. As passage of the South African Communal Property Associations (Annex 5) shows, well-informed and active groups can influence policy makers and legislatures during critical turning points in a country’s history, even when civil society is weak. Niger and Tanzania are examples of countries where this strategy has resulted in substantial overhauls of national forest codes and land laws.

For most developing countries, the critical turning points—when lobbying and public awareness are most useful—occur during a transition to democracy, a change in government, a challenge to a government’s legitimacy such as mass demonstrations in the streets, or a power shift bringing reform-minded people to the top of important ministries. Rapid public education at such a juncture often depends on building connections, contacts and awareness across constituencies and among journalist and media networks before the critical moment arrives.

During such critical moments, policy agendas are often reopened. Then, people with a cause can typically find willing listeners. Citizens, academics, think tanks, and nonprofit organizations are able to interact with those in power. A common tactic at such moments is launching a highly visible public conference on the key issues of concern. These conferences sometimes attract media and public attention. In turn, this attention can influence change in tenure status. A key strategy in this regard is preparing data and materials that clearly quantify and summarize the benefits of the desired model of management and ownership—including returns to the environment, returns to the economy, returns to equity and social harmony, and returns to local livelihoods.

Donors have long supported this kind of public education and lobbying, although in the developing world the nature of public education may be different than in the United States. In the Philippines, for example, donor-financed consulting reports on community property rights influenced the national debate at the time. In Tanzania, Britain’s foreign aid agency, the Department for International Development (DFID), worked with an expatriate consultant to prepare viable tenure legislation palatable to the Tanzanian Parliament. And in the case of Niger described in the Box on page 21, both USAID and the World Bank spent 18 years sticking with a project to create a framework for property rights security within a new “code rurale,” a goal that had once been thought impossible.

Brazil is a famous case where this strategy was used in combination with civic mobilization at the national and international levels. An alliance with academics, local nonprofits and the international environmental community allowed both the indigenous peoples of Brazil and the rubber tappers to press their land claims into the international arena. The combined effort of civic mobilization, high-level public education and lobbying positively influenced the national scene such that extractive reserves for indigenous peoples and for rubber tappers were finally recognized and could be demarcated.

In the case of South Africa’s Common Property Associations Act (see Annex 5 for details), success meant having a national organizational and intellectual infrastructure already in place prior to the critical moment when influence at high levels was possible. The Ford
Foundation had long supported think tanks, nonprofit organizations and academic centers to do action research on tenure issues. Therefore, a network of academics and organizations already was in place to present legal options to a new government. That network urged the new government to consider common property as one of many legal options for the country. And to their credit, they succeeded.

Lessons:
- Lobbying is the end result of a long-term process of institutional support and of building a field of organizations working on the cause. When the moment is ripe, networks of people and organizations must be ready to jump into action with concrete proposals. This implies prior expertise and experience with the tenure issue and the prior existence of coalitions and networks that can speak to power at an important juncture.
- When the moment comes, advocates must have the facts and figures at the ready. This includes sufficient knowledge about the policy positions and possible benefits to successfully advocate for change.
- Legal changes may be only on paper and not implemented. Other means may be necessary to assure political support for implementation and to solve related problems in the field.

Strategy 4:
Supporting Working Groups to Transform Bureaucracies that Manage Common Property
Advocates can promote a policy change, but implementation requires changes in the bureaucracy and in the minds of the people who work within the bureaucracy. One theory of social change and learning says that when people acquire new mental models or intellectual ways of seeing or analyzing a problem, they become more receptive

The Case of Niger’s Rural Code 
As a Form of Tenure Change

Niger’s “Rural Code” and its related policy edicts allow for recognition of all types of land rights – be they collective or individual. The code provides for all such claims to be mapped as registered. But if there is any local opposition to a specific claim, registration of that claim is suspended until a special land court decision settles the dispute. The process of establishing this new rural code, informing the population about it, creating the policy framework around it, and setting up the implementation mechanisms took 18 years (1986-1998). During this time there was much stop-and-go funding from a variety of donors, notably USAID and the World Bank. Implementation of the code has been very weak, due to the tepid support of traditional authorities, incomplete decentralization, and the very high recurrent costs of running the 11 regional land commissions which are supposed to arbitrate the many disputes that arise when attempting to map out and zone land claims. It was a heavily donor-driven process and was dependent on donor funding for every step (Yacouba, 1999).
to experimentation and to changing habits, beliefs and policy positions. This is the idea behind a common strategy among donors to support bureaucracy-based working groups, or affinity groups, on particular problems. Some also report that the mere act of bringing people together to talk about a subject can lead to action because it focuses participants on an important task or highlights a problem such that it becomes a ministerial priority. Working groups are thus fora, where preconceptions, data, new “mental models” and field experiments can be discussed and assimilated.

In the Philippines, a government working group was established with donor support to study innovations in farmer-managed irrigation systems. It was led by a civil servant who was an advocate of such systems. The working group took on the task of creating a setting for ministerial “group learning” about specific field-based experimental projects. These field projects represented a core innovation in the way the irrigation bureaucracy did business. The working group constituted a community of practice on the devolution concept and led to significant changes in the way the Philippine irrigation bureaucracies related to farming communities. Donors in this case paid for meeting costs, study tours, consultants and research for the working group.

Working groups in India for Joint Forest Management (Annex 2) provide another example of support that included nonprofit organizations and researchers from outside the forest service.

Lessons:
• Working groups are good vehicles for change when the obstacles to reform are not deeply embedded in a political economic context that opposes any change at all. That is to say, it can work for a problem like devolution of an irrigation authority to user groups, but may not be useful for dealing with a problem like apartheid in South Africa prior to victory by the African National Congress.
• Working groups are most useful when led by an advocate with authority within a bureaucracy and where there is some the desire to innovate. In such cases, it can widen the power of that person within a bureaucracy and create some credibility and freedom to innovate without excessive resistance or sanctions.
• Working groups need credible leaders. There is also a potential danger to working groups: they can provide too much legitimacy to a government position opposed by advocacy groups. Supporters of working groups must have a strategy prepared to address such cases.

Strategy 5:
Strengthening Politically Active Coalitions of Cause Leaders, Organizations and Networks
When promoting a cause like community property rights, all vested organizations usually have a role to play. Researchers can provide the data necessary for action. Think tanks and academics can produce policy analyses. Grassroots nonprofits can help communities do mapping and create land-use plans. Community leaders, federations and associations, and sometimes local government authorities, can build grassroots consensus and bring legitimacy to a critical political moment. Activists can lobby government officials and legislators on new ideas and models of how to do things. Training groups can facilitate meetings and strategy sessions among all the players. Public interest law firms can manage landmark cases. And leaders of these groups and organizations can jointly plot ways to keep the issue in the public eye through good marketing and claims on media attention.

Negotiation, research, project management, accounting, budgeting, teamwork, fundraising, public relations, social marketing, lobbying, grassroots facilitation, coalition building, and use of GIS and participa-
tory appraisal are but a short list of the many skills that can come into play in the reform movement for community property rights. Rare are the individual organizations that combine all these skills. Coalitions need to bring together an array of skills. To be effective, they need to develop synergies and a coherent strategy.

A typical, time-honored strategy is to support the strengthening of potential leaders, to organize the political constituency, and to strengthen the constituency itself through networks. Particularly important in the dialogue involving indigenous peoples worldwide is the formation of horizontal linkages among indigenous leaders from different regions and countries so that they are able to develop their own direct dialogue with decision makers, rather than depend upon NGOs and others for mediation.

Leadership can be supported in a variety of ways. Providing scholarships and training opportunities for promising leaders has proven to be highly effective. It is also important to support opportunities for leaders in small organizations to practice skills as they confront real challenges. Similarly, promoting exchange between leaders and organizations within and between countries has proven to catalyze learning and enthusiasm for change. It is important to build space for all parties to enter a dialogue.

For a grantmaker, this strategy also can include longer-term institutional assistance to key organizations such as support for vehicles, computers and Internet access. It can also include long-term core support for a group’s operating costs. A good example of the success of this strategy is in Brazil, where the Ford Foundation played a key role over many years in supporting and strengthening the Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), a Brazilian organization famous for its authoritative work on the rights and fate of that country’s indigenous people.43

When promoting a cause like community property rights, all vested organizations usually have a role to play.

This strategy can also mean the establishment and training of local networks of cause-related organizations. The most important lesson from such an approach is the need for long-term flexible funding to an array of local, national and international organizations working on the issue at once. There is a need to facilitate collaboration and learning among them so that a community of practice and an effective political constituency emerge.

**STRATEGY 6:**
**Piloting Working Models That Illustrate Successful Commons Management**

Some important obstacles to changing tenure security include the use of erroneous received wisdom on the faults of common property, institutional complacency, and the practical challenge of getting a viable model off the ground. Pilot projects help demonstrate that it is possible to implement change. They also give government agencies opportunity to experiment with getting a model right. Once in place, a model can set in motion a powerful chain of events that creates national change (see Box on page 25). This is especially the case when people believe that their place, site, region, or country is so unusual that models successful elsewhere cannot possibly work in their place or country.

Exchange visits and apprenticeships for people to learn about donor-supported models can be very powerful. When individual
communities or ethnic groups realize that they have more options than they thought, they are often motivated to support change. It may be necessary to link people from very different cultural and political settings so that they can see solutions outside their own political and historical context. This approach also helps to highlight experiences from more economically diverse countries such as Europe and North America, illustrating that options may have little to do with a given country’s stage of “development.”

Change can also come from innovative government officials who are at the margin of the policies and regulations set by their own institutions. A classic case is India’s Joint Forest Management. JFM began in a situation where government ownership of forests was widely accepted. It started as a local level “innovation” when a forestry official in West Bengal struck a deal with a local community to keep farmers out of his timber research forest in exchange for a share of the future timber harvest. The innovation and variations on that first JFM agreement spread in West Bengal and then to other states. As JFM spread, other “foresters at the margin” experimented on their own to create models relevant to their local settings. With help of a donor-supported working group, the idea of joint management agreements for forest use spread throughout India.

Another example of building a working model to create change is described in detail in Annex 3. It is the case of a community in Lombok, Indonesia. There, a local NGO pioneered the use of a community forestry concession, first on the tiny scale of 25 hectares. Once the model was accepted, the concession was expanded to 500 hectares, and it may be expanded farther in the future. Other NGOs across Indonesia tried similar strategies on the local level. With the recent change of government in Indonesia, the idea of a community forest concession is no longer regarded as ludicrous as once it had been. In fact, the government has issued a decree (Decree 31 of April 2001) to encourage local government agencies to allow such community concessions. Many communities of course would prefer full ownership rights over their forests.

Lessons
- Building a model as a “pilot” for change requires cultivating local leadership and often many years of testing before it can be scaled up and called a success. It is also important to recognize that reaching a critical scale requires collaboration with governments and other donors.
- To be successful, pilots require research, public education and strengthening cause-related organizations.
- A pilot project has to do more than demonstrate physical benefits in order to persuade opponents that it is acceptable. For example, it may be necessary to show the public that government expenditure will be reduced because the community model will require less policing action.
- An economy of scale is important. West Bengal, Andra Pradesh and Sujhomajari in India all profited from NGOs working in regional contexts with a core set of communities to advance the model.
- Joint exchange visits to pilot projects by government officials and community leaders can stimulate productive discussion and build trust.
- University researchers can play a key mediating role and enable governments to accept the changes offered in a pilot model.
A Model That Worked: A Community Concession in Petén, Guatemala

Environmentalists helped established a national park in Petén, Guatemala called the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Local residents, however, continued to cut timber out of the reserve. A solution was found. With help of the environmental organizations, a buffer zone around the park was established, and initially local residents were organized into five community organizations. These organizations were granted timber concessions within the buffer zone. As of 2001, those involved claimed that the community was no longer invading the park to seek timber and is, in fact, earning about $500 a year per family in the buffer zone concessions. The model is being extended within Guatemala and is often cited as one that other countries might follow (Jukofsky, 2000).

STRATEGY 7: Building Civic Mobilization around Better Commons Management

Civic mobilization is often essential to achieve major reforms. As the Bolivia case illustrates (Annex 6), civic activity can be mobilized by lobbying ministers, holding conferences, and staging peaceful protests and marches to attract media attention. But it relies on sound organizations for sustained support in order to be effective. For example, in Bolivia, an indigenous peoples’ organization built broad support for indigenous demands through an arduous and difficult march from the lowlands to the high altitudes of the capital to ask the president to grant them property rights. They sought other legal reforms through a single law that would recognize the integrated rights of indigenous peoples—such as tenure, education, health and human rights. There was no violence, and the tactic worked to gain sympathy from media and wider society. Although the government eventually passed a law to enable indigenous communities to claim land rights, many lowland indigenous communities are still struggling for finalization and enforcement of their property rights. Brazil also saw civic mobilization around the cause of the rubber tappers led by Chico Mendez and promoted by international organizations, which led to the creation of extractive reserves. In Indonesia, civic mobilization forced a dictator to resign. Now, progress is being made by the Coalition for the Democratization of Natural Resources in its efforts to achieve some of the demands made at the time of the mobilization campaign.

Civic mobilization also is very important to the property rights causes of Native Americans in both Canada and the U.S. A famous case is that of Clayoquot Sound. There, paper and logging companies, such as MacMillan Bloedel and Interfor, had official rights to log old growth temperate rain forests claimed by the
Nuu-Chah-Nulth First Nation. Environmentalists disputed the corporate and government plan for the forest. This was followed by nearly 15 years of civic mobilization, blockades, tree-sitting, negotiation and the largest civic disobedience acts in Canadian history. Finally, it resulted in an alliance of First Nation and environmentalists, as well as the Canadian government’s recognition of First Nation rights over their traditional territory.47

Lessons:
• Civic mobilization requires community solidarity and commitment at the grassroots level, a network of effective organizations, a pool of activists willing to take substantial risks often in the face of unlikely odds, and the strategic ability to seize judicious political moments to advance a cause.
• The role of external supporters is separate and different from those of local NGOs or advocacy groups.
• Donors are most effective when they support diverse actors, encourage them to build coalitions and strategize together, and give them the freedom to respond to opportunities as they arise.

Key Emerging Issues
By Andy White

The bulk of NGO and government efforts to secure tenure, as well as the bulk of the previous discussion on strategies, focuses on land. But forests provide many different products and services. Along with rights to land and rights to the forest, rights to each of the many products and services can all be different. When this natural complexity is complemented by indigenous knowledge and intellectual property, few countries have legal frameworks to deal adequately with these issues, and an almost endless set of emerging issues can be imagined.

Among the most obvious and pressing issues are those surrounding the emerging markets for genetic material, preserved landscapes, water filtration, soil and biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration and carbon sinks. Communities have legitimate claims to these products and services, and the potential income from them can contribute significantly to incomes and livelihoods. However, these claims will be ignored and overruled unless there is concerted and quick action by NGOs and donors to advance community interests with governments and the private sector. If government does not act, it may even be necessary for private investors entering these markets to pay for independent adjudication of competing claims before marketing any...
There are many transitional democracies in a state of turbulence, creating more opportunities. But communities and their advocates must be prepared to move forward.

With the increasing trends of decentralization and devolution, local governments around the world are playing larger roles in land administration. Depending upon their capacity and legal authority, this shift could lead to better or worse outcomes.

Real estate markets are emerging in remote areas, and there is increased land speculation as populations grow. Community lands easily disappear as land is sold to investors to build hotels or resort cabins for their own use.

The Box on page 28 presents a set of “counter-strategies” that may reverse the progress made by communities to protect their rights to ancestral territories. Communities, activists and donors must be cognizant of these schemes in order to respond to them effectively.

Conclusions and Recommendations

By Andy White

This report has shown that various strategies can be effective to help communities gain more secure property rights over forest resources. While progress and impact have occurred, work must continue because of the scale of the problem of limited community tenure rights and security. More organizations with different expertise must be involved, engaging in the strategies described above and addressing the emerging issues. We believe that recognition of community tenure is urgent, where it is appropriate, because: 1) deforestation and degradation...
Some Counter Strategies Used by Extractive Companies to Deal with Indigenous Organizations

1. Neutralize government agencies that are supposed to enforce laws.

2. Relate directly to community leaders and give them cash to corrupt them. Damage their relationship with their constituency.

3. Bypass leaders and political bodies and selectively work with individuals in the community.

4. Provide limited information about the project and the legal obligations of the company to the community. During initial phases of environmental impact assessment (EIA), consult without fully informing people of their rights under the law. In answer to questions, give highly technical information that community members cannot understand.

5. Manipulate expectations of the community while hiding information. In the first stage, to get signatures of authorities, behave well and respond to requests as though they will be honored. Then after entering the community lands, give excuses for unkept promises or say it will be done “next year.”

6. Maintain paternalistic relationship with community by giving supplies (school notebooks, aspirin) and services (visiting dentist) to keep people quiet about the environmental damage.

7. When communities unite, then divide and conquer. Give favored treatment to some of the communities and not to others.

8. Undermine leaders’ credibility and political base. Selectively work with one leader or NGO without following appropriate channels in community government/organizations, and then put community authorities in a position where they have to take responsibility for decisions without knowing about the negotiations and information from meetings between companies and political leaders or NGOs.

9. Say “nothing is wrong” when confronted with environmental impact evidence, such as fish kills. Say scientifically gathered evidence shows water is clean when impact is invisible to the eye. Refuse to discuss long-term impacts.

The solutions for these problems lie in better relationships between government and community and in strengthening community organization (“internal organization”) to confront these problems. For example, Pancur Kasih in Indonesia trains communities in confronting logging companies and informs them about the consequences of confrontation, how to watch out for the ways companies will try to divide them, how to maintain solidarity against the companies, and the legal strategies they can use to assert their customary land rights and laws (force companies to pay customary fines, etc). These are political strategies that “create law” through practice.

Written by Janis Alcorn and adapted from Osrendu Magazine, December 2000, “Las estrategias de las empresas petroleras frente a las organizaciones indígenas.”
continue to destroy the natural assets of indigenous and other communities; 2) the growing market for forest ecosystem services is likely to bypass or even hurt local communities unless proactive efforts are made to protect them; 3) governments and societies do not have the financial resources to carry out many of the protection and management tasks currently assigned to them, but which are more cost effective at the local level; and 4) proposals to undermine community participation or bypass it by establishing extensive commercial forest plantations do not address local livelihoods, sustainability or poverty alleviation. Secure community tenure can help avert these trends. Increasing government openness, along with social and political support for communities, provides an historic opportunity for action.

Building the Community
Seizing this opportunity will require the development of a new, much larger and more effective international political constituency and community of practice. As illustrated in Figure 2, critical institutional actors—community federations and associations, public law groups, activists and NGOs, researchers, policy groups, community development and training organizations, multilateral institutions and governmental agencies—each have a critical role in putting into place the building blocks of community tenure security.

This new community should develop and act with forest communities on a new agenda. This agenda could be used to: 1) accelerate the transition from access to public forests to community ownership, where communities have claims; 2) highlight where private ownership may not be most appropriate, providing local communities with greater access to these public forests; 3) aggressively explore and develop mechanisms to ensure the protection of community rights in markets for environmental services and genetic materials; and 4) develop and support effective enforcement mechanisms for protecting community property.

To achieve these goals, this new, broader community of practice should: 1) collect data on property claims and ownership at local, regional and global scales. These data are necessary to formulate and promote arguments for advancing community claims; 2) educate government officials and donors on the issues of community rights and the very feasible possibilities for enhancing their livelihoods with tenure reform; 3) link the emerging networks of community tenure advocates to build a concerted international political constituency able to leverage new funds, new technology, and new political openness to expand community rights; and 4) develop new partnerships with governments and selected multi- and bilateral agencies. Achieving substantial change at national levels means that more effort needs to be put into collaborative efforts.

Moreover, at the governmental and donor level there is a lack of awareness about the nature and scale of the property rights problem when it comes to forests. Hence, some funding should be targeted to educating donors and government officials. Each of these approaches helps build the community. Major donors, particularly the Ford Foundation, are uniquely positioned to power this agenda. A summary

Proposals to undermine community participation or bypass it by establishing extensive commercial forest plantations do not address local livelihoods, sustainability or poverty alleviation.
As we have stated earlier, tenure security is a critical step, but certainly not the only step necessary to advance sustainable livelihoods and forest management. Where communities have gained more secure rights, such as in parts of British Columbia and in the Amazon, communities and their supporters are beginning to work on “second-generation” issues—those associated with the challenge of converting these newly secured forest resources into assets for social and economic development. While their tenure may be more secure than before, most forest policies favor large companies and landholders over small ones, and communities continue to face an uneven playing field in trying to compete in forest markets. Many communities have forged ahead despite the policy and business barriers, embarking on a search for sustainable business models. They will need long-term funding and the time to experiment. The political and economic opportunity has never been as open as it is today to respond effectively to this global challenge and to ensure that enhanced tenure security leads to better outcomes for the communities and for the forests.

Case Studies
Prepared by Lynn Ellsworth

**CASE 1: Demarcation of Indigenous Lands in Brazil**

**Forest Tenure in Brazil.** There are about 360,000 indigenous peoples in Brazil representing 0.2 percent of the national population.
Opportunities to Advance Community Tenure Security: A Summary

- **Support anti-corruption and justice reform activities** at national levels. Strengthen local and national legal groups by financing training, salaries, and the costs of specific legal casework. Resources to support training and case mentorship for would-be public interest lawyers and judges may be essential.

- **Support development of the legal process** of claim-making through various actions. Support mapping by financing training and organizational costs of the nonprofits who utilize it to support community-based tenure reform.

- **Support direct advocacy** and the longer-term process of nurturing organizations so that networks are prepared to jump into action with concrete proposals.

- **Convene people to discuss specific tenure issues.** This focuses people on an important task or highlights a problem so that it becomes a ministerial priority. Working groups are fora where preconceptions, data, new “mental models” and field experiments can be discussed and assimilated.

- **Support emerging leaders.** Strengthen leaders and organizations who represent community or indigenous constituents. Providing scholarships and training opportunities should be complemented with opportunities for community leaders to interact with parliamentarians and other political leaders.

- **Build successful field models.** This requires cultivating local leadership and often many years of testing before it can be scaled up. Avoid promoting pilots that represent the lowest common denominator acceptable to government as this can undermine efforts at more meaningful reform.

- **Mobilize civic society.** This requires a network of effective organizations, broad grassroots commitment based on a common understanding of the problem, a pool of activists willing to take substantial risks in the face of unlikely odds and the ability to seize judicious political moments to advance the cause.

- **Create a global learning network** that includes cross-site visits and apprenticeships nationally and cross-regionally. This will raise public awareness, sharpen advocacy strategies, and speed change in countries that have been slow to change.

- **Support federations and credit/marketing associations** in communities that are attempting to exercise their tenurial rights, in addition to supporting NGOs to build informed grassroots capacity and commitment to the political responsibilities required to maintain tenure rights.
Their fate in the modern world has been uncertain and their plight has been an international cause. The government of Brazil has adopted a protectionist philosophy toward its indigenous peoples, creating a separate ministry—Fundaçao Nacional do Índio (FUNAI)—to provide specifically for their legal, social, and health needs. In 1988, a transition to democratic rule brought about political and social changes from which a more vocal and organized civil society emerged. The Constitution of 1988 recognizes that indigenous peoples have the right to live in their traditional manner on their ancestral lands and that the federal government has the responsibility of awarding these lands claimed ancestrally. This constitution was a remarkable step forward for the rights of indigenous peoples. Many claims for land rights were presented. More than half of the claims were fully demarcated and registered by 2001. The claimed territories account for about 12 percent of the country’s landmass and are almost entirely concentrated in the Amazon.

The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest Rights. Indigenous peoples now have a modest degree of tenure security within the areas demarcated after 1988. The process is in principle simple: the government grants the land to one or various groups and gives compensation to private landowners for giving up that land. Indigenous reserves give indigenous peoples a place to live and a place to practice their traditional livelihoods, but they are not empowered to use their resources in a commercial manner. The underlying intent of government is not to provide indigenous people with a tradable asset base for dealing with the modern world, but rather to give them a refuge where they can be free of pressure to change their traditional lifestyle.

The Ford Foundation played an important role in the demarcation of indigenous lands. For a decade, Ford funded and supported the NGOs and researchers at the center of the debate over how to protect the indigenous population. These agents of change (e.g., Instituto Socioambiental) modified public perceptions about indigenous living conditions and rights, lobbied legislators to include indigenous rights in the debate for a new constitution, and informed the international community about the urgent need to protect indigenous peoples’ habitat. Ford also funded mapping activities, sponsored influential research and symposia by leading academics, such as anthropologist João Pacheco at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. These activities helped make the government and the international community aware of the importance of social justice for indigenous communities.

Territories held by indigenous groups are subject to the oversight and managerial authority of FUNAI. When a territory is to be demarcated, FUNAI sends an anthropologist who writes an account of territorial use. This information is translated into maps and published in the Federal Journal for public review. Since 1996, a new legal provision allows private landowners in the claimed territory to request compensation for any infrastructure they have built in the area, a procedure that has slowed the process. Documentation for claimed areas is sent to the Ministry of Justice, which must approve the demarcation. If accepted, the land is then physically demarcated with highly visible signs—a tough job since some of the territories are the size of Belgium and some have international borders. When demarcation is complete, the president of Brazil issues a decree recognizing the indigenous territory.

Nonprofit groups are active in assisting indigenous groups to make claims and in advocating on their behalf, but resistance from landholders living in the claimed areas is strong. These landholders have pressured the government to either dismiss claims or slow demarcation processes. Other problems have been noted in the establishment of indigenous territories. Boundaries are often simply not recognized, being de facto indefensible. Land invasion by outsiders—
from farmers to goldminers—is typical; illegal logging is rampant; and violence against indigenous people remains common. Some community leaders do not always act on behalf of community interest, and unfair business deals are frequent.

Enhanced tenure security for Brazil’s indigenous people has not solved all problems. While some indigenous groups are marketing products from their forests, others retain a more subsistence-level lifestyle. Compensation to indigenous groups for outside use of their resources and knowledge of indigenous plants and organisms remains an international issue. Suicide rates among indigenous groups are still higher than the Brazilian average, and they continue to be vulnerable to outside diseases and pollution from mining, logging and oil drilling. The lands around the indigenous territories remain unregulated, a situation that poses numerous threats to the indigenous people.

**Looking Forward, Future Challenges.** Activists see that seeking tenure security by mapping and decree is only the beginning of a process. Obviously, it is an essential and widely applauded first step toward justice, but much work remains to assure implementation and to find economic models that honor the natural resources and the traditions of the indigenous peoples.

Abstracted from the following sources: Martin, 2001; Barbosa, 2000; Cowell, 1999; Cardoso, 1999

**CASE 2: India’s Joint Forest Management Network**

By Lynn Ellsworth and Chetan Agarwal

**Forest Tenure in India.** Joint Forestry Management in India is a process in which communities sign agreements with forestry officials to manage and rehabilitate degraded forests. In exchange, communities gain widely varying, but usually limited use and access rights to timber and nontimber forest products, depending on the specifics of the agreement. Communities are also expected to regulate access to the forest by both members and nonmembers.

JFM in its current form was started by an official working group in West Bengal that developed an agreement with a local community to manage a forest in the 1970s. Over time, it was hailed as a great step forward in participatory development, and the model was expanded nationally. Since then, it has been the subject of a tremendous amount of academic research and activist advocacy. Activists now focus on ways to establish tenure rights over forests that are stronger than mere use rights.

**Course of Events and Implications.** The JFM model owes much of its popularity to the fact that it can solve the problem of how to regenerate a forest at low cost. Some say it also played a key role in stabilizing forest cover in India. The Ford Foundation provided important support for the NGOs that created the national-level JFM network, which aimed at gaining bureaucratic support in the the government for JFM. (The working groups idea was started by Ford
Foundation program officers in the Philippines and elsewhere in Asia, see Poffenberger, 1988.)

In the early years (1989-91) of Ford support for JFM ideas, there were meetings of Ford Foundation grantees on specific forestry issues. At that time there were over 50 programmatic grants on forestry and rural development. A large number were concentrated in the states of West Bengal and Haryana, the states with experiments in participatory forest management dating to the 1970s. The Ford Foundation played an important role in organizing a statewide meeting in West Bengal; the meeting was instrumental in passage of a state government resolution to recognize and promote participatory forestry. The Ford Foundation went on to facilitate state-level working groups in Haryana and West Bengal.

A 1990 workshop in Delhi brought together government officials interested in promoting JFM and numerous researchers from Haryana, West Bengal and Gujarat to create a nascent JFM network. The central government had also passed a notification in June 1990 suggesting that states should start their own JFM programs. This opened an opportunity to promote JFM nationwide.

If 1989-91 were the years of advocacy at state and national levels, 1991-93 may be termed the years of promoting JFM. A National Support Group (NSG) was established at the 1992 meeting of the JFM network at Suraj Kund, near Delhi. It brought together hundreds of participants to kick start the network with a focus on starting a dialogue between foresters and NGOs, promoting examples of JFM and undertaking participatory research that highlighted the benefits of JFM for forests and for people. By 1993, the network had been decentralized thematically, to focus JFM research on ecological/economic and institutional research and training. 1993-96 were consolidation years—the research networks undertook participatory research and developed a profile for their work. In 1994, a subgroup was formed to focus on gender and equity issues within the institutional research network. By 1996 the focus had moved to examining “second generation issues,” for example, the impacts of JFM on women and the landless and the role of NTFPs (nontimber forest products) in providing early benefits, as well as the importance of the microplan for documenting forest dependency and for including the interests of diverse forest users with differential bargaining powers.

Since 1997, as regional and state-level advocacy have increased, the Ford Foundation, the NSG and key network members have focused increasingly on promoting regional networking efforts that focus on individual states and regions. The frequency of national meetings has been reduced, and they have been moved from Delhi as
Deeper Roots

In the last four years, the last two meetings were held in state capitals. Further, in recent years, there has been greater and more broad-based participation by senior forest department staff. Clearly, the sheer scale of JFM—more than 10 million hectares and 35,000 village groups in about 20 states—means that it has become a significant reality in India rather than just an idea.

Positive impacts of the network include:
- dialogue among the previously antagonistic forest department, NGOs and researchers;
- recognition for those forest officials who participate in the network;
- experience-sharing between stakeholders and across regions;
- jointly determined research agendas and new participatory research across regions, e.g., the Ecological and Economic Research group conducting coordinated research in 12 zones covering about 60 sites;
- enhanced recognition of gender and equity questions in state JFM orders; and
- a brand name. Network membership in a national-level network, based in Delhi has provided some brand recognition for members and facilitated their dealings with state-level bureaucracies, especially at field levels.

At the time of inception, JFM was seen as an innovation for many communities which had limited control and de jure access to often degraded forests. But as time went on, historians and field workers began to report that in some places, JFM could be a step backward in property rights. Critics believe that JFM has distracted attention from the injustice of the underlying property regime, in which government progressively claimed ownership of much of India’s forest, which originally was managed under viable common property regimes. Some also point out that JFM is a better deal for the government foresters than it is for communities. This is because it mostly solves a forestry department management problem: how to cheaply regenerate degraded forests. Others argue, with good evidence, that JFM creates new obligations for communities without resolving older claims, resulting in declining property rights for some communities. Those in question are communities that had strong existing rights such as the Van Panchayats in Uttarakhand or the members of Forest Cooperative Societies in Himachal Pradesh. For both of those communities, JFM was a step backward from progressive institutional arrangements established under the Indian Forest Act of 1927.

Looking Forward, Future Challenges. JFM is best seen as an incremental improvement in use rights when full property rights are not on the political agenda. However, observers suggest that given time, the nature of the conversation on JFM is likely to turn to ways in which government can help communities manage their own forests, rather than focusing on ways in which communities can help government manage government forests. There are new ideas entering the dialogue, including Community Forest Management and Participatory Forest Management, as well as some indications of greater support for communities’ rights and decision-making. Some even speak of increasing the return local people get from forests. Thus far, more substantial rights have been given only to forests with less than 30 percent canopy or to degraded forests. An active debate is under way in India, and it is opening up these questions of land rights.

CASE 3: *Forest Concession and Landlessness in Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia*

In Indonesia, large-scale forestry began on the islands outside Java in the mid-1960s with the passage of legislation introducing forest concessions. The situation for each island is different, but forest dwellers have increasingly pressed for recognition of their traditional rights to forests within their areas of use. Outcomes have been mixed. One case that can be thought of as a success is on the island of Lombok in Sesaot village, which is located near Mount Rinjani in Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia. The village is adjacent to a forest of about 6,000 hectares. The forest is part of a watershed supplying the southern part of the island. Much of the forest is degraded because the government’s Forestry Department managed the area as a “production forest.”

**Course of Events and Implications.** The government declared the forest logged out by 1953, although the forestry department had a tradition of replanting mahogany in the forest as a revenue-earning measure for government. But throughout the 1970s degradation of the forest worsened. In 1983 the watershed was so obviously under threat that the government reclassified the forest as a “protected area.” Local logging was then severely restricted, but the government retained the right to cut the planted mahogany for its own use. The local forestry department even maintained a revenue target of about US$200,000 per year from ongoing mahogany harvests. Local people did not share in that revenue.

In response to village grievances over the new, tight local logging restrictions, the governor of the province declared a buffer zone of 100 meters around the boundary of the newly formed protected area. “Within it every village family was granted a quarter of a hectare of forest land to set up agroforestry activities.” Villagers were instructed on planting mahogany for their own use and sale. Coffee was allowed, but the government imposed a 50 percent tax on it. The tax was viewed as a rental payment for using the buffer zone. It also served as a way for government to discourage coffee production, which was considered inappropriate to the forestry department’s agroforestry model of farming.

Villages did not like either the managerial rules in the buffer zone or the agroforestry model promoted by government. They wanted to plant coffee and other trees that did not interest the forestry department. Farmers also insisted the coffee tax was unfair, and they argued that the canopy created by the mahogany stunted the growth of coffee. Moreover, it is not clear that the forestry department’s agroforestry model of coffee and mahogany was economically superior to the farmer’s model (Borsa, 2001). Farmers finally persuaded the forestry department to grant them a tiny 25-hectare concession of the protected area where they could try their own ideas for sustainable forest management. In exchange, they offered to take on the burden of protecting the forest themselves, rather than having the forest department do it. An NGO, LP3ES, facilitated this agreement. LP3ES helped the farmers create a coalition of nine farmer groups to conduct negotiations and to organize against illegal logging.

An agreement with the government was reached in late 1995. The farmers agreed on the following: to reforest the 25-hectare concession area and contribute 80 percent of the seedlings necessary; to maintain the existing indigenous trees; to enforce and police the forestry department rules about logging; and to accept that the government would retain ownership of the forest. In exchange, the farmers received rights to harvest timber in the concession area and to use the land for agroforestry-style farming. The farmer coalition then
decided on the following prioritized list of those with access to the new concession:

1. farmers without agricultural land in the previously established buffer zone or village area;
2. “female farmers without husbands, but with children and no job;”
3. members of the coalition of nine-farmer groups;
4. people aware of the rules established with the forestry department; and
5. people willing to do the agreed-upon replanting without technical assistance from the outside.

Fifty-eight families were eventually selected. They worked in groups of four families to do the replanting work in their allotted areas. Most replanted economically viable trees like durian, candlenut, jackfruit and *albizia*. The farmer coalition also organized poaching patrols. It reported illegal loggers to the forestry department, but had no legal authority to try cases. This limited the patrols’ effectiveness. A few years later, an evaluation reported the survival rate of the newly planted trees as a remarkable 93 percent, with most families earning the equivalent of about $500 per year from their planted trees.

After some time, the forestry department allowed the farmer coalition to fine illegal loggers from within the coalition’s own ranks, although outsiders were still tried by the forestry department. The coalition found that it was unable to impose strong sanctions, even when violators were turned over to the police after the coalition determined them “guilty-as-charged,” as accused loggers would still get off lightly. The problem remains unresolved.

The model, however, was considered an overall success in terms of protecting livelihoods and watersheds, so the farmer coalition won the right in 1999 to expand the concession area to an additional 211 hectares of degraded forest. That land was then allocated to 1,240 additional farming families selected from an applicant pool of 1,497 families. A local team was established to select families for the new concession area using the variables described above. Once again, management of the additional hectares was regarded as a success. The farmer coalition then incorporated as an association and proposed taking on management of an additional 1,000 hectares of the protected area.

**Looking Forward, Future Challenges.** As of this writing, the proposal for an additional 1,000 hectares had been rejected by a district officer who did not favor that level of decentralization. But given the many legal changes and policy movement towards decentralization in Indonesia, it is entirely possible that the group will eventually get its chance to manage the 1,000 hectares. This case shows the importance of building a viable model in the field to prove a project’s viability. It also shows the incremental, locally negotiated character of tenure and property rights over forest resources.

Sources: Most of this case was abstracted from Suryadi, 2001. Material was also obtained from Ellsworth, 2001, Campbell, 2001; Bennet, 2001, and Borsa, 1997.

By Danièle Perrot-Maitre and Lynn Ellsworth

Forest Tenure in the Philippines. Indigenous communities in the Philippines represent about 16 percent of the country’s population. Until recently, these people have had little security of tenure over their ancestral lands. Government agencies allocated resource use rights to forest concessionaires and mining interests, often ignoring community claims to land and forests.

The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest Rights. While researching the property rights situation of Philippines’ indigenous peoples, an American public interest law attorney teaching at the University of Philippines law school uncovered a case dating from the beginning of the 20th century. That showed that the King of Spain had recognized indigenous property rights. The attorney’s legal finding of this fact resulted in the overturn of a legal doctrine stating that all land belonged to the crown (or the government), from the moment Spain’s representatives set foot on the Archipelago. This legal detective work provided the perfect ammunition that many social justice-minded law students in the Philippines needed to help indigenous peoples in their quest to obtain greater property rights. As these law students graduated, they became public interest attorneys and NGO activists themselves. For ten years, they worked with a coalition of indigenous peoples for congressional passage of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act. In 1997, they finally secured passage of the act. Their victory was due to a confluence of factors: a favorable political context with the emergence of democracy; the quality of their legal work; success at building a coalition of NGOs and indigenous peoples’ organizations to do the necessary lobbying; the personality of the senator who sponsored the bill; willingness to compromise and “water down” the original bill; and good timing. At first, the victory appeared to be short-lived, for mining interests quickly challenged the bill. Finally, in a remarkable 2001 court session, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the constitutionality of the act.

The act did not appear out of nowhere. It was built on a significant local history that influenced ideas about the ways in which things could be done. For example, in 1974, an indigenous group established a precedent by getting a communal lease to public forests. Then in
1982, after martial law was lifted, an experiment began with a new tenure instrument called a “Certificate of Stewardship Contract.” The certificate paved the way for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to test “Communal Forest Stewardship Agreements” in 1986, as a kind of lease. The DENR expanded use of these leases in the subsequent year. And in 1990, DENR circulars created a task force to work on the problem of identifying Ancestral Land Domains. In a next step, the DENR created actual rules for accepting and evaluating ancestral land claims. In 1993, a new DENR order recognized Ancestral Domains and provided the basis for the concept of land delineation outlined in the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act. As a result, indigenous communities mapped more than one million hectares of their lands. Ancestral Domains claims were submitted to the government, thus pushing for a legal definition of Ancestral Domain. Hence, change built upon change in an incremental fashion.

**Looking Forward, Future Challenges.** The act is considered by many to be a step forward for more secure community property rights. It provides indigenous communities with a legal basis to make their claims and even requires that communities be informed and consulted before any mining concessions or other projects are started. Yet the act has important limits. Property rights are still weak, as the act merely grants indigenous people *priority* use rights over Ancestral Domains (except in the case of individual farms which can be sold). It also gives local people the responsibility for managing resources, a potentially costly burden. Indigenous communities remain subject to the oversight and decisions of local government and the DENR. This means that mining interests remain a large threat to effective tenure security. Implementation and enforcement of the act is also thought to be slow and requires considerable political clout at the local and national levels. There is also a lack of organizational infrastructure and specific enabling rules within the governmental agencies responsible for interacting with indigenous communities. In addition, many believe that helping communities make profitable use of the resources they do control is a neglected, but emerging, issue of importance.

Donors played an important role in the long road to obtaining passage of the act. Over many years, they funded and supported many of the public interest law firms, NGOs and indigenous rights organizations that were at its center. They funded field experiments and learning activities for mapping and concession management. They also sponsored influential research, evaluations, and consultancies that signaled to government the importance of social justice for indigenous communities.


**CASE 5: South Africa’s Communal Associations Act of 1996**

By Lynn Ellsworth and Danièle Perrot-Maître

**Forest Tenure in South Africa.** The post-apartheid government of South Africa faced daunting problems with providing tenure security for South Africa’s poor, a goal proclaimed in the country’s constitution. So called communal property systems, where they existed at all, had long been exposed to market and political influence from the wider
After the fall of the apartheid regime, informal renting and trading of land was commonplace. Moreover, the role of traditional authorities was quite different than it had been in the 19th century. These facts meant the communal property systems neither resembled nor functioned like those systems that anthropologists and legal scholars had once described.

Artificial homelands had also been created everywhere in South Africa, and thousands of people were grouped into them. Overcrowding was typical in some regions. Violent evictions from “white” lands had taken place, and “nature reserves” had been declared in areas previously viewed as a managed commons. Many people lived as refugee guests on the lands of another “tribe”—a word that was starting to fail in meaning. Competing claims to land were, and remain, a thorny problem. To make matters even more complicated, the migratory character of the labor market in South Africa made defining a member of any given “community” or “tribe” an insolvable puzzle. In sum, the sheer number of people with potentially valid land claims meant that accommodating them all was a vast task.

These are only some of the difficulties and complexities presented, all of which shrink as obstacles before the appallingly unequal distribution of land ownership between whites and blacks, a great wrong stemming from South Africa’s apartheid heritage.

The Process of Tenure Reform for Indigenous Forest Rights. With the political arrival to power of the African National Congress (ANC) and the contributions of international donors to the country’s finances, policy change was in the air. A period of optimism and a lively debate ensued about what should be done and how it should be financed. Scholars with sympathy to the common property school of thought (see “A Place in the World” in this publication series) influenced this policy discussion by urging diverse property rights and legal legitimacy for group land ownership. One of many outcomes from that initial period of policy change was the passage of the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996. It allowed groups to constitute themselves as associations and to create trusts with duly elected boards of directors and officers. Group title can then be granted to such trusts. This is a remarkable achievement.

While in theory this was a simple way to accommodate the great diversity of tenure situations, in practice, implementation of the act has been difficult and success has so far been rare. However, this is not suggest that the act was not needed. Interestingly, implementation difficulties have led reformers to propose ancillary changes to many different laws as well as organizational changes for the different levels of government. The aim of these changes is to allow government to interact better with land trusts and claimant groups in order to offer adequate policy and service support to the “new” landowners. But a primary difficulty with implementation has been the fact that groups seeking land claims through this form of tenure are unfamiliar with the Anglo-Saxon notion of trusts and with the managerial system involving boards of directors. Moreover, the trust solution does not systematically mesh well with the “traditional” systems as they have evolved over time. One researcher reports that trusts offer “inequitable allocation of assets based on self-help, the squandering of opportunity; a disregard for internal rules;... with infrastructure and land being left to deteriorate” as well as “failure to follow open and transparent tender procedures. These problems appear to exist regardless of group size.” (Pienaar, p. 329).
Looking Forward, Future Challenges. In addition to problems with implementation of the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996, the larger issue of land reform in South Africa has been mired in internal debate. One discussion revives the 1930s and 1950s controversy throughout East and Southern Africa about the role of the middle-class yeoman or “commercial” farmer as a favored beneficiary of land redistribution and individualized property rights. So, despite legislative innovation, the character of land reform in South Africa still is uncertain. One lesson here may be simply that *de jure* changes must be accompanied by substantial resources to assure implementation and viable field models of success.


CASE 6: Bolivia’s Move Toward Multicultural Democracy: Legal Reforms Strengthening Community-based Tenure and Governance of Forest Resources

By Forest Trends Staff

Forest Tenure in Bolivia. Bolivia is a multicultural society where indigenous people compose 70 percent of the population. Almost half of the country is covered by forests. During the past decade, social movements have brought radical reforms to Bolivia with the stated purpose of putting the government under the control of the people. These reforms reduced the powers of the president and governmental ministers, creating a robust framework that provides multiple avenues for grassroots political action to achieve full implementation of community property rights. Reforms have been linked to extensive public awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens about exercising their rights.

A Timeline of Events and Implications.

1953: Following the National Revolution, which destroyed the hacienda system in the highlands, a coalition of miners and highland indigenous communities benefited from the 1953 Agrarian Reform Law. The law returned lands to indigenous peoples of the Andes. However, the indigenous territories of the lowlands were left open for colonization, logging, and ranch expansion. The law recognized collective property rights. Two different state agencies registered land titles, creating confusion. Land rights did not include rights over forests, subsoil minerals or petroleum.

1980: Indigenous lowlands peoples began to organize with assistance from APCOB, an NGO dedicated to supporting the rights of indigenous peoples. The Guaraní of Izozog in the Chaco, with their strong traditions of self-governance, provided an anchor for the new movement.

1984: Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano, or Confederation of the Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB), was founded under the leadership of Bonifacio Barrientos, Capitán Grande of Izozog. CIDOB began as a confederation of Guaraní, Chiquitano and Ayoreo peoples. CIDOB then joined

Bolivia is a multicultural society where indigenous people comprise 70 percent of the population.

Almost half of the country is covered by forests.
COICA—the federation of pan-Amazonian indigenous peoples. CIDOB had a pan-indigenous identity and eventually included representatives of indigenous organizations from all of the Bolivian lowlands departments. CIDOB includes a grand assembly of 300 representatives from 34 lowland indigenous groups, and a group of directors that coordinate closely with regional organizations (CABI, CICC, CICOL, CIPB, CIDDEBENI, CPIOAP, CIPITCO, CPIAP, etc.) and to respond to local community assemblies. The directors’ role is to represent peoples’ interests and reach out to donors, NGOs, consultants and others to keep base constituents informed. CIDOB does not make decisions, but rather negotiates on behalf of its constituency.

1986: The community of San Antonio de Lomerío initiated the first indigenous forestry project—basically a sawmill operation—on its community lands with assistance from APCOB. But the state refused to legalize the sawmill. Management plans were made so community-based logging could compete and resist state-awarded forestry concessions until 1996, when the forest first became certified. Over the decade, APCOB, CICOL and communities of San Antonio Lomerio adjusted their forestry and financial management approach to fit communities’ culture and expectations.

1990: The March for Land and Dignity took place. Led by Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (CPIB) and supported by CIDOB, 600 indigenous people from Beni marched 800 kilometers from lowlands to the high altitudes of La Paz to demand recognition of indigenous land claims. The dramatic march was covered by media and achieved public awareness for Bolivia’s lowland peoples as citizens seeking their property rights. In response, the president signed “Supreme Decree 22611,” which created four “Multiethnic Indigenous Territories” to be followed by five more. However, little concrete action resulted from the decree.

1994: Constitutional reforms laid the framework for real political change to support nationwide community-based tenure under the political leadership of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada with Aymara Vice President Victor Hugo Cárdenas. The new constitution recognized the multiethnic and pluricultural nature of Bolivia and included provisions from ILO 169. Article 171 recognizes and protects the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous people, especially those of the TCO, “guaranteeing the use and sustainable exploitation of the natural resources, their identity, values, languages, customs and institutions.”

Popular Participation Law (LPP) was rapidly written by a small team of professionals with strong grassroots connections and awareness about rural problems. Taking advantage of political will behind the
movement in late 1993, the law has great legitimacy and helped build a base for a strong democratic system by:

• creating new local government structures, including municipios in all parts of the country, a vigilance council to monitor the functioning of the municipal government and other similar accountability structures throughout government agencies;
• recognizing all civil associations as legal and not subversive, and enabling easy registration;
• giving indigenous communities legal status so they can take advantage of rights under laws;
• reorganizing many government bureaucracies to streamline accountability by reorienting agencies to local demands instead of demands from within;
• shifting revenue and decision-making to municipal governments; and
• including a strong provision that all laws must conform to LPP and incorporate popular participation.

1995: CIDOB established a technical arm, CPTI, which includes a GIS system to overlay government land-use data with indigenous land claims and to illustrate threats to indigenous land rights. CIDOB also analyzed draft laws for potential impact on indigenous land rights. A decentralization law provided municipal governments with new resources and powers, establishing a citizens’ vigilance committee to hold local government accountable. Implementation was uneven.

1996: The March for Territory, Land, Political Rights and Development took place. It was the second indigenous march to the capital to demand territorial rights. CIBOB and the rural farmers’ organization, CSUTCB, joined together to protest the draft land reform bill. CIDOB successfully lobbied to include TCOs (Tierra Comunitarias de Origen, or Traditional Community Lands) in the National Agrarian Reform Law, which also was passed in 1996. The INRA incorporated the nine areas listed in the presidential decree of 1990 and stipulated that 16 other TCOs be granted within ten months’ time. However, the law’s process for creating a TCO was burdensome, including multiple steps: 1) petition, 2) profiling, 3) mapping, 4) immobilization, 5) study of the area, 6) legal review of private properties in area, 7) compensation and 8) titling.

In the same year, a new forestry law created a forest superintendency to provide professional management and accountability for implementing forest regulations. It empowered local government by decentralizing decision-making and by allocating forest royalties to enable municipios to establish and manage their own forests. The forestry law gives indigenous peoples special rights to exploit forests on their TCOs and prohibits access of timber companies without community permission.

San Antonio Lomerio also received the first “green label” in Bolivia—a first for any South American indigenous community. Certification was used as strategy to exclude outsiders from indigenous forests.

1996-2000: Izozog, Lomerio and Urubichu unilaterally declared themselves “indigenous municipal governments,” moving forward their agenda for political semi autonomy. Izozog linked its TCO claim with support for Kaa Iya National Park and built an alliance with WCS, an international conservation NGO. The UPAS law was drafted by the Ministry of Sustainable Development and CIDOB to recognize the autonomy and special participation of these units, separating them from the problems of political parties participating in local elections. This allowed local governments to focus on local problems and solidarity for maintaining land rights. Some communities created “mancomunidades” to serve as representative governments
spanning several municipalities and controlling the TCO territory under a single government, rather than fragmented under several local government administrative units. Another strategy involved "Unidades de Gestión" to unite TCO under a single government by redrawing municipal boundaries to coincide with TCO boundaries. Indigenous communities negotiated with oil companies which extract oil from their lands with widely varying degrees of success. Colonists invaded some areas under TCO claims.

2001: Beni called another march protesting slow action on TCOs and the president sent emissaries to assure the community that progress will be made. The developments offer the possibility of a new trust fund, similar to that already created for rural farmers, which will support economic, social, cultural and political development for indigenous people. Implementation of social control of the justice system has begun, including the role of ombudsman, a constitutional tribunal and a citizens' review of sentences with process for resolution of issues.

Of 20 million hectares put under TCO claims in 1996, only two million hectares achieved full TCO status by mid-2001. Four of 16 territories mentioned in the law—with promise of being titled within ten months after its enactment—had been titled. In the same year, the Izoog TCO land claim was contested by powerful ranch interests.

Looking Forward: Future Challenges. The Bolivian forest sector policy reform experience is one of the few detailed major exercises in developing countries to rationalize the management of the country's forest resources in consonance with wider changes in the total system of government. Seven million hectares of forests are under sustainable forest management plans, and now the country is a world leader in tropical forest certification, with some 800,000 hectares of forest resources certified. Advances in the institutional field are remarkable, with the replacement of a corrupt and inefficient public forest administration by a professional and transparent one. Significant advances also have occurred in the decentralization and devolution of responsibilities and decisions about forest resources management to rural communities. At least 14 enterprises now have access to some 1.4 million hectares with clear property boundaries and ownership rights. Notwithstanding, the reform initiative has faced numerous obstacles. For example, the institutional consolidation of the superintendence has failed in certain regions; financing is a serious problem; and issuing of land titles has been slow.

It is hoped that in the future, Bolivia will continue to work toward implementing this reform, perhaps revising the fee system to reflect the variety of concessionaires and communities, ensuring that penalties can be enforced to control the targeted actors, ensuring that more companies can vertically integrate, making sustainability more feasible and encouraging continued civil society participation to inspire effective decentralization.


CASE 7. Group Title for Colombia’s Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Colombians: A Timeline

Forest Tenure in Colombia. There are about 420,000 indigenous peoples in Colombia spread across 27 administrative departments. Since 1990, there has been a movement to guard the rights of indigenous peoples to their traditional territories and protect them from outside settlement and integrationist policies. In 1995, based on changes to the nation’s constitution, Colombia allowed indigenous groups and Afro-Colombian communities to register their rights to
territories they have historically occupied. Titles to land have been granted by the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA) to 404 communities and to the indigenous “cabildos,” or traditional governing authorities of these territories.49

Course of Events and Implications. This timeline illustrates the almost random nature of change and the way in which many elements can coalesce at critical moments from unplanned directions. In this case, some of the factors include a receptive World Bank mission infused with the goals of a new operational directive (originally written to protect the Yanomami in Brazil), a group of activist NGOs representing the affected communities (which were already aware of their options and fighting for land rights), an earlier model of success in their own country and a moment of government willingness to change after significant changes in its own constitution.

1880: Law 89 of Colombia passed. It granted indigenous people the right to create their own form of internal government, known as Indigenous Councils, and the right to hold property in the form of resguardos. Resguardos have complete rights of property over their lands within a specific jurisdiction.

1900-1950s: Most land was a public forest reserve under direct state administration allocated to companies as huge rubber concessions, sugar cane and banana plantations. This period ended with expansion of ports on the Pacific coast and finalization of roads and railroads connecting mountains to the ocean.

1961: Agrarian Reform Law #135 passed. It recognized indigenous peoples’ full rights to property in traditionally occupied lands.

1960s-70s: Many new highway and dam projects and big forest and mineral concessions were proposed.

Late 1960s: INCORA implemented law #135 and titled 73 resguardos with one million hectares.

1970s: Indigenous communities began to pressure the government to convert “reserves” to resguardos.

1980s: A majority of “reserves” were converted to resguardos. Afro-Colombians began to imitate the success of the indigenous activist groups with a “reserves-to-resguardos” strategy to secure claims to land, much of which was forested. During the same period, Colombia followed a policy of “opening” to foreign investment in the Pacific Rim frontier. There was a consequent increase in commercial extraction of timber and in agroindustrial operations. Parallel to this, the main thrust of World Bank policy in Colombia was promoting private-sector development consistent with the “opening” goal of the Colombian government.

1985: A Tropical Forest Action Plan was proposed to provide economic and social benefits of forests for rural populations instead of for large companies only.

1988: Regional Autonomous Corporation of Chocó signed “accord 20” granting an indigenous group (ACIA) 800,000 hectares of land in a nonbinding, unofficial agreement that became a district model of success.

1990: Indigenous people, mobilized by protests against the cele-
bration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus, worked to elect two
delegates to the national Constituent Assembly. A coalition of
Afro-Colombian and indigenous groups was created to lobby for
constitutional changes. The most influential Afro-Colombian
group that emerged was *El Movimiento Nacional Cimarrón*.

1991: Significant changes were made to the constitution. Under the
changes, Colombia recognized ethnicity as part of the Colombian state
and created the possibility of collective territorial rights for ethnic
groups. In the same year, the World Bank developed an operational
directive to protect the interests of indigenous groups, an outcome of the
international outcry over the tragic situation of the Yanomami people
of Brazil.

1992: In Yanaconas, Colombia, the World Bank project review
team, with the above-mentioned operational directive in mind, met
with communities to explain a new land-titling initiative within a
proposed natural resource management project. Indigenous and
Afro-Colombia groups rallied at the meeting to demand collective
title rather than individualized title. The tactic was effective and the
National Planning Authority agreed to guarantee the articulation of
“Transitory Article 55” giving Afro-Colombians collective rights to
territory. The World Bank project was modified to add regional com-
mittes and a “policy and strategy development” component
designed to find a way to help make group title a reality.

1993: The Agrarian Law #70 passed. It guaranteed Afro-
Colombians collective rights to territory. In the same year, a World
Bank appraisal mission proposed that land rights be clarified. The
loan for the natural resource management project proposed the previous
year was approved, and the titling process for groups began.

June 2000: Thirty-seven collective titles for black communities
were created, affecting 1.6 million hectares and 17,770 families.

**Looking Forward, Future Challenges.** Colombia’s model
provides a number of interesting lessons for countries with similar pop-
ulations. The reform has been most effective in the lowlands and in
places where overlaps between protected areas and indigenous territories
provide double protection against settlement pressures from outsiders.
The upland areas continue to face challenges from ranchers, farmers
and the government; and INCORA has not had the capability to
demarcate and address conflicts over land rights. The recognition of
Afro-Colombian collective property rights is being mirrored in other
countries, such as Honduras, with increasing acceptance by the sur-
rounding society. Basing legal change on a new constitution provides
clear legitimacy for implementing the reform in a consistent manner.

*Case Abstracted from Ng’weno, 2000.*

**CASE 8: Nepal’s Forestry Law of 1993**

**Changes Property Rights: A Timeline**

**Forest Tenure in Nepal.** Despite a long relationship between
local communities and the forests surrounding their agricultural set-
tlements, the Nepali government historically appropriated all forest
lands as public property. In so doing, it kept discretionary control over
all forest products and management decisions. Then, formal legal
devolution of rights began in 1957. It was a process of restoring local
management institutions and systems, even under increasing land
pressure from a rapidly growing population. But tenure reform did not
clearly establish the rights of community and user groups to forest
products. And recently the parliament tried to pass laws re-establishing
strong government control. This step was fought by newly emerged
associations of forest user groups. There is strong support within the
government to continue the decentralization process, despite commercial interests’ position against this.

**Course of Events and Implications.** Events in Nepal illustrate (as do other cases) that an innovative legal framework can remain hard to implement. It will stay under threat from those who oppose it. Despite efforts to organize forest user groups at the federal level, Nepal’s forest user groups remain politically weak. Legal changes are part of a longer-term, bigger struggle for security. Although many people trivialize the changes in Nepal, pointing out how they did not bring the desired effect, many say that legal changes such as the Nepalese Forest Act can provide a tool that active communities can benefit from until a different political climate emerges.

**Prior to 1957:** Most forests were managed under a welter of indigenous common property systems, some of which were more effective than others at sustainable use of the timber.

**1957:** The Private Forests Nationalization Act brought forests under government jurisdiction.

**1961:** The Forest Act passed with various amendments to the 1957 version, none of which substantially affected forest nationalization.

**1967:** The Forest Protection and Special Arrangement Act also amended, without substantially changing the 1957 situation.

**1976:** The National Forestry Action Plan was laid out, but only partly implemented.

**1978:** The government set forth the “Panchayat Forest Rules” and “Panchayat Protected Forest Rules” to try to reverse deforestation resulting from the nationalization of forests in 1957. This allowed local Panchayats to create a management plan and take over some of the management of their forests. Despite the new rules, implementation emphasized replanting trees. At the same time, the World Bank paid for a community forestry project in 29 hill districts, eventually expanded to an additional 14 districts.

**1965-1979:** Nepal experienced a loss of 38,000 hectares of forest cover. Landlessness and the government’s inability to enforce size limits on earlier land reforms forced landless people more and more into the hills in search of places to live and cultivate.

**1980:** The Panchayat Rules were amended again to include more community forestry concepts, but implementation continued to emphasize replanting.

**1987:** The first “National Community Forestry Workshop” was held with forest department and project staff. Significant donor support for reform was expressed.

**1988:** A master plan for the forestry sector was completed, proposing complete overhauls of the forestry acts. Reformers proposed that forest user groups should have greater rights over forests, emphasizing the need for massive retraining of the entire staff of the ministry to allow for user-group management of forests.

**1990:** New “Forestry Development Rules” and “Leasehold Forestry Rules” were enacted and the Forestry Bill of 1990 passed. Innovative and consistent with the recommendations of the master plan of 1988, the act contains guidelines for handing over forest management to user groups.

*There is strong support within the government in Nepal to continue the decentralization process, despite commercial interests’ position against this.*
1993: The Forest Act of 1993 formally enshrined the concepts of user group and community forestry in law. District officers became able to hand over any part of the national forest to a user group for conservation, use and management. Communities were able to sell and distribute their forest products.

1998: About 4,466 user groups were legally recognized and 293,000 hectares of national forest were handed over. While the Forest Act was seen as a great innovation, implementation was difficult due to the weak ability of the forest departments to build managerial capacity within user groups, as well as to distrust of government, inadequate financing, increased local disputes about benefit sharing, and leadership and actual membership problems in some of the groups.

2001: Proposed amendments to the Forest Act were designed to return land to control of the forestry department and require user groups to give away 65 percent of their earnings to the government. Widely seen as an attack on the act, the proposed provisions also called for giving forest areas to foreign concessions. The search for more government revenue was the primary drive behind the proposed amendments.

Looking Forward, Future Challenges. The debate on the respective rights of the nation and forest users continues, particularly in the lowland of Terai where the commercial interests are greatest.

Nepal is an interesting case because of the diverse use of the forest resource—to support agriculture, for timber and nontimber products, and to protect water sources and provide other environmental services. Experiments in different parts of Nepal are designed to strengthen local institutions and associations for communities and user groups. The focus also includes maximizing returns to forest users, in the form of cash income, new enterprises and subsistence products.

Despite the recent policy changes by the government, Nepal continues to be a model for other countries in South Asia who have not handed over as many management rights. A remaining challenge for forest user groups is to organize and prevent the government from re-establishing its control over forests now that these have increased in value thanks to the communities investments.

Sources: Forest and Communities.org; Mahapatra, 2001; Shrestha, 1998; Shrestha, 1999; and Britt, 1998.

Case 9: Tanzanian Land Policy Inspired by Models of Success

Forest Tenure in Tanzania. Tanzania is the southernmost country in East Africa, with a rich forest estate providing a variety of products and services, including fuelwood and numerous nontimber forest products, and more recently tourism resources. These forests are under considerable pressure for conversion to other uses and because of repeated forest fires. Since 1995, more than 1,000 village forest reserves have been created by communities, and more than 40 national forest reserves are coming under working co-management arrangements.50

Course of Events and Implications. 1970-early 1990s: Tanzania’s forest management model followed a typical Southeast African approach. In this classic African situation, most land was considered public property. A government forest bureaucracy sometimes zoned public land and declared it protected or conservation land, regardless of community claims or customary use rights. Community involvement in forest management was limited to occasional efforts to protect forests, replant, or make ill-managed community woodlots. Unique to Tanzania, however, was the presence of artificially created “villages” from Tanzania’s years of experimentation with socialism.
These villages were given strong legal rights. The villages have village councils—elected and recognized as legal entities in Tanzanian law. The councils can hold property, sue and conduct legal transactions. Village councils can also zone village-owned land as common land. The notion of the village as a legal governance entity is rare in Africa, as villages are usually part of territory administered in the colonial tradition by a central government.

1984: Duru-Haitema forest was proposed for gazettement as a forest reserve. The bylaws of the affected district declared the area protected, meaning local people could no longer use it or harvest timber. However, implementation of these rules did not take place.

1989: A discussion on the need for widespread legal tenure reform began within ministries and among experts and donors working in Tanzania. This resulted in the creation of a technical committee in the Ministry of Lands to look into urban land policy.

1991: The urban land policy commission was expanded to look into national land policy. A 12-member commission of inquiry traveled throughout the country to carry out its investigations.

1991-1992: Government forestry agents cleared the Duru-Haitema Forest boundaries and installed beacons. Affected village residents reacted with “resistance” (the nature of this resistance was not specified in documents consulted). External arbitration was sought. The arbitrator suggested that the government trade forest use rights for the “taking” of public land and its classification as a protected forest. Negotiations with affected villages halted reclassification of the land, and discussions continued for several years.

1993: The Land Commission of 1991 made its report with no support from the government. A position paper drawn up by the ministry eventually was based on the commission’s report. No public consultation on land tenure issues occurred.

1994: The forest land of Duru-Haitema was returned to the affected villages with recognized village title deeds. This solution was “discovered” in part because the affected villages were being supported by a donor project to survey and demarcate village areas at the same time the dispute over the Duru-Haitema forest took place. In the resulting agreement, each village zoned its part of the forest and closed some areas for restoration. Management rules were set up. After a local magistrate ruled against some villages on some management issues, the affected villages instituted village bylaws to clarify forest management rules.

1995: All 9,000 hectares of the Duru-Haitema forest were under the management of the affected villages. A National Land Policy was approved in Parliament.

Since 1995: Duru-Haitema forest management rules were continually modified and updated in incremental, local problem-solving arrangements.

1995-1998: Five villages around the Mgori forest in a different region followed the earlier model discovered at Duru-Haitema.

1996: A draft bill for a new Land Act was prepared by a British government-funded expatriate consultant. This angers members of the earlier land commission. The consultant’s Draft Land Act was not circulated.

1998: Very limited public discussion took place and the proposed

Unique to Tanzania was the presence of artificially created “villages” from Tanzania’s years of experimentation with socialism.
Land Act was finally allowed at the end of the calendar year. Local academics praised the bill for giving attention to the security needs of women and squatters, the village administration concept, the acceptance of commonages and the recognition of customary law. However, the bill was criticized for continuing to require government approval for nearly every step and every local change.

1999: Village Land Act #5 and the Land Act #4 were both quickly enacted in February with full support of Parliament. These laws divided Tanzania into village land, reserved land, and government land. Customary land law was also recognized. The laws provided for adjudicating, recording, registering and issuing titles for customary rights. Village councils managed village lands. Commonage also was accepted as a legitimate type of land.

2000: A new draft Forestry Bill was designed to add community forests as a type of forest classification. Cumbersome regulations for establishing community forests limited expansion of the Mgori and Duru-Haitemba models. The Land Acts of 1999 came to be seen as extremely difficult to implement due to lack of political will within the affected ministries. The ministry of Lands claimed the new Land Acts would require decades to implement. Experts on the scene questioned whether the Ministry would bother advising villages on using the act for community benefit or simply would ignore the new laws and continue Top-down land management and “business as usual.”

The timeline of this case illustrates the usefulness of successful field experiments and how they get the attention they need when national reform emerges as a possibility. It also shows the limitations of many worthy “top-down” changes promoted by donors, as well as the limitations of change through models without strong civil society associations. Top-down reforms can provide necessary legislative framework, but bottom-up activism and a dense network of civic organizations and interest groups may be necessary to make the changes operational and to make them stick over time. Tanzania is also an unusual case in its region, in terms of communities’ strength with registration and the rights to elect their own local governments in the form of the village council. As the decentralization process unfolds in Africa, Tanzania will provide interesting lessons on the role of governance in effective forest management.


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