

CELEBRATING INDONESIA

Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation 1953-2003



FORD FOUNDATION





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I N T R O D U C T I O N

A TIME FOR CELEBRATION

The story of the Ford Foundation's half century in Indonesia resonates with the great motifs of nation-building, development and modernization that shaped international relations in the second half of the 20th century. It is also a chronicle of one of the United States' leading philanthropic organizations as it sought to play an effective and relevant role in a rapidly-changing world. The Foundation's work in Indonesia and elsewhere is grounded in the culture of American philanthropy, which emerged in the late 1800s from a unique combination of the United States' industrial expansion, ideals of social reform, and a system of government taxation providing incentives for the charitable giving of private wealth.

The Foundation has never functioned as a *charity*, in the sense of providing direct relief or services to those in need. Instead it is a *philanthropy*, defined in the dictionary as "an active effort to promote human welfare." The Foundation works to effect positive change in strategically chosen areas of endeavor. Its mission statement expresses and elaborates this basic purpose through four overarching goals: strengthen democratic values, reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation, and advance human achievement.

◀ *Displaying hand-woven ikat textiles in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, 2003. Facilitating the transmission of traditional arts – including weaving – across generations is a theme of the Foundation's arts and culture grantmaking.*

The Ford Foundation was established in 1936 as a local philanthropy in the state of Michigan, using gifts of stock in the Ford Motor Company from Henry and Edsel Ford. Following the global turmoil and destruction of World War II, and anticipating additional bequests from Ford family estates, the Foundation commissioned a study (known as the “Gaither Report”) to assess new options and directions for its work. In 1950, the Foundation’s trustees made the historic decision to expand the organization to become a national and an international foundation. This decision reflected particular concern for the cause of peace: “among all the problems in human relations,” the trustees stated, “the greatest challenge is the achievement of peace throughout the world.” The Trustees felt that only through improving economic and social conditions in societies around the globe could the causes of war be eliminated, and they mandated that the Foundation’s resources be managed as a perpetual source of support for programs and operations. Over time, the Foundation divested itself of all of its Ford Motor Company stock, and the Ford family no longer was involved with the decisions or policies of the Foundation.

Under the guidance of its first president, Paul Hoffman, the Ford Foundation began operations outside of the United States, focusing on newly independent or emerging societies struggling to institute democratic forms of government. Before joining the Foundation, Hoffman had been a principal architect of the Marshall Plan in Europe. He approached the development of overseas programs by focusing on the needs of individual countries, consulting the governments of those countries about their own priorities, and establishing overseas offices of the Foundation to work “on the ground.” These basic principles of operations in countries around the world have endured to this day.

Of those countries where the Foundation initiated overseas work in the 1950s, there are only two in which it remains active: India (where the field office opened in 1952) and Indonesia (opened in 1953). In Asia today, the Foundation also has offices in China and Vietnam, but over time it has had resident Representatives in Bangladesh, Burma, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Indonesia was viewed as “a country of unique significance” in early Foundation memoranda, because of its rapid and turbulent transition from colony to independent state and the great need for development of its human resources, and because – in the political thinking of that time – Indonesia seemed to have “a reasonable chance of developing along democratic lines.” It is clear that in the early days of the Cold War, the Foundation’s leadership shared the concerns of the United States government regarding communism in Asia, and that Indonesia was regarded as contested territory in the confrontation between totalitarian and open societies.

In 1952, the first assessment team to visit Indonesia from the Ford Foundation described Indonesia’s pressing need to train competent administrators, increase rice production, improve basic health, and address education needs that were “tremendous in scale,” including a need for greater fluency in English. Indonesia had a population of 75 million people, the sixth largest population in the world at that time. It had vast resources of forest, marine and mineral wealth, yet its population suffered from widespread poverty following the Depression of the 1930s, the Japanese occupation, and the war for independence in the 1940s. Only ten per cent of Indonesians were literate; unlike in India where mass education was provided to train colonial subjects for public service, Dutch colonial policy severely limited the educational opportunities available to “natives.”







The Indonesian government welcomed the Foundation's offer of involvement, and President Sukarno endorsed the proposals for training civil servants and improving the teaching of English. In an unpublished memoir, one of the early Representatives in Jakarta, John Bresnan, suggested that "a private American philanthropy like the Ford Foundation was of some interest [to Sukarno] as an alternative to the US government," which had only reluctantly come to support the cause of Indonesian independence during the struggle against the Dutch from 1945-49. A one-room office in Jakarta's Hotel des Indes opened in June 1953, but activities at first progressed with frustrating slowness. It was only when a former labor organizer named Michael Harris took over the Jakarta office in 1955 that the Foundation began to make a mark.

Over the 50 years of its work in Indonesia, the Foundation has committed, in today's dollars, some US\$ 420 million in Indonesia in a variety of fields, out of more than \$12 billion given in grants and loans in the US and internationally. The Foundation remains an independent, nonprofit organization, accepting no contributions from governments or any other donors; its trustees set policy and delegate grantmaking and operational authority to the president and

senior staff working in its New York and 12 overseas offices. Programs in Indonesia are linked to those in other countries around the world, promoting the cross-fertilization of ideas and strategies as well as international collaboration among grantees and staff.

Conditions in Indonesia have vastly changed since 1953: there are now some 212 million people, national literacy rates approach 90 per cent, and per capita income has grown from less than \$30 in the early 1960s to around \$900 today. Schools, health facilities, modern communications, and basic infrastructure have spread throughout the archipelago. A succession of governments – from Sukarno's super-nationalist Guided Democracy to the authoritarian New Order of Suharto, the brief interludes of B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, up to the current administration of President Megawati Sukarnoputri – have wrestled with enormous problems in addressing needs for improved livelihoods, social justice, and pluralist tolerance. These governments' policies and their effects, along with global and local currents of socio-economic change, have created the context for the Foundation's work and the array of issues and challenges to which it has sought to respond.




▲ Representative Michael Harris with his secretary, listed only as Miss Cunningham in the photo's original caption, in the Hotel des Indes office, 1957.
 ◀ The Hotel des Indes, where the Foundation opened its first office in Indonesia in 1953.

Over the past 50 years, grantmaking programs have changed and evolved in tune with the Foundation's staff assessments of issues to be addressed and opportunities for making an impact. The first decade of activity focused on establishing faculties of economics and teachers' training colleges, and on building English language capacity. Most of the Foundation's Indonesian grantmaking at that time went toward education; the Foundation could point to over 300 teachers and administrators who studied outside the country, many of whom later attained key positions in government or universities, or as policy advisors. The most famous among these – a cohort of economic “technocrats” trained at leading US institutions like the University of California and Massachusetts Institute of Technology – became known as the “Berkeley Mafia.”

Political conflict led to a temporary closing of the office in late 1965. When it reopened in 1967, the Foundation decided to add new emphases to its existing programs through support for family planning, rice research, basic social sciences, and development planning at the national level. These themes were the hallmarks of work in the 1970s, along with continuing support for higher education for Indonesians. The Foundation's approach was importantly influenced by a report in 1971 on

social-science training commissioned from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. He observed that “Indonesian intellectual life is centralized, over-organized, practical, and strongly influenced by economists.” Geertz argued that the social sciences required stimulation through a decentralized training program based in regional institutions, “animated by regional concerns,” and grounded in research methods and analysis. As a result, the Foundation helped launch the Social Science Research Training Stations program and extended support for the non-economic social sciences in other directions as well.

Entering the 1980s, the Foundation's substantial commitment to the social sciences had strengthened its capacity to respond to the need for poverty alleviation strategies for the village-based, agriculture-dependent Indonesians who formed 80 per cent of the population. By 1982 Indonesia had been classified as a “middle income country” by the World Bank, and along with other ASEAN countries had enjoyed a period of relative stability and economic growth. Yet this stability was shadowed by tight military control and concerns about basic human rights, and there were growing and glaring inequities in the distribution of the fruits of development, especially under the domination of Indonesia's military and business elite.



▲ Taufik Abdullah (Cornell), Alfian (Wisconsin), Harsja Bachtiar (Harvard), Soedradjad Djiwandono (Wisconsin), Mely Tan (UC Berkeley), and Algamar (Wisconsin) in front of UC Berkeley's Sather Gate at a meeting of Foundation grantees who had been selected for study abroad by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – LIPI), 1966.





▲ and ► Foundation-supported researchers from Brawijaya University in Malang, East Java, interview farmers to gain a better understanding of their agroecological practices. ◀ Repairing manuscripts in the court of Surakarta, Central Java. The Foundation's work in preserving, cataloguing, and microfilming Indonesia's endangered manuscripts began in 1984.

The Foundation's program, accordingly, focused increasingly on community-based management of land and water resources, on the productivity of Indonesia's diverse agroecosystems and its informal employment sector, and on the need to base development interventions on the real interests and involvement of rural Indonesians. Another signature of this period was a growing number of grants to emerging civil-society organizations struggling to operate outside the framework of government, promoting concern for legal and human rights, the environment, consumer interests, and gender equity. Equally important was the growth and deepening of support for work in cultural preservation and vitality, which sought to study, document, and sustain Indonesia's diverse and vibrant living traditions.

During the years 1981 to 1995, Jakarta was designated as Ford's Southeast Asia regional office, and the geographic

focus and impact of the Foundation's work expanded considerably. During this time all grantmaking in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam was administered from Jakarta, and program staff based in Indonesia frequently worked on parallel activities across the region.

In the 1990s, it became clear that a fractured yet progressively more adamant opposition to the New Order was emerging from many sectors of society, and that Indonesia's economic disparities, official corruption, and lack of openness were great and growing problems. Increasingly, Foundation grantees promoted social justice concerns, whether these took the shape of attention to minority cultural groups and their "right to be different," women calling for improved reproductive health and livelihoods, journalists advancing freedom of expression, or local communities seeking recognition of their rights to forest resources.

DESA GUBUG
KEPALA
KRAJAN

KELOMPOK
PEK
ANGREK





UNIBRAW
FORD FOUNDATION



KMS
KARTU MENUJU SEHAT





- ▲ *A trainer from Rifka Anissa, a reproductive health grantee in Yogyakarta, speaking at a workshop for local police on handling cases of domestic abuse, 2003.*
 ◆ *A mother with her newborn child at a clinic outside of Bandung, 1985. Improving maternal-child health was an important focus of the Foundation's support in the 1980s.* ► *A sex worker in Singaraja, Bali, learns how to properly apply a condom at a clinic run by grantee Citra Usadha, 2003.*

Throughout its 50 years in Indonesia, the Foundation has sustained its commitment to education, supporting a range of scholarship and fellowship programs that have evolved with changing conditions and needs in the country. The earliest scholarships were designed to help forge new generations of university teachers in fields such as economics and education that were deemed critical for a newly independent nation. Subsequent programs helped to build expertise in specific fields such as cultural documentation and revitalization, population and reproductive health, and rural development. Today significant new programs support post-graduate study for talented individuals from underserved or disadvantaged sectors of the population, who show promise as leaders of their community or society.

Other emerging areas of the Foundation's work moving

into the new millennium include support for Muslim groups exploring alternative interpretations of social and gender issues, religious groups seeking to increase their appreciation of local artistic traditions and cultural practices, and educators developing a new school curriculum in the arts stressing Indonesia's cultural diversity. A new program portfolio focusing on local governance and civic participation was established and quickly built momentum. Another new area of grantmaking reflects the Foundation's interest in the cultures, practices and environment for philanthropy within Indonesia, along with concern for the sustainability and accountability of civic associations and nonprofit institutions. Underlying much of its work in Indonesia is the Foundation's commitment to pluralism and peaceful co-existence among the archipelago's diverse cultures.





This record of support to thousands of individuals and institutions over half a century reveals certain shifts and changes in the modalities of the Foundation's philanthropy. While in its early days grants were conceived and designed in concert with agencies of the Government of Indonesia (including universities), over time the Foundation also developed strong links with private groups and the nonprofit sector. Initially, the Foundation's strategic approaches were based on training, institution-building, and the provision of outside expertise. Later on, the importance of networking among various organizations, integration of research and policy processes, and building knowledge through community-based initiatives was recognized. The Foundation increasingly has sought to facilitate fruitful, diverse partnerships involving NGOs, academic researchers, and government, providing multi-faceted institutional support for people to explore new avenues and test innovative ideas.

The Ford Foundation's flexibility, patience, and long-term commitment to important problems have been distinguishing features of its work throughout its years in Indonesia. Grants not only fund short-term projects, but also provide essential core funding to help ensure long-term organizational sustainability. The Foundation invests in people, institutions, and ideas, without always predicting the outcomes of its support. In fact, the unanticipated outcomes or by-



▲ *President Suharto greets visiting Ford President Franklin Thomas (center) and Board Chair Edson Spencer, 1989.*
 ▶ *Playing on fish traps outside of Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, 2003. These traps are a local invention developed by villagers working with WARSI, a grantee that promotes community-based natural resource management.*

products of grants provide important insights, as when community organizing around irrigation management and forestry gave people skills that are now proving vital in the radically new context of decentralization.

Relationships between donors and grant recipients can be one of the most sensitive and challenging dimensions of international philanthropy. The Foundation seeks to fulfill its obligations for grantee reports and monitoring while still allowing grantees to develop their programs without excessive oversight

or intervention. In a speech commemorating Ford's 40th anniversary in Indonesia, the prominent economist Widjojo Nitisastro commented that the Foundation did not involve itself in day-to-day activities or decision-making once programs it funded were initiated.

A willingness to experiment with, to learn from, and to adjust activities as innovative approaches are tried has characterized the Foundation's work in Indonesia as elsewhere. In measuring the results of its support, the Foundation recognizes that even projects that fail to achieve all their objectives can yield valuable insights and lessons for the future. Forging successful partnerships with independent local groups and institutions means that innovation and learning take place in a mutually respectful environment. In the end, dialogue and the exchange of ideas and critical perspectives can be just as significant as the transfer of funds.





▲ *The second Foundation office, on Taman Kebon Sirih in Central Jakarta.*

▼ *Sidney Jones and Brent Ashabranner in 1978, during one of the many memorable floods that staff endured over the years at the Foundation's Kebon Sirih office.*



A visitor to the Ford Foundation office in the early 1960s would likely have taken a pedicab along the narrow, leafy lanes of Kampung Bali, or have crossed a small bridge over the nearby canal, to reach Taman Kebon Sirih (“Betel Tree Garden”). The office occupied the rooms of what was once a private residence, and its reception, work, and storage areas bore traces of the former domestic layout. Because of its low-lying location and the nearby canal, in the rainy season the grounds were often submerged, and water periodically seeped up through the tiles of the office floor. A former representative recalled how the staff drew high-water marks from severe floods on the inside wall. They even took home inundated files and – on one unforgettable occasion – wet banknotes from the office safe in order to iron them dry.

Until the mid-1970s, the professional program staff of the Foundation tended to be American, white and male. The pool of potential employees willing and able to work overseas overlapped with those who typically joined the diplomatic service or foreign aid organizations; it is not surprising, then, that there was some circulation of staff among foundations,

the United States Agency for International Development, and the State Department.

When the Foundation began working in Indonesia, there was a dearth of local professionals to carry out activities such as language or teacher training, teaching clerical skills to public servants, or development planning. The only way to launch significant efforts in any of these areas was to hire experts to do the work, hence the Foundation employed numbers of American university trainers and international consultants. These experts, often called “project specialists,” lived in regional centers such as Malang, Medan or Yogyakarta, while their operations and support facilities were managed by the Jakarta office. In the 1970s the Foundation operated a residence on Jalan Daksa III in Kebayoran Baru that functioned as a six-bedroom guest house (*wisma*) for project specialists and consultants passing through Jakarta. Many expatriates then working with Foundation-supported projects still recall pleasant evenings spent exchanging stories at “Wisma Ford,” and the legendary cooking of Hasan, its resident manager.



▲ Inspecting construction of new Foundation houses in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta: Kamaruszaman, Andrew Choa, F.F. “Frosty” Hill, Harrison Parker, Michael Harris, and an unidentified colleague, 1957.

▶▶ The Foundation’s crowded office in the Hotel des Indes, 1957. The photo’s original caption identifies Kamaruszaman, Miss Cunningham, Bahasuan, June Kuntjoro-Jakti, Tony, Sukardjo, Andrew Choa, Hasanah, Harrison Parker and Miss Livingstone.





Beginning in the late 1970s under the presidency of Franklin Thomas, the Foundation underwent a significant institutional reorientation, leading to changes in the staff profile and its public mission. Diminishing resources earlier in the decade had led the trustees to require financial retrenchment, and the Foundation's staff worldwide was decreased by nearly half. Several field offices were closed, as the Foundation determined that it was more productive to work more intensively in a smaller number of countries. At the same time, Thomas encouraged the staff to provide direct grant support for program activities, with local institutions deciding when and how to bring foreign technical assistance to bear; the role of the "project specialist" thus was ended. All of these changes meant that Foundation program officers became less concerned with operational details of specific projects, and could be more involved with design and monitoring of broader thematic programs.

Other sorts of changes began to alter the profile of the Foundation's staff around the world. Gender, ethnic and international diversity became high priorities in both grantmaking and staffing, and the Foundation applied this commitment at all levels of the organization, including its Board

of Trustees. In the Jakarta office, where the first female program officer was hired in 1977, the Representative and three out of four program officers were women in the mid-1990s. At the same time, Ford's leadership wanted to open staff positions to excellence wherever it could be found, and thus large numbers of program officers with non-US citizenship now work in the New York and overseas offices, under the leadership of President Susan V. Berresford. This process of "internationalizing" has also enabled more program staff to be hired from within the host countries, including Indonesia.

For visitors to the Foundation's office in Jakarta – which moved from Taman Kebon Sirih to its current location on Jalan Jenderal Sudirman in 1990 – the most familiar faces belong to local staff who have dedicated their careers to Ford's activities in Indonesia. Expatriate officers come and go, but the Indonesian administrative, clerical and support staff have been key to the continuity and grounded nature of the Foundation's expanding portfolio in the country. The local staff have a strong informal network, and their professional bonds are deeply felt; their commitment has indeed anchored the Foundation's achievements over the decades.



▲ *The Foundation's drivers and office assistants posing in front of the Hotel des Indes: Winata, Totong, Sukardjo, Sarwani, Abas (standing), Basir and Bahasuan, 1957.* ► *Images of the Foundation's Indonesian and other Southeast Asian staff over the years.*

From the moment Foundation staff began to think about the approaching 50th anniversary of the office, it was clear that some kind of history needed to be written for our colleagues and partners within Indonesia and abroad. Beyond the myriad existing grant-related publications and reports, office brochures, and commissioned assessments, we agreed that we needed a thoughtful view of the Foundation within the evolving context of a half-century of independent Indonesia. The best book, we felt, would show the Foundation's legacy through the eyes and voices of Indonesians who have, in some manner, interacted with this institution.

Foundation staff began discussions with a broad group of Indonesian colleagues who might be either subjects of or actors in the book project. It was our good fortune that one of Indonesia's foremost essayists, a founding editor of the news weekly *Tempo* and Harvard Nieman Fellow, Goenawan Mohamad, agreed to write the main text. He then assembled an especially talented team including the anthropologist and journalist Sandra Hamid; the journalist and another Nieman Fellow Andreas Harsono; and the author and critic Laksmi Pamuntjak. Mark Hanusz of Equinox Publishing was tireless in coordinating a number of translators, editors, proofreaders and photographers. The team was given unfettered access to the Foundation's archives – to materials ranging from program planning documents to outside evaluations and internal critiques, and lists of individual and institutional grantees over the past 50 years. Researchers conducted exhaustive searches of public and private photo archives to find evocative images of each of the decades covered in the book, and current and former staff and grantees contributed photographs from their personal collections.

The writers shaped an outline featuring different voices, individual reflections, and specially-researched interludes, or “sidebars.” They had a free hand in articulating the content and perspectives of the volume, and in selecting the individuals and institutions whose voices and work would be featured. The result is a critical view of the country's development and of people who have helped shape it, capturing some of the themes and challenges that have resonated over the nation's first half-century. The writers chose to examine these themes and actors in the context of history, not judging them by current standards, but nonetheless offering an unvarnished impression of the legacy they left for future generations.

Given the breadth of our subject – not only the magnitude of the Foundation's work, but especially the complexity of the

country's first fifty years of independence – we knew that the book would necessarily be selective. It could not possibly portray every important aspect and episode of modern Indonesia. Likewise, countless individuals, institutions, grant-supported programs, and staff members associated with the Foundation are inevitably left unmentioned here. But we gratefully acknowledge their help to the Foundation. We hope that this picture of the Ford Foundation within an Indonesian frame will be meaningful for all of our partners and colleagues over the past five decades.

Placing this book itself in historical context, it is apropos to note that it was conceived in the early months after the “9/11” terrorist tragedy, in an environment of exacerbated tension, fear and mistrust among and within many societies around the globe. Yet we could not have foreseen then that as preparation of this book proceeded, Indonesia would become a front-page news story as it endured shocking terrorist attacks on its own soil by members of its own citizenry, or that it would be catapulted from relative obscurity to international notoriety as a haven for terrorism. This was not the image of Indonesia that the people whose voices and faces emerge from this book could have imagined or would now accept as a definitive characterization of their home. As Goenawan Mohamad tells us at the conclusion of this book, Indonesians are engaged in a great experiment which, for the overwhelming majority, is a journey toward a just, prosperous and inclusive society. It is more important than ever that their vision and their stories prevail.

This book is part of a larger celebration of the Ford Foundation's 50th anniversary in Indonesia. It is also a celebration of the country's diversity and pluralism, an opportunity to honor the achievements of our myriad colleagues and grantees, and a salute to the creativity and determination of Indonesia's people in forging a strong independent nation and in anticipating the challenges of an uncertain future. This book gives voice to some of those individuals who have played a role in the country's development over the past half-century and reflects many of the challenges they have faced along the way. It has been a privilege for the Ford Foundation to contribute, however modestly, to these efforts just as it is an honor to continue with old and new colleagues on the journey into Indonesia's new millennium.

Suzanne E. Siskel and Mary S. Zurbuchen
Jakarta, October 2003





CHAPTER ONE: NO IVORY TOWER



NO IVORY TOWER

Half a century ago, no one would have thought that an important part of modern Indonesian history would begin in a building of bland colonial architecture at No. 4 Jalan Salemba. It is just a stone's throw from the morgue of the hospital that bus drivers used to call "CBZ" – short for the Dutch "Centraal Burgerlijk Ziekenhuis" – but now better known as the Dr. Cipto Mangunkusumo General Hospital. Almost next to No. 4, just across a small side street, is No. 6 Jalan Salemba, a more attractive, multi-storied building, and the site of classrooms for the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Medicine. There, if you turn to the left, you will see a kind of gateway. Pass through it and you come to an open ground where sit two additional classrooms and a large auditorium, sometimes called the "amphi" by students, probably because of the arrangement of seats that are banked progressively higher toward the back of the room. Walk several meters past this building today, and you come to the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Economics (*Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia* – FEUI), a patchwork school of sorts that has grown by bits and pieces.

The longing for a free, independent, and modern Indonesia was not something foreign to the inhabitants of these buildings on Jalan Salemba. Only a month after Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, a group of doctors and other intellectuals met in the CBZ's delivery room. They were

- ◀ *A reunion of UI students inside No. 4 Jalan Salemba, 1958.*
- ▶ *The UI Faculty of Medicine. Jakarta, 1950.*







not there to talk about medicine. They had gathered to discuss the establishment of an institution that would combine the existing Faculty of Medicine – the seeds for which were sown in the 19th century when it was called the “Javanese Doctors School” – with other academic disciplines. So there in that delivery room, the idea of establishing a National Center of Higher Education (*Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia* – BPTRI) was born. It would not be called a “university”; that would have been too Western. The people gathered there on Jalan Salemba were painfully aware that the new republic desperately needed a modern institution of advanced learning. The Dutch colonial government had left behind practically nothing; a mere 1000 citizens had received the benefit of higher education – 1000 out of 70 million.

This dream nearly foundered in midstream, though. In late 1945, following the surrender of the Japanese, Allied troops occupied Jakarta, and the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) was established to oversee administration of the former Dutch colony. Predictably, many Indonesian intellectuals refused to be forced again to wear the yoke of colonial domination. Some of the staff of the Faculty of Medicine repaired to Central Java, where the new government of the independent Republic of Indonesia had moved. Other staff, in consideration of the need for their services at CBZ or,

perhaps, because of the possibility of more opportunities to advance their position, remained in Jakarta.

In 1948, NICA seconded two Dutch officials, an army colonel and a medical doctor, to take over the task of running CBZ. Some of the Indonesian employees at the hospital refused to work with them. As an expression of solidarity with these nationalists, medical students stopped going to lectures in Salemba No. 6; instead, they went to their professors’ homes for instruction. In this way BPTRI – one of the first institutions of the Republic of Indonesia – survived. When, in 1949, NICA then established a so-called “Transitional” University of Indonesia in Jakarta, many medical instructors refused to join.

Despite this setback, NICA continued to pursue its plan. It established a chain of campuses in other cities: in Surabaya, faculties (schools) of medicine and of dentistry; in Bandung, a technical school; in Bogor, faculties of agriculture and of animal husbandry; and in Makassar, a faculty of economics. Taken together, these campuses formed what NICA called *Universiteit van Indonesië*. Later, when the Dutch finally recognized Indonesian sovereignty, this institution became *Universitas Indonesia* or the University of Indonesia, now commonly known as UI. Yet BPTRI was not subsumed within this institution until February 1959, and even then only after much heated debate.



▲ A lecture at Hasanuddin University, Makassar, 1952.

SAYUTI HASIBUAN

Sayuti Hasibuan was one of several academics from Nommensen University, an affiliate of the Indonesian Batak Protestant Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan – HKBP), to receive funding from the Ford Foundation for further education in the US in 1961. While most of his colleagues came from Java, Hasibuan came to the US directly from Medan. He studied the economics of human resources at the University of California, Berkeley. Due to internal rivalries at Nommensen stemming from clan and religious differences, Hasibuan, a devout Muslim, resigned from his post. He moved to Jakarta, where he works in the Faculty of Economics at the Al-Azhar Indonesia University. He is particularly interested in issues related to the Islamization of the economy and the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia.

Nommensen University was founded in 1954. The Faculty of Economics used Dutch lecturers with experience in the plantation sector. Prior to the establishment of this university, there was a theological school in Pematang Siantar. I entered Nommensen in 1955. In the years that followed, the university was involved in a range of programs with the Foundation. I left for Berkeley in 1961, and I was still on a contract with Nommensen. I returned in 1965 to complete my dissertation and to resume teaching. At the time, the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* – PKI) was extremely active.

I was actively involved in the Islamic Students Federation [*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* – HMI]. At that time there was a great deal of conflict between Muslim and communist students, and so I thought it would be better to leave Medan. Luckily I received an offer from the Foundation to study in America. It was a great opportunity to avoid the discord that occurred throughout the 1960s. When I returned as a lecturer, however, the divisions in society were even more violent. So in 1971 I decided to leave again.

That same year I was asked by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo to help rationalize the Indonesian Army, as it was extremely overstaffed and many personnel had to be dismissed. I assisted in the planning of this, and although my official title was assistant to Sumitro at the Ministry of Trade, my main responsibility was to prepare those soldiers who were to be dismissed from active duty.

Later Widjojo Nitisastro invited me to assist at the National Planning Board [*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan*

Nasional – BAPPENAS] where I worked in a variety of fields involving human resources. In the 1970s the situation in Indonesia was extremely chaotic. There was no clear



Sayuti Hasibuan in Jakarta, 1995.

direction to development. As a result, academics performed a wide range of unusual functions.

Actually, Sumitro was not entirely in accord with the Widjojo-led technocrats. His natural impulses were more community oriented, with a strong interest in the development of human resources. However, he was unable to articulate his own beliefs. Even though he wasn't entirely in accord with them, Sumitro was trapped in Western paradigms, dominated by Keynesian economics and the ideas of Adam Smith.

These ideas had been developed over hundreds of years, and Sumitro was unable to challenge them.

It was not easy to develop Nommensen.

There was a conflict between the university and its foundation. Who was in charge? Nommensen was controlled by the foundation and the foundation was controlled by HKBP church. The foundation was beset by conflicts beginning with instructors' salaries, who would be sent for study, who would not, who would become rector and even how funds would be used. That's how it was then. I don't know how it is now.

Cooperation between universities – for example those in Indonesia and the US – are good because of the contact between [Indonesian] nationals and foreigners. There can be conflicts that disrupt the balance between them and this can be hard to change.

If we compare the three universities that have been assisted by the Foundation – Gadjah Mada [UGM], UI, and Nommensen – only UI has significant influence. Many of its academics are powerful in government circles. In a way, that's natural, because UGM and Nommensen are distant from the capital Jakarta. But even so, the influence wielded by academics from UI is entirely different from that wielded by UGM and Nommensen. UI academics promote the classical economic paradigms, those developed by John Maynard Keynes, Adam Smith, and others of that ilk. But those who have worked actively to develop a new paradigm for the development of Indonesia – such as critics like Sritua Arief from Nommensen – have come from outside UI.





The history of FEUI parallels that of its Faculty of Medicine, but with somewhat different problems. Prior to Indonesian independence there was no school of economics in Jakarta. There was one in Makassar, in southern Sulawesi, but even this was far from ideal as courses there were more concerned with business administration than with pure economics. Qualified instructors were almost nowhere to be found. In Jakarta, the study of economics was limited to socio-economics as taught by the Faculty of Law and Social Science. Thus, an aspiring young economist would have to study somewhere besides No. 4 Salemba. So it was that at around the same time UI was created, the Society for the Advancement of Science, a private foundation, established an alternative higher educational institution, the National Academy.

A number of the Academy's first students – Daoed Joesoef, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, and Panglaykim, to name just three – would go on to become well-known economists. For Daoed Joesoef, a young painter who had joined nationalist independence forces in Medan, North Sumatra, enrolling at the National Academy was an expression of republican sentiment. Studying alongside him were Suhadi, who had joined the guerrilla movement while still a member of the student brigade in East Java, and Widjojo Nitisastro, whose later role

in history would figure more prominently than those of his friends. In Joesoef's view, no matter how you looked at it, the institution at No. 4 Salemba was a creation of the Dutch. A true nationalist would opt to go elsewhere, even to the poorly financed National Academy, just as medical students had sought instruction in their professors' homes. "Sometimes, classes were held at night, beneath the light of oil lanterns," Joesoef recalls.

In the end, however, a proper faculty of economics was established at UI. Students of all political stripes enrolled, from the republicans who had once been in the guerrilla movement to the 'lesser republicans' who came from the school founded by NICA in Makassar. With an extremely low enrollment fee of 300 rupiah for the first year – after which it was free – 300 students applied and were accepted.

Almost all of the new students were admitted at the first year level, the *propaedeutis*, a term illustrating the irony that even while the nationalist spirit was burning, the use of classical terms was still acceptable in schools. The general lecture, held weekly in the "amphi," was called *studium generale*. School songs, such as the cheerful *Ius Vivat*, as well as the more somber *Gaudeamus Igitur*, continued to be sung at campus gatherings and ceremonies just as they were in far-off Leiden and Rotterdam.



◀ and ▶ Initiation of first-year UI students, October 1950.

DAOED JOESOEF

Daoed Joesoef is a native of Aceh who grew up in Medan, near where his father owned a milk factory. Joesoef was the first lecturer from FEUI to study at the Sorbonne in Paris, breaking a tradition established by the majority of his colleagues who studied in the US. He once served as minister of education and culture under President Subarto, and was known by students in the late 1970s as a “man of analysis” not a “man of public meetings.”

At the beginning of the 1950's, I served as an assistant to Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo in his endeavors to develop the study of economics at FEUI. I was responsible for the development of economics faculties at universities in the regions, including Makassar, where the university was originally established by the Dutch, and which later became the Hassanuddin University.

In fact, previously, I'd sent a letter to Prime Minister Hatta, after the recognition of sovereignty in 1949, to suggest that the school of economics at Makassar be dissolved. This was for reasons of efficiency, and also because the school was unsympathetic to the Republic. However, Sumitro insisted that we should overlook the past. I accepted the justice of those arguments, and served as a visiting lecturer. I also established schools for the study of economics in Palembang and Lampung.

In 1956, the PRRI-Permesta rebellion broke out. One day, just after I'd flown into Makassar to teach, the airport was bombed by the rebels. I was trapped in Makassar. It was quite ironic, really, because Sumitro was actually one of the leaders of the rebellion.

Sumitro played a significant role in the establishment of FEUI. He introduced Keynesian economics to Indonesia and approached the Foundation for assistance in the development of FEUI's teaching staff. He also facilitated the recruitment of teaching staff from the US. Prior to that, when FEUI had been under the influence of Dutch teachers, Keynesian economics was unknown. At the time, almost the entire collection of material in the library was in Dutch.

The Foundation assisted in sending Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, and various others to America. I didn't go, because of my other duties. Also, my mother was unwell. As the oldest child, I felt particularly responsible for her after the death of my father.

At the time, I was also an active writer. I'd written an article criticizing Hatta's assertion that it was not necessary to maintain gold reserves to guarantee the Indonesian currency. At the time, it was stipulated that gold reserves must equal 20 per cent of the value of currency in circulation. However, in the unstable political environment, the government paid its bills simply by printing money. Hatta had



Daoed Joesoef in Jakarta, 1978.

suggested that the gold standard be eliminated. I argued this point through an article in *Mimbar Indonesia*. I took view that it was necessary to maintain the gold standard, but that its level should be determined with respect to the value of imports.

Not long later, I was invited to join the vice president's group as he traveled through Tegal, Pekalongan, and the surrounding areas. We traveled by chartered train, with me in the same carriage as Hatta. Hatta engaged me in discussions throughout. While these did not result in decisive conclusions, I felt honored by the attention Hatta paid me.

By the end of the 1950s, I felt that economics as taught at FEUI did not prepare students to play a part in the public economy. In a work entitled *Economic*

Development: Theory, History and Policy, Meier and Baldwin argue that issues related to development were far too important to be controlled by economists alone. This argument influenced FEUI to establish a new department, the Department of Public Economic Administration.

In order to achieve this, funding for experienced lecturers was required. The Foundation was prepared to fund the education of teaching staff. I decided that training should be conducted at the Sorbonne, because of the high quality of the education provided to their civil servants in post-graduate training programs at *l'école d'administration*.

Being a Francophile, I was the only one interested in studying at the Sorbonne. I am an enthusiastic painter, and I appreciate Paris as an artistic center. However, things didn't go as smoothly as planned. Widjojo, the deputy dean of FEUI, refused to approve my departure to Paris, and the Foundation didn't want to send an academic without the approval of his superiors.

I took this matter up with Representative Frank Miller. In the end, Miller agreed, on condition that the government approved. I visited the Minister for Education Syarif Thayeb, a military officer from Aceh. Syarif Thayeb was surprised to hear that Widjojo had refused to sign my letter, saying that the Sorbonne was even older than UC Berkeley.

I studied at the Sorbonne for eight years. When I returned, I found that my department had been dissolved. Widjojo and I held divergent views on the issue of economic development. I always felt that the economy was too important to be handled by economists alone. When I joined the Cabinet as minister of education and culture, I hoped that I would be able to promote my vision. However, Suharto told me that I should confine myself to issues directly related to education as he had other people who could handle the economy.

It is possible that the teaching staff and students at UI imagined themselves to be part of the centuries-old European tradition of higher education. Until the late 1950s, student life at Salemba resembled that of their peers in Holland. At the time the practice of “free study” was in vogue: students, being considered mature enough to choose their own courses and set their own schedules, were not required to attend classes so long as they were able to demonstrate their knowledge on a test. Even then, if they failed, they could repeat the test until they passed. These were the university’s “eternal students.”

One student in the Faculty of Law – who would later gain prominence as a founder of the country’s first think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – was Harry Tjan Silalahi. Recalling his time at the university, he said that he practically never attended classes. Hailing from a poor family in Yogyakarta, Silalahi made his living as a teacher. For him, attending lectures was a luxury. One day, when entering the classroom to take a test he did not even know who the professor was.

And when students like Silalahi did find the time to come to Salemba, often they would wind up hanging out at a coffee stall across the street from CBZ while waiting for students from the Faculty of Letters, most of whom were women, to pass. “We lived on books, parties, and love,” said Djunaedi Hadisumarto, a budding economist who, years later, served in President Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration as chairman of BAPPENAS.

For college students at that time, life seemed untouched by the outside world. They attended classes when they felt like it. They spent their free time hanging out at Miauw Seng’s, a snack shop across the street from No. 4 Salemba. They went dancing at their friends’ homes. Or, as freshmen, they spent the last day of initiation week celebrating at the Harmonie club house, a gathering place for Jakarta’s elite. Two law students, Marihot and Paul Hutabarat, formed a band that became extremely popular. As their friends hit the dance floor, they played songs reminiscent of Bill Haley and the Comets and The Platters. The students’ drinks of choice: lemonade and sarsaparilla.

Regardless of these romantic memories, student life at UI was actually never far from day-to-day realities of an impoverished country that was not yet a decade old. A year after FEUI officially opened in the Faculty of Medicine’s auditorium, it had yet to find its own space on campus. Sometimes lectures were held in a classroom in the Faculty of Letters across from CBZ, other times in a room on nearby Jalan Tambak or in various other locations. The school’s administrative officers worked out of a room down the street on Jalan Kimia at the Ministry of Education, Instruction, and Culture.

The school had no library of its own. Students and faculty were forced to go elsewhere to find books, including to the library of the Dutch cultural exchange organization (*Stichting Culturele Samenwerking* – Sticusa). When FEUI was finally assigned its own space, its library was located in a room that sat between a food stall and a small building where the student film league screened movies. It had few books or scientific journals and former students recall that they could borrow them for only one hour at a time.

Some of the more clever students found a way out of the dilemma. They took extra careful notes during lectures, typed them up, then stenciled and sold them in large quantities. In the late 1950s, this small business within the Faculty was run by a group of students calling itself Vivayuba. One of the group’s entrepreneurs, Fikri Jufri, became a prolific writer on economic issues and eventually co-founded the country’s leading news magazine, *Tempo*.

The quality of Indonesia’s educational system at that time was in a state of emergency, and not only because the students lacked textbooks. In its early years, FEUI had a more serious problem. The school had been founded by legal experts; its first dean, Soenario Kolopaking, among them. The school had only one qualified instructor and no economist at all. Soenario himself was forced to juggle his duties as dean with several different jobs and, when he fell ill and resigned, a crisis occurred.

It was at this point that Suhadi, a quiet and serious young man who was chairman of the Student Senate, took matters into his own hands. He rounded up a group of friends, some

of whom had been members of the Student Brigade against the Dutch, and went to the Ministry of Education, Instruction, and Culture. The group urged the government to step in to solve the school's crisis. It was unclear what the government could do at the time, but the seriousness with which Suhadi conveyed his plea moved one of its teachers, Djokosutono – who later became dean of the Faculty of Law – to lend his own assistance. Together, they went out in search of instructors.

In Indonesia at that time there were no more than ten qualified economists, and among these only a few were interested in teaching. One of them, Mohammad Hatta, wanted

to help but was too busy with his duties as vice-president. “History sometimes happens by accident,” said Widjojo Nitisastro, recalling that time.

Coincidentally, one young economic expert shared Suhadi's sense of seriousness. Thirty-four year old Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a graduate of the College of Economics in Rotterdam, had recently stepped down as minister of finance. Since he was one of only two Indonesians with a doctoral degree in economics, it was fortunate for the students that he did not turn down their appeal. Yet when they asked him to serve as dean he did hesitate.



▲ *A piano concert at Sticusa, the Dutch cultural exchange organization (now Erasmus Huis), Jakarta, 1953.*

INSTITUTION-BUILDER: SUMITRO DJOJHADIKUSUMO

In the late 1960s, an American visitor to the Department of Trade was so intrigued by Minister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2001) that he asked, “Sir, your English is excellent. Have you studied in the United States?” Unblinking, Sumitro replied, “No, I never studied in the US, I only taught there.”

Almost 20 years earlier, a student delegation from UI had called upon Sumitro. Their mission: to ask Indonesia’s first economics PhD from the Netherlands School of Economics, by then already minister of trade and industry, to become dean of FEUI.

In post-independence Indonesia, tertiary education, particularly in economic studies, was severely limited. The Foundation estimates that in 1949 Indonesia had only ten fully qualified economists in a population of over 70 million. “There was simply nobody else as qualified as he was,” says Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, leader of that delegation.

Nobody could have predicted then that this slender, quick-witted man, the son of a public servant in the Netherlands Indies administration, would do a great deal more than whip an academic faculty into shape.

Sumitro was a multidimensional character: cabinet minister, lobbyist, academic, cosmopolite, rebel. He seemed to believe his destiny was to lead the country. His confidence was almost messianic: in 1952 he explained his vision in a public polemic with Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, the first governor of Bank Indonesia and a champion of agricultural development. Sumitro argued instead that only rapid industrialization would strengthen Indonesia’s bargaining power with more developed countries.

Sumitro was a consummate institution builder. “There were people in the Foundation who were always talking about building institutions,” said John Bresnan. “If you focus on the individual and look for the brightest people you can find anywhere –

they will build institutions.” Clearly, Sumitro was one such person. “He was restless, rebellious, a pool of nervous energy,” said close friends. Many saw him as ‘visionary.’ “He was indisputably the pioneer of modern economic studies in Indonesia,” wrote economist Thee Kian Wee in 2001.

Early in his deanship Sumitro, who was then also minister of finance, built the faculty infrastructure from scratch. The result: a strong teaching staff, adequate lecture rooms, a solid library and research



Sumitro Djojohadikusumo in his office, Jakarta, 1971.

units, and an effective administration. “Before Sumitro came on board, FEUI did not have any lecture halls. Lectures were given in Gedung Kesenian, the Adhoc Staat, the PTIK building, and sometimes underneath the trees of the present UI campus,” said fellow economist Emil Salim in 1993.

The then-dominant school of economic thought, Dutch-inspired, was unsuited to the needs of a developing country like Indonesia. “The style was very theoretical and philosophical,” Salim recalled. Sumitro meanwhile was aware of a new approach –

Developmental Economics – and he wanted this taught at FEUI. During 1955-56 the curriculum was overhauled with a new emphasis placed on solving Indonesia’s economic problems. “It was Sumitro who introduced macroeconomics to Indonesia,” says Salim.

By this time nearly all the Dutch professors had fled. Sumitro was prepared for this, and following an agreement between FEUI and UC Berkeley, American professors began to arrive. FEUI responded by sending its best and brightest to schools such as Berkeley, MIT, Stanford, New York University, and Cornell. So began Indonesia’s economic development.

“The most instantly felt difference was the start of a culture of debate between students and lecturers,” recalled Saleh Afiff, later a leading national planner. “Before, the professor was all-knowing.”

The FEUI-Berkeley affiliation was not Sumitro’s first attempt to enlist development assistance. He favored “Anglo-Saxon” educational methods, but earlier bids for British expertise made through the British Council had failed. Negotiations with Cornell through the Rockefeller Foundation, were similarly unsuccessful.

He did manage to secure a project with MIT. When the Sukiman cabinet adopted his initiative and established Indonesia’s first state planning bureau he invited nine foreign experts to serve as consultants. Their leader, MIT’s

Benjamin Higgins, recalled the time when scholars who were neither Dutch nor Indonesian were “heavily involved in both research and policy formation.”

Sumitro made his first appeal to the Ford Foundation for educational assistance in 1951, through the economist Everett Hawkins. Meanwhile other Indonesian leaders were knocking on the Foundation’s door; in the same year, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Ambassador to the US, sought support for a project promoting English proficiency in Indonesian schools. A year later, the



Sumitro giving a lecture in Surabaya, 1955.

Foundation sent an exploratory mission to Indonesia which served as the basis for its initial engagement in the country.

Another of Sumitro's talents – raising a constituency – emerged during this period. The Institute of Economic and Social Research (*Lembaga Penelitian Ekonomi dan Masyarakat* – LPEM), established in 1953 and supported partly by the Ford Foundation, fostered the “passing of the torch,” cadre-building, and full Indonesianization. LPEM became a testing ground allowing Sumitro, aided by his students and faculty colleagues, to fine-tune economic policies. The Institute also became the principal link between faculty and government.

Like everything Sumitro touched, LPEM developed from a collection of able, if inexperienced, young people into a respected institution. Many were attracted to it simply by Sumitro's fame and reputation. He gave them internships and practical exposure. He placed the best of them in Central Planning Bureau (*Badan Perancang Nasional* – BPN) and its 1952 Five Year Development Plan. He

introduced them to the world's top economists. When these people came of age as Indonesia's economic decision-makers, they knew whom to thank.

In 1955 Sumitro founded the Association of Indonesian Economists (*Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia* – ISEI), today a well-regarded professional organization.

By the early 1960s FEUI boasted a self-sustaining local leadership, broad support in government and society, a capacity for growth without external assistance, and good staff development. As a “feeder” institution it supported other economics faculties in state universities around the country. The technocrats remember fondly how “flying lecturers” from FEUI commuted by air to Sawerigading (later Sriwijaya) University in Palembang, and to UI's satellite campus at Makassar.

Sumitro wore many hats, some surprising. Daoed Joesoef speaks of being one such “flying lecturer” in Makassar in 1957. At the time, the city's airport was under bombardment by the rebel forces of the

Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* – PRRI). Ironically, Sumitro himself was civilian leader of that rebellion. As Joesoef noted, “It was Sumitro who first asked me to teach in Makassar; it was also he who sent the bomber.”

Sumitro's role in this uprising long remained a stigma. Critics associated his CIA-backed political misadventure with his “liberal” economic thinking. This was a dubious label. Sumitro always maintained his faith in government intervention and believed above all in effective public policy-making institutions. His much-quoted diagnosis of the 1998 economic crisis – “Indonesia is suffering from institutional diseases” – referred to the deterioration in public policy resulting from President Suharto's interference in favor of his family's business interests.

That remark – vintage Sumitro – expresses the best side of an economist who was also a public intellectual, ever trying to offer an alternative vision.

In Sumitro's mind, a dean should have a beard and the title of professor, neither of which he possessed. Despite his reservations he accepted and, as was typical of him, he proceeded to work exhaustively on behalf of the school. Years later he would say that on the long and winding road that was his distinguished life, his work in establishing FEUI gave him the most pride.

Typically, Sumitro devised a plan that in the end strongly influenced Indonesian history. His plan was simple and limited in scope. Since FEUI would be starting from zero, he and his colleagues would have to build from the ground up. There were five main tasks: to flesh out FEUI's roster of teachers; to complete the administrative structure and obtain the necessary equipment and supplies; to put together a curriculum; to establish the complementary institutions that the Faculty would need, including a library and a research institute; and to get the Faculty its own building.

Sumitro worked quickly. To fill out his corps of instructors he was compelled to coax a number of Dutch scholars, who happened to be in Indonesia, to teach at the school. He was not entirely happy with this situation; most of these people were not in fact economists. And even though he himself was a graduate of Rotterdam, he harbored mixed feelings about the Dutch, particularly those still living in their former colony. He said, "The Dutch in Indonesia are far more old-fashioned than those in Holland itself." As a result, the Faculty's curriculum could not help but be "old-fashioned" too.

In the early 1950s, the British theoretician John Maynard Keynes held sway in the world of economics. The ideas that he developed in his masterpiece, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, first published in 1936 in the wake of the Depression, were seen as the antidote to the destruction of much of the world's infrastructure during World War II. The Marshall Plan, launched by the US to channel assistance to the destroyed countries of Europe, clearly indicated how important government intervention could be. At the same time it signaled the limited impact that liberal *laissez-faire* policies would have

on the situation. The ideas of Keynes completely altered the classic economic view.

Sumitro, who had received his doctorate from Rotterdam in 1945, was familiar with recent developments in economic theory. Though only 25 years old when he graduated, he had already rejected the classic economic views that found so much favor among Dutch economists. At UI he attempted to apply both a Keynesian and post-Keynesian approach to the situation in Indonesia.

Sumitro dreamed of establishing a "Jakarta School of Economics." His goal was to hire teaching staff whose views were sympathetic with the Developmental Economics that he was creating. Sumitro had taken several courses at the London School of Economics under professors such as the liberal Harold Lasky, and with fellow students like the future leaders Nehru of India and Ghana's Nkrumah. He wanted to send his cadres to England. Unfortunately, the Indonesian government had no money for this, nor was the British Council able to help. Eventually, the Ford Foundation provided the necessary assistance, but the road there was not completely straight and it eventually led to Berkeley, not London.

Sumitro submitted his first proposal to the Foundation in 1951 through Everett Hawkins, an American economist who worked at the US embassy in the office of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). His initial request, for \$400,000, was intended to finance a group of American economic experts to teach in Indonesia for three years. Sumitro saw this as a short-term way to compensate for the lack of qualified indigenous teachers and to replace the Dutch instructors who were leaving the country. But he did not receive an immediate response to his request. In fact, a later confidential assessment of the Foundation's early work mentioned that the US Department of State – which apparently held influence over private philanthropic organizations at that time – asked that consideration of Sumitro's request be delayed. In the words of an intern at the time, this happened simply because the US government was "piqued" that the application had not been made via the "proper channels."



▲ and ▼ Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Lieutenant-Governor Hubertus van Mook at the handover ceremony on 27 December 1949 marking the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia from the Netherlands to the new Republic.



TECHNOCRAT NUMBER ONE: WIDJOJO NITISASTRO

Widjojo Nitisastro has been called Indonesia's "number one technocrat," the "architect of the New Order economy," and, less glowingly, the "Don of the Berkeley Mafia." Whatever the fairness of these labels, he clearly was the intellectual leader of a whole generation of economists.

Born in 1927 to a nationalist family, Widjojo grew up in Surabaya. In 1945 he was in high school when the Revolution broke out and he joined the Republican Youth Army (*Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar* – TRIP). "He was very brave," said an old friend, Pansa Tampubolon. "He nearly died somewhere between Ngaglik and Gunung Sari, fighting and throwing grenades with his bare hands."

That story paints a different image of a man who was later accused of being unpatriotic for "selling" his country to the IMF and the World Bank. In fact, Widjojo has served his country all his life.

As a student at FEUI and at Berkeley, he organized informal seminars on the topic of his country's outlook. "He was always taking the lead in discussing Indonesia's future with us," said Ali Wardhana, a classmate and colleague. When Widjojo was chairman of BAPPENAS, he often worked until the wee hours. Unlike many other top officials in the New Order government, he was never tainted with corruption. After students took to the streets protesting corrupt practices among the military elite, Widjojo declared that they did "the right thing."

Furthermore, he maneuvered to unseat Ibnu Sutowo, the powerful director of the state oil company, Pertamina, who had squandered the country's oil revenues and plunged Pertamina into debt. He was always suspicious of grandiose projects. He was even secretly critical of Suharto's support of the First Lady's theme park, Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* – TMII).

Widjojo worried about petrodollar-generated hubris and was skeptical of high-tech industry as an engine of growth. Instead, he had a passion for such village-level services as elementary schools and medical units. Even the security guards at his office remembered him as a high official who cared for "little people" like themselves. They talked fondly of his unassuming manner, his shunning of the trappings of power, and his penchant for



Widjojo Nitisastro, Jakarta, 1971.

after-hours street snacks.

Obviously no mere puppet of Western interests (as his left wing detractors often suggested), neither was he sympathetic to Marxist ideas. His formative years as an economist coincided with the heyday of Third World socialism and its disposition toward state regulation. Widjojo advocated an alternative strategy: Keynesian economics with an Indonesian face. He

argued, for example, that cooperatives were unsuited to the needs of a modern state. He preferred a government-directed economy that stimulated growth, but that also kept close watch over Indonesia's unreliable bureaucracy. He believed in good planning, conceived and supervised by trained economists.

Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, from the moment he assumed the deanship of FEUI, saw in the young Widjojo a first-rate intelligence, leadership skills, tenacity, and something else: an ease with rural life.

When Sumitro sent his students to the villages, Widjojo was in his natural element. His report, co-written with Julius E. Ismael, drew the attention of the Ford Foundation Representative. He was not the only person impressed. In the early 1950s, when Harvard demographer Nathan Keyfitz was consulting for the BPN, he became "frustratingly bored" and went instead to do research in an East Java village. Widjojo, then still a student assistant at BPN, accompanied him. Their results were published in a widely used textbook titled *Soal Penduduk dan Pembangunan Indonesia* (On Population and Development in Indonesia).

It was almost inevitable that Widjojo should inherit control of FEUI. In a 1986 interview Sumitro said, "By 1955 I told Widjojo, 'This is as far as I can go as a teacher.' So immediately after his graduation as *sarjana* [Bachelor of Arts], I made him director of LPEM." Commenting on Widjojo's rapid ascent, another colleague, Mohammad Sadli, said half-jokingly, "That was the beauty of it. If everybody had been equally bright, there would have been no natural hierarchy."

Irma Adelman, a member of Widjojo's dissertation committee at Berkeley, told scholar Karen Brooks in 1996, "We always felt that Widjojo was by far the brightest



President Suharto, Widjojo Nitisastro and John Bresnan in 1972.

and most energetic of the Indonesian students we had. We thought at the time that he by himself would be a sufficient payoff for the whole Indonesia-Berkeley project – and were taking bets as to whether he would wind up in jail or as prime minister!”

In the end, with his coterie of the country’s best economic minds, he rose to power and prominence. This group, known as the “technocrats,” dominated economic decision-making in the early days of Suharto’s New Order, and pulled Indonesia out of the quagmire of the mid-1960s. How

this began is the stuff of legend.

The technocrats first presented their vision to Suharto in August 1966, during an army seminar in Bandung. The general asked them a blunt question, “If you had the chance to change the economy, what would you do?”

It was here, according to several sources, that Widjojo won Suharto’s trust and confidence. Economic nationalist A.R. Soehoed said of the technocrats, “They were very good at scaring the old man. They kept him on the razor’s edge, and that’s how

they got their way. They told him that if he didn’t follow their suggestions the people would be without food and clothes, or the economy wouldn’t grow.” Another view is that Widjojo charmed Suharto with a combination of Javanese manners and an ability to package complex issues clearly and convincingly.

In any event, when Suharto entrusted Widjojo and his colleagues with real power, they accepted the challenge, and Indonesia’s economic history was changed profoundly.

In early 1952, at the request of the Indonesian government, the Ford Foundation's head office in New York sent an exploratory team to Indonesia. At the end of its visit, the team confirmed the need for English language instruction, financial assistance for which had been requested by Indonesia's ambassador to the US, Ali Sastroamidjojo. The need for assistance for UI and UGM was also touched upon, but no specific mention was made of Sumitro's proposal.

In June 1953 the Foundation sent its first representative to Indonesia. Elmer Starch had been raised on a wheat farm in Montana and knew little about Indonesia. He was not provided a house, so for the duration of his two-year stay he lived in a single room at the Hotel Des Indes, as did his American secretary. They ran the Foundation's first "office" in yet another room at the hotel. Located where the Duta Merlin shopping center now stands, the Des Indes may have been the only prestigious hotel in Jakarta at the time – international negotiations for Indonesia's independence had been held there – but it was far from ideal as a location for an office.

If Foundation personnel knew little about Indonesia, the same could be said of the Indonesians who first came into contact with the institution. Take Umar Kayam, for instance, who would one day become one of Indonesia's leading scholars and writers. At that time he was a student in the pedagogy program at UGM. He learned that Ford was offering assistance for Indonesia's educational development

and decided to request assistance for publishing activities on his campus. Summoning up his courage, he went to the office at the Hotel Des Indes and asked Starch for a vehicle. "It doesn't have to be a sedan – a pickup would do just fine for us," the budding scholar said in broken English. Starch laughed but had to explain that the Foundation was not a car dealership.

That period of Indonesia's history was tense. The Wilopo

Cabinet had been disbanded. Conflict among political groups was growing, just as it was in the army, which had supported a massive violent anti-Parliament demonstration that came to be known as the October 17th Incident. Within the government and society as a whole uncertainty was spreading.

In an unpublished reminiscence, John Bresnan, painted a picture of the difficult situation. He wrote that Starch "was no man to deal with the government." It seems that Starch was not the person to deal with Sumitro either; during Starch's tenure in Indonesia, Sumitro's re-



quest for assistance for FEUI went unheeded.

In 1955, Starch left his tiny room in the Hotel Des Indes to return to the US. He was replaced by Michael Harris, a man Sumitro refers to in his biography as an "old friend." They first met in 1951 when Harris came to Jakarta with a survey team to investigate the possibility of providing assistance in a manner similar to the Marshall Plan. Harris had been handpicked by the Foundation's President Paul Hoffman, who was a former director of the Plan.

▲ A crowded reception area in the Hotel des Indes office with a blackboard showing the daily assignments of cars and drivers, 1957.

SELO SOEMARDJAN

Professor Selo Soemardjan (1915-2003) was well known as a senior academic in sociology at UI. He began his career as a government bureaucrat in Java, serving as a district head in a rural area outside Yogyakarta. During the revolutionary period 1945-1950 he was secretary to Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, a major figure in the struggle for independence. Later, Soemardjan continued his studies at Cornell University. After his return from the US in 1959, he held a range of academic posts, although the majority of his time was spent at UI and the Social Sciences Foundation (Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial – YIIS) which he co-founded and headed for three decades.

In 1948, an American student named George McTurnan Kahin was doing research in Yogyakarta. Kahin asked Minister of Education Ali Sastroamidjojo to suggest a suitable candidate as a research assistant.

Sastroamidjojo suggested me. I was a civil servant, secretary to Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. The Sultan had served the young republic by allowing Yogyakarta to be used as a temporary capital, and as a result the Sultan was held in high esteem by the Indonesian independence movement.

I took Kahin everywhere. I even introduced him to President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta. After his return to America, Kahin was appointed professor at Cornell, where he established the Modern Indonesia Project. He needed Indonesian staff. He called me and asked if I wanted to study in America.

I wasn't even sure exactly what I wanted to study. I was really only a graduate from the Dutch middle school, moderately proficient in English. But I remembered my experience as district head during the Japanese occupation. It was an extremely difficult time, with the Japanese army commandeering rice and livestock, and forcing men to join the labor corps. The revolution broke out after the Japanese left. The situation became even more unstable. Social change took place rapidly. These experiences made me think that I'd like to study sociology. Kahin helped me get the documents needed to study at Cornell, with sponsorship from the Ford Foundation.

In February 1956 I went to Cornell. At the time the Sultan was becoming quite well known throughout the world. The Founda-

tion offered to fund his visit to Cornell. That was in 1958, the first time the Sultan visited America, and it had a big influence on him. I was assigned to escort him during his one-month trip. When we were going to Wisconsin from Chicago by train, three officials accompanied us to the station, then left us.



Selo Soemardjan in Jakarta, 1971.

Unfortunately they had given us the wrong tickets, and we had to get off. We had to find a new train, and buy new tickets. I had to carry *all* the suitcases – after all, a Sultan is a Sultan.

At Cornell, I studied all the European theories of sociology. These allowed me to make sense of the things I had witnessed in Yogyakarta. In 1959, I returned there to do research on social change for my PhD. After six months, I went back to Cornell to complete my thesis and sit for exams.

On the day of my exams, there was a grenade attack against President Sukarno at a school in Cikini in Central Jakarta. Sukarno survived, but four students were killed. Of course, I was concerned and deeply upset

by the reports as my children were studying there. Back then, it took a long time for accurate information to come through to America. My teachers were also concerned about what was happening in Indonesia. I think maybe they allowed me to pass my exams because they felt sorry for me.

On my return, Mohammad Sadli of FEUI asked me to teach sociology in his department. I was the only teacher in the department without a background in economics. My subject was titled “Non-economic Factors in Economic Development.”

In 1968, after General Suharto officially replaced Sukarno as President, Sadli and his colleagues became the architects of Indonesia's economic policy. I was involved in the analysis of non-economic factors. The emergence of these economists – Widjojo Nitisastro, Sadli, and others – was due to the assistance provided by the Foundation for their education. I, too, have reason to be grateful.

During 1974-1984, the Foundation assisted social scientists through YIIS. Each year, 15 individuals were selected for training in research techniques. I was the chair of this foundation.

Looking back now, I can see a big difference in the assistance provided by the US and the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided direct assistance to the people, usually through the PKI, and usually in the form of food or agricultural tools. The Americans, on the other hand, provided assistance to academics, through scholarships. Their intent was for these academics to become leaders in society. Through the trickle down effect, many people benefited.



Harris was a memorable figure, “a tall, physically imposing man, full of nervous energy, familiar with the corridors of power.” Harris, who had never attended college, began his career as an organizer with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and had headed Marshall Plan programs in France, Sweden, and Germany. Sumitro was impressed by Ford’s new representative; he tended to admire “men of action.” Harris acted decisively to establish a firmer base for the Foundation in Jakarta. By 1958 he had moved out of the room at the Hotel Des Indes and bought a house at Taman Kebon Sirih in the city’s central business district to serve as the office, purchased two spacious houses in the elite residential area of Menteng, and built five others with Scandinavian-style architecture in the newly developed suburb of Kebayoran Baru. The Foundation’s staff and expenditures grew significantly. In 1957 alone, the administrative costs in Indonesia consumed half of Ford’s total office expenses overseas.

Harris remained in Indonesia for six years. He was all business, and he had to be when dealing with Sumitro. The

young economist from No. 4 Jalan Salemba could not postpone his plan for FEUI much longer. In fact, by the time Harris arrived, Sumitro had nearly forgotten about the possibility of funding from Ford and had initiated an agreement with the Rockefeller Foundation, which had signaled an interest in assisting the faculty in cooperation with Cornell University. In the end, however, Sumitro’s hopes of an arrangement between the two academic institutions collapsed because the necessary matching funds, which had been pledged by ECA, failed to materialize.

By then Ford was Sumitro’s last resort. His persistence and Harris’s hard work finally bore fruit. In May 1956, UC Berkeley officially entered into an agreement with FEUI, one that would turn out to have great historical ramifications. The Foundation gave its approval to nearly all of Sumitro’s plans, including the idea of sending some 20 students and their families to the US for further education. Part of the budget was also earmarked for bringing instructors from Berkeley to Indonesia. They were to fill temporarily the staff vacancies at FEUI. Ample funding, more than \$2 million, was provided for this purpose.



- ▲ *The Foundation expands in the late 1950s: construction of residences in Kebayoran Baru for staff and consultants, 1957. When the office closed temporarily in 1965, the Foundation donated these residences to Foundation grantees.*
- ◀ *Miss Cunningham, Andrew Choa, and Hasanah in the general administrative area of the Hotel des Indes office, 1957.*

Even today, people still argue whether this program can be considered a success. Mohammad Sadli, one of the first members of FEUI and later a long-serving member of Suharto's Cabinet, argued that the Foundation's assistance program failed to fulfill Sumitro's plan for building a modern school of economics. The plan's original aim was to strengthen UI, but in the end nearly all the economists that the program produced were recruited into the government. Graduates, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, Subroto, Daoed Joesoef, J.B. Soemarlin, Saleh Afiff, Emil Salim, Suhadi, J.E. Ismael, Djunaedi Hadisumarto, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and Sadli himself, are today far better known for their years of public service than as scholars. The number of academicians produced by UI is far fewer than it might have been.

This "failure," if that is what it was, can be related to the situation in Indonesia at that time. In a nation where well-educated workers were rare, both academic and social pressures demanded that capable academics had to be able to perform jobs other than teaching. Nonetheless it is possible to show positive results from the Sumitro plan. In 1958 FEUI finally shed its Dutch legacy and revised its curriculum. It dropped the Dutch "free study" method for a "guided study" approach. It tightened

acceptance criteria; new students were required to pass an entrance examination. Even these moves, however, would not have stimulated growth in the knowledge of economic science in Indonesia without the Ford-funded Berkeley program. Emil Salim, one of the graduates of this program, said in an interview, "All my knowledge of economic science came from Berkeley, from the most basic of subjects to calculus."

Emil Salim was in a good position to judge. Prior to the start of the Berkeley program, he reported, FEUI students who were studying with Dutch teachers focused on micro-economic topics. "As with a tree," Salim wrote in commemorating FEUI's 50th anniversary, "the whats and hows of their connection with the economic forest were not explained. . . . Meanwhile, in the academic world, Keynesian economic theory, with its macro-economic approach, was all the rage."

Not all criticisms of the Sumitro program and the economists that FEUI produced came from academic quarters. Vicious criticism came from the political sector as well. Sumitro, besides being known as an economist, was known also as an active member of the Indonesian Socialist Party (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* – PSI). Given his guiding role at FEUI, it is not surprising that political foes would view FEUI as "socialist" territory.



▲ *Mohammad Sadli receives his doctoral diploma from FEUI, 1957.*

While Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Suhadi, and Emil Salim might never have declared themselves to be PSI members, or members of any other party for that matter, there were some lecturers, Tan Goan Po being one, who were well-known socialists. And, indeed, PSI did seem to have a wide following among FEUI students. The university's Socialist Students Movement was very active on campus. "Even the bicycle parking attendants on campus wore PSI badges," said Silalahi, who himself was a leader of the Indonesian Catholic Students Association (*Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia* – PMKRI).

During the 1950s, attacks against PSI and anything remotely connected with it generally originated from the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia* – PNI) or from the PKI. As the decade advanced, these attacks grew harsher, especially after the 1955 general elections when PSI was routed at the polls. It was around then that Sumitro was summoned several times by the Military Police Corps for questioning on charges of corruption. Sensing that this was merely a tactic designed to imprison him, he fled Jakarta.

Thereafter Sumitro joined a group of military officers in Padang who had formed the PRRI in rebellion against

President Sukarno and the policies of the central government. This gambit resulted in much tension, and even though the rebel officers were not completely convinced that Jakarta would send troops against them, they made military preparations anyway. Sumitro even accepted assistance from the CIA toward that end.

As a result of Sumitro's affiliation with PRRI, PSI leaders suspended his party membership. This action, however, did not save the party from Sukarno's wrath. In 1960, having already disbanded Parliament and declared Indonesia to be in a state of war, Sukarno dissolved PSI and imprisoned former Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. Thanks to an effective PKI campaign, the PSI label came to carry a stigma, tainting FEUI as well.

The late Bruce Glassburner, a lecturer from Berkeley who had been assigned to teach at No. 4 Jalan Salemba, recalled that those were the darkest weeks in the early history of FEUI. From that time on, FEUI found itself in a defensive position. Concurrent with President Sukarno's moves to implement his policies of "guided economy" and "guided democracy," newspapers were banned and several opposition figures jailed. As a result, FEUI could not provide an open forum for discussion.



▲ Initiation of members into the Indonesian Catholic Students Association in Pasar Baru, Jakarta, 1958.

AN EVENING WITH THE TECHNOCRATS

One night in March 2003, while US President George W. Bush's plan to attack Iraq filled the airwaves, a unique meeting took place at a hotel in Jakarta. Five journalists interviewed nine senior Indonesian economists. Widjojo Nitisastro came with some of his colleagues from FEUI, who in the past studied economics in the United States as part of the cooperative program between FEUI and UC Berkeley. This program was supported by the Ford Foundation.

There were Subadi Mangkusuwondo, Subroto, Julius E. Ismael, and Mohammad Sadli. Widjojo sat between Saleh Afiff and Subroto, while Ali Wardhana, Djunaedi Hadisumarto and Sri Hadi sat further back.

Over the years these people occupied key positions in the planning agency, in the finance industry, trade, mining, and transportation departments, as well as Indonesia's representative at the IMF. Widjojo introduced his colleagues, who replied with jokes. "He was called our village headman," Sadli said.

During the evening these men described their experiences. After studying in the US in the 1950s and 1960s, they served as lecturers at FEUI. Later on they served in government assisting President Subarto in managing the Indonesian economy.

THE BERKELEY MAFIA

Widjojo: Luck always plays a role in history. FEUI has been lucky to have Prof. Sumitro Djohadikusumo. We were also lucky that in the early 1950s Suhadi Mangkusuwondo led the student senate. When Prof. Sunario Kolopaking (FEUI's first dean) resigned as dean, the student senate took the initiative and sought out a new dean. They chose Dr. Sumitro. If it were not for Suhadi and Prof. Sumitro, nothing would have been achieved by FEUI. The course of events would have been completely different.

Suhadi: Prof. Sumitro was the only economist with a doctorate in economics. The other came from legal or social science backgrounds. There were also others with doctorates, such as Dr. Saroso, but he was not really well known as an economist.

Widjojo: Prof. Sumitro headed FEUI where most of the teachers were Dutch. Then, tension grew between Indonesian and the Netherlands, as a result of the Papua issue. The Dutch were planning to leave. Prof. Sumitro took the initiative to find other professors to replace them, and he thought about the United States. He considered that the continental and the Anglo-Saxon systems each had its advantages and disadvantages. Prof. Sumitro then contacted the Ford Foundation to get assistance to finance the plan.

Luckily, the Foundation's Representative in Jakarta, Mr. Michael Harris, had a good relationship with Prof. Sumitro. They agreed that Ford would find an educational institution in the US to act as counterpart of FEUI and would finance the cooperative program. Prof. Sumitro did not nominate a university, but left that up to Ford. Ford

selected UC Berkeley.

UC Berkeley sent two senior academics, Prof. Paul Taylor, chair of the Department of Economics, and Dr. Thomas Blaisdell, professor of political science. In the US, Prof. Frank Kidner organized the administrative side, including the selection of academics to be sent to Indonesia, and the selection of students here.

The academics selected to come to Indonesia included associate and full professors and younger staff. They began coming in 1965. I remember that their chairman was Prof. Leonard Doyle, who often argued with Prof. Sumitro. So things didn't always go smoothly. The second man was Prof. Leon E. Mears, who became an outstanding figure because, together with Saleh Afiff, he wrote a book on rice marketing in Indonesia. Another was Hans Schmitt, who was quite young. He had a close working relationship with Ali Wardhana, because both had an interest in fiscal and monetary studies.

Prof. Sumitro and the faculty secretary, Prof. Tan Goan Po, were responsible for selecting those who were to study in the US. There was an intake each year. Suhadi, Julius Ismael, I and other colleagues left in 1957. We were the first batch. In 1958 Ali Wardhana, J.B. Soemarlin and others followed. In 1959 Emil Salim, Saleh Afiff, Batara Simatupang and others went. After that, a number of other students followed, going to different universities.

After Prof. Doyle, Prof. Malcom Davisson held the position of chair. He came from a background in public finance. Later came Prof. Bruce Glassburner, who stayed longer and had a wide network of contacts.

As to the question what about Prof. Andreas Papandreou who taught at Berkeley during that time and later became the socialist prime minister of Greece, it can be told that he became the chair of the Department of Economics at Berkeley after Prof. Paul Taylor. At Berkeley, Prof. Papandreou taught a course in mathematical economics. I took this course. At that time he did not show an inclination to become involved in politics.

CHOOSING A FIELD

Widjojo: The students had different interests. For example, Ali Wardhana was particularly interested in fiscal and monetary studies.

Afiff: At FEUI I began my studies in the business economics department. At the time the department was involved in research on the marketing of rice. Prof. Mears was looking for an assistant and I was selected. When I went to Berkeley, I attended the School of Business Administration.

Widjojo: The choice of a field of study was decided before departure. Berkeley looked for suitable universities. They didn't make the decision for a candidate, but offered a number of choices.

What was crucial for FEUI at that time was not just those who were sent abroad, but also those who organized the program in Indonesia. In 1957 Prof. Sumitro left because of the rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Prof. Djokusutono, Dean of the Faculty of Law, doubled as dean of FEUI. At the practical day-to-day level, two people from FEUI who had returned from studies in the US – Subroto, the secretary of FEUI, and Mohammad Sadli, director of the

Institute of Economic and Social Research – played a significant role. So we could leave with confidence. Suppose they said, “No need to take care of them, let them all come home.” It could have happened and the history of FEUI would have been very different.

Subroto: During that time there was a lot of pressure from the leftist movement. Prof. Djokosutono was the leading figure in defending FEUI. There was a lot of pressure to appoint leftists on the teaching staff.

Afiff: Ford provided not only individual scholarships, but also assisted in institution building, such as developing our library. We were also lucky with our timing. When the Dutch left, the Americans replaced them. By the time the Americans went home, we had already come back. So we took over the positions left empty. That was just chance.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 65-66

Widjojo: The recent economic crisis (1997-1998) is not the only one we passed through. The Indonesian economy went into free fall in 1965 too. Another example of economic disaster? The Indonesian economy also imploded during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945).

In 1965 there were important changes. At that time there was a significant event initiated by students. On 10 January 1966 the students of FEUI held a seminar. Speakers included Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and Adam Malik, as well as lecturers of FEUI. Sadli made a salient point: “We must recognize that we lack the capital to improve the economy and develop the nation. We need capital, yet we cannot raise capital internally. We must look for capital from abroad.” At the time, to say that Indonesia needed foreign investments and foreign loans, was indeed an extraordinarily brave statement. After that, there was a division of labor: there were seminars and there were actions.

Before 1965, FEUI was asked to provide lecturers to the Army Staff College. Sadli was the first to be involved. The Commandant, General Suwanto, was

acquainted with him. Both Subroto and Sadli spoke at an army seminar in 1966. Mr. Suharto came into the government also in 1966. We met at the seminar for the army. Later he asked us to assist him.

At the time, the government’s priority was not to carry out a major development program, but an economic stabilization and rehabilitation program. Stabilization was required to counteract the prevailing very high rate of inflation. Rehabilitation involved repairs to infrastructure, including irrigation facilities, roads, and agricultural facilities. We developed the plans for economic stabilization and rehabilitation together with President Suharto.



“Technocrats” take questions on the state of the economy at a press conference at the Department of Information, 1971: Subroto, Radius Prawiro, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Widjojo Nitisastro and Ali Wardhana.

WIDJOJO’S LEADERSHIP

Ali Wardhana: We were lucky to have Sumitro, Subroto, Sadli, and Suhadi – and Widjojo too. When I was a student at FEUI, before taking exams I received suggestions and guidance on the subject form Widjojo at the student dormitory at Pegangsaan where he lived. At Berkeley, we were encouraged by Widjojo to ponder about the developments in our country. He kept this up until our return. Widjojo’s aim was to prevent us from becoming just passive lecturers observing the surrounding situation.

The turbulence started in 1965. It was an important year because of the establishment of the New Order. Towards which course was the economy to be directed? Widjojo took the initiative to put together our ideas to overcome the situation. Later these ideas became the foundations of economic policies.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS: 97-98

Widjojo: The crisis of 1997-1998 was not just an economic but also a political crisis. In the same way as the crisis in 1965 which was also an economic and political crisis.

A question was raised whether President Suharto did not as much listen to us anymore at the time of the 1997-1998 crisis? This question may also be correct. As Ali Wardhana said, in the past President Suharto did not merely listen but also took notes. For example, the problem of rescheduling foreign debts in December 1967. It had to be explained to him what rescheduling was, how it was done, what was the system used in the world. If we wanted to reduce the

burden of debt we could not merely oppose this system. We had to be familiar with the intricacies. At that time President Suharto was prepared to learn.

Afiff: At one stage, Ali Wardhana and I had an audience with President Suharto to discuss deregulation. At first, he didn’t even give us a chance to speak. He gave us a lecture. But Ali pushed forward. In the end President Suharto agreed to deregulation. Indeed, in the past President Suharto took notes, later on we were the ones who took notes. That

was true, but anyhow we continued to argue.

Widjojo: Was the economic crisis of 1997-1998 the result of the deregulation package in the 1980s? The deregulation began in 1985. It covered many aspects of the economy. If there had been no deregulation, imagine what would have happened. Formerly, to import soybeans, you had to go through a certain processing plant in Tanjung Priok. Which country manages its economy that way? As a result there was a lot of rethinking. It was the same with banking. In the past when clients wanted to put their money in government banks or take out their money from these banks, many suffered bad treatment. Later on, when private banks were given an opportunity and there was competition, there was an improvement in the services of government banks. It was true that there were still shortcomings. One of the weaknesses was supervision.

Despite these constraints FEUI survived, in large part due to the efforts of Sumitro's successors. Djokosutono, a law professor at the university, took over Sumitro's titular position but insisted on being called assistant to the dean. Then there was Subroto, who had earned his master's degree at McGill University in Montreal and his PhD at UI. He stepped in to serve as acting director. Thanks to these men (especially Subroto) the Berkeley program was able to continue, pursuing its goal to send some 45 UI graduates to school abroad between 1956 and 1962. In 1957, Widjojo and Suhadi left for California, along with J.E. Ismael and Barli Halim. Another group soon followed, as if nothing was amiss.

But things had changed at No. 4. No one heard *Ius Vivat* any more. The words "books," "parties," and "love" were stricken from the UI hymn that was sung at every school anniversary. Instead, the term Manipol – an abbreviation of "political manifesto" – became a holy word, just as did "revolution" and "socialism." Politics became a serious activity. Left-leaning and communist students found themselves facing off against students in Muslim and Catholic organizations.

Militancy was on the rise, even among the teaching staff. Soemarlin, who joined the dean's staff in 1962 to head the educational division, was accosted by poster-carrying activists from the Indonesian Students Movement Center (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia* – CGMI). They accused him of being anti-Manipol, that is, an opponent of Sukarno's Political Manifesto. Years later, Soemarlin admitted to having refused to hire known leftist students as teaching assistants.

Carmel Budiardjo, now famous for her work to free Indonesian political prisoners during the New Order, was one such person. A British citizen, Carmel had married an Indonesian student, Budiardjo, in Prague and had come to Indonesia in 1954. She was one of the founders of the Union of Indonesian Scholars (*Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia* – HSI), an organization affiliated with PKI. She had earned her degree at FEUI and as a student had chaired HSI's economics section – which is the reason she was not hired. "An American professor who taught economic history... whispered to me that the US embassy and the Foundation acted to prevent my appointment," Carmel recalled.



▲ Subroto defending his doctoral dissertation at FEUI, 1957.

► Evidence of the growing importance of politics in the nation's educational institutions: an invitation to all students in Jakarta to support the government against Sumitro Djohadikusumo and the PRRI.

S E H U A N

KEPADA SAUDARA MAHASISWA DI-IBU KOTA REPUBLIK INDONESIA

D J A K A R T A .

1. Hari ini tanggal 12 Maret 1958 mulai jam 17.00 bertempat di Gedung Pemuda - Merdeka Utara 14 Djakarta, Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA (C.G.M.I.) Djakarta Raya mengundang wakil2 organisasi mahasiswa/perseorangan mahasiswa dalam suatu pertemuan untuk membitjarkan :
"APAKAH SUMBERGAN MAHASISWA DJAKARTA, DALAM MEMBANTU TINDAKAN TEBAS PEMERINTAH/ANGKATAN PERANG R.I. MENGGAGHIRI HIWAJAT PENGORIHATAN ACHMAD HUSSEIN -KOMITRE DJOJOHADIKUSUMO -Z. LUBIS -SAFRUDDIN -MERHANSUDIN HARAHAP -SIBOLON DAN ERWAN KAWAN DENGAN APA JANG DINGJALAKAN PRIHATINJA".
2. Penghinaan Achmad Hussein es telah menjebekkan pula keangsuaraan bagi mahasiswa/poladjer di Sumatera Barat. Bagi mereka jang berada di Sumatera Tengah, dipaksa Achmad Hussein es untuk menghentikan studinja dan dimobilisasi untuk melawan Angkatan Perang R.I. Bagi mereka jang berada dikota2 lain karena kepentingan studinja, dengan rasa tjemas menunggu nunggu berita tentang apa gerangan nasib jang menimpa keluarganya sebagai akibat petualangan Achmad Hussein ini, belum lagi masih dirisaukan oleh kesulitan2 keuangan karena putusnja hubungan dengan rumah.
3. Kenyataan ini menjebekkan bahwa setiap mahasiswa jang setia pada tjita2 proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 nanti mengutuk pembontakan Achmad Hussein es dan siap sedia membantu Pemerintah/Angkatan Perang R.I. nebasni pembontakan tsb. Sebab makin tjepat berakhirnja pembontakan itu, makin tjepat pula kita segera melantjarkan kembali pembangunan nasional, dan ini bagi mahasiswa berarti suasana atau sjarat jang diperlukan untuk melantjarkan studinja setjara normal karena tidak didipersuak oleh akibat2 pembontakan disektor ekonomi, politik dan kult:il. Djedi tak usah mengherankan, bila kita menjanbut dengan gembira langkah pendaratan Angkatan Perang R.I. di Sumatera Barat -sebagai langkah jang lidjaksana untuk menjelamatkan Republik Proklamasi 1945 !
4. Tindakan bidjaksana ini pasti negara sentjapai tujuannja, sebab kekuatan raksa-na ada dibelakang Pemerintah/Angkatan Perang R.I., ialah kekuatan Rakjat Indonesia inklusif pemuda dan mahasiswaja ! Demikian pula apa jang dihasilkan oleh pertemuan nanti sore mempunyai arti penting karena dia memperkokoh kekuatan raksa-tadi, karena dia mendukung nilai2 pengabdian kepada tanah air dan bang-sa.
5. Berdasar hal hal tersebut diatas, Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA (C.G.M.I.) Djakarta Raya, menjerukan kepada saudara2 para mahasiswa di Djakarta agar :
-- LEMAT MAHIAN2, R.R.I. DJAKARTA, DAN SIARAH2 LAIN JANG DAPAT KAMI PERGUNAKAN MENGIKUTI DENGAN TERSEHAT APA JANG DIHASILKAN OLEH PERTEMUAN NANTI SORE ! --
-- IKUTSERTA DALAM BERALA AKTIVITET JANG DIHASILKAN OLEH PERTEMUAN TERSEBUT ! --

Bidun Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Proklamasi 1945 !

Bidun Pergatuan Mahasiswa Indonesia jang setia pada tjita2 proklamasi R.I. !

Djakarta, 12 Maret 1958, jam 07.00

Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang

CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA

Djakarta Raya.



A PALACE FOR THE ARTS IN UBUD

Along the narrow main road in Ubud are markets, a theater, internet cafes, bike rentals and eateries. The atmosphere is relaxed, and the scent of incense from temples wafts on the winds.

Puri Lukisan (“palace of painting”), near the market, houses a significant collection of historic Balinese paintings. Here, the myths of Bali are on display. Bima is present. So is Garuda, and a witch, and several figures from the *wayang*. But there are also pictures of bare-breasted maidens bathing in a pool. Unfortunately, some of the paintings have deteriorated over time. Jean Couteau, researcher and author, says in his book *Museum Puri Lukisan* that the collection bears witness to the renewal of the arts of painting and sculpture in Bali. Until the 19th century, Balinese artists worked exclusively to serve the needs of religious institutions and the aristocracy. The Dutch colonial influence, however, created conditions for the opening up of Balinese arts, which then were further encouraged by the development of tourism in the 1920s.

“The collection now consists of more than 200 paintings, and maybe 80 pieces of sculpture,” says the director, Tjokorda Bagus Astika. Most of these works were originally collected by Rudolf Bonnet. Any discussion of the museum must mention Bonnet, Walter Spies, and Tjokorda Agung Sukawati, each of whom played a significant role in the renewal of Balinese fine arts.

Walter Spies was born in Moscow in 1895 into a family of German descent. In 1923 he travelled to the Netherlands East Indies, where he worked for a while as a musician in the Yogyakarta *kraton*. There, Spies met a prince from Ubud, Tjokorda Raka Sukawati, a member of the *Volksraad* who had studied for a while in France and who was married to a French woman. The prince invited Spies to Ubud and introduced him to his younger brother, Tjokorda Gede Agung Sukawati. Spies decided to spend some time in the small town.

Over a period of several years, Spies came to be known as the foremost non-Balinese authority on Balinese culture. He was variously an insect collector, a composer, a film production consultant, an author of books and articles, a patron of the arts, and a choreographer – he was the first to arrange the now-famous *kecak* dance as a secular performance. Spies opened up his house to guests from abroad, including Rudolf Bonnet, a Dutchman of Huguenot ancestry.



The Museum Puri Lukisan, Ubud, 2003.

These two European artists gave added momentum to the renewal of the Balinese arts. Spies and Bonnet provided artists with materials and instructed them in new techniques. Spies himself oversaw the training of 12 to 15 young painters in his own house. He also helped them market their work.


In 1936 the *Pita Maha* association was established. This name, which was taken from ancient Kawi, means “honored ancestors.” The association was headed by Ida Bagus Putu, while the artistic committee included Tjokorda Agung, Bonnet, Spies, and the painter I Gusti Nyoman Lempad. The association became established in art centers around Bali, and involved between 120 and 150 artists.

Each week, committee members met at Spies’ house. The association sponsored exhibitions in Batavia (now Jakarta), Bandung, Medan, Palembang, Surabaya, and abroad in the Netherlands, Paris, New York, and Nagoya. Bali became established as an artistic center equal to China, Japan, and India. Lempad, in particular, became acknowledged around the world as a major artist. And then, World War II broke out. Accused of sexual misconduct, Spies was expelled from *Pita Maha*. Bonnet protested and also withdrew from the association.

In 1942, *Pita Maha* was dissolved. Spies and Bonnet were arrested by Japanese troops. Sadly, during his return to Germany, Spies’ boat was torpedoed and sank off Sri Lanka. Bonnet was held in Makassar but eventually returned to Bali after Indonesian independence. He used the revolutionary period to do research, train young painters, and collect the works of Balinese painters. He revived his plans to establish a museum in company with Tjokorda Agung.

They purchased land near Tjokorda Agung’s family seat in Sukawati. In 1953, the Ratna Wartha Foundation was established to develop the museum. In January 1954, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, a close friend of Tjokorda Agung, came to Ubud to lay the cornerstone. Donations flowed from the Indonesian government, from the Dutch cultural association Sticusa, and from the Ford Foundation. Two years later, the museum was inaugurated by Minister for Education and Culture Muhammad Yamin. The name Puri Lukisan was coined by Yamin.

Bonnet and Tjokorda Agung died in 1978. Their remains were cremated in a shared ceremony in 1979. Puri Lukisan continues to attract the interest of artists from other areas, including such notable figures as Affandi, S. Sudjojono, Dullah, and many from abroad. These artists come to study in Ubud and to find inspiration from one of the finest collections of Balinese art in existence.



“The Birth of Hanoman” (1936) by the Balinese painter I Gusti Made Deblog, hangs in the Puri Lukisan in Ubud. It was donated to the museum by Michael Harris, a former Foundation Representative.

While there is no record of this incident in Foundation documents, it was true that in Indonesia the fear of communism was spreading, and no one living in the country, Indonesian or foreign alike, was immune to its effects. At UI, as both Soemarin and Daoed Joesoef recall, PKI was trying to take control of FEUI.

Because of its strong PSI stigma, FEUI was an easy target for criticism. The administration felt that it had to defend itself by all means necessary. When Sukarno criticized economists who were trapped in “textbook thinking” and who had been “brainwashed by Keynes,” staff members removed certain books based on non-Marxist theory from the library, those of Keynes foremost among them. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, who later served as ambassador to the US and as President Megawati’s coordinating minister for finance and economy, was a student at the time. He told of being assigned by Professor Sarbini Sumawinata to remove the library’s books on “capitalist economics” and store them in the teacher’s office. Some books even ended up being held for safekeeping in Cipinang prison.

As a safety precaution, course titles were changed. “Accountancy,” for example, was changed to “Indonesian

Socialist Accounting Procedures.” Even the vocabulary of academic papers was altered to fit the times. Sadli wrote about “industrial organization within the Indonesian socialist system.” Ali Wardhana and Subroto presented a paper entitled “Economic Cooperation Among the New Emerging Forces.” Some of the teaching staff were sent for training to Eastern European countries, like Yugoslavia, or in the case of Widjojo, to the People’s Republic of China. Batara Simatupang, another grantee who finished his studies at Stanford University in 1961, left for Poland to study with the noted socialist economist Oscar Lange at the Warsaw Central School of Planning and Statistics. Berkeley professor Glassburner viewed these trends with dismay, but No. 4 Jalan Salemba, it seemed, was no ivory tower. And, in fact, it had never been destined to be one.

Even in its earliest days, the active role that this institution would play in national life was implied, if not always evident. When Soenario gave his first lecture on the day FEUI opened in 1950, the title was “The Economy, Economic Politics, and State Politics.” Emil Salim wrote in the foreword to a book commemorating the school’s 50th anniversary that this inaugural



▲ PKI members on the second anniversary of the Jakarta chapter, 1953.

speech established the FEUI's character. Thereafter, he said, the school was always "weaving together developments in the fields of economics, economic policy, and national development."

A highly significant development in the history of FEUI took place nearly a decade later when Sadli met an old school friend from his time in revolutionary Yogyakarta in the 1940s. Suwanto was now an army colonel and the deputy commander of Seskoad. To those Indonesians who admired him, he was an extraordinary military man. In 1967, after Suwanto's death from cancer, the statesman Soedjatmoko wrote in an obituary that he was an example of a warrior-priest, an intellectual in the military. Suwanto had revamped Seskoad's curriculum so that half of its courses dealt with economics, law, political science, sociology, and philosophy. In 1958, he established a cooperative program between Seskoad and UI, UGM, the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and Padjadjaran University. A year earlier, after their return from studies in the US, Sadli and Subroto had begun to teach courses there.

The commemorative book, *Fifty Years of the University of Indonesia's School of Economics*, describes the cooperative

program that Suwanto established as one attempt "to take into consideration the political and economic developments of the times in order to stem the influence of communism." For the teachers seconded to Seskoad, the forum offered something they couldn't find in other official places: the freedom to express their criticisms of Sukarno's guided economy which, by way of its pervasive government control over production and distribution, had succeeded only in producing economic stagnation. Similarly, the officer-students at Seskoad had used the ideas that these economists generated to form their own political agenda, preparing for the day when they would hold power – that is, after PKI had been eliminated.

That time did come, in 1966, with the rise of Major General Suharto as commander of the armed forces and then head of state. Thereafter, as the concepts of the Salemba technocrats began to be implemented on a national scale, the face of Indonesia changed more rapidly. A historical transformation in Indonesia's economic system was effected. The country made a large-scale shift away from a guided economy toward a market economy, 30 years before China



▲ *Opening day of the Armed Forces Staff College in Cililitan, 1951.*



▲ *Classes resume at UI, 1966.*

and Vietnam went through the same process. For those who saw that the lights were much brighter on the “capitalist street,” the rise of Suharto and his New Order policies was good news indeed.

Up until this time Suharto was not familiar with Widjojo, although he might have known Sadli and Subroto during his time as an officer-student at Seskoad in 1959 and 1960. In early 1966, after the PKI had been eliminated through bloodshed, students at FEUI held a “Lecture and Seminar Week” at the auditorium of No. 6 Jalan Salemba. Suharto was still just an army commander, but since his emergence on the national stage following the events of 30 September 1965 he had demonstrated a level of authority that already proved a match for Sukarno. Students who opposed Sukarno enthusiastically invited him to give the opening speech for the seminar.

Widjojo, who was the school’s dean at the time, participated in choosing both the speakers and the topics of the seminar. With the cloud of guided democracy still hanging over the country, students and faculty were still hesitant to speak freely, and at the close of the seminar the participants together recited an oath of loyalty to President Sukarno, the “Great Leader of the Revolution.” Even so, after all the presentations had been made, Widjojo did voice a critique of the government that was only partially veiled. He said that the government’s actions with respect to the economy and finance “were unwise” and that they “only added to the current economic difficulties.”

Perhaps it was at that moment that Suharto realized he had found a useful source of ideas for Indonesia’s rehabilitation once he was in power. In his address at the seminar, Suharto expressed his appreciation to the organizers. Thereafter, the road to the halls of power began to open for Widjojo and his FEUI colleagues.

For these neo-Keynesians, rehabilitation from the degradation caused by Sukarno’s “guided economy” did not mean doing away with guidance altogether. Indonesia’s economy was in shambles, as it had been during the Depression of the 1930s, and it could not right itself without intervention. The FEUI technocrats saw the need to embark on a rational

economic development plan, one for which coherent and consistent leadership was vital. Their plan was effective: it became the road map that charted Indonesia’s most rapid economic development of the 20th century.

Yet what was rational was not necessarily democratic. Democracy, it seemed, was a luxury, a notion to celebrate freedom, while freedom itself could be bothersome. Nevertheless, as time went by, the need for greater democracy grew. The control over national development that had been so effectively exercised by the economic technocrats started – like so much else under Suharto’s rule – to erode. The New Order, which began with the mass murder of its political opponents in 1965 and 1966, could not transform itself from an emergency-driven regime into a free and democratic administration. Anxiety and fear were epidemic and surfaced even when people tried to think of stopping the decay through a change of government.

Over time, Indonesia’s authoritarian regime, which had relied so heavily on the bureaucracy, the military, and the technocrats, came to be centered on one person: Suharto. He sat securely in his home on Jalan Cendana in Jakarta, both as president of the country and as father to his children. As his sons and daughters grew to become the nation’s most powerful capitalists, the country’s “rational” development plan repeatedly had to be accommodated to support them. The systems and procedures set up by Widjojo and his team were ignored whenever they were inconvenient. The very words “Cendana Family” cast a spell that made all other powers irrelevant.

Towards 1998, when Suharto resigned as president, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo harshly criticized the regime for the institutional decay that had occurred. By that time, however, it was too late. Widjojo and his team had long been out of the cabinet. For Suharto, the old technocrats were history. Indeed, in his autobiography *Suharto: My Thoughts, Sayings and Actions*, he mentions Widjojo’s name only twice, while heralding B.J. Habibie, with 17 references, as the source of a new economic approach, one unknown in the halls of No. 4 Jalan Salemba.

**CHAPTER TWO:
AMERICA, AMERICA...**





CHAPTER TWO


AMERICA, AMERICA...

In 1956, an American scholar set out for the Indonesian island of Ternate. His goal: to locate a tribe that, so it was said, communicated by whistling instead of speaking. Although he didn't succeed in finding this unusual group, that was not the worst of Lucien Zamarski's experiences. On Ternate, he was arrested by the Indonesian military and accused, among other things, of making radio contact with a Dutch submarine. He was detained for more than two months without any official charges having been levied against him. It was not until US Ambassador John Allison intervened that he was released to fly home to his wife in Moline, Illinois.

In 1958, an American woman who worked at an English language school in Bukittinggi was arrested. The civil conflict caused by the establishment of the separatist PRRI in West Sumatra was all but over. Central government troops had regained control of the area, and the few remaining rebels continued to wage guerrilla warfare. Beatrice Sutherland, who had been sent by the Foundation to Indonesia to teach English and who had lived in Bukittinggi for eight years, was accused by the central military commander of being a PRRI sympathizer. His proof: a recording she had made of the sound of gunfire.

Ms. Sutherland explained that she had become intrigued by the contrast between birdsong and the sound of gunfire, which could be heard on an almost daily basis, and had made the recording as a souvenir. But the military officials believed that she was using the recording to send signals to rebel soldiers.

- ◀ *The turbulent 1960s saw hundreds of demonstrations calling for an end to foreign involvement in independent Indonesia. This one in Yogyakarta in 1961 protested continuing Dutch control over West Irian.*



Sutherland was eventually released and the Ford Foundation office in Jakarta asked the Ministry of Education to conduct an investigation into the military's charges. The investigation turned up no evidence whatsoever to support the military's claim.

To be an American in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s was not always a comfortable experience, particularly if one wished to study a remote ethnic group or make an unusual sound recording. This was understandable. While the geographical distance between the United States and Indonesia had "shrunk," political tension – due to the Cold War, American fears of a "communist threat," and a drive by the US to expand its global influence – had driven the countries apart.

In a press conference in Washington, DC on 11 February 1958, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that "Indonesia's 'guided democracy' might very well be unconstitutional and was unsatisfactory for many." Dulles' comments did not receive a warm welcome in Indonesia, where guided democracy was an underlying principle of President Sukarno's so-called "Political Manifesto," the doctrine of the Indonesian revolution that he was reviving.

But the US did not simply criticize this guided democracy. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and younger brother of the secretary of state, went much further.

He organized assistance for the Indonesian military officers who rebelled against the government, in the PRRI and in the Sulawesi-based Permesta (*Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam* – Universal Struggle Charter) rebellion which also took place in 1958.

These officers, along with anti-Sukarno civilian leaders like Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, were good partners for the CIA in its quest to thwart the establishment of a communist regime in Indonesia. Crates of bazookas, machine guns, and grenades, each clearly marked with the stamp of the US Navy, were sent to the Permesta rebels in North Sulawesi. An even more obvious indicator of US interference in Indonesian politics occurred in May 1958 when a bomber belonging to the rebel forces was shot down, and its pilot, Allen Pope – believed to be a US Air Force pilot – was captured. Though Pope was never officially acknowledged by the US government to be a member of the US Air Force, American involvement in Indonesian politics could no longer be kept secret.

The outcry over the Pope incident caused a sea change in US policy. The Pentagon, which

did not approve of the CIA's actions, now had an excuse to press the State Department to change its image and course of action. The US government, realizing that the CIA's support for the rebels was a failed venture and was damaging to America's reputation abroad, put a stop to the channeling of assistance to the insurgents.



▲ Allen Pope showing a judge his flight path before his plane was shot down. Jakarta, 1960.

◀ John Foster Dulles visits Jakarta in 1956.

This change in the position of the Eisenhower administration reveals how uneasy international bilateral relations could be during the Cold War. Indonesia had always been ambivalent toward the US. American diplomats in Jakarta believed that Sukarno was beginning to distance himself from the US. They felt that he suspected Washington wanted to overthrow him. “The imperialists are truly... imperialistic!” he proclaimed. At the same time, he also made it clear that Indonesia was not rejecting the assistance the US was offering. He maintained a pragmatic attitude, even in periods of resurgent nationalist rhetoric.

A mere four months after Pope was shot down, Indonesia accepted \$7 million in military assistance from the US. The first shipment arrived by a C-124 transport plane, in which Sukarno was only too happy to take a short ride.

Whether to accept aid, or whether to provide assistance – in those days, the variations on this theme were many. The most interesting example of this confused or, perhaps more accurately, this ambivalent state of affairs can be seen in the relationship between the Indonesian government and the Ford Foundation, which survived the heated and, finally, explosive 1960s.

Since the beginning of its history in Indonesia the Ford Foundation played a unique role in Indonesian efforts to obtain foreign aid. For Paul Hoffman, the Foundation’s president at that time, Indonesia also held a special place for the Foundation, second only to India in importance.

Hoffman became interested in Indonesia only by coincidence. In the late 1940s, when he was working in Europe administering the Marshall Plan, he learned that the Netherlands wanted to use a portion of its aid to put an end to the independence movement in its former colony. He threatened to stop further assistance to the Netherlands unless it desisted.

An Indonesian parry to the Dutch move came in early 1952, when nationalist figure Ali Sastroamidjojo, then Indonesian ambassador to the US and later Prime Minister, wrote to the Institute of International Education (IIE) requesting that the Foundation help fund an English-language teacher training project in Indonesia. Hoffman quickly assigned Dyke Brown and Edwin Arnold, two consultants for the Foundation, to conduct an initial survey in Jakarta.



▲ An exhibition of US military hardware in Jakarta, after the Pope Incident, 1958.

MAYLING OEY-GARDINER

It was late in her career when Mayling Oey-Gardiner became a grantee, but her relationship with the Foundation began much earlier. The first female professor at FEUI, Mayling earned two masters' degrees and one doctorate and was the first Indonesian ever to receive a PhD in demography. She is currently involved in the Foundation's International Fellowships Program, a world-wide initiative to provide post-graduate scholarships to promising but socially or economically marginalized students.

My first experience with the Foundation wasn't as a grantee, but rather as a clerk in its office on Kebon Sirih in 1963. I had just finished a project at FEUI when I was asked – in fact, told – to join the Ford office by Assistant Representative William Lightfoot. Because of the political situation, Ford's activities in Indonesia were slowing down but for some reason Mr. Lightfoot and Mr. Phineas Quinn insisted I come to work for them. Mr. Quinn, who was based in New York, came to Jakarta every couple of months. Since the workload was slowing down he convinced me to teach him Indonesian, and in return he would teach me English. But his idea of English was Oxford English, and he decided my lessons would focus on reciting Shakespeare. After several of these lessons, he popped the question, "What do you think about going to school in America?" I replied, "What, me, go to school in America?"

The early 1960s was a very difficult period to be Chinese in Indonesia. I initially rejected the offer, but my parents convinced me to go. There was substantial educational funding provided to universities in the US, and Mr. Quinn put me in contact with a colleague of his at St. Xavier in Chicago and I was granted a full scholarship. In 1964, just before Sukarno closed the borders, I was awarded a Fulbright scholarship and left for the US. While I didn't receive any grant from the Foundation at the time (mainly because, I believe, they were only able to provide grants through the government), Mr. Quinn's persistence got me to the US. During the summer of 1965 Mr. Quinn arranged for me a summer job at Cornell to help John Wolff with his Indonesian-language study book. I also landed a second job assisting Dr.

Widjojo with his dissertation *Population Trends in Indonesia*.

Throughout my years in the US I kept close contact with Mr. Quinn. So, after graduating with a BA in Sociology in 1968 I decided it would be better to stay in the US as the situation was still very tense in Indonesia. I was accepted into the MA



Mayling Oey-Gardiner at St. Xavier College, Chicago, 1965.

program at William and Mary, and upon completion, I moved back to Indonesia in 1971. Again my mentor, Mr. Quinn, influenced the direction of my future. His contacts with several institutions paved my way and introduced me to the study of population. Around this time, Dr. Widjojo, who was heading BAPPENAS, was instrumental in getting population into the development debate. This was also the time when the US allocated a lot of funds to population, and Indonesia received the largest multilateral population grant. It was also the time when the US decided not to continue expanding

the bureaucracy; instead it gave money to universities to run population programs. So when Harvard, being one of the big grantees of this money, came to Indonesia looking for students to train in population, I accepted the opportunity for a second MA in Population Science.

In 1976, after two masters degrees and 15 years being involved with the Foundation, I was the first Indonesian to win a Ford-Rockefeller population studies award to do research on transmigration in Lampung. I was convinced to do this by another Foundation program officer, Peter Weldon. After the research was completed, Mr. Weldon further convinced me to get a PhD from Australian National University in 1978, which made me the first Indonesian ever to get a PhD in Demography. More recently, in 2001, I became the first female professor at FEUI.

Ever since I was a clerk at the Foundation, I always felt it is the *people* there that affected my life, much more so than the actual institution. What I appreciate most about the Foundation is the fact that they have been able to pick up on atypical and marginal cases, especially now through the International Fellowship Program. I have always felt that for many granting organizations, people are just numbers; they're just another grantee. But the Foundation is different – they are involved in the grantees' lives, and not just financially. The people who kept challenging and encouraging me have made a huge impact on my life, and I'm certain there are many others whose lives have been affected as well. To me the Ford Foundation stands for providing development assistance with a human face.

THE GREEN REVOLUTION: INDONESIA FEEDS ITSELF

Nowadays, the term “biotechnology” conjures a host of other terms, many controversial: genetic modification, gene splicing, engineered seeds, transgenic crops, “Frankenfoods.” The field has stirred a whole set of side-issues involving trade, national and economic sovereignty, health concerns, and philosophic and moral questions.

It wasn't always so. In the 1960s, “biotechnology” was synonymous with the Green Revolution that gave hope to developing countries threatened with a Malthusian disaster. The term Green Revolution referred to the dramatic improvements in grain crop yields resulting from the introduction of new varieties of wheat and rice.

For rice agriculture, the revolution began in 1966 with the release of new hybrids by the University of the Philippines' International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). Established in 1960 by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, IRRI is a non-profit research and training organization. Its worldwide activities to help poor farmers and consumers are estimated to have touched half the world's population. The scientific breakthrough of 1966 was designed to stave off the mass famine predicted for Asia in the 1970s. In fact it was to alter profoundly the political economy of rice.

The timing proved crucial for Indonesia. The economy was in shambles. The population was growing at an alarming rate, and the country still suffered from the severe rice shortage that had contributed to the fall of Sukarno. Importing rice was not only costly, but for a proud nation it was an embarrassment. By the time Suharto took power, just about everyone was short of food, and the new varieties were a boon. They provided increased productivity, economic stability, and self-respect.

But managing the new technology was a problem. The integrated package of irrigation infrastructure, chemical fertilizer, and improved seed varieties required

substantial investment, something a large landowner could manage but which was beyond the capacity of poor or landless peasants.

The political mood was also problematic. In the aftermath of the 1965 massacres, the army took political control of rural Java. Villagers, whatever their politics, were no longer free to conduct their own local affairs.

The combination of these economic and political forces – not to mention continued population growth – brought abrupt



Threshing rice in the village of Abianbase, Bali, 1985.

changes to rural Java. Landowners became less willing to enter sharecropping arrangements, thereby jeopardizing the social harmony underpinning rural life. Increasingly, fields of ripe grain were opened to outsiders who brought in their own harvesters – mostly men – using sickles and rotary weeders rather than the traditional palm-held blade.

By the early 1970s, Indonesia was experiencing the highest levels of rice production in its history. The new variety known as IR5 was in use on one-fourth of the country's rice land. But rice-land owners, eager to cut labor costs, had increasingly turned to machinery, and within a few years had ended a major source of paid work for poor women. When the sociologist Masri Singarimbun asked some of these women how they would cope, they replied, “We will eat more carefully.”

John Bresnan was the person responsible

for bringing IRRI to Indonesia. At the time, Bresnan's former boss in New York was chairman of IRRI's board, and adamantly opposed extending its work to Indonesia due to the mounting political tension between Indonesia and the US. Bresnan, however, believed deeply that the Green Revolution was good for Indonesia, and eventually his view prevailed.

IRRI's achievements make for impressive statistics: the International Rice Genebank, with 90,000 samples of cultivated and wild rice in storage; the *Farmers' Primer on Growing Rice*, translated into 48 languages; the library with its Rice Bibliography, containing more than 170,000 references to rice in at least 80 languages. The tradition of local community work – scholarships, income-generating training activities, gender empowerment programs – is solid.

But critical questions should be raised. Some say that the new rice varieties are more vulnerable to pest and disease; they cite, for example, the devastation wrought by the brown planthopper in Indonesia. Others say that soils are eventually impoverished by long-term intensive applications of chemical fertilizer. Still others point to pollution by pesticides, the most dangerous being the poisoning of fish.

IRRI stands its ground, and claims that the technology has actually reduced the amount of pesticides farmers have had to use, with happy consequences for the environment and for human health.

In 1984, to global accolades, Indonesia finally achieved rice self-sufficiency. The report card however has been mixed. Poor rural dwellers have had to compete for shrinking rice-field jobs, and many have fled to the cities to look for wage labor. Although many decades have passed since the Green Revolution, we still see these economic migrants everywhere: sex workers, street vendors, scavengers, barely eking out a living in the towns and cities of our “self-sufficient” country.



There was great enthusiasm for this proposal in the Ford office. A memo to Hoffman by Brown and Arnold stated that Indonesia appeared to “have a reasonable chance of developing along democratic lines.” The consultants also noted that, aided by “its experience, geographic isolation, and the Islamic faith, which is followed by 90 per cent of its people, Indonesia has remained non-communist.”

“Communist” and “non-communist” – these were the labels that dominated American thinking at the time and were used to decide whether a country should be classified as friend – and deserving of assistance – or foe. As such, Indonesia’s request for assistance was not to be denied. As a “non-communist” country, it could knock on Washington’s door. Even so, resources were limited. In 1952 the UN assistance program was small, and the budget for US technical assistance had recently been cut from \$8 million to \$3 million.

Relations with the US were not easy. The problem with the American government, according to Foundation staff at time, was that “it underestimated the strength of Indonesian nationalism.” Further, during the Cold War, the US was somewhat inflexible in the face of Indonesia’s refusal to take sides between the “free world” and the “Communist bloc.”

Indonesia maintained what it called a “free and active” – as opposed to a “neutral” – position. And, indeed, it was active in the drive toward a resolution of the conflict between the blocs. Its hosting of the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 marked the initial declaration of this non-aligned position. This was a policy the US did not fully appreciate. Thus, the friction between American and Indonesian foreign policies existed even before Dulles’ 1958 declaration.

In 1952, when Sukiman Wirjosandjojo was prime minister, Indonesia was scheduled to receive US aid. This assistance was cancelled, however, because of a clause in the US Mutual Security Act of 1951 requiring that US economic assistance be linked to defense of the “free world.” Negotiations were held in order to dispel the appearance that Indonesia had abandoned its non-aligned foreign policy. An agreement seemed to be within reach, but opposition to this clause had already spread within Indonesia. The Sukiman Cabinet’s mandate was withdrawn by Parliament in February 1952. This incident demonstrated that, for Indonesia, foreign aid often involved complications not easily resolved.

This was the same conclusion reached by Ford consultants Brown and Arnold after they visited Indonesian



▲ *The opening session of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung.*
 ◀ *Terraced rice land in Bali. For nearly two decades Foundation grantees promoted the involvement of local farmers in the design and management of the systems that irrigate their fields.*

SAJOGYO

Professor Sajogyo is a well-known lecturer at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (Institut Pertanian Bogor – IPB). He is widely acknowledged as one of Indonesia’s principal experts on poverty alleviation, rural development, family welfare, and rural sociology.

After graduating with a degree in agricultural science from the Faculty of Agriculture at UI, I served for ten months as research assistant to Prof. Karl Pelzer, a geographer from Yale University, working in North and South Sumatra. After that, I was an assistant in social-economic studies in UI’s Faculty of Agriculture in Bogor from 1956-1957. At the same time I was an assistant to the guest sociologist, Prof. W.F. Wertheim from the University of Amsterdam. In October 1957 I completed my doctorate in agriculture under Prof. Wertheim with a thesis entitled, “Spontaneous Transmigration to W. Sekampung, Lampung, South Sumatra.”

“Spontaneous transmigrants” came to Lampung without government assistance. They hailed from all across Java, following the path of earlier Javanese migrants who had established settlements in Lampung prior to World War II. They did not just develop farm lands, they established new communities with their own institutions and endeavored to have these settlements recognized officially as new villages by the district government.

In the 1950s, the key word in social studies was “community development.” This was an area of academic inquiry but the World Bank, International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization also supported the concept of grassroots development.

The Department of Agriculture’s Agro-Economic Survey (AES) project began in 1964. As part of its support for the project, the Foundation funded the consultancy of Dr. E. de Vries, who had been an agricultural official of the colonial Dutch government in the 1930s. I was seconded by IPB in 1964 to head the working committee of the AES with funding from the Department of Agriculture as well as Ford. The New Order government sustained its support for the AES over many years, and I headed it until 1972.

The Foundation supported agricultural development throughout Southeast Asia through the Agricultural Development Council (ADC). The collaboration between ADC and the AES coincided with the introduction of a new rice strain from IRRI in the Philippines. Given the enormous demand for rice in Indonesia, this was a vitally important new development. Previously, in the Sukarno era, projects that



Sajogyo outside his office in Bogor, 1977.

promoted intensified rice cultivation by the Padi Centra Program used Indonesian varieties.

After 1965, the ADC became increasingly involved in agricultural development in Indonesia. IRRI began conducting research on rice in this country, involving many IPB lecturers in this work. A hybrid rice strain that came to be called “AES rice” was developed by crossing the tall, silky *peta* strain with a variety that had the opposite characteristics. With the new, faster-growing

rice strain the production volume of this vital commodity could be expanded dramatically. Cultivation of the new rice strain required the use of commercial fertilizer and pesticide, and thereby necessitated the development of a new agricultural industry that included construction of factories, and systems of distribution and credit. This became known as the Green Revolution. It also opened up great opportunity for corruption and collusion between the bureaucracy and business.

IPB staff were not involved in the ‘discovery’ of the IRRI rice variety. Our contribution was hybrid strains of Indonesian rice that were used as genetic stock for the new seeds. Some IPB staff had the task of introducing the new strain in three villages in Karawang [West Java] where they worked intensively with farmers over a six-month period to encourage them to use the new strain. The farmers were convinced. Agriculture agencies began involving senior students as extension workers, sending them to work in villages for six months; and their reports constituted part of their final exams. In 1965 there were hundreds of IPB agriculture students on such assignments.

In 1973 I went on leave to Hawai’i to write a paper for a seminar of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Entitled, “Modernization without Development,” it was later published in the *Journal of Social Sciences* in Dhaka.

The New Order government did not pay sufficient attention to agrarian reform. The forestry law of 1967 stipulated the transfer of hundreds of millions of hectares of forest land to state control. This opened the way for big business to take over forest management. So today, after 30 years of a New Order administration that gave priority to capital development, our forest heritage is in ruins.





PUBLIC DEFENDERS: THE INDONESIAN LEGAL AID FOUNDATION

Once upon a time in an Indonesian courtroom, recalled Adnan Buyung Nasution, typically the judge would ask the defendant, “This is how much I will fine you. Think you can handle that?” and typically the handdog defendant would answer, “Yes, judge, whatever you say.”

In 1957, young prosecutor Nasution was appalled by Jakarta’s top-down justice system. His work in the courts had exposed him to extortion by judges and policemen, unfair jail terms, and the general defenselessness of the poor. He felt that the country needed an independent, non-profit legal aid organization to defend the public interest.

Because this idea violated the “revolutionary” character of Sukarno’s later years, more than a decade passed before it could be implemented. By the early 1970s, meanwhile, it had become clear that the same kind of corruption, patronage, and abuse of justice was rampant under the Suharto regime.

The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia* – YLBHI) was launched in 1970 by a group that included Martokusumo, Mochtar Lubis, P.K. Ojong, Suardi Tasrif, Yap Thiam Hien, Hasjim Machdan, Minang Warman, Victor Sibarani, Albert Hasibuan, and H.J.C. Princen. The institutional model was American, with the Neighborhood Legal Offices and the Public Defender Services providing particular inspiration. After charismatic Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin endorsed the new institute, a nod of approval came from Suharto.

YLBHI quickly became the leading *pro bono* defender of indigent Indonesians and a center for human rights activism. Over the years it has maintained links with a diverse network of legal aid organizations, research bodies, and advocacy groups; published on legal and human rights issues; and conducted seminars, workshops, and paralegal training.

Initial funding came from Nasution’s own law firm, which he built at the urging of Mochtar Lubis and Sumitro

Djojohadikusumo to ensure his financial independence. Later, funding came from other local and international sources.

YLBHI’s pioneering role in support of the political goals of NGOs is well known. It has long struggled, for example, for a society based on the rule of law. At the same time, its organizational efforts, particularly in networking and coalition building, have served as a practical model for NGOs. YLBHI has links with its own branches, with other more loosely affiliated groups in the provinces, and with local networks or posts in smaller towns and villages.



The YLBHI office in Central Jakarta as it appears three decades after its founding, 2003.

Since 1986, YLBHI’s efforts on behalf of labor associations have been channeled mainly through the formation of credit unions and small enterprises. This type of assistance also extended to unorganized labor such as domestic servants and women shop assistants. In fact, the rights of women had drawn YLBHI’s attention as early as 1979, when a group of Muslim professional women established a complimentary institute to improve the status of Muslim women in marriage and family law.

The Foundation’s support for YLBHI began in the late 1970s, at a time when state hostility toward human rights organizations had a chilling effect on donors. The Indonesian government did not recognize international human rights principles, so support for activism in Indonesia was virtually impossible. It had to be provided

indirectly, through foreign human rights organizations or programs such as the International Commission of Jurists and Human Rights Watch/Asia.

After the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor – and in a tense political atmosphere – a Foundation grant to Human Rights Watch/Asia and the Legal Aid Institute helped pay the travel costs of YLBHI lawyers to defend East Timorese. Support for Human Rights Watch/Asia also included an intern exchange program with YLBHI. Other support came in the form of individual grants for study and conference

participation abroad. Young lawyers such as Tatang Suganda, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, and Todung Mulya Lubis – vocal critics of the New Order and important figures in YLBHI – went to places like Manila, Seoul, London, and Geneva.

Another Foundation strategy was to inject social justice concerns into areas such as resource management, environmental law, and women’s issues. But NGOs didn’t always know how to resolve personal or institutional frictions, and this prompted the Foundation to consider ways to help strengthen the organizational capacities of these groups. In the view of former Human Rights Watch/Asia

Director Sidney Jones, the goal was “to devise the kind of training that could bring big and little NGOs into closer contact.” By the late 1980s, a tug of war within the NGO community was far from resolved.

YLBHI’s achievements over several decades were impressive. It helped shape the fundamentals of community development in Indonesia by empowering local groups, encouraging popular participation in decision-making, and fostering the idea of a strong civil society as a counterweight to the power of the state. Ironically, YLBHI was beset by funding problems soon after Suharto fell from power. Internal friction and continuous lay-offs have characterised its operations since. It was further torn asunder by Nasution’s controversial decision to defend Indonesian generals accused of human rights abuse.

cities in August 1952. In Jakarta they met with Prime Minister Wilopo, Minister of Education Bahder Djohan, the rectors of two universities, and with President Sukarno. Their 45-minute meeting with Indonesia's leader left a positive impression. The Americans concluded that Sukarno "has a warm view of the West and the US." The head of state asked them, "What other nation has philanthropical organizations like the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations? Is it because Americans are so rich, or because they are so humane?"

Amid all this congeniality, Brown and Arnold learned two crucial things about Indonesia. First, they understood the character of its top leadership, which they described as "forged in the revolutionary struggles of the country and genuinely dedicated to the progress of Indonesia as a free and independent country." Second, they learned that "Indonesians are particularly slow...to accept assistance from foreign governments." According to Brown and Arnold, this was due to "the newness of Indonesia as an independent country," and to the "bitterness of the struggle to emerge from its 300-year status as a colony." Hence, the "hypersensitivity of Indonesians concerning the independence of their foreign policy" must be taken into consideration.

It was precisely for this reason that the Foundation, an independent nongovernmental agency, was viewed in Indonesia as having the potential to play a key role in relations with the US. The conclusion reached by Foundation consultants was that Sukarno "very much wanted the Ford Foundation to conduct activities in Indonesia."

The list of programs that needed implementing was extensive. Building a nation as vast as Indonesia – with its lack of money and planning, a ten per cent literacy rate, and a government administration in complete disarray – was a job not previously envisioned by any power in the history of the archipelago. The task was so huge, wrote Frank Miller, the Foundation's second representative in Jakarta, that it was understandable there should emerge "the sublime in humility, or an ego on the grand scale." At the same time, there was within Indonesia a resolve, said Miller, "to never fall into the hands of a foreign power again, or to mortgage itself through obligations or alliances."

As a result, the Foundation's response was measured – and properly so, it seemed – for it would have been difficult to follow a ready-made design. The most urgent task, and the easiest on which to reach agreement, was to improve the country's quality of education. English-language education was a must. In Miller's view, Indonesians were quick to realize that learning the English language was one of the keys to national development. This, it seems, was the reason for Ali Sastroamidjojo and Sukarno's requests. Even before their departure from Indonesia, Brown and Arnold sent a telegram to New York recommending that English-language teachers be dispatched to Indonesia right away, for the academic year 1953-54.

In the history of the Foundation in Indonesia, perhaps no other program was initiated as quickly. The request was approved only one day after Hoffman received the telegram. Brown and Arnold were told to convey this information to the minister of education before leaving Indonesia. The ensuing agreement was simple: immediate support to build language laboratories for university students and middle-school teachers.

Over time, this agreement expanded and grew more complex. A decade later, the total allocated by the Foundation to its English-language program in Indonesia had reached almost \$1.5 million (no small sum at that time) – even amid a rancorous political atmosphere.

The Foundation-funded program began with a five-week basic training course for English-language teachers, the goal being to improve these teachers' speaking ability. Eleven American teachers were sent to cities around the archipelago. Following that, a two-year "standard training course" was designed to produce Indonesian instructors able to teach English to the next generation of students.

An internal evaluation produced by the Foundation gave high marks to the English-language program for the institutional change it effected. At the outset of the program in 1953, nearly 80 per cent of the country's English-language teachers had no grasp of standard pedagogical methods. For the most part, they lacked the necessary teaching materials or even an institution where they could receive proper training. By 1963, "the situation was dramatically changed. A whole complex of institutions, materials, and teachers existed."

The evaluation also pointed to a potential indirect outcome, one consistent with thinking typical of the Cold War era. It noted that sufficient English-language skills among educated Indonesians provided “an important political advantage for the free world and its ideology.” It assumed, since English was now the international language of communication as well as the language of much of the “free world,” that the Indonesian government would favor American teachers over those from communist states. This, it was said in the report, would “help limit the influence of communist countries in Indonesia.” In fact, by the early 1960s, credit from the USSR to Indonesia rose to \$800 million, while 300 technical assistants from the USSR were working in Indonesia, compared with 200 from the US. Teaching English seemed to have no impact on the extent of influence from communist countries.

The Foundation’s principal goal in establishing its English-teaching program also proved elusive. The British Council and other organizations, too, had initiated similar programs in Indonesia. Yet a Foundation report in 1971-72 observed the “very slow progress that had been achieved in English language training” overall, and stated that the Foundation’s program was one of its “less than encouraging” endeavors. A quarter of a century after American and other western teachers first entered Indonesian schools, it appeared it still was not easy to equip Indonesians with English.

A 1974 article in *Tempo* noted that “English language courses are springing up like street vendors and new restaurants.” According to Kurnianingrat Ali Sastroamidjojo, a former professor of English at UI, whose husband was one of the first Indonesian officials to request assistance from the Foundation, “From one year to the next, young people are getting progressively worse. It’s as if they don’t read anything in school. Only those students with the financial means are able to sign up for private lessons.” Students who could not afford private lessons enrolled in whatever courses were available, the quality of which varied greatly. One English course in Jakarta that catered to the needs of hotel and nightclub employees provided reading materials with sentences like, “What’s the matter has been so happened?”

An indisputably beneficial and enduring result of the Ford Foundation’s work in the field of language was a set of bilingual dictionaries compiled over several decades by John M. Echols of Cornell University with the assistance of an Indonesian lexicographer, Hassan Shadily. An initial publication subsidy of \$3000 from Ford in 1963 ensured that their Indonesian-English volume could be sold at a reasonable price, and it became a best-seller. Later, the Foundation provided an additional \$170,000 for preparation of the English-Indonesian volume eventually published in 1975. Updated editions are still widely sold both in bookstores and, as pirated copies, by street vendors all around the country.



▲ By the end of the 1950s, the Soviet Union had increasing influence on Indonesia with the sale of planes, ships and military equipment.
 ► A hawker selling pirated Echols-Shadily dictionaries in Central Jakarta, a common occurrence since it was first published. Of the estimated 120,000 copies sold each year, 80 per cent are illegal.

HARYONO SUYONO

Haryono Suyono first became involved with family planning through articles he wrote for papers and magazines while working as a statistician. Ali Sadikin, one of the few government officials of the 1960s to have the courage to openly support the family planning movement, encouraged him to continue to write about the disastrous effects of Indonesia's population explosion. Haryono also wrote a speech that Ali Sadikin delivered when he opened the first International Family Planning Conference in Indonesia. From his beginnings as a writer, Haryono rose to become head of BKKBN, a body established by the government in 1970, and later joined the Suharto cabinet.

It all began with a column I wrote for various newspapers: *Kompas*, *Berita Buana*, and *Jaya* magazine, among others. Mostly I wrote about the disastrous effects of Indonesia's population explosion. Ali Sadikin encouraged me to continue writing on the topic. At the time, Sadikin was a hero to the family planning movement. He was the only senior ranking official to come out in favor of family planning.

President Sukarno was actually happy with the idea of a rapidly expanding population. He seemed to be under the impression that a large population signified a great nation. Many attacked Sukarno's viewpoint purely on health grounds, including doctors and other health professionals. But Sadikin didn't just address the issue from the perspective of health; he took a wider viewpoint. He addressed issues such as quality of life and the development of human resources.

In 1967, an international family planning congress was held in Jakarta. The government was represented by the Minister for Human Welfare – if I'm not mistaken, Idham Chalid. At the time, the majority of religious leaders were also opposed to the concept of family planning. The selection of Idham Chalid as Minister was calculated to win support, because he was a highly regarded figure within the Nahdlatul Ulama [NU]. Through Chalid's influence, NU became one of the first major mass organizations to support family planning. At the conference, the national government also affirmed for the first time its commitment.

This affirmation sent out a signal to other elements in society. While the government initiated the process, others actively encouraged the movement. Donor agencies also played a significant role. World opinion was institutionalized through a UN declaration on

population control. Later, Suharto made Indonesia a signatory to that declaration. From that point, at the end of 1967, the government's commitment was institutionalized. Many programs were devised and implemented with the support of the full range of state agencies. The role of the donor com-



Haryono Suyono at his office in Jakarta, 1979.

munity became extraordinarily significant. The Foundation sponsored the education of a large number of workers in this field. I myself was sponsored by USAID.


When the program began, we never imagined that we would have to deal with such frequent transitions between governments. With each new president – almost one each year for three years – not only are ministers and other top officials replaced, but so are many of their subordinates. Under Suharto there was a certain stability, and the transfer of authority and skills was usually a steady and ongoing process. Things are different now. If we had

predicted that, we would have structured our organization differently, in a manner that facilitated a more rapid transfer of knowledge.

Another major issue is that of preparing communities to stand on their own. In the past, this was not considered a priority, and so the level of dependence on the government has remained very high. In the past, the government provided all contraceptives and other necessary items. Even when the issue of community self-reliance was raised, it was always expected that the government would continue to provide a significant proportion of the expenses. The community was considered to be poor, and it was assumed that the government's help would be ongoing. Now, apparently, the government's budget has been limited to 100 billion rupiah [around US\$ 11 million] – that's certainly not enough to provide free contraception across the country.

With excessive dependence on the government, success depends entirely on the level of funding provided. If the concept of self-reliance is applied, communities will be empowered to continue their programs even without access to funds. If it is not possible to provide contraception, perhaps a similar objective can be achieved by providing information regarding and access to contraception, through pharmacists and other suppliers. Unfortunately, programs to stimulate self-reliance are still very limited in range and scope.

Moreover we did not anticipate the decentralization of governance in Indonesia. The government should move quickly or else there will be another population explosion. It could even be mightier than the Bali or the J.W. Marriott bomb.



Kamus
Inggris
Indonesia
An English-Indonesian Dictionary
DR. ANWIL BE. FERDUS
DR. HUSSEIN SHADILY
KEMENTERIAN PENDIDIKAN DAN KEBUDAYAAN
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA



An interest in learning English, however, did not suit the worldview of Indonesians who, in the late 1950s and early '60s, were caught in a drastically changing political situation.

Politics in the young country followed their own unique direction and development, in part driven by the trauma of colonization, fear of “neo-colonialism,” the Cold War, domestic insurgencies, and a multitude of administrative and social rivalries across the archipelago.

The government’s announcement of a State of Wartime Emergency in early 1957 dramatically altered the country’s political atmosphere. Repression became the most common method for settling conflict. Meanwhile, both national mobilization and increasing militancy manifested themselves as well, beginning with the government’s demand that the Netherlands relinquish its claim on West Irian. Its anti-Dutch campaign proved to be vehement.

In late 1957, Indonesian workers at KPM (*Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij*), the Dutch shipping line, staged a sit-in at the company’s main offices in Jakarta. This was followed by a similar protest at the Netherlands Trading Company. Thereafter, the Minister of Justice ordered all Dutch citizens

who were not employed to depart from Indonesia. In the end, almost 46,000 people left for the Netherlands, and the Indonesian government nationalized all Dutch-owned companies.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian military, under the leadership of General Abdul Haris Nasution, was increasing its political power. The position of political parties, with the exception of PKI, was declining. The military attempted to undermine PKI’s influence too, but it was the best organized among the parties and would not cede its power. Another factor was President Sukarno, who lacked his own organized base of popular support, and relied increasingly on PKI.

In March 1960, Sukarno dissolved the Parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – DPR*) which had been formed after the 1955 general elections, and created a new organization called the National Front (*Front Nasional*). All parties were required to turn over their membership lists and, in August that year, Masyumi (*Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia – the Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians*) and PSI, both supporters of liberal democracy, were banned. For PSI, whose political influence was slight as a result of its poor showing in



- ▲ Dutch nationals leaving for Holland aboard the *Captain Cook*, Jakarta, 1957.
- ▶ The nationalization of the Netherlands Trading Company in Jakarta, 1957.
- ▶▶ An early Masyumi congress in 1951.







1955, the impact of this ban was negligible. But the consequences for Masyumi, which had come second only to the PNI in 1955 and had almost eight million supporters scattered throughout Indonesia, were devastating.

Because of pressure on the media at the time, it is difficult to gain a true picture of the situation from press reports. The communist-affiliated newspaper, *Harian Rakjat*, was muzzled, albeit temporarily. *Pedoman*, whose chief editor was Rosihan Anwar, was also banned and only allowed to publish again after Sukarno's fall in 1966. Mochtar Lubis, editor-in-chief of *Indonesia Raya*, was imprisoned. Over time, media censorship and arrests became more frequent, often leading to questionable charges. In early 1961, for instance, a number of people were arrested and charged with being part of a conspiracy known as NIGO (*Nederlandse Indische Guerilla Organisatie*, the Dutch Indies Guerrilla Organization), which planned to "assassinate the president and take control of authority." One person arrested was UI professor of medicine Sjahriar Rasyad, a radiologist who had never been active in politics. Even though the government could find no proof of his guilt, he was nonetheless subjected to house arrest.

By this time, President Sukarno's life had been threatened

by four assassination attempts. The result was an increasingly harsh and restrictive environment. In the wee hours of the morning one day in mid-January 1962, leaders of PSI and Masyumi were arrested on orders from the Military High Command. They were accorded no trial, nor given any indication of when they would be released. As it turned out, they were not released until after Sukarno's own fall. Sutan Sjahrir, the former prime minister and a leading figure in PSI, died while still a political detainee.

Arrests such as these became more common as the campaign to free West Irian mushroomed into conflict between the Indonesian and Dutch armed forces. Finally, in 1962, the Netherlands was forced to relinquish its last colonial outpost in the archipelago to the UN. By this time, however, Indonesians had grown accustomed to a political life that, in the name of patriotism and security, flew the banner of militancy and condoned repression.

The State of Wartime Emergency officially ended in May 1963, but the power structure that had developed during that time did not change. Extralegal regulations replaced government-established law as the norm. Political prisoners were not released. The arrest of dissenters continued, particularly



▲ President Sukarno in Yogyakarta denouncing the Dutch presence in West Irian, 1961.

►► The Cikini Affair: four men on trial for attempting to assassinate the president with a hand grenade. August, 1958.

SUKADJI RANUWIHARDJO

Sukadji Ranuwihardjo graduated from the Faculty of Economics at UGM in 1957. One year later, while employed as an official of the railway service in Bandung, he was offered a scholarship to complete a master's degree in public economics at UC Berkeley. On his return to Indonesia he was appointed dean of the Faculty of Economics at UGM, then rector of the same institution, and finally director-general of higher education in the Department of Education and Culture.

At the beginning of the 1950s, when UGM first established cooperative links with the University of Wisconsin, I hadn't decided where I wanted to study. Just one week before I was due to leave for America, I met with a senior academic from America who was involved in the management of the program. He told me that there were already a lot of teachers from UGM at Wisconsin, and asked me if I wanted to go to Berkeley instead. I spent two years there. At Berkeley, most of the Indonesian students were Javanese. Initially, Javanese was spoken at home by young mothers with their children. On campus, the fathers spoke Indonesian or English, but gradually Javanese terms entered into our conversation. We had to teach Javanese to Emil Salim, Sayuti Hasibuan, Bistok Sitorus, Arif Djanin, Panglaykim, Ang Giok Hun and others.

In 1962, at the age of 31, I was appointed assistant rector at UGM, a position I held until 1964. At that point I told the rector, Professor Herman Johannes, that I wanted to return to America to engage in further studies. I left in 1964.

Around this time, as part of his anti-Western stance, President Sukarno issued a decree forbidding economics lecturers from studying economics in America. However, we managed to find a way around that. Those scheduled to study in America received letters from the state secretariat that scrupulously avoided stating that the bearer would be studying economics. Rather, these letters referred to studies related to management, statistics, or other technical matters, so the secretariat would let them through.

At the beginning of the program with

UGM, there were only two senior academics involved: Professor Soenardjo and Professor Kertonegoro. The UGM senate was extremely traditional. Professor Kertonegoro once said that before he visited America, some members of the senate told him that if Indonesian lecturers couldn't develop their capacities by themselves, it would be better



Sukadji Ranuwihardjo in Yogyakarta, 1978.

for them to close shop. They felt that cooperation with America was unnecessary. Conservative attitudes were very strong, partly because Yogyakarta was still a relatively closed society. Since its establishment in 1949, most of the teachers at UGM were graduates from Leiden, and most of them were aristocrats. They were extremely suspicious of foreign influences.

McGeorge Bundy, president of the Foundation, came to Yogyakarta in 1968 or

1969 to monitor the progress of the program between Wisconsin and UGM. At a meeting we offered him snacks, including *klepon*, little cakes with palm sugar inside. When he bit into it, the sugar spurted all over his shirt. It seems funny now, but it was a crisis at the time.

Observers often compare FEUI with the faculties at Gadjah Mada and Nommensen. A lot of people say that UI is the most successful. But just because UI produces a large number of ministers doesn't mean that it's more successful than the other institutions.

The New Order regime emerged in Jakarta. The first student demonstrations against the Old Order broke out at UI. Suharto selected the people closest to him, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto, from among the staff at UI.

While I was at UGM, I was also offered a position in Jakarta. At the time I was on the research staff of the minister for labor and transmigration, Professor Subroto, and had to make frequent trips back and forth between Yogyakarta and Jakarta. One day, I was told that Radius Prawiro, the minister for trade, was looking for me. "You've spent too long in Yogyakarta. It's time for you to move to Jakarta," he said, adding that the position of secretary-general in the Department of Trade was open.

I refused. My colleagues at UI who have served as ministers or other functionaries can still give weekly lectures at Salemba. If I'd moved to Jakarta, I wouldn't have been able to teach. For me, my first commitment is to my university.



PEMBELAJAN



after an outbreak of riots in Bandung that same month against Indonesians of Chinese descent. Sukarno accused a “counterrevolutionary” group of being behind the riots, comprising “PSI, Masyumi, PRRI, Permesta, and foreign subversive elements.”

The accusation of being a counterrevolutionary was sufficient to silence most people. When a group of artists and intellectuals announced its Cultural Manifesto, proclaiming that the arts must be free from political influence, the group was attacked by pro-communist organizations. Subsequently their writings were banned and those who worked at universities, such as H.B. Jassin, a famous literary critic, were pressured to resign from their positions.

During Sukarno’s Crush Malaysia campaign, the country’s militant and repressive atmosphere grew even more intense. Reports circulated that 21 million volunteers had been recruited to participate in this struggle. Meanwhile, on the domestic political stage, rivalries intensified.

PKI’s frequent attacks on its political rivals made them ever more defensive. The party’s campaign to cleanse the

country of “land-owning demons” – the so-called *setan kota* and *setan desa* – pushed landowners into a corner. Widespread and bitter conflicts erupted, primarily in rural areas of Central Java, East Java, and Bali, where communist farmers took to squatting on land belonging to these rural “demons.” Over the years the number of landless farmers had indeed increased; even so, the pattern of land ownership in rural areas did not reflect true control by large-scale landowners. In very few villages, in fact, was ownership of the land that was used for rice production concentrated in just one or two hands. As one left-wing activist later admitted, PKI’s unilateral action to redistribute land only resulted in “clashes between the poor and the middle class.” As is now known, that conflict ended in horrifying bloodshed.

In the cities, PKI’s militancy was generally limited to areas outside the economic sphere. There, the fiercest conflict centered on the realm of ideas, the media, and culture. Those people who suffered the brunt of PKI attacks generally sought the protection of the military or took refuge in the name “Sukarno.” One example of the latter was a group of



▲ The 33rd anniversary of the founding of the PKI, 1953.

MELY G. TAN

Dr. Mely G. Tan is one of Indonesia's most distinguished sociologists. She is well known for her work on inter-group relations, for example on the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and on gender development including women's reproductive health and the empowerment of women. She received a Foundation fellowship organized by LIPI for her PhD studies at Berkeley in 1963. Since then she has presented lectures and papers at conferences all over the world, and served on the National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan), a current Foundation grantee.

While I was completing my MA at Cornell in 1959, I met Professor Selo Soemardjan, who was getting his PhD in sociology there at the same time. I returned to Indonesia in 1961. In 1963 Pak Selo told me about a recent program where LIPI was looking for people to send to the United States for further study, after which they would return to Indonesia to work full-time in the National Institute for Economics and Social Research (*Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional* – Leknas). The program, funded by Ford, was immediately interesting for me, so I applied. I believe there were a total of 60 applicants for 12 positions, and I was fortunate to be chosen and sent to get my PhD at Berkeley. I arrived back in the US a few months before Kennedy was shot in November 1963.

My thesis was on the Chinese in the United States, and I completed that degree in 1968. I remember being very worried about the events of 1965 when Ford closed its office, because we thought that our fellowship would be terminated. Luckily for us, even though Ford closed its office for a short time, it still maintained its funding and all of us were able to complete our studies.

When I returned to Indonesia I went to work at LIPI as agreed. All this time I didn't

have too much to do with Ford, since the LIPI fellowship program was administered by the International Education Foundation. In 1974, however, I was asked to be on a team to evaluate Ford grants in Southeast

which Pak Selo was chair. His name always seems to come up in any discussion about the social sciences in Indonesia. Ford assisted this Foundation and since then I have been involved, directly or indirectly, with Ford in my work to advance women in the social sciences.

For me, the Foundation has made a great impact on Indonesia with its original and continuing focus on education. In the very beginning, when we became a republic, the standards were such that there was a superb, albeit thin, top layer of educated people. So, what the Foundation did in giving as many young people as possible the opportunity to finish their studies is extraordinary.

The Foundation is a very well regarded organization here in Indonesia, which surely helps it implement its programs. I think one of the reasons for this success is the quality of the Representatives. I remember the first Representative I met was Frank Miller, who was replaced by John Bresnan,

and then later of course there were women such as Mary Zurbuchen and Suzanne Siskel – and all are fluent in Indonesian! This is important, as fluency in Indonesian makes a very good impression on the people here, and also these women have been very sensitive to the issues that women face in today's Indonesia.



Mely Tan with Soedradjad Djiwandono in her apartment at Berkeley, 1966.

Asia. I was assigned to go to the Philippines, South Korea and [South] Vietnam. I don't remember too many details about that evaluation, but I do remember how interesting it was meeting so many grantees. Ford's impact was undeniably positive in those countries.

In 1980, I became a member of YIIS, of

journalists and activists who called themselves “The Sukarnoism Support Group” (*Badan Pendukung Soekarnoisme* – BPS). However, sometimes even this proved ineffectual, as was the case with BPS, which was banned in December 1964. Sukarno himself concurred with the charges that PKI leveled against the group – that it had been established for the purpose of assassinating him and destroying his ideas. BPS supporters were interrogated and, several months later, 21 newspapers that had backed the group were shut down.

On college campuses, student members of CGMI, a communist-affiliated organization, pushed for the dissolution of HMI, the nation’s largest organization of Muslim students. Tensions within universities were more or less consistent with what was happening off campus. Demonstrations and expressions of anti-Western sentiment, particularly toward Great Britain and the US, grew increasingly strident. In September 1963, following the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, several thousand protesters burned down the British Embassy.

In Jakarta, other protesters went to the homes of British citizens, ordered them outside, and burned their belongings in the street. A year later, the Indonesian government closed the main office of the British Council and its branches.

In May 1964, 16 organizations representing workers, young people, women, and the film industry launched a boycott against American films. In mid-July of that same year, Minister of Education and Culture Prijono issued the instruction that schoolchildren should no longer call their fathers the Dutch- or English-sounding *papi* or *mami*. In the first quarter of 1965, five branch libraries of the United States Information Service (USIS) were destroyed and American Peace Corps volunteers were deported. In June 1965, musicians in the band Koes Bersaudara were detained by the Attorney General’s office for singing Beatles songs. In August 1965, some 22,000 American-published books and 250 Beatles albums were burned on the grounds of the Jakarta Central Police Headquarters.



Tensions over foreign involvement in Southeast Asia: a protest and subsequent burning of the British Embassy in 1963 ▲ and ► demonstrations at the US Embassy against the Western-backed South East Asia Treaty Organization in 1958.

SOPHIE SARWONO

Inspired by the hard work of her close friend, Dr. Hoeroestiati Soebandrio (see page 108), Sophie Sarwono became involved in the family planning movement. In the late 1950s the movement still had far to go to win acceptance. Ibu Sophie remembers President Sukarno's distaste for the movement. He openly belittled its aims in front of state guests at the Bogor Palace. Later, she became chairperson of the Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association (Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia—PKBI), which received technical and financial assistance from the Foundation.

When I was at PKBI I always said that despite Soebandrio's unfortunate political associations, his wife, Ibu Hoeroestiati Soebandrio, made a great contribution to the development of the family planning movement. Everyone involved in PKBI remembers her with appreciation and respect. Using her position, she smuggled condoms, IUDs, and diaphragms into the country through the diplomatic pouch.

At that time, the government had set up maternal-child health clinics. Hoeroestiati saw these clinics as a safe channel for distributing contraceptives.

She was unable to operate freely because Sukarno was opposed [to family planning]. Whenever there were guests from abroad, Sukarno used to show off the wives of officials with a large number of children. He would say things like, "Look how beautiful she is! She has 12 children." The guests would acknowledge her beauty, and then Sukarno would continue: "Twelve children! See! We don't need birth control in Indonesia! The more children our women have, the more beautiful they become!" He said things like that all the time.

One reason the family planning movement was not designated as subversive and banned outright was that Ibu Hoeroestiati was quite flirtatious and a good dancer – and Dr. Soebandrio was "the King of Jive." So she danced and chatted with Sukarno to butter him up. Even if Sukarno never came to accept the need for family planning, at least he didn't ban it.

Dr. Suharto, who assisted with the birth of Sukarno's children, also played a role. He was an uncle of mine. Before he died, I asked him if he'd ever talked about family planning with Sukarno. He said that he hadn't, because if he had, Sukarno would

have felt that he was being pressured – and one thing you couldn't do was pressure Sukarno. Everyone involved adopted a non-confrontational approach. If we hadn't been careful, it is possible that BKKBN wouldn't exist today. Suharto might have continued with the previous government's opposition to the movement. Luckily, Suharto inherited the seeds for a functional movement, even



Sophie Sarwono, Jakarta, 1979.

if it hadn't been encouraged previously.

People should have been accustomed to buying cheap contraceptives right from the start of the program. That way, they would consider buying their contraceptives in the same natural way they buy their toothpaste or soap.

We always said: don't provide free contraception. Contraception should be cheap and readily available, but users should pay. The authorities disagreed, and now look at the result. If there aren't enough funds to provide free contraception, people don't

want to pay for it. It's not just a matter of not having enough money, it's a matter of expectations – people think, contraception has been free for years, why should we pay for it now? Recently, I read that BKKBN has 100 billion rupiah in funds. That's not enough to provide free contraception! BKKBN made a grave error by acclimatizing members of the community to not having to pay.

The general level of awareness about contraception among those with a reasonable level of education has improved greatly since BKKBN was established. Those with some education have come to accept the need for contraception, but not the reality that they have to pay for it. Of course, these people are in a better situation than the most disadvantaged groups who need contraception most. Without free contraception, many of these people will drop out of the program.

At the beginning, BKKBN played a facilitating role, coordinating the activities of a number of independent units and programs. PKBI was considered a unit, but there were also units associated with Muhammadiyah, with the Christian organizations, and with the Departments of Health and Social Welfare. Each of these bodies implemented the family planning program in its own way. BKKBN played a coordinating role, assigning funds when these became available. Slowly, however, BKKBN began managing programs directly, using funds from donor agencies abroad. In particular, they started a lot of training programs, perhaps because a large proportion of the funds was assigned for that purpose. In fact, PKBI was better suited to do that training, because it had had more experience. They took a lot of our ideas, without even acknowledging them. They didn't even say thank you.



DOWN WITH SEATO

Indonesian Students Condemn SEATO

SEATO HANDS OFF

Down WITH SEATO!

SEATO HANDS OFF INDONESIA

INDONESIAN STUDENT SOCIETY STRONG AND FREE OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

SEATO GO TO HELL

Down WITH SEATO!

SEATO HANDS OFF

OFF INDONESIA!

PACT

0=

ATC. HANDS
OFF INDONESIA

STUDENTS
Condemn
ANY FORM OF
FOREIGN INTERVENTION

SEATO
GO TO
HELL

B-16



A SHORT HIATUS

What did John Maynard Keynes, the Beatles, and the Indonesian pop group Koes Bersaudara have in common? They were all on President Sukarno's hate list. The Great Leader of the Revolution once complained, "All those young men say to me is [Joseph] Schumpeter and Keynes. When I was young I read Marx!" The Beatles and Koes Plus came under the dismissive rubric of '*ngak-ngik-ngok*' music, and were held up as examples of Western decadence.

Such was the climate of the early 1960s: an era of raids, persecutions, diatribes, and alerts – and of fractured friendships. Politics revolved around the Presidential Palace as Sukarno struggled to maintain his tense coalition of communists, Muslims, and military. Meanwhile, US-Indonesia relations deteriorated following CIA involvement in the PRRI rebellion and US opposition to Sukarno's *konfrontasi* campaign against the formation of the new state of Malaysia. After the British embassy was burned in 1963, the US withheld new aid to Indonesia until the Malaysia dispute was settled.

In 1962 Orville Schell, Jr., later in life dean of Berkeley's Graduate School of Journalism and award-winning author of such works as *Mandate of Heaven: The Legacy of Tiananmen Square*, came to work at the Foundation's office in Jakarta. The PKI fascinated him. Soon he befriended a left-wing operative named "Comrade Nata," through whom the attempted to learn more about the party's organizational work in the villages. Schell's inquiries went awry, however, and in the end he and colleagues were falsely accused of being spies working under Foundation cover. The Representative in Indonesia, Frank Miller, fearing that the Foundation would be forced to close, put Schell on a plane immediately.

By mid-1964 things had heated up again, when Foreign Minister Soebandrio ordered that no one should be sent to the US for

study. This, of course, struck at the heart of the Foundation's work. Miller visited Sukarno and argued that the Foundation's goal was "to enable Indonesia to do what you yourself said it should do – stand on its own feet." The president relented and allowed every scholarship candidate to go as an "exception."

By late 1964, as communist harassment led to the closing of US Information Service libraries and the departure of the Peace Corps, Sukarno overplayed his hand. When Malaysia was selected for membership of



Frank Miller, 1972.

the UN Security Council, he impulsively announced that Indonesia would leave the world body. Malaysia took its seat, and Indonesia was out. There followed an exodus of foreign agencies from Jakarta, the Ford Foundation being the lone survivor.

Meanwhile, although the Foundation continued to suffer minor harassment, rarely was it the target of political attack from the left. Its position and self-confidence as a private philanthropy seemed to protect it. Officers on the ground remained unperturbed. "The more difficult our task became, the more determined we were to soldier on," recalled a former staffer.

New York however did not share this view, especially after March 1965, when the town of Malang, East Java, was racked by demonstrations. The protestors opposed the presence of professors from the State University of New York (SUNY) at a Ford-financed local teachers' college. The college voted to expel the professors because of the program's "connection with the US government" and announced furthermore that all SUNY property had been confiscated. After Foundation executive George Gant was apprised of the situation,

Miller – who was scheduled to return to New York in only a few months – was told of his new task: to close the Indonesia office.

Miller was described as being "deeply sentimental about Indonesia and the Indonesian people." He flew to New York at his own expense to try to reverse the Foundation's decision. Failing in this, he then flew back to secure Sukarno's support in assuring the Foundation a peaceful departure. And so began the heartrending tasks: giving away the office building, residences, vehicles, and other property; making the severance payments to local employees; re-ordering the lives.

The process turned out to involve much more than the mere disposal of resources. By that time,

Indonesian army personnel had taken over many residences vacated by departing expatriates. Ford staff were determined that this should not happen to Foundation property. Instead, they made efforts to transfer property to grantees and social institutions. One building, for example, was offered to *Yayasan Asih Budi*, a school for mentally challenged children.

The Foundation would reopen in 1967, under Miller's leadership. "Frank had been given the disagreeable task of shutting things down," said David Bell, a Foundation executive. "He deserved to have the satisfying task of opening them up again."



▲ G30S: the funeral of the generals, October 1965.

It was indeed a time of tumult. In late March 1964, Sukarno told the Western world to “Go to hell with your aid!” Implicit in his further statements, however, was the sense that Indonesia was still willing to accept aid, but it would refuse to accept assistance that was linked to political ties. Later in the year, when Malaysia was accepted as a member of the UN Security Council, Indonesia announced its intention to leave that organization.

During this passionate, uncompromising decade, patience for negotiation was lost. In the early morning hours of 1 October 1965, when six generals and a mid-level Air Force officer were taken from their homes and killed, the outburst of violence that followed quickly rocketed to its climax. PKI was accused of involvement in the incident. That party, which had played such a dominant political role over the previous decade, itself experienced what had been its own standard political *modus operandi*: civil unrest, repression, and destruction. This time, however, a combination of fear, thirst for revenge, local conflicts, and a brutal political plan engendered mass murder. Estimates of the numbers of PKI members and sympathizers slaughtered range between 300,000 and two million. Whatever the true death toll, this was one of the worst massacres of the 20th century.

The US had good reason to be pleased with the changes that were taking place in Indonesia. But enthusiasm was tempered by a desire to appreciate Indonesian realities and sensitivities. Indeed, after that time senior American diplomats

under Ambassador Marshall Green settled on what they called a “low profile,” meaning that aid would be channeled through multilateral agencies. Writes former US diplomat Paul Gardner, US assistance programs were to “be kept simple” and without “a proliferation of commitments or personnel.” This was because even after a new government had emerged, with Major General Suharto coming out on top of all the mayhem and violence, Indonesia continued to be dogged by uncertainty.

Suharto’s government, the New Order, was built on the basis of fear and hope. Turmoil within the nation’s political structure was seen as a challenge, and because Sukarno had failed miserably to manage the economy – not only had inflation reached 1000 per cent by 1965, but foreign debt had also grown to \$2 billion – it was imperative that Suharto find his way out of this crisis. He was unflinchingly vigilant, always fearful that communism would return. He was understandably wary, too, that Indonesia continued to face two problems that had already played a major role in undermining the country’s stability: a fast growing population, and insufficient food production.

Anxious in the beginning, Suharto grew more self-confident over time. Born in poverty, he slowly climbed to the apex of power and, as he wrote in his autobiography, “I have become a person who can truly understand and feel the meaning of life’s difficulties.”

**CHAPTER THREE:
PETROLEUM, POLICIES, AND
PROTESTS**



PETROLEUM, POLICIES, AND PROTESTS

The fires flickered as if exhausted, but the smoke continued to billow. Scattered on the streets were the carcasses of some 900 vehicles. Above them loomed the wreckage of nearly 150 buildings, all either burned or ransacked. The streets were quiet. It was seven in the evening and a curfew was in effect. A line of armored vehicles stood ready. Military trucks disbursed soldiers in battle gear.

A revolution? A demonstration? A coup d'état? A provocation? Even to this day, it is unclear what actually happened on 15 January 1974. What is known is that upwards of 50,000 people descended on Jakarta's thoroughfares and, as if run amok, burned cars and motorcycles, and incinerated buildings, including the Toyota Astra dealership and the new Senen Mall. The city had never experienced rioting like this.

The government press later dubbed it "Malari," an acronym formed from the words "Malapetaka Limabelas Januari" ("The January 15th Disaster"). By way of this abbreviation the government hoped, perhaps, to launch a campaign against the perpetrators and to attach a stigma to its political enemies. But if this was the case, who were these enemies?

Thousands of students from three Jakarta universities had filled the streets that day. None said anything about trying to overturn the government, nor demanded that Suharto step down. Ostensibly they were there to protest the arrival of Japan's Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka; they were angry about foreign investment in Indonesia – Japanese investment in particular. It was only later that it became apparent that Tanaka's arrival was not, in fact, the key element in that day's story. Something else was going on.

◀ *Students protesting in front of Senen Mall, January 1974.*





The student leaders and their followers had not expected that thousands of other people would suddenly join them in the streets. It was this group that is purported to have initiated the large-scale rioting. Who they were, or from where they came, has never been fully explained. Over time, however, it has become increasingly clear that this event could be linked to a fierce but hidden rivalry in the upper echelons of Indonesia's political structure.

At the time, two people close to President Suharto were wrestling for influence and position: General Sumitro, head of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* – Kopkamtib), and Lieutenant General Ali Moertopo, a trusted aide of President Suharto who headed his “special operations” unit. Both men were ambitious. Each wanted to push the other aside and grab for himself a powerful position even closer to Suharto. They both might have dreamed of succeeding Suharto

as president. Whatever the case, they employed a variety of methods to achieve their ends.

Following the riots, a number of witnesses reported that unidentified provocateurs were behind the transformation of a student protest against Japanese investment into an occasion for rioting and arson. Realizing the volatile nature of this situation, the students had retreated to the UI campus on Jalan Salemba in central Jakarta. But they were unable to prevent the mayhem and conflagration that then erupted.

In the wake of the incident, the president decided that General Sumitro had failed to control the situation, and fired him. If this was truly a battle between Sumitro and Moertopo, the former had lost.

Two days later, a number of individuals were arrested. The list included Hariman Siregar, chairman of the UI Student Council; Adnan Buyung Nasution, whose role as a critical observer of the government had gained increasing strength



▲ *General Sumitro addresses students, 1974.*

◀ *One of many students arrested after the Malari riots, 1974.*



▲ Author Marzuki Arifin, with journalist Fikri Jufri, 1984.

through his position at YLBHI; Syahrir, a popular FEUI student; and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, a FEUI lecturer. Also jailed were Marsillam Simanjuntak, a medical doctor and former student leader who had participated in the 1966 demonstrations that helped to bring down Sukarno, and Rahman Tolleng, editor-in-chief of *Suara Karya*, the newspaper owned by Golkar (*Golongan Karya*), who was suspected of being a PSI sympathizer. At the same time, even Soedjatmoko, a prominent Indonesian intellectual and former ambassador to the US, was interrogated.

The reason for these moves was not long in coming, however ambiguous. Admiral Sudomo, who had replaced General Sumitro as commander of Kopkamtib, announced that “radical socialist” elements were behind the Malari incident, and that the brains behind the riots belonged to members of banned parties.

But who these people were, he did not say. In 1985, a local publishing house produced a pocket-sized book entitled *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974* (The 15 January 1974 Incident) that purported to provide the answers. Written by Marzuki Arifin, who was known to have close connections with Ali

Moertopo and his special operations unit, this book posited that PSI and Masyumi were the ‘puppeteers’ behind the riots. An editorial in a publication of CSIS – and organization of which Moertopo was co-founder – confirmed this view. It stated that “former PSI and Masyumi members” had both incited and used the student demonstrators for their own purposes.

It was somewhat ironic that official sources were now using the same kind of language that PKI had once employed to hound its political enemies. Through the use of innuendo – by tainting its foes with the label of PSI or Masyumi – the government was able to intimidate its opposition.

After intimidation comes repression: history seemed to be repeating itself. Even though the government had undergone a complete about-face in political outlook since the early 1960s, it still did not hesitate to ban newspapers with opposing views. *Pedoman*, *Indonesia Raya*, and *Abadi* were forcibly closed. *Nusantara*, a newspaper that the Sukarno government had once shut down, was also closed, as was *Harian Kami*, a newspaper that had been born together with the student protest movement against Sukarno in 1966.

Syahrir is well-known both as an economist and as a politician. He was the founder of the New Indonesia Association Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru) and aspires to the presidency. In 1974, Syahrir was an activist at UI. Following the Malari unrest that began on 15 January 1974, when Japanese goods and shops selling them were burned or destroyed by a rampaging mob, he was convicted of subversion. Syahrir spent four years in prison for this offence, despite the belief of a large number of people that his prosecution was the result of the direct intervention of key figures in the Subarto regime.

At the beginning of 1974, I had no inkling that the Malari incident was in the air. At the time I was getting ready to leave for America. I had been accepted into Harvard University as a post-graduate student at the Kennedy School of Government. I was due to leave in July. Instead, I was arrested, tried, and jailed for almost four years.

I was convicted of subversion, because of my alleged role in leading and provoking the students through a series of talks I gave before the incident. During these talks, I criticized the government's development strategy. It was later claimed that these talks influenced the students and provoked them to engage in the rioting and unrest that came to be known as the Malari incident.

I have no idea exactly why I was prosecuted, although two generals, Ali Moertopo and Sudjono Humardhani, played a major role in my arrest and that of my colleagues.

The real, underlying causes of the Malari incident are still unclear, although there were struggles within the political leadership at the time, particularly between General Sumitro and Ali Moertopo. Also, the general economic and social conditions exacerbated the conflict. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the government. When the students protested and violence broke out, Ali Moertopo had an excuse to

arrest anyone who opposed him, and to blame Sumitro for the unrest. As a result, after Malari, Sumitro's influence over the political process was severely curtailed.

At the time of the unrest, there was a lot of looting and destruction. It was only when



Syahrir, Jakarta, 1970.

we were in prison that we realized that the government classified those involved in the unrest into three groups. The first group was known by the intelligence services as *kembang sepatu* [hibiscus]. This group included those with connections to Sudjono Humardhani. The second group was known as *gladak* [bridge]. This group included Mardanus, a well-known nationalist figure, and his followers. The third group was known as *kelinci* [rabbit]. I think this

classification system was based on the government's perception of the level of involvement of the accused in the riots. Three individuals were clearly proven guilty of setting fire to buildings, but there was no proof that any students were involved. My

feeling is that some of the people in the *kembang sepatu* group were involved in the unrest, although it was the *kelinci* group who were made into scape-goats. None of those charged and tried were from the *kembang sepatu* or *gladak* group.

In 1978, I was released from prison and got married. To its credit, Harvard had kept my scholarship open. Soedjatmoko – an intellectual, a former Indonesian ambassador to Washington, and a trustee of the Ford Foundation, who was also briefly detained after the Malari incident – played a significant role in that decision. Soedjatmoko

assisted me in obtaining a scholarship from the Ford Foundation. He also assisted me in applying to several universities. But I really wanted to go to Harvard.

I completed my PhD program in 1983. Both my children were born in Boston. My wife was accepted at Cornell, but because it is located far from Harvard, we decided she should attend Boston University, for which she also had some support from Ford.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE: THE FAMILY PLANNING CAMPAIGN

If there's an award for unsung heroes, here's a nomination. Hoeroestiati Soebandrio was smart, progressive, a trained medical doctor – and married to powerful Old Order Deputy Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister Soebandrio. She was used to overseas travel, diplomatic dinners, and doing the *lenso*, a dance from eastern Indonesia, in the Presidential Palace. Yet in Hoeroestiati's less public moments, she smuggled contraceptives in diplomatic pouches into Indonesia. Her example sparked a guerilla coalition of doctors, gynecologists, nurses, and women volunteers, who received, disseminated, and explained the use of these contraceptives to women the country over. Thus in 1964 PKBI was born.

Soon the Foundation was aware of the new organization. Even before the Suharto government had reversed state policy and begun to support family planning, the Foundation had provided “modest” assistance to PKBI, including the services of Dr. Brooks Ryder, a family planning specialist.

PKBI was a people's movement, the first that addressed the crucial link between family planning and women's reproductive health and rights. It mounted a challenge to government, and proved that citizen action can sometimes get results. PKBI demonstrated the political power of networking, and fostered cooperation among international donors, NGOs, and funding agencies. For example, the Margaret Sanger Institute, named after the woman who had pioneered the birth control pill, was among them; Sanger herself visited Indonesia in those heady days of women's reawakening.

When Jakarta's first New Order governor came out in support of PKBI, things moved fast. Ali Sadikin was famous for his firebrand energy, political courage, and fierce commitment to action. He quickly went to work on two pilot projects in Jakarta, and mounted an intensive campaign in favor of family planning. Meanwhile, in September 1967, the Ford Foundation renewed its grant to continue

Ryder's consulting services, as well as to clarify PKBI's role in the government-endorsed national family planning program soon to come. This included the purchase of a building for PKBI's headquarters, assistance in sponsoring workshops, training programs for family planning workers, and provision of information to opinion leaders.

The campaign for family planning succeeded surprisingly rapidly. In 1967 Suharto signed the UN Declaration on Population. Jakarta's pilot projects were



A family planning clinic in South Jakarta, 1969.

expanded, and the national family planning program followed a year later. Finally, in 1970, BKKBN was established.

The confluence of several factors led to the success of the campaign. The movement had credible and powerful allies. Much of the groundwork had already been laid by PKBI (its institutional alliance with the International Planned Parenthood Federation enhanced Indonesia's credibility). The campaign had good relationships with international donors and with the UN. And profoundly significant were the new, receptive attitudes that had been shaped within the community at large – this in a country where, not many years earlier, the

nation's leader and prevailing religious values had been opposed to birth control.

At the outset, BKKBN was intended to be only a coordinating body for the myriad health units run by private organizations like PKBI. But by 1976, on Java and Bali alone, the initial thin layer of 116 clinics had grown to 2,700 clinics. PKBI then became only an implementing unit, one among many such bodies.

“PKBI clinics used to suffer because of BKKBN's free handouts,” recalled Ninuk Widyantoro, founder of the Panca Warga network of clinics (another beneficiary of Foundation grants). “But people started coming back to us when we introduced counseling. People didn't mind paying to get proper and thorough information so that they could make the right choice.”

The national program gave the family planning movement the weight and outreach that only the power of the state can mobilize. Where local community structures were conducive, strong social pressures working through the village administration were especially effective. In Bali, for example – which in only five years had reduced the average number of births per woman from 5.8 to 3.8 – family heads in the village met once a month, and the family planning situation was a regular item on the agenda. In the meeting hall a map of all houses in the village was displayed. Houses of IUD users were colored blue, those of pill users red, condom users green, and non-users left blank. Red, considered an unlucky color in anti-communist Indonesia of the day, was a nudge towards the cheap, effective IUD.

In East Java, family planning had also done well. An authoritarian provincial government had pushed the program, often through spectacular recruiting drives involving army personnel. In some villages, the headman rapped a wooden gong once a day to remind women to take their pill. The result? Fertility declined from 4.6 children per woman in 1971 to 3.9 in 1976.



▲ *Explaining the use of an IUD to a young mother at a family planning clinic in South Jakarta, 1969.*

▼ *Soewardjono (seated right) and Haryono Suyono (standing left) at a Planned Parenthood meeting in Jakarta, 1975.*







 Rapat RT/RW se DCI DJAKARTA **24 April '71**
di ISTORA-SENAJAN **djam 08.30**



For most critical thinkers, it was difficult to make a connection between PSI, Masyumi, and these “radical socialist” newspapers that Admiral Sudomo had mentioned. Prior to the 1974 riots there had been some debate in intellectual circles about the need for a return to a more leftist point of view, especially in terms of the equitable distribution of national wealth, but that particular ethic seemed to have disappeared in the 1970s.

The 1970s were in fact a deceptive, confusing time. The economy not only grew, it took off. Villages prospered, especially those on Java – even though, it should be noted, per capita income rose at a slower rate there than in the large cities. As with many tales of growth, however, there were painful side effects not always evident.

It all began in the late 1960s, at a time when the Indonesian economy was at a virtual standstill. The only way out of this situation, it seemed, was to try to stimulate trade and investment. Because investment from the domestic sector alone was insufficient to meet the task, the government sought an infusion of foreign funds by offering various incentives.

As a result Indonesia experienced a rush of foreign investment. By the mid-1970s, 50 per cent of all investment in the country, with the exception of the oil sector, originated abroad. A wide range of consumer products began to appear, along with a surge in television and print advertising. The face of Indonesia’s cities, especially Jakarta, soon changed, largely because of the influx of Japanese products.

Japan as a whole contributed an impressive amount of funds, equivalent to one-third the total amount of aid provided by the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the consortium of governments giving economic aid to Indonesia. Japan used much of its aid to expand the market for its products. Hence, brand names such as Toyota, Hitachi, Honda, Mitsui, Marubeni, and many others began to appear on billboards and in store windows throughout the archipelago.

In Japan, as a result of rising salaries and soaring land prices, a push was on to relocate factories to cheaper sites in Southeast Asia. Japanese money seemed to be everywhere – in business offices, banks, factories, and of course, golf courses. By the end of 1973 investment by the Japanese in Indonesia was nine times higher than in the Philippines.



▲ A familiar sight throughout the archipelago from the 1970s to the present: Japanese-brand motorcycles on sale, 1974.
 ◀ Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin addresses community officials at Senayan stadium during the 1971 election season.

IBRAHIM ALFIAN

Ibrahim Alfian is director of the humanities faculty at UGM. During 1975-1977, Alfian served as director of the social sciences training center at Syiah Kuala University. This center managed a program that was first conceived by anthropologist Clifford Geertz and funded by the Foundation. This program was always headed by two managers with doctoral qualifications, one Indonesian and one foreign. When Ibrahim Alfian was there, his colleague was Lance Castles, a social scientist from Australia.

The program was initiated by my close friend and colleague, also called Alfian, in 1974. I replaced him in 1975. We got to know each other during our doctoral studies in Holland. The Dutch used to call us Little Alfian and Big Alfian because of our physiques. I was Big Alfian.

In 1977 I was replaced by Syamsuddin Mahmud, the Acehese scientist who later became governor of Aceh. Over two years, there were a total of 24 participants in our program. The program's teaching methods, guidance, and funding were excellent. After they graduated, participants conducted research in Aceh. I adopted a cunning strategy to ensure that the researchers were accepted by the local authorities.

The Acehese Governor Muzakkir Walad invited the researchers to a dinner with traditional Acehese dancing. This was to promote Aceh, as most of the participants came from Semarang, Surabaya, Manado, and other places in Indonesia. I made sure that each individual was photographed standing next to the governor.

I told each participant to blow up these photos and put them on the front of their notebooks. Then, when they were in the field, they had to make sure that these photos were seen. That way, there were no problems with the local authorities.

At the beginning of the program, I always told the participants, "There aren't any beautiful girls in Aceh. But after three months here even a tamarind tree will look beautiful."

And so it was. Some of them ended up chasing the nurses or the students, and some who were already married said they weren't.

When the program was over, I used to



Ibrahim Alfian at a seminar in Yogyakarta, 1983.

help the participants buy imported goods from Singapore or Penang. At the time, Sabang was a duty free port. The traders offered the participants electronics, typewriters, crockery, and other inexpensive, high-quality goods to take home. The customs officials also helped ensure that the participants got these things at good prices.

I was proud to be involved in training the

24 participants. Of all the training centers, in Aceh, Makassar, Surabaya, and Jakarta, the one that produced the most doctors and professors was Aceh. These included Mukhlis PaEni (former director of the National Archives), Nani Tuloli (rector of the Teachers Training College, Gorontalo), Amir Lutfi (rector of the State University for Islamic Studies, Pekanbaru), P.J. Suwarno (rector of the University of Sanata Dharma, Yogyakarta), Hamid Abdullah (a professor at Diponegoro University), Syarif Ibrahim (a professor in Pontianak), Durtje Durasi (a professor in Banjarmasin) and others. It was a very productive program.

Each year, one outstanding paper was selected. In my first year, a paper written by P.J. Suwarno of Yogyakarta was chosen. He was sent to Jakarta, with the author of the best paper from Makassar and the other centers, to take part in a seminar and to discuss his paper.

Suwarno was a Javanese Catholic who wrote about the role of the *ulamas* [Islamic scholars] in North Aceh. I was extremely surprised. His paper was the best. He handled himself well when he was conducting his research, complying with local customs. The *ulamas* opened up to him. As a result, his research was the best as well. Later, he got his doctorate – his thesis was about Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX and I was his supervisor – and then went on to become rector of the University of Sanata Dharma.



While Japan did stimulate growth in the Indonesian economy and expand employment opportunities, the experience for Indonesians working with Japanese investors was not always pleasant. Economic expert Panglaykim said that in partnering with Japanese business interests, Indonesia “usually had no choice but to surrender all the managerial and organizational power to the Japanese partner.”

Pribumi or indigenous Indonesian business owners who, for whatever reason, were unable to enter into partnerships with Japanese investors felt even more left out than they had before. The majority of Japan’s business partners in Indonesia were people of Chinese descent who, generally speaking, had much more commercial experience than indigenous entrepreneurs. Even in industries in which they once had been dominant – such as textiles – there were few remaining *pribumi* owners. With the collapse of the economy during Sukarno’s final years in office, these people had seen their fortunes dwindle, and the New Order government had yet to benefit them economically. Indeed the country’s economic strategists, who wanted to see Indonesia open itself to foreign investment, simply sat back and let indigenous businesses continue to falter.

These were the circumstances in which protests against government policies began. In November 1973, IGGI Chairman Jan Pieter Pronk visited Indonesia. When he landed at Kemayoran airport in Jakarta, a large group of students and young people greeted him with a bouquet of flowers, and with posters that read, “Foreign Investment Creates Domestic Colonialism,” and “Indonesia for Indonesians.”

In a declaration read that afternoon, the students said they were ashamed to see foreign capital being used only to bankroll tall buildings, hotels, Coca-Cola, and nightclubs, while people had no jobs, homes, or land. The country’s textile industry was dead, they lamented. Indonesia’s forests were bare. Its oil was running dry.

In late November 1973, a group of intellectuals and activists held a discussion to analyze the pros and cons of foreign investment. This resulted in a manifesto whose signatories included Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Yap Thiam Hien, and Mochtar Lubis, all of whom were known for their critical opinions about government policies. Yet another signatory was former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, who was known as the father of the nation’s cooperative movement.



▲ Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Mochtar Lubis, Maruli Panggabean and Suhadi at the 1973 foreign investment discussion.
 ◀ Students protesting the arrival of IGGI Chairman Jan Pieter Pronk at Kemayoran Airport, Jakarta, 1973.

The manifesto demanded a return to national pride, which had been sullied “by certain segments of society.” Which segments was unclear. Maybe it was business owners of Chinese descent, maybe it was the technocrats who had flung open the country’s doors to massive foreign investment, or maybe it was the generals who had close links with Japanese business. The means by which national pride was to be restored was not spelled out either. Even so, the desire for radical change was tangible. What had happened in Thailand a month earlier was an inspiration for Indonesian activists.

On 14 October 1973, thousands of students took to the streets in Bangkok in a protest that lasted for nearly a week. Finally, on the sixth day of these demonstrations, Thailand’s prime minister, Air Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who had ruled for 12 years with military backing, resigned.

In November, Indonesian students began to chant, “we will turn Jakarta into Bangkok,” which is just what they tried to do in January 1974.

But what was it the protesters really wanted? However great their dissatisfaction, they did not produce a firm agenda that could unite the diverse elements of society.

“Restoration of national pride” might have meant putting a halt to foreign investment. But by the early 1970s foreign investment had already been dwarfed by government income from oil revenues. In mid-1973, the international price of oil rose from \$2 to \$3.70 per barrel; a year later, the price had shot up to \$12, and the influence of oil on national growth was apparent. In the words of political and economic expert Richard Robison, Indonesia was experiencing “state-driven economic nationalism.”



▲ *The opening session of the OPEC meeting in Bali, 1976.*

JUWONO SUDARSONO

An academic-cum-politician, Juwono Sudarsono is widely known not only as the author of well-respected works on political science and international relations, but also as the minister of defense in President Abdurrahman Wahid's cabinet – the first civilian to occupy this position in 50 years. In 1975, Sudarsono received a scholarship from the British Council with a supplement from the Foundation for further studies at the London School of Economics. This funding enabled his wife, Priharumastinab, and his one and a half year old son, Visbnu, to accompany him.

In 1971, I assisted professors Selo Soemardjan and Harsja W. Bachtiar to gather materials for the then projected study on advancing social sciences in Indonesia to be undertaken by professor Clifford Geertz of the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton University on behalf of the Ford Foundation.

The study was in part encouraged by Dr. Soedjatmoko, former ambassador to the United States and then a member of the Board of Trustees of the Ford Foundation, who believed that some aspects of Western social sciences should be adapted to and "indiginized" with local culture and realities. John Bresnan, Ford Representative at the time, vigorously supported the initiative.

The Geertz Report became the basis for establishment of Social Sciences Research Training centers in Banda Aceh, Jakarta and Makassar funded by the Ford Foundation and jointly supported by the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s hundreds of public and private college and university academics from a wide variety of fields (population, education, literature, history, public administration, political science, mass communications, languages, archeology, sociology-anthropology) went to Banda Aceh, Jakarta and Makassar, devising research methods and following up on field work leading towards preparation of their master's and doctorate theses in Indonesia as well as abroad.

The graduates of Banda Aceh, Jakarta and Makassar research centers became the "critical mass" of faculty and researchers throughout Indonesia who, through their stint in these three meeting points in Western, Central and Eastern Indonesia shared



Juwono Sudarsono with his son Visbnu, London, 1976.

insights, experiences and cross fertilized their individual knowledge of Indonesian society, culture, politics and economy. Through their interaction with the supervising faculty, and most importantly with one another, constituted an important part in replenishing the notion of Indonesian-ness among many

rising young faculty members who hailed from every major island grouping throughout Indonesia. They became critical partners to the economists and technocrats initially sent by the Ford Foundation to UC Berkeley in the late 1950s and early 1960s, underlying Dr Soedjatmoko's prescient observation in 1954 that any success in Indonesian economic development had "vital elements of society and culture to account for."

The problems facing Indonesian social scientists that were first brought to light by Geertz in 1971 are still with us. Social scientists do not conduct enough research, their salaries are small, and they are often required to moonlight in order to make ends meet. This is because most researchers are public servants, working in the Department of Education and Culture.

But at least we are beginning to see the development of partnerships among the private sector and university campuses and research institutes. This is a vital development, as in order to overcome the shortage of funds, research must address both the need to serve the community and the need to respect market forces. Unfortunately, only the most skilled and senior researchers are in a position to provide services required by the market. How are we to ensure that young researchers can develop a more market-oriented approach? Our biggest problem is how to create a cadre of young researchers who can replace their seniors.

At the forefront of this growth was Ibnu Sutowo, managing director of Pertamina, the state-owned oil company. A doctor by training, a general by profession, and with an athletic build even as an older man, Sutowo was a force unto himself. Pertamina, which Sutowo had led since 1967, exercised monopolistic control over every segment of the oil industry, from upstream to downstream, from exploration to the gas pump. By early 1970, the company's employee rolls had swollen to almost 40,000. Efficiency did not seem to be Pertamina's strong suit, yet the company did feed a lot of people.

Sutowo did not manage just Pertamina. Beginning in 1971, Suharto turned over to him a number of construction projects, along with the authority to seek financing for them on his own. Before there had been a Pertamina, when the company was still called Permina, Sutowo was already providing funding for the military in the form of foreign currency. Now, he more or less continued his previous working methods, but on a much larger and more ambitious scale. Backed by oil export income that had grown since the 1970s, he began to seek credit abroad.

At that time it was difficult to tell exactly how much debt Pertamina had incurred, or whether the credit terms

were favorable. No one, it seemed, was keeping watch. It wasn't until 1976 that *Tempo* magazine finally succeeded in uncovering part of Pertamina's deception. The magazine revealed that the amount of debt amassed by Ibnu Sutowo was sufficient to destabilize the Indonesian economy.

Mohammad Sadli, minister of mining and refineries at the time, reported to Parliament that Pertamina's debt totaled \$10.5 billion. He also said that "the major share of Pertamina's investment activity was wasteful and had little connection with the company's basic function."

Since 1972, the IMF had been advising Indonesia to limit the amount of mid-term credit that the government and its agencies were carrying. Yet this advice went unheeded as Sutowo accepted the aggressive offers of foreign creditors, defying legal requirements to

obtain ministerial approval for new loans. Conflict between Sutowo and the technocrats was inevitable, and finally came to a climax in 1976 when Suharto removed him from leadership of Pertamina. Sutowo was never prosecuted, though he had broken the law and, in the process, increased Indonesia's foreign debt fourfold and turned Pertamina into a massive nest of corruption.



▲ Protesters calling Pertamina to account after years of corruption, 1970.

ANUGERAH PEKERTI

Anugerah Pekerti is a lecturer at the Institute for Development and Management Research (Lembaga Pengembangan dan Penelitian Manajemen – LPPM) in Jakarta. With the assistance of the Ford Foundation, during 1978-1986 he earned a PhD in Management from the University of Southern California (USC). On his return to Indonesia, Pekerti helped develop an MBA program with scholarships for students lacking a business background. An Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent, Pekerti believes that this program will correct imbalances created by the colonial system which encouraged Chinese Indonesians, but not pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians, to go into business.

By the end of the 1960s, the private sector in Indonesia was becoming increasingly important. Capital entered the country, corporations were started, but Indonesia still lacked competent business managers. Kadarman, a Jesuit priest, had the idea of starting a school to teach management skills. At the time, across the world, many business schools were being established on the American model.

Kadarman wanted to launch the school through the Catholic and Protestant organizations. He put this idea to the late T.B. Simatupang, a retired general and a senior figure in Protestant circles.

During the 1965-66 change in government, religious conflict broke out. Responding to the idea to establish a Christian school including both Catholics and Protestants, Simatupang asked why Muslims were not included too. So the institute became inter-denominational. At first, it involved Muslims and Christians, later, Hindus and Buddhists. The inter-denominational emphasis drew the attention of Ford.

Simatupang, Kadarman, and several colleagues established LPPM in 1967. From the beginning, Muslims with a strong business background, such as Syafruddin Prawiranegara and Bahder Djohan, were involved in the launch. USAID provided \$4 million for staff training, improving the library, and creating an MBA program. I joined LPPM in 1968. After working there for ten years, I received a scholarship for doctoral studies at USC, under the sponsorship of the Foundation. On my return in 1986, I became director of the new MBA program.

One problem is that in Indonesia, even now, management is considered a branch of economics. Economics in fact is a science, while management is a professional skill.

Harvard Business School and similar schools accept students from a variety of backgrounds into management courses. There is no explicit connection with the faculties of economics.

LPPM continues to accept people from a range of backgrounds, religions, and



Anugerah Pekerti at his office, 1990.

ethnic groups, all of whom work together harmoniously. A high level of idealism inspires us. We operate on the basis of a clear set of ethical principles and values. We are independent. During the 32 years that I have worked at the institute and the ten years that I have been its president director, it has never been suggested that the institute has obtained contracts through illegitimate means. We are famous for putting into practice the values that we publicly espouse.

One of LPPM's missions is to provide opportunities to young people without a business background to enter business through the study of management. In Indonesia, because of its colonial

background, different ethnic groups dominate different sectors. Business, for example, is dominated by people of Chinese descent.

At the beginning of the 1950s, to correct this imbalance, certain policies were implemented. One policy introduced by Trade Minister Sumitro Djojohadikusumo involved providing special facilities to *pribumi* traders in rural areas. Unfortunately, this did not result in the emergence of skilled entrepreneurs. Rather, it created all sorts of distortions and excesses, with many so-called "*pribumi* entrepreneurs" merely selling the licences provided to them to Chinese businessmen. The result was the emergence of so-called "Ali-Baba" companies, managed and operated by Chinese businesspeople but with an Indonesian front. "Ali" was the Indonesian at the front of the shop; "Baba" was the Chinese somewhere out the back.

We addressed the problem from a different perspective, without discrimination, by creating the chance for those without a business background to enter the world of business. If we provide 30 scholarships each year at LPPM, over 100 years we will have helped 3000 individuals. It will take that long before the full effects of the program are felt.

[In the 1980s] I had an idea for extending this program. Of the \$4 million provided by USAID, a certain proportion should be made available directly to students. I met with USAID director William Fuller and put the proposal to him. Fuller agreed to provide \$367,000 to establish a revolving fund. The idea is that this money is used to provide financial assistance to students, who repay their debt after graduation. The money they repay is then used to assist other students. This effort, the Wijawiyata Manajemen program, is still in operation.

THE PROFESSOR WHO LOVED INDONESIA

When President Megawati Sukarnoputri presented John J. Bresnan with the Bintang Jasa Pratama Award in January 2003, many asked what had been this man's contribution to Indonesia. What had he done that justified an award that had been granted to only a handful of foreigners, including the American scholars George McTurnan Kahin and Clifford Geertz?

An answer came from senior diplomat Ali Alatas, quoted in the newspaper *Kompas*: "His criticisms were always constructive. He never discussed a problem without presenting a constructive solution to it." Professor Juwono Sudarsono of the University of Indonesia said: "Over a period of many years, Bresnan has worked to develop Indonesia's human resources extremely effectively, despite the complex and pluralistic nature of Indonesian society."

Bresnan arrived in Indonesia in November 1961 to assist Frank Miller, the Foundation's Representative in Jakarta.

At the time, President Sukarno was demanding that the Netherlands surrender Papua to the new republic. The Soviet Union supported these demands and provided military assistance. US President John F. Kennedy intervened to prevent the use of force by both the Indonesians and the Dutch. Nonetheless, Indonesia deployed "volunteer" troops in Papua.

In September 1963, relations between Indonesia and Malaysia broke down. Indonesia accused the United Kingdom of interfering in Malaysia's affairs. In Jakarta, a mob of 10,000 demonstrators burned the British embassy, and many houses occupied by British residents were attacked and looted. In March 1964, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that his country would not provide financial aid to Indonesia. Sukarno famously responded, "Go to hell with your aid!"

At about the same time, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Soebandrio issued regulations prohibiting Indonesians from studying in the US. This was a serious problem for the Foundation, which had

already agreed to provide scholarships for 13 Indonesian lecturers.

Miller rushed to the Presidential Palace, where he often had breakfast with Sukarno. Sukarno was fond of Miller. He had even told Miller that if Miller allowed Sukarno to find a suitable marriage partner for him, Sukarno would dance at the wedding.

So, Sukarno was receptive, and told Miller that he might be prepared to make exceptions to the regulation. He then asked



John Bresnan receives the Bintang Jasa Pratama Award from President Megawati Sukarnoputri, January 2003.

which of the 13 candidates Miller particularly wanted to go to America. Miller responded that he wanted all of them. Sukarno laughed, but in the end he agreed, saying, "Just tell Soebandrio that I said it was okay."

So, even in extremely difficult circumstances, Miller and Bresnan found opportunities to help Indonesia develop in a positive fashion.

The political situation worsened when Indonesia withdrew from the UN. In March 1965, demonstrators protested the presence of Ford-funded American lecturers at the Institute for Teaching and Education in Malang. An American student informed the American consulate in Surabaya. The

consulate told the State Department in Washington, who told the Foundation in New York. F.F. Hill, the Foundation's Vice President, felt that the situation had gone too far. Hill sent Miller a letter demanding that Miller close the Jakarta office.

Miller and Bresnan opposed this order vehemently, but were forced to leave Jakarta. A few months later Bresnan learned of the killing of several Indonesian Army generals. Soon, hundreds of thousands of Sukarno's supporters had been murdered, and Suharto ascended to power.

The Foundation reopened its Jakarta office in 1967. Bresnan replaced Miller in 1969. Under Bresnan's leadership, the Foundation funded research into high-yield rice, education for social scientists, family planning, management training, and the preservation of marginalized cultures. Bresnan included Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan in these programs.

Bresnan considered the participation of IRRI in Indonesia the most successful of the Foundation's programs. Because of this institute, the level of rice production in Indonesia increased dramatically. "I knew nothing about the Green Revolution, except that I wanted to make it happen. That was probably the single most exciting or influential thing that I did, in retrospect. But even at the time I felt it was important," said Bresnan.

In 1974, Bresnan was recalled to head the Foundation's Asia-Pacific division from where he maintained strong links with Indonesia. In 1982, he left the Foundation to join the East Asian Institute at Columbia University, New York, where he taught and did research on Asian studies.

In 2001, a large number of academics who had received assistance from the Foundation during Bresnan's tenure approached Juwono Sudarsono, at the time a minister, to nominate Bresnan for the Bintang Jasa Pratama. President Megawati agreed, and so Bresnan became the third American to receive Indonesia's highest award for non-Indonesians.

In fact as early as 1966 the newspaper *Indonesia Raya* had published a series of articles, replete with data, on “leakage” within the company. But these reports had no effect. The word “Pertamina” had come to suggest a world of glamor for Jakarta’s elite. In 1968, Ibnu Sutowo celebrated the marriage of one of his daughters with an opulence unparalleled for that time. So grand was the affair that *Pedoman*, a Jakarta daily, ran a special editorial on the event. For his family, it was nothing to fly by private jet to Houston, Texas for a dental appointment, and Sutowo himself often played golf in Palm Springs, California. He even imported a Rolls Royce to Indonesia for his private use.

For years Ibnu Sutowo had remained virtually untouchable. During this time he built a business network for his family, long before Suharto ever did. Jakarta Governor Ali Sadikin gave Sutowo permission to build a five-star Hilton Hotel in the city’s

Senayan sports-complex area, under the impression that the establishment would be owned and operated by Pertamina. As was revealed years later, the lease was held by the Sutowo family. For Ibnu Sutowo, the division between personal and company property was completely blurred. He owned some 35 companies which, in whole or in part, were Pertamina subsidiaries.

“Maybe it would be better if we didn’t have oil,” Widjojo Nitisastro once complained to a friend. It was oil, however, that had enabled Suharto and his generals to witness rapid development with businesses popping up like mushrooms after a warm rain. Petrodollars bolstered their conviction that Indonesia, with its rich natural resources, would finally be able to enter the modern world.

Throughout the country, and especially in major urban areas, the face of Indonesia had changed markedly as it assumed a modern appearance. Sutowo had built golf courses; sunk money into real estate and construction; paid for the construction of Bina Graha, the new presidential offices; built a modern hospital; designed a floating fertilizer factory and petrochemical plant; and funded the construction of the Krakatau Steel plant and a host of other projects, including the College for Koranic Studies (*Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Al-*



Qur'an). He also served as a financial patron for top-level military officers who came to be on Pertamina’s rolls. In short order, this state-owned company came to act as if it had the duty, if not the actual legal authority, to underwrite the funding of development projects not covered by the national budget.

From the outside, Indonesia appeared to be growing by leaps and bounds, but economic disparities were increasing, chiefly between those benefiting from the petrodollars and those lower down the economic ladder. This was most apparent in Jakarta, where a wealthy class emerged even as the government sought to rid the city of poor pedicab drivers and itinerant vendors. Never before had the economic gap within Indonesian society been so clear.

There were some who attempted to address this imbalance. YLBHI, for instance, provided free legal assistance to help the poor to defend their rights. In the 1970s, such assistance was becoming increasingly urgent. There were no checks and balances within the prevailing political structure to prevent abuse of authority. Predictably, it was the students, with their historical and almost mythological role as moral arbiters of the nation's transformation and development, who were the first to take action. After their successful demonstrations against Sukarno in 1966, their next volley of protests came in 1969, not long after *Indonesia Raya* revealed the corruption within Pertamina. Their voices were heard again in 1974 in the Malari Incident. But the climax occurred in 1978, when students from

UI and ITB declared in a manifesto called the *White Book* that "they had no faith in Suharto and did not want him as president of the Republic of Indonesia."

Suharto did not remain silent. Troops soon occupied the ITB campus and more than 100 students were arrested. Heri Akhmadi, chairman of the student council, became the chief target. Lukman Hakim from UI experienced similar treatment. In March 1978 Suharto, unchallenged, was again elected president.

The decade's unrest was not limited to street protests and was not just about the nation's leadership. As social imbalances became more and more apparent, so too grew the number of voices asking if there was not some other road to follow toward national development.

At that time, such inquiry on the part of Indonesia's intellectuals was reflected in the journal *Prisma*, published by the privately-funded Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial – LP3ES*). Originally funded by the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS)



▲ A sign of the times: the Jakarta city government tries to rid the city of pedicabs by dumping them into the sea.

SARTONO KARTODIRDJO

Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo is one of Indonesia's most prominent historians. He received an MA from Yale University in 1964 and completed a doctoral dissertation for the University of Amsterdam in 1966. Titled The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, it has been highly praised by historians and academics. In 1968, Kartodirdjo was appointed senior lecturer at the Faculty of Arts at UGM. In 1981, he spent a year as guest lecturer at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences in Wassenaar, The Hague. During this period, he wrote a series of articles on issues related to Indonesian history and Dutch colonialism under the rubric "Letter from Wassenaar" for the Sunday edition of Kompas.

In 1957, I attended a seminar in Yogyakarta on Indonesia's national history. At this seminar, the need for a work of Indonesian history that accurately reflected Indonesian national identity was analyzed in detail. At the time, Indonesia was still a newly emerging nation. Most history books reflected the Dutch colonial perspective. Prominent intellectuals such as Muhammad Yamin and Soedjatmoko took part in this seminar. Unfortunately, the book remained a pipe-dream.

In 1970, a second national seminar was held, also in Yogyakarta. This time, I chaired the meeting, which yielded more material and concrete results than the previous one. An official committee was formed with the approval of Mashuri, the minister for education and culture.

At the time, Soedjatmoko was Indonesian ambassador to Washington. He introduced us to the Ford Foundation. In 1971, we entered into an official relationship with the Foundation. There were seven core members of our committee: Nugroho Notosusanto, Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo, Sutjipto, Oka Tjandrasmita, Buchairi, Sujono Panji Suroso, and myself acting as Chairman. Ford was prepared to assist members of this committee to conduct research at libraries in the US and the Netherlands.

Initially, I went to America to find an appropriate base for the team. I went to Berkeley, Yale, Wisconsin, and Cornell. On my return to Indonesia we decided to base ourselves at Berkeley. The reason was simple. Oka, Sutjipto, and Abdurrachman had never spent much time in cold climates, and we

recognized that adjusting to a cold winter might have an adverse affect on our work. At least in Berkeley we were reasonably sure that the weather would be good.

In November 1971, the core team was meant to depart for Berkeley, although there were a few scheduling problems.



Sartono Kartodirdjo at UGM, 1979.

Nugroho could only stay for two months, while Sutjipto could only arrive in January 1972. Every day, our work schedule was the same. In the mornings, we spent our time at various libraries. Every evening, some time between 18:00-20:00, we held a seminar in the apartment of a group member. At first, we held these seminars at the office of Joe Fischer, an Indonesianist who assisted us with administrative details. This was during the period of violent anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, and there were police everywhere, so we decided to meet at our apartments. In total, we held 99 such seminars at Berkeley. We decided to use a history of Belgium, written by Ari Pirenne,

as our model. We felt that this work was comprehensive, and addressed historical issues from all perspectives, including political, economic, and cultural.

In April 1972 the team moved to Leiden to complete our study of the archives at the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (KITLV). We read every available book and work on Indonesia. In May, we returned to Indonesia.

Then there were more seminars in Indonesia, funded by the Department of Education and Culture. Eventually, six volumes of Indonesian history were produced, each one involving five writers. So, in all, 30 writers were involved in the project. In 1976, we completed the work and presented it to President Suharto.

Frankly, I was disappointed with the results. Most of the writers were involved with other projects, and did not give their best. In my opinion, if each volume had been the responsibility of a single writer who was able to devote his or her entire time to the task, the result would have been better.

In 1981, I received the opportunity for further study at Wassenaar, also under the sponsorship of the Foundation. During my year there, I wrote *An Introduction to Indonesian History (1500-1900)* which was later published by Gramedia. I think this was a better work than the one produced earlier. On my return to Indonesia, I wrote two volumes on the struggle for independence, although my eyesight was declining. Luckily, I was able to complete these works, although I couldn't finish the third one, on the period of the Japanese occupation. By that time, my vision had become a major problem.

A PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL: SOEDJATMOKO

Historian, diplomat, intellectual, visionary – Soedjatmoko was Indonesia’s true “renaissance man.”

“Koko,” as he was known, was born in 1922 in Western Sumatra to a well-to-do family. He received a Dutch education, and his father’s profession – surgery – exposed him further to travel, books, and intellectual vigor. During the early 1940s his family lived in the city of Solo, where he was delighted to discover that “all the libraries raided by the Japanese ended up in the flea market.”

From this liberal background came an awareness of Kierkegaard and of rural poverty, existentialism versus the revolutionary ideal, the search for inner freedom combined with the call to duty. These contrasts gave shape to Soedjatmoko’s life-long intellectual disposition.

It may be said that he was a thinker by example. Reading and conversation were constants in his life. In the late 1950s, as chief editor of the socialist-leaning magazine *Siasat* (Inquiry) and, simultaneously, the man behind the influential opinion page *Gelanggang* (Forum), he sparked a polemic on literature and culture that energized the entire discourse on nation building. One of his greatest contributions to this exchange was his call for tolerance and openness. He believed passionately in the freedom and independence of individuals. He was always “too cosmopolitan for the rest of us,” said poet Sitor Situmorang, but “he inspired dialogues, he was meaningful.”

In fact, Soedjatmoko wasn’t a specialist in any particular field. According to sociologist Ignas Kleden, he represented the psychology rather than the epistemology of intellectual thought. Taufik Abdullah said he was not so much an historian as a thinker who pondered history (Soedjatmoko’s

signature work is probably *An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography*). Often, it was his range of interests, rather than the depth of his thinking, that dazzled. Social sciences, information sciences, traditional arts – it seemed there was nothing he didn’t explore.

Some argue that Soedjatmoko was ill at ease with the realities of Indonesia, and that he sought to pursue his intellectual quests largely on foreign shores. During the last 20 years of his life, undoubtedly, the international circuit was his domain.



Soedjatmoko with Ford Foundation Chairman Alexander Heard at a Board of Trustees meeting, New York, March 1973.

His active life abroad began remarkably early. In the late 1940s he was sent to the UN with Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Sri Lankan journalist Charles Tambu to struggle for global recognition of Indonesia’s independence. Soedjatmoko then was 25 years of age.

That was the launch of his diplomatic career. After serving as Indonesia’s first *chargé d’affaires* in London, he went to Washington to strengthen the political section of the newly established embassy. Later, in New York, he acted as alternate

permanent representative of Indonesia to the UN. And in 1968 he became Indonesian ambassador to the US.

No other Indonesian intellectual has received such a breadth of international awards and honors. In 1969 he became the first trustee of the Ford Foundation from what was then often called the Third World. In 1978 he received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for International Understanding. Two years later he was appointed Rector of the United Nations University in Tokyo where, during his seven-year tenure, he tirelessly expounded his vision of freedom and development. At the same time, he helped put Indonesia on the global map.

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz saw a common dilemma for people like Soedjatmoko: how best to serve one’s country, not by exaggerating its virtues, but by bringing it closer to itself? Following a nine-month “tour of personal political discovery” to Eastern and Western Europe, Soedjatmoko agonized, “I am not a communist, nor a left wing socialist, and not a rightist either; none of the political approaches that these labels stood for seemed relevant to the kind of problems Indonesia faced...”

To his left-wing detractors he was “PSI,” local shorthand for elite intellectuals who spoke more English or Dutch than Indonesian, who preferred to pontificate rather than risk contact with the masses. Another disparaging term for this group was “the Jakarta Fabian society.” This PSI connection, as well as Soedjatmoko’s links with the West, fuelled darker suspicions about his true political motives. Paradoxically, he was resented for his personal closeness to Sukarno – the man who banned his party in 1960.



A meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the "Indonesian Question." Sutan Sjahrir (center) surrounded by his advisers: Soedjatmoko, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Charles Tambu and Agoes Salim. New York, 14 August 1947.

Soedjatmoko had been called "brilliant but naïve," a "lightweight," "a panderer to trendy ideas," "a lover of truisms," a public intellectual who spread himself too thin. Yet he always championed human dignity as an essential component of the social contract: "We can only remain human beings if we learn to develop within ourselves some sort of inner life. A much greater realization of self then is possible. Art and religion must be fostered."

Such an attitude led Soedjatmoko to an alternative vision of development. He argued that "intermediate technology" should fuel Indonesia's economic progress.

This outlook contradicted the prevailing ideas of the 1970s when Indonesia, awash with oil profits, was eager to hurtle into the future. Although his neo-Gandhian vision failed to explain which strategy Indonesia should adopt in the global competition for trade and power, nonetheless students and younger intellectuals welcomed his challenge to the New Order's model of aggressive development.

By 1974, however, this challenge had come back to haunt Soedjatmoko. Although he had never been an open critic of the government, he was accused of being the

"mastermind" of the Malari riots. As a Foundation Trustee, he could have invoked the prestige and influence of the organization to help him. But he refused to do that. His situation was an Indonesian affair, he told the Jakarta Representative, Guillaume de Spoelberch, and he wanted it resolved in an "Indonesian" manner.

He died in 1989. During the years since, his exact legacy has remained elusive. Perhaps his true bequest to Indonesia, and to the world, is this: the idea that nothing is as permanent as change, that ambivalence may not be such a bad thing after all.

RUMORS, PLOTS, AND CONSPIRACIES: THE *RAMPARTS* ARTICLE

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, “foreign intervention,” in the eyes of some, was a specter threatening the developing world. Advisors, consultants, and trainers were portrayed as “neo-imperialists” bent on ruling post-colonial societies through the subtle and sophisticated means of financial and technological assistance.

This period was highlighted by the election of Soedjatmoko to the Ford Foundation’s Board of Trustees, which quickly drew criticism from both left and right. In October 1970, *Ramparts* magazine published an essay by California-based writer David Ransom. He described Indonesia’s political upheaval of 1965 and 1966 as being the product of a sinister and elaborate American plot. The culprits? Ford Foundation, Rand Corporation, USAID, the Council on Foreign Relations, assorted American universities, and the CIA – he seemed to be implicating the entire free world. The Ford Foundation’s real interest in Indonesia, according to him, was the subversion of the government followed by the coaching of Indonesian economists to produce a national development plan compatible with “the new indirect rule of America.”

Initially, the so-called exposé generated little press interest, either in the US or in Indonesia. It was the fiercely nationalistic *Merdeka* (Freedom) daily that later gave Ransom’s thesis its curious staying power. In January 1974, when anti-foreign demonstrations in Jakarta reached their peak and Indonesian army intelligence needed a scapegoat, the article became the basis for accusations that “radical socialists” were behind a grand plan to discredit the government, with Soedjatmoko cast in the role of “mastermind.”

The *Ramparts* attack was spicy, entertaining, and persuasive in the way of most sensational pieces. But there were holes in the argument. Ransom did not take sufficient care to distinguish among the alleged parties. He ignored the fact that the Foundation’s entire extensive program of

educational activities – teacher training, English-language education, public administration and management, and research and development – had been initiated and conducted with the approval of President Sukarno. These activities, in fact, made up the bulk of Foundation funds committed to Indonesia.

Ransom focused on a team of Ford-financed, US-trained economists based at FEUI, whom he branded the “Berkeley Mafia.” After returning from their postgraduate

Harris, Ford Representative in Indonesia at the time the training project was approved. He knew members of the economics faculty at Berkeley, including Thomas Blaidzell, who convinced the university of the merits of the project. In the meantime, Harris’s own close friendship with Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the man widely regarded as the father of the “technocrats” and the instigator of the affiliation, was a matter of public record.

And Sumitro, in turn, had a personal connection with the then chairman of the Berkeley Department of Economics, Dr. Andreas Papandreou, a fellow socialist he much admired.

Ransom’s emphasis on Berkeley was odd, in light of Foundation-supported projects in Indonesia based at other prestigious universities, including MIT, Cornell, and the University of Wisconsin. The purpose of all of these projects, said another former Ford Representative, Frank Miller, was to “prepare teachers of economics, not public officials.”

In 1957, when Sumitro fled Jakarta to avoid arrest and later joined the PRRI rebels in West Sumatra, the affiliation with US universities stayed afloat despite “severe difficulties.” Sources close to the event agreed, “Any association with him [Sumitro] was a serious liability.” Although this also raised considerable suspicions about FEUI’s loyalty, the Foundation and all the contracting universities refused to retreat. In his 1965 report for the Foundation, consultant Richard Dye spoke glowingly of the dedication of two men in particular, Mohammad Sadli and Subroto, in keeping FEUI going during Sumitro’s absence. Widjojo Nitisastro echoed this exact sentiment almost 40 years later.

A decade elapsed between the time the Berkeley Mafia first went off to study and when they became Indonesia’s economic tsars – a long time, some might say, to sustain a ‘conspiracy’ to control the fate of a nation. As Berkeley’s Bruce Glassburner noted, “We were neither that diabolical nor that clairvoyant.”



Even today the Ramparts article still serves as occasional fodder for conspiracy theorists.

studies – at Berkeley and other universities – some were appointed to influential positions in the Suharto government. The so-called “conspiracy” lay in Berkeley’s role in “training most of the key Indonesians who would seize government power to put their pro-American lessons into practice.”

But history is often simpler and less devious than it may seem. In fact the international educational exchange may have had several beginnings.

It could, for instance, have started with a few books. In 1950, the Berkeley student body had collected books for UGM in Yogyakarta. The students sought Ford Foundation money to ship the books. Ford said fine, but since the students had no corporate entity, the money had to be given through the university. Plain and simple.

It could also have started with Michael

of Germany, the journal later received much-needed assistance from the Ford Foundation. *Prisma* was the preeminent forum for the exchange of critical thought, which had almost no place in other Indonesian media. It was in *Prisma* that one could trace the path of Indonesia's contemporary intellectual history.

The writers whose articles appeared in *Prisma* raised numerous questions, and their search for answers took them to a wide range of sources, including the critical New Left. Since the 1960s this school of thought had attracted much interest on campuses in the US and Western Europe. According to its proponents, economic development of the type being implemented in Indonesia was part of a worldwide capitalist conspiracy. Before the attraction of this school began to wane, *Ramparts*, a California-based New Left monthly magazine,

heralded the view that Indonesia's development was the product of a "Berkeley Mafia" that was carrying out a liberal American economic agenda.

Another important source of alternative thinking was Soedjatmoko, Indonesia's most prominent intellectual at that time, who posited the idea of using mid-level technology to support the nation's development plans. He argued that methods used by the established industrial nations had been proven to cause environmental destruction and to create social imbalances. Soedjatmoko believed it was not too late for Indonesia to choose a more appropriate strategy. The country would be served best by using less expensive technologies that would stimulate growth in the labor force without wreaking havoc on the environment.



▲ Four of the so-called "Berkeley Mafia" take the oath of office along with other members of the 1971 cabinet: (beginning from second left) Mohamad Sadli (mining), Subroto (manpower and transmigration), Widjojo Nitisastro (economy, finance, and industry), Emil Salim (communications). Also pictured are (far left) Mukti Ali (religion) and (far right) M. Panggabean (politics and security).

Soedjatmoko's idea was not completely original. In fact it had begun to enjoy popularity in other countries as well, especially after the 1973 publication of E.F. Schumacher's *Small is Beautiful*. The book rapidly gained wide critical attention, both in Indonesia and abroad. Schumacher was a German-born British economist. Much like Soedjatmoko, he had come to the conclusion that poor countries should avoid the adoption of advanced technologies since they did not stimulate job creation. Instead, they should adapt mid-level technologies to meet their needs. Schumacher questioned the need for continuous economic growth, recommending the development of a society that was not heavily dependent on capital- and energy-intensive investment. While capitalism might improve the quality of life, he argued it was also necessary to conserve and maintain the world's natural resources. Large cities and industries would only destroy them. Small was beautiful.

Around this same time, a group of scholars from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) shed new light on this subject. In a report entitled *The Limits to Growth*, which had been commissioned by the international council of business leaders known as the Club of Rome, the MIT scholars put forth the Malthusian hypothesis that if global population growth and industrial expansion continued at their current high rate, world food production would not be able to keep up, and natural resources would be rapidly depleted. If this outcome were to be avoided, there would have to be, as the report stated, a "Copernican revolution in thinking." Governments had to rethink and review policies calling for continuous growth. The birthrate had to be reduced to zero. Continuous expansion of industrial production was not necessary. Instead, pollution had to be controlled, products had to be recycled, and the manufacturing industry geared towards the fabrication of more durable items that could be repaired.



▲ Selo Soemardjan, chair of the executive committee of the Social Sciences Research Training Centers Program, addresses the first group of fellows in Ujung Pandang [Makassar]. To his left is Umar Kayam, director of the center and to his right is the anthropologist Clark Cunningham, 1975.

TAUFIK ABDULLAH

Taufik Abdullah, a Cornell-trained historian, was director of Leknas from 1974-1978, and has been affiliated with LIPI for most of his professional career, becoming its head during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wabid. He is currently the director of YIIS and formerly ran its Social Science Research Training Centers program.

The Foundation originally had the idea to establish a program to develop the social sciences in Indonesia and invited Professor Clifford Geertz here. Geertz travelled to a number of campuses to interview academics and administrators. After Geertz completed his report, the Foundation asked for comments from people including Selo Soemardjan, Harsja Bachtiar, and Daniel Lev. We all agreed that the social sciences in Indonesia were in a poor state and that there was no tradition of sound research methods. We decided to establish what we called “research stations” – institutions to provide training in research methodology in one-year programs.

The Department of Education and Culture was ready. Selo Soemardjan and Soedjatmoko had also established a foundation to support the project. These joined together into YIIS which worked with local universities that were to manage the training centers. Three local universities were nominated, in Aceh, Padang, and Ujung Pandang. Aceh responded enthusiastically and promised to support the program. Madjid Ibrahim, the rector of Syiah Kuala University, was prepared to set aside two buildings, a dormitory, and a lecture hall. The other universities did not respond nearly so enthusiastically. Also, in Aceh, Governor Muzakir Walad strongly supported the program. At the time, Aceh’s star was rising, and Syiah Kuala was a highly influential institution in Aceh. The governor and several regents were elected from Syiah Kuala lecturers. At the time, we all had high hopes for Aceh. The center was opened at Syiah Kuala in 1974.

Preparation took four years, partly because of the debate that followed the

Geertz report. We also had to select the right campuses, recruit staff, and so on. Staff were recruited from all over Indonesia. The first intake of students consisted of 12 individuals who came from all over Indonesia, too.

The first director was Alfian, assisted by



Taufik Abdullah posing in front of anti-socialist graffiti on a visit to Wisconsin, 1973.

Stuart Schlegel, an anthropologist who had developed the “grounded method.” This was a good research methodology because it didn’t involve an undue period of time spent on theoretical studies. After one or two months preparation, the researcher was ready to go into the field. Participants in the program also studied the Acehese language. I went to Aceh at least once a year for lectures and workshops.

After two years, Ibrahim Alfian replaced

Alfian, and Lance Castles, from Australia, replaced Schlegel. Since Ibrahim Alfian, the position has been held by various native Acehese. The first was Syamsuddin Mahmud, who later became governor of the province, then Ali Basyah Amin, later rector of Syiah Kuala University, then Dayan Dawood, who also became rector of Syiah Kuala, and who was killed in 2001. All of these people turned out to be successful, although it is sad to remember Dayan.

About two years after the Aceh program started, Umar Kayam was appointed as first director of the program in Makassar with anthropologist Clark Cunningham. After Kayam was Mochtar Naim, then Mattulada, then Hasan Walinono. At the time I was director of LEKNAS.

The programs that ran for the longest periods were in Makassar and Aceh. In the end, the universities took over the management of the centers. The programs were highly productive while they lasted. With 12 people each year at each center, over ten years there were between 200 to 400 graduates of the program, many of whom went on to receive doctorates and become professors and rectors, although some also disappeared without a trace.


The influence of the social scientists in the New Order regime was nowhere near as strong as the influence of the economists. The New Order had little patience for the social sciences in general. The social sciences therefore had little impact on political development. Unfortunately, the whole country is paying for that neglect now. We have been fully aware of the potential for disaster in Aceh and East Timor for years, but our input has been considered decidedly unconstructive by those in power.

For Indonesians who were open to new and alternative ideas – particularly those who wanted change – Schumacher’s views and the warnings implicit in *The Limits to Growth* were earth-shaking. Further, these ideas were far more attractive than the concepts previously employed with regard to economic development, the consequences of which were deeply worrisome.

For Indonesians with an even more radical bent, a fair wind was blowing from Latin America. Since the mid-1960s, Andre Gunder Frank had been arguing against the Third World’s adoption of Western development theories. In his opinion, the under-development of the Third World was due to its close links with the capitalist economies, especially the

US and European countries. The 1970 book, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, offered a similar viewpoint. Its theory of *dependencia* recommended radical change, including severing links with international trade and investment. Arief Budiman, Indonesia’s premier champion of leftist thought during the New Order, was one of this theory’s proponents.

The Chinese socialist model, as espoused by Mao Zedong, also had its supporters (even though, as was later revealed, information about the practices of the People’s Republic’s socialist economy was not always accurate). The Chinese leader and his followers argued that equitable distribution of wealth was in fact possible, but only if society



▲ A LIPI-sponsored math quiz on the national television station TVRI. Jakarta, 1976.

THEE KIAN WIE

Thee Kian Wie is a senior researcher at LIPI. He is well known as the author of prize-winning books about the Indonesian economy, and is among the group of economists who studied in the US in the 1960s. He began his career at the National Institute for Economic Research (Lembaga Kajian Ekonomi Nasional – LKEN), which later amalgamated with LIPI. While most of his colleagues have joined the bureaucracy, Thee continues to engage in research and writing. He also chairs the board of a current Foundation grantee, SMERU Research Institute, an important new poverty research center in Jakarta.

I'd been an ordinary member of the administration staff at the Indonesian Council for Science and Learning [*Majelis Ilmu Pengutabuan Indonesia* – MIPI] since 1959. In 1962, LEKNAS was established as one of seven institutions in MIPI to be engaged in research into economics and the other social sciences. I wanted to become a researcher, so I applied to the director of MIPI, Professor Sarwono Prawirohardjo.

Sarwono asked Professor Sadarjoen Siswomartojo, whose background was in education, to take up the position of director of Leknas. He wasn't an economist himself, and he established a board of advisors that also included a lot of economists, including Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Selo Soemardjan, Koentjaraningrat, Sarbini Sumawinata, Makaminan Makagiansar, Ali Wardhana, and Emil Salim.

I was accepted there. Widjojo had a good relationship with the Foundation. They were prepared to provide assistance. At the beginning of the 1960s, the PKI was extremely strong, and President Sukarno was becoming increasingly anti-Western. American institutions were not in favor in Indonesia. The Foundation saw an opportunity to maintain links with the community of intellectuals in Indonesia.

So, Ford was prepared to provide scholarships to a number of economists and social scientists to complete post-graduate studies in the US. At the time, Leknas did not have any economic researchers of note. Most graduates were clearly incapable of high-standard research. After a rigorous process of selection, several people were chosen for further studies. Funds were channeled through the Harvard Development Advisory Service (later Harvard Institute of

International Development – HIID).

The first intake included Harsja Bachtar, Mely Tan, T.S.S. Soetanto and myself, left in 1963. The second, which included Soedradjad Djiwandono and Taufik Abdullah, left in 1964. The final one left in 1965. In all, 13 students completed post-graduate studies in economics in the



Thee Kian Wie in his office at LEKNAS, Jakarta, 1978.

US through this program.

After I returned Harsja Bachtar became acting director of Leknas-LIPI. At the beginning of the 1970s, Bachtar felt that our knowledge of the economic situation in the provinces was lacking. We didn't have much experience with field research, so he agreed to work with the Center for South East Asian Studies from the University of Kyoto.

The first survey research with which I was involved was a regional economic survey conducted in South Sumatra. For two years we engaged in field research. This involved a number of parties in addition to the University of Kyoto, including the Economics Faculty of

Sriwijaya University. In general, the research yielded good results.

Indonesian academics, including economists, enjoy holding seminars. They are less productive when it comes to publishing papers, particularly in English, despite the fact that it is the ability to publish that determines the worth of an academic in the eyes of the world.

Several factors explain this. The tradition of academic research in Indonesia is still quite weak. Many economists, including those with PhDs, do not see research or education as their primary focus. Most are more interested in joining the bureaucracy, or becoming rich, or establishing an institute that provides consulting services rather than one that engages in research.

The inability of Indonesia's economists to make a significant input on the world stage is indicated by the lack of material by these economists in international economics journals. There are far fewer contributions from Indonesians than from their counterparts in Malaysia, the Philippines, or Singapore. The usual defense – that we are not English-speaking – doesn't hold water, considering that the number of papers published by Thai academics is significantly greater.

FEUI used to be strong, but every significant economist to emerge there was taken away to serve as a ministerial advisor. In the 1970s and 1980s, the ministries took a lot of economists on their return from their studies in America. They were never able to continue their studies in economics. It's very difficult to continue as an academic if you stop writing and spend all your time giving newspaper interviews and shallow presentations.



▲ A traditional birth attendant weighing a baby in a clinic near Bandung, West Java, 1982



▲ *The anthropologist Clifford Geertz in Yogyakarta, 1984. Many of the observations in his seminal 1971 report on the state of the social sciences in Indonesia remain relevant today.*

was treated as a commune. A communal life style, detached from the world market and without an agenda that stressed economic growth, was the answer to the problem of prosperity or the lack thereof. In Indonesia, support for this model, which first appeared in the writings of prominent Moslem intellectual and economist Dawam Rahardjo, did not last long. After Mao Zedong's death and Deng Xiaoping's rise to power, China adopted a different path – a capitalist one. Around the world, the theory of *dependencia* was abandoned, even by the future president of Brazil, Cardoso himself. The small-is-beautiful spirit had lost its luster.

In the mid-1970s, however, the influence of Mahbub ul-Haq did warrant notice. This famed Pakistani economist argued it was wrong to believe that growth in a country's GDP would automatically resolve the problem of poverty. He introduced the concept of a Human Development Index

(HDI), in which the basic standard for measuring prosperity was not simply an increase in per capita income, but also growth in the level of education, life expectancy, infant survival rates, and other factors not generally tabulated in economic analyses.

It seemed that “technocratic optimism” was showing signs of slackening, according to Clifford Geertz's 1971 report for the Foundation. People were becoming aware that economic calculations might solve certain problems, but could give rise to other, more troubling difficulties. The need for a deeper understanding of social reality was becoming increasingly felt. Up to that point, said Geertz, it had been “polished by the machinery of modern economics.”

Understanding social reality is never easy. The problem in Indonesia was that people were being asked not simply to understand or to evaluate the world, but to change it as well.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE MANTRA OF UNITY





THE MANTRA OF UNITY

On 12 September 1984, a stage was erected on Jalan Sindang in Koja, a neighborhood in the Tanjung Priok section of North Jakarta. The area, located near Jakarta's main harbor, is crowded, and most of its residents are poor. Whenever a stage is erected, therefore, it signals festivities to come, and a huge crowd soon gathers. That night was no exception. A protective tarpaulin hung over the stage. Dozens of loudspeakers were attached to the electricity poles along the street.

There was nothing special about that Wednesday night. The site of the stage, an intersection that had been closed to traffic, was a place where local events were often held. The notices handed out by *Remaja Islam*, a Muslim youth group, billed it as an evening of prayer for the young. But the night would end in bloodshed.

Maybe no one saw it coming, not even when Amir Biki appeared on stage at eight PM. Standing 178 centimeters and weighing more than 100 kilograms, this man had his own special presence on the stage. He was a person of influence in the area, better off than his neighbors, and a natural leader. Originally from Gorontalo, North Sulawesi, Biki was frequently called upon to help resolve conflicts among local residents.

◀ *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* ("Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature") – a theme park of an idealized Indonesia that was heavily criticized at the time of its construction as a luxury the country could ill afford.

Amir Biki spoke with anger that night. One report by *Tempo* magazine described him as carrying a dagger, which he brandished at the crowd while shouting invective against the government. The target of his anger was a proposed law requiring all Indonesian organizations, even religious ones, to adopt Pancasila, the state-prescribed ideology, as their guide. This set of five principles includes belief in one God; humanitarianism; national unity; representational democracy; and social justice. The government's insistence that Pancasila be adopted by all organizations had raised hackles across the country.

On 7 September, five days prior to the prayer evening, Sergeant Hermanu, an army officer posted to the South Koja sub-district, had discovered three posters protesting the government's plan on the walls of the *As-Sa'adah musholla*, a local prayer house. He asked the members of the prayer house to take down the posters, but they refused.

The next day, the sergeant returned to the prayer house accompanied by another soldier. When he saw that the posters were still in place, he tried to remove them. He took a sheet of newspaper, dipped it in the open gutter outside the prayer house, and tried to smear the posters with the foul, black water. Local

residents were angered. Rumors spread: "a sergeant went into a mosque without removing his shoes"; "a soldier sprayed a mosque with sewer water"; "Sergeant Hermanu is a Christian." Two days later, on Monday, 10 September, conflict erupted. While Sergeant Hermanu and one of the heads of the mosque – to which the prayer house was attached – were discussing the matter, a crowd of people gathered. Someone then set fire to Sergeant Hermanu's motorcycle. Soon, troops arrived and arrested the two heads of the mosque, the head of the *As-Sa'adah* prayer house, and one of the people who had taken part in torching the motorcycle.

In his speech to the crowd on the night of 12 September, Amir Biki loudly demanded the release of the four men. He had already paid a visit to the local civilian authority to request their release, but the military had refused to budge. Biki might have been using his speech that night to further press his case. According to an official statement from General L. B. Moerdani, commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Amir Biki had given the local military headquarters an ultimatum: if the four prisoners were not released by 11 PM, he would "commit murder and destruction."



▲ Military commanders Try Sutrisno and Benny Moerdani address the media following the Tanjung Priok incident, September 1984.

AUGUSTINUS RUMANSARA

Augustinus Rumansara serves as vice president of the integrated social strategy program for British Petroleum at its mining operation in Tangguh, Papua. Prior to this, he worked in the field of human rights and environmental protection in Papua through the Village Community Advancement Foundation of Irian Jaya (Yayasan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa – YPMD) and for WWF, the global environment network. He headed the International Non-Governmental Group on Indonesia (INGI) in the early 1990s.

I studied agriculture at the Satya Wacana Christian University in Central Java where I became involved in the struggle to help the poor. I graduated in 1978 and returned to Jayapura, where I began working for the church. George Junus Aditjondro, a friend from my student days and an environmental activist, arrived in Jayapura to establish the Irian Jaya Development Information Service Center at Cendrawasih University. This center was funded by the Asia Foundation and was involved in research and community development. After a while, the university became concerned about the activities of the center – this was during the New Order period, after all. They told us to establish ourselves as an independent entity, so we formed YPMD.

Through YPMD I came into contact with the Foundation, which assisted us in developing a social forestry project. YPMD was also involved in home industry programs intended to help Papuans develop sources of income. In 1986, when George left to continue his education at Cornell, I replaced him as director of YPMD.

Later, for 15 months I studied the politics of development at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. On my return in 1991, my colleagues from NGOs pushed me into heading the secretariat of INGI in Jakarta. There were two secretariats, in Holland and in Jakarta. The goal of this organization was to approach donor agencies and states that provided funds to the government of Indonesia to encourage them to place issues related to the environment, human rights, and democracy on the agenda.

In Jakarta, the INGI secretariat only came to life in the period before its annual meeting. I proposed that INGI also act as a lobby group in Jakarta – after all, the Indonesian government was the most significant factor in the issues that

concerned INGI. INGI agreed, and we were provided with extra funding. Not all Indonesian officials welcomed our presence, but at least the minister for the environment, Emil Salim, and the minister for internal affairs, Rudini, accepted us.

INGI played a major role after the



Augustinus Rumansara on the golf course, August 2003.

decision to build the Kedung Ombo dam in 1989. INGI protested that the World Bank failed to consider the social aspects of the project. The World Bank accepted our input.

INGI also proposed establishing a human rights commission after the killing of East Timorese at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili in November 1991. Another important INGI activity was promoting the rights of women. Until now, it was as though women achieved whatever rights they had only through the sympathy of men. I have fought for women to be allotted one-third of the seats in the People's Consultative Assembly of Papua.

My major concern continued to be Papua and the massive violations of human rights and environmental destruction there. While at YPMD, I often found cause to criticize Freeport McMoRan, the gold mining company that operates in Papua. In the end, they offered me a job. Of course, after criticizing them for so long, I didn't feel that it would be appropriate for me to join them.

The flow of "newcomers" into Papua has created tensions with the original inhabitants. I'd say that newcomers currently make up 50 per cent of the population. If we look at local parliaments and private enterprises throughout Papua, newcomers are greatly over-represented. The political and economic institutions of the region do not accommodate the aspirations of the Papuans.

However, I don't agree that newcomers should be prevented from coming. Papua is part of Indonesia, and any Indonesian should have the right to go there. If affirmative action programs, especially in the area of education, are implemented well, I feel that the problems in Papua can be slowly overcome.

In 1999, British Petroleum began exploring for oil in Tangguh, Papua. I worked to establish a social policy that would prevent a repeat of the damage caused by Freeport. British Petroleum was interested in this, and asked me to join them. I met with their senior figures in London and became convinced that they were serious about the program.

I believe that British Petroleum is committed to fulfilling its social responsibilities. I told them that I didn't want merely to implement the program; I wanted to be involved in its formulation. I was offered the position of vice president at British Petroleum for the Tangguh operation. Some of my activist friends criticized my decision to accept, but I feel I can achieve real goals here. My goal is to transform Tangguh into a model of good corporate citizenship.

PRESERVING THE PAST: MANUSCRIPTS AND MICROFILMS

Until the twentieth century, many of Indonesia's indigenous literatures existed only in oral tradition. In those languages that had developed writing systems, however, vast quantities of manuscripts were produced and preserved in private collections and court libraries. Scribes used perishable materials (paper, palm leaf, bark, bamboo), but it was common practice to recopy texts into new manuscripts if an old one was falling apart or an extra copy was needed. In this way Indonesia's written heritage was passed down, despite the impermanence of the materials it was written on.

Nowadays, however, the preservation of manuscripts has become an enormous problem. Upkeep of a collection requires constant climate control, usually by means of air-conditioners and dehumidifiers, and many of the libraries that hold large collections are finding them too expensive to maintain. The manuscripts are deteriorating rapidly in Indonesia's tropical climate, and they are not replaced by new copies, as the practice of recopying has died out. Moreover, the contents of the manuscripts are increasingly remote from contemporary readers: the establishment of Indonesian as the lingua franca has led to a decline in the strength of regional languages, and the dominance of the roman alphabet in print has rendered the regional scripts in the manuscripts virtually unreadable by anyone but scholars. Centuries of literature and history are at risk.

It was against this background that the Ford Foundation decided in the mid-1980s to support work in preserving Indonesian manuscripts, both through conservation of the actual manuscripts and through the

production of microfilm copies. Ford modeled its grants on two earlier microfilming projects: the Surakarta Manuscript Project, undertaken by Nancy K. Florida in the early 1980s with funding from Cornell University and the National Endowment for the Humanities, and work begun in 1984 to microfilm colonial-era Indonesian newspapers at the National Library in Jakarta. The Foundation, sometimes in cooperation with other donors, eventually supported the filming of over 14,000 manuscripts in various court, university, and private collections. Copies

manuscript inventory was compiled. Individual research and publication awards were given for work on literature in manuscript.

Imagine, then, Ford's dismay when a 1998 evaluation by Roger Tol, head of a Dutch library with a vast Indonesia collection, revealed that the microfilms held in Indonesian collections were deteriorating even faster than the manuscripts they recorded! The problem was, of course, climate control: stored in uncontrolled conditions, the films were vulnerable to fungus. The entire Indonesian collection of microfilms, Tol wrote, was in great danger of being lost forever.

Fortunately, there was a solution, already in use at LIPI in Jakarta: a storage process known as hermetic sealing. The microfilm is vacuum-packed in an aluminum pouch, after which no climate control is necessary. At Tol's recommendation, Ford, which had thought its microfilming work completed, agreed to a rescue operation, in which all of the damaged microfilms were washed and cleaned and the master films hermetically sealed.

Before the final sealing, additional duplicate films were made to fill in gaps and increase the number of complete sets to four, two in Indonesia and two abroad.

The problem of the microfilms appears to have been successfully resolved. Preserving the manuscripts themselves, however, is still an urgent need. Outside donors can offer short-term assistance, but in the long run Indonesia itself must shoulder the responsibility – or else let its heritage crumble away.



An illuminated Javanese manuscript held in the Sonobudoyo Museum in Yogyakarta.

of the resultant films were deposited in the home collections, in the Indonesian National Library and National Archives, and in a research library abroad.

The Foundation did not see preservation as an end in itself, but instead as a necessary first stage in the process of encouraging public and scholarly access to the manuscripts and interest in their contents. Catalogues, exhibitions, archiving workshops, brochures, and videos on book conservation were produced. A nation-wide

No proof exists that Biki ever gave such an ultimatum. According to several witnesses, at that evening's prayers he said only that he intended to go to military command headquarters – where the four men were being held – to free them. Regardless of what Biki actually said, tension mounted considerably and at 11 PM a crowd of around 1500 began marching toward military headquarters. They carried aloft both the Red-and-White, the Indonesian national flag, and a green flag emblazoned with Arabic letters spelling out the Islamic profession of faith. Along the way, the crowd's progress was blocked by troops. Trucks and tanks were in evidence. Some people reported that a unit of troops approached the demonstrators from behind, possibly with the intent of arresting them, but thereby blocking their retreat.

According to an eyewitness who was marching close to him, Biki grabbed one of the flags and yelled "Forward!" The crowd began to move again. Perhaps they weren't surprised when tear gas canisters were fired their way – they would have expected that – but then a volley of shots rang out. Biki fell. Two witnesses said that a soldier stabbed him with a bayonet as


he tried to get up.

More and more victims fell. Later they were taken away in troop transport trucks to the Gatot Subroto Army General Hospital. The next day, General Moerdani stated that nine people had been killed and 53 injured, but another eyewitness said that as many as 400 had been killed. Sixteen years after the incident, in its own investigation into the case, Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) concluded that 24 were killed and 55 injured.

This run-in between the demonstrators and the military was not the only cause of death that night. A second group of demonstrators had marched northward. On Jalan Jampea they set fire to Toko Tanjung Jaya, a store where auto parts, fuel, and lubricants were sold. An adjacent pharmacy, Apotik Tanjung, had been spared once it was learned that its ethnic Chinese owner was Muslim. Nonetheless, because the fire at Tanjung Jaya could not be contained, the pharmacy too was engulfed in flames. The following day the remains of eight people were removed from the ruins of the Toko Tanjung Jaya. The family of Tan Kio Liem and their maid had burned to death.



▲ *Emotional mourners in the funeral procession of Amir Biki, 1984.*
 ► *Inspecting microfilm at the Sonobudoyo Museum in Yogyakarta, 2003.*





Like many other stories of unrest in Indonesia, the violence in Tanjung Priok that night had its roots in poverty. The Koja area is inhabited mainly by casual laborers, and many ethnic groups are represented there. Nearly all the district's adult males rely on ship repair work to make a living. They and their families live in ramshackle huts made from scavenged materials in the area's labyrinth of small side streets.

In mid-1984, a global recession that had begun in the industrialized world but soon spread to the developing countries hit Indonesia hard. Foreign investment projects, including factory construction and the like, were either cancelled or postponed. World oil prices fell, causing a major disruption in the flow of national income from oil sales. Domestic investment by the government and state-owned companies – historically a major source of employment – plummeted by 17 per cent. And the difficulties did not end there. Due to a drop in government subsidies caused by growth in the nation's budgetary deficit, the

price of basic foodstuffs rose.

The flow of casual employment for Koja residents became even more insecure, further exacerbating economic inequities. The business group owned by ethnic Chinese businessman Liem Sioe Liong, whose close connection with President Suharto had given him control over a large number of trade monopolies, suddenly experienced spectacular growth. Liem's conglomerate had even begun buying companies and banks abroad.

As had happened before in Indonesia, these apparent inequities exacerbated anti-Chinese racism among the lower classes. Liem became a symbol of "Chinese-ness" and, therefore, an emblem of the New Order's injustice. Such inequity, set in a social context where freedom of choice and expression are stifled, provided the spark that ignited violence in the economically-pressed and politically-marginalized Muslim community that night.



▲ *A beggar outside a Chinese temple in Pontianak, 2003. The existence of an ethnic Chinese lower class in Indonesia is often overlooked.*

ERNA WITOELAR

Erna Witoelar is a well-known pioneer activist with NGOs. She began her career in the Indonesian Consumers Association (Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia – YLKI), before assisting in the establishment of the Indonesian Environmental Forum (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup – WALHI). Throughout her career she has been involved in activism and grass roots politics. When Abdurrahman Wahid became president in 1999, Ibu Erna entered the cabinet and became a trusted advisor. When he was forced from office in 2001, she resigned immediately in solidarity. Today she chairs several civil society organizations and, as this book went to press, was appointed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as ambassador to promote the Millennium Development Goals.

In the 1980s in Indonesia, what might be termed “advocacy NGOs” began to emerge, joining the existing community development NGOs. I worked at YLKI from 1978. YLKI’s secretary, Permadi Satrio Wiwoho, and I handled education and surveys. I also held the position of executive director.

At first, YLKI was involved in community development. In 1978, YLKI conducted consumer education programs. We saw a need for this, given the weak position of the consumer protection movement even in the cities, let alone in rural communities. We conducted consumer education programs in cooperation with *pesantren* [Islamic boarding schools]. We tried to raise awareness of consumer rights, dealing in particular with pesticides and their effects, irresponsible trade practices, and so on. The funding for this program came from the Foundation. We established the program in Jombang, in Tebuireng, and in Guluk-Guluk, Madura.

I left YLKI because of differences with Permadi. This is normal, and it didn’t prevent Permadi from accepting me back in 1986 to replace him as head of YLKI. In 1989 I left again and was replaced by Zoemrotin.

As a representative of YLKI, I was involved in the establishment of WALHI. Then, during 1980-1986, I was actually based at WALHI. Ford Foundation not only supported that program, but they also provided institutional support, helping us to reach our goals without interfering.

In 1986, when I went back to YLKI, the most vulnerable consumers are women and

children. At the same time, women as consumers affect the well-being not just of themselves, but of their families. Their reproductive rights are threatened by pollutants on the



Erna Witoelar visiting a landfill clean-up project in Jakarta, 1992.

streets and in cigarette smoke. We opposed the excessive promotion of powdered baby milk, particularly through advertising in hospitals and doctors’ surgeries. When I was the chairperson, other major issues involved the contamination of food with pork fat and other substances.

The Foundation encouraged WALHI to begin its biogas campaign, which, like pesticides, involved both environmental and consumer protection issues. Bianti Djiwandono managed the Foundation’s grants to WALHI. We had a very close relationship with Bianti.

USAID also played a significant role from the beginning. The Foundation did not really support advocacy; it was more oriented towards community development and training. USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Asia Foundation were all more supportive of advocacy. The Foundation is subtler, and its institutional support is stronger.

I’ve learned how to establish networks from the examples set by world-class consumers’ organizations such as Consumers International, Pesticide Action Network, and World Alliance for Breast Feeding Action. We need to establish alliances. Those are the perspectives I brought to WALHI.

By the 1990s, those involved in advocacy were increasingly intolerant of the Suharto regime. NGOs began to oppose the government more and more openly. It was similar to the situation in the Philippines before the fall of Marcos in 1986. Every NGO, whatever their cause and purpose, was fed up with Suharto. NGOs held demonstrations, assisted the student movement, got involved in court cases, and used any available means to oppose the government. WALHI was also directly involved in the campaigns that led to the fall of Suharto.

The tale of violence in Tanjung Priok may be seen as a chapter in the story of Indonesian Islamic politics. President Suharto had always viewed Islam with suspicion – at least until the 1980s. Some believe this was because he himself was more attracted to Javanese mysticism, or *kebatinan*. Born and raised in rural Central Java, Suharto felt much more at home with local traditions than with Islam, a “foreign” religion. One of Suharto’s confidants, the late General Sudjono Humardhani, who was close to Suharto even before the latter’s rise to power in 1966, was also known to be a strong follower of *kebatinan*.

Others claimed that Suharto’s experience at the beginning of his military career in dealing with the religious separatist movement Darul Islam and its armed wing, the Indonesian Islamic Army (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*), had made him wary of Islam as a political force. Since the 1940s, when Darul Islam was first established in West Java for the purpose of building a

nation based on Islam, the general view among the Indonesian military and among its officers, in particular, was that anyone associated with it was a traitor. For the military, any group proposing to make Islam the basis for the state – even by constitutional means – was its enemy.

For whatever reason, the Suharto of the 1980s was no longer the Suharto who spoke only about economic development. It was the Suharto who spoke continually of the need for propagating Pancasila as the basis of national life. In a speech he delivered in August 1982 in Pekanbaru, Sumatra, he proposed that all social and political organizations, especially political parties, should accept Pancasila as their sole guiding principle. When Parliament convened in April 1983, he again expounded on this point. Pancasila, he said, was the only way to eradicate the remnants of conflict, division, and suspicion. Pancasila was the path of unity.



▲ President Suharto and Vice President Adam Malik announcing the third Development Cabinet at the Presidential Palace, 1978.

CHARLES SURYADI

A meeting between Charles Suryadi, his colleagues and a Foundation program officer resulted in the establishment of a national epidemiology network that allows public health research institutions to achieve higher levels of cooperation. Jaringan Epidemiologi Nasional (JEN) involves 24 organizations engaged in addressing public health issues using approaches influenced by epidemiology, the social sciences, and health management sciences. A researcher with extensive experience in community health organizations, Charles Suryadi is convinced that a strong impulse towards mutual aid exists within Indonesian society. However, all too often, he says, when government becomes involved in a community health program, problems will develop.

The Foundation assisted JEN by strengthening our institutional capacities and encouraging us in the direction of social epidemiology. Epidemiology in Indonesia is usually regarded as the study of the clinical factors behind the distribution of disease, and most research has been conducted by the medical establishment in hospitals. Through the establishment of JEN, an approach to epidemiology that is more influenced by public health considerations has been introduced.

JEN's activities include capacity building, training, and the development of external networks, and once a year we hold our congress. Because we operate as a network linking existing organizations, we are able to coordinate comprehensive research. For example, in order to conduct comprehensive research into AIDS, we adopted not only a medical approach, but also a social approach. A range of organizations was involved in 33 defined research zones across Indonesia. Because of our structure, we were able to do research in an integrated fashion, involving all segments of society throughout all regions of Indonesia. This was the first significant research carried out on AIDS in this country.

The study of public health must be maintained and developed within medical faculties, in order to ensure that doctors remain fully aware of these issues. At present there is a tendency to eliminate public health components from the study of medicine. This could have dire consequences. In medical faculties, the issue of preventative medicine in general is given far too little attention. Under the influence of the pharmaceutical industry, medicine here is heavily biased toward the curative

approach, not the preventative one. However, the scope of public health extends beyond preventative medicine. It must also deal with cultural, social, and anthropological issues. In a developing country, a deep understanding of these



Charles Suryadi in Jakarta, 2003.

issues and the impact they have on public health is vital.

In the past, we operated through meetings with community organizations, through informal gatherings. We saw our role not merely as providing information. We aimed to strengthen community capacities and facilitate the establishment of effective organizations, in order that communities be better able to identify significant issues and create their own programs to address them. As doctors, we merely played a facilitating role. We

adopted strategies from those found to be effective in a range of community development programs.

A concrete example involves the establishment of a community health insurance fund for economically disadvantaged people. We have also facilitated the establishment of healthcare programs for young children. These programs have been developed on the principle of community involvement and self-help, with some mothers volunteering to supervise playgroups of between 20 and 30 children. All funding for these activities comes from the communities themselves. As outsiders, all we do is play a role as facilitators.

We have many examples of successful community programs conducted within small groups, involving units below the sub-district level. At the level of small, residential groupings, the level of mutual aid and cooperation in Indonesia can be outstanding. It is a very different matter when an initiative involves a large city in its entirety. This may be because activities involving small residential groupings are not marred by excessive government interference. When larger numbers of people are involved in units above the district level, the involvement of government officials becomes inevitable. This often has a detrimental effect, because government is not prepared or able to implement the programs that the community needs. The ability of the community to organize itself is influenced by our political culture: are power holders prepared to develop forums that might monitor, even criticize, their performance? Or will they perceive this as a threat to their own power?



▲ A mother and child with oral rehydration salts. Ford supported the Diarrheal Disease Research and Training Unit of the University of Sriwijaja in Palembang, South Sumatra for development of a field station, technical consultants, equipment, and staff training.

NINUK WIDYANTORO

Ten years after the Subarto government first instituted its family planning program, Ninuk Widyantoro and several doctors established a small family planning clinic called Wisma Panca Warga. This clinic worked to achieve what the government programs did not: staff listened to clients, provided information, and allowed clients to choose for themselves. Ibu Ninuk believes that the right to choose whether or not to employ contraception and which form to use is fundamental. She says that this should be the right of all women, not merely the rich and well-educated.

In the fifties, President Sukarno was strongly opposed to the family planning movement, and infant mortality rate reached an appalling 800 per 100 thousand births. A group of dedicated doctors, including Ibu Soebandrio and Prof. Hanifah, continued to work to address this problem. I remember women of my mother's generation volunteering to provide information and to distribute the pill.

After Soeharto came to power, the government took complete control of family planning, establishing BKKBN to do so. After its in 1970, all funding for family planning initiatives was channeled through this body, not PKBI. Family planning officials implemented the program in the field. The influence of the original volunteers faded, and programs were run to achieve a set target, defined by the number of "acceptors," of the number of men and women using contraception. I don't like the term "acceptor." It reduces people to objects. At Wisma Panca Warga, we use the word "client."

In fact, BKKBN programs achieved significant changes. The number of births declined dramatically, and public values began to change. Lots of children were no longer seen as a "blessing." Rather, limiting the number was seen as promoting family welfare.

However, set targets made the quality of family planning services decline. The provision of accurate information and women's right to choose became secondary considerations. Sometimes, the programs

used force to achieve its goals. As a result, there were a lot of failures, a lot of unwanted pregnancies. At about that time, in 1980, I became involved in an Integrated Family Planning program as a counselor.

At government hospitals and clinics, failures occurred because of simple



Ninuk Widyantoro at the Panca Warga Clinic in Jakarta promoting women's right to choose, 1984.

misunderstandings. Clients were not provided with full and clear information, nor with the freedom to choose the appropriate form of contraception. For example, I'd ask women how they came to be pregnant, even though they said they had been taking the pill. And the woman would say, yes, she had, but she didn't bother taking them when her husband was away! Another one said she only took the pill on days when she had sex.

Some clients complained of health problems as a result of contraceptive pills or injections. They complained of dizziness, nausea, weight gain, and decline in libido. On the whole, officials didn't listen. In particular,

implants caused a lot of suffering due to a lack of information and a lack of recognition of the side effects, which include increased sporadic bleeding. The doctors say that this is not medically significant, but it has a serious psychological impact. Women in the rural areas felt unable to have sex or even pray when they are in a state of "impurity." I wrote about this in the magazine *Reproductive Health Matters*, saying that the implant program involved violations of human rights.

As a psychologist, I was taught to respect clients as individuals. I thought that family planning programs should be orientated towards meeting the needs of the clients. I always let the client choose a form of contraception that they personally considered safe. If it didn't work out for her, I helped her choose another form of contraception.

In the case of unwanted pregnancies, Family Planning Centers (*Wisma KB Terpadu PKBI*) helped to facilitate abortion. Many officials, including Haryono Suyono, the coordinator of the Family Planning Program, knew what we were doing and tacitly supported us.

Programs to empower clients were held not just at Family Planning Centers, which served paying clients, but also in villages. Lombok was chosen for a pilot study. There, we found that even illiterate women were capable of making informed choices, if they were provided with clear information. The right to choose is not the monopoly of the rich and the educated.

Suharto's intention behind this drive was not entirely clear. Was it his goal to eradicate differences altogether? Numerous organizations rejected the idea outright. In an extraordinary show of unity, the Council of Islamic Scholars along with representatives of the Catholic and Protestant churches, and of the Hindu and Buddhist faiths, issued a joint statement saying that while they did not reject the idea of Pancasila as a national ideology, it was clearly out of the question to alter the religious basis of their organizations.

In July 1983, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a prominent Islamic political figure, wrote a letter to Suharto, the contents of which were leaked to the public through the political grapevine. Sjafruddin stated his worry that the government might prohibit the Muslim community from establishing its own Islamic associations. According to Sjafruddin, this was akin to "attempting to kill Islam" with Pancasila. Pancasila, in his view, was a human creation and could be interpreted and implemented according to the ideas and wishes of those in power, including those who controlled the armed forces.

Sjafruddin reflected the mindset of the Islamic community, which had felt itself cornered ever since President Sukarno dissolved the Islamic political party Masyumi in 1960. Since then, a stigma had been attached to nearly anyone who was considered to be sympathetic with that party. In Parliament's attempt to formulate a constitution after the general elections in 1955, Masyumi had championed Islam as the basis for the Republic of Indonesia. Masyumi had thus come to be equated with an "Islamic State" and, therefore, was equated with the Darul Islam separatist movement and its Indonesian Islamic Army. Just as had happened with PSI, Masyumi was seen by both the PKI and the military as an enemy, which was why, after Suharto came to power, Masyumi supporters continued to be prevented from reviving the party in any form.

During the 1980s, certain Islamic political activists quietly sustained the hope of creating an Islamic state. This aspiration, however, occupied no place in the minds of the political generation that had matured since the 1960s.



▲ *Indonesian army troops capturing suspected Darul Islam members in West Java, 1951.*

ZOHRA ANDI BASO

Zobra Andi Baso doesn't make it to Jakarta all that often these days. "I spend more time in the villages, talking to ordinary people," she says. These visits have made her aware of two issues. They have revealed the ineffectiveness of government programs, most of which, she says, assume a lack of capability on the part of the community. And more importantly, Zobra has become aware of just how fast members of local communities can learn to overcome any lack of capabilities. At 51, Zobra, who comes from Makassar, has a wealth of experience and is widely known in the activist community. According to Zobra, this is a cause for sorrow, because it demonstrates just how few activists are emerging to replace the older generation.

I first became involved in gender and reproduction issues through the South Sulawesi Consumer Protection Foundation. I took part in a workshop on women's health funded by Ford. After that, I thought about conducting research into issues related to the levels of service provided to and the rights of users of contraception. I feel that when addressing consumers' rights, it is important to base your position on facts established through research. We need to understand what the real problems are, not just what we think they are. We have to dig to understand what the community sees as problems.

From our research, we learned that the biggest problem is that family planning services pay little attention to the needs of the community. Second, we found that there were still top-down army-sponsored family planning programs. These should have been reduced. Finally, we found that service providers had no conception of the rights of their clients. There might have been some awareness of these issues at the national level, but very little among clients themselves or among those directly involved in providing services to them. We also found that local communities had developed their own methods for avoiding unwanted pregnancies.

A lot of people missed the close connection between consumer rights and family planning. I'm asked about that a lot. We have seen the problems with the delivery of reproductive health services. Even in the cities, a lot of people still feel that doctors are always right. We try to show them that they have the right to say

no. They have the right to protest if, for example, a doctor tries to reuse a syringe. The problem is to create an awareness of their rights.

The problem is even more acute with other reproductive rights. As part of an HIV/AIDS awareness program, we invited



Zobra Andi Baso, a promoter of reproductive rights, Makassar, 1995.

members of *Dharma Wanita* [Association of Civil Servants' Wives] to participate in a discussion. We assumed that as middle class people, these women would be more open to a discussion of sensitive issues, and that they would be in a position to spread their new perspectives among members of the broader community. When we discussed the rights of women to reject their husbands' sexual overtures, or to question their husbands regarding their sexual practices and hygiene, many of these women were

horrified, and said that that would be a sin. In South Sulawesi, there is a strong gender bias inherent in religious interpretation. These women must learn to be assertive and ask questions if they are to avoid the dangers of AIDS.

Recently the governor of South Sulawesi made belittling comments about women, referring to their having been produced from Adam's rib. This was barely days after the Canadian government had provided funding for training in women's issues for members of the government. Now, a lot of officials take part in gender issues programs, but I worry that these are only popular because they are required in order to gain promotion. People do the courses to gain points, but their attitudes are not really affected.

We still have a long way to go. We have to be patient. For socialists, there is no surrender. I want to see things happen faster. It seems like when we try to be tactful and polite, we don't achieve anything. I'm getting old, and I'm losing my patience. People say that as you get older you become more patient, but that's not true for me. I'm scared I'll die before I see any significant move to democracy.

Women's groups still don't seem to be able to form strong networks. Personal problems and misunderstandings often arise, and we haven't learned to separate personal issues from political ones. And again there is the problem of the lack of human resources. We have been unable to develop a group of potential leaders. Also, women's groups are reluctant to get involved in politics. This is unfortunate, as we need women in the political arena if we are to achieve gender justice.

Furthermore, once the assorted Islamic political parties had been forced by the government to merge into one, the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* – PPP) – the name of which did not even include a reference to Islam – the issue of a guiding principle for the state seemed to have no relevance.

In 1982, Nurcholish Madjid and Amien Rais, two young and prominent Muslim intellectuals, openly rejected Islam as a legitimate basis for the state. “Nowhere is it stated that the religion demands the establishment of an Islamic state,” wrote Amien Rais in *Panji Masyarakat*, a magazine published by the Islamic organization Muhammadiyah. “Indonesian Muslims will be satisfied if the esteemed Pancasila is applied in a truly consistent manner.”

But in the 1980s, when the country’s intellectual life seemed frozen, the issue of ideology began to regain importance. Since 1966, Indonesia had been preoccupied with economic growth, but 15 years later the issue of Pancasila versus Islam had become heated. And with it, violence was brewing.

Tanjung Priok was not the first example of religious-related violence during the 1980s. On 28 March 1981, a Garuda Indonesia Airlines passenger plane, the Woyla, was hijacked en route from Jakarta to its destination in Medan, North Sumatra, and its 42 passengers held hostage. After the hijackers forced the pilot to fly out of Indonesian air space, the media reported that it was headed toward Sri Lanka and then on to the Middle East. But when the plane landed instead at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok, an Indonesian anti-terrorist unit stormed it and freed the hostages. In the melee, four hijackers, the plane’s pilot, and one member of the anti-terrorist unit were killed.

The person judged to be the brains behind the hijacking was a man named Imron, a cherubic 33-year-old preacher at the Istiqamah Mosque in Bandung. He, it was said, had founded the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council (*Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia*), the aim of which was to “implement Islamic *syariat* law in its purest sense.”



▲ *The hijacked Woyla at Don Muang International Airport, Bangkok, 1981.*
 ► *Balinese women on their way to a subak temple, 1985.*

NYOMAN SUTAWAN

Nyoman Sutawan is perhaps best known as a former rector of Udayana University in Bali. Sutawan has also made a significant contribution through his research into the traditional Balinese system of irrigation, which is managed through an institution known as the subak. He claims that if the subak system disappears, Balinese society will lose its integrity. The subak system can be examined from technological, social, cultural, and environmental aspects. In addition to his position at Udayana, Sutawan has served as rector of Marwadewa University in Denpasar.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the *subak* system operated on the principle that water was a shared resource. Irrigation facilities were managed through a system of mutual cooperation, without interference from the princely houses. Working together, farmers built dams and dug channels for the distribution of water. In the 1920s, the Dutch colonial government extended its influence into Bali. At this point, they became involved in the improvement and maintenance of irrigation systems. Almost exclusively, they addressed the physical aspects of these systems, without any regard for the other aspects.

The most negative impact on the system, however, came in the 1970s when the New Order government, with assistance from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, introduced the Bali Irrigation Project. This began at a time when the central government coffers were overflowing with oil revenues, and Jakarta was instituting a range of agricultural development projects in the regions, including in Bali. This caused a dramatic change in the system of irrigation in Bali. Different *subak* were amalgamated. Distribution channels were made to conform to the requirement of the government's plan. At no point was any attempt made to involve local people in the process,

While they were able to amalgamate the *subak* at the physical level, it was more difficult to amalgamate at the social level. The result was an uneven distribution of water resources. Often, only upstream areas gained access to the required amount of water, although the stated aim of the program was to distribute water both upstream and downstream. At the social

level, the project failed. In the 1980s, floods occurred frequently as a result of badly planned irrigation.

Farmers complained that the system was inappropriate, and that many projects had to be dismantled. Now, farmers are working to resuscitate the *subak* system. In Bali, there are thousands of *subak*



Nyoman Sutawan with a farmer in Bali, 2003.

organizations. These are slowly coming back to life. Most are small organizations, involving a small geographical area.

The defining characteristic of the *subak* is harmony. Mutual agreements govern planting cycles, the division of water resources, the financial contribution of members, and the rights and responsibilities of members. The underlying philosophy is defined by the Hindu concept *tri hita karana*, or "three elements of happiness." First, people must be in harmony with their neighbors, with fellow human beings. Second, humanity must be in harmony with the environment. Third, humanity must be in harmony with God.

The *subak* system is entirely different from the *banjar* system. The *banjar* is an administrative division, created for the organization of a community. The boundaries of each *subak* are defined according to hydrological needs. Thus, a *subak* can overlap *banjar* boundaries.

I conducted research on the *subak* under the sponsorship of the Foundation between 1983 and 1999. Ford also funded similar research at other universities throughout Indonesia, including those in South Sumatra and West Sumatra.

Prior to the 1980s, Bali's rice fields covered 125,000 hectares. This has been reduced to 85,000 hectares due to development in the Denpasar region. Development for the tourism industry has also played a major role in this reduction. The Balinese government has made some token efforts to discourage the reassignment of farming land for other purposes, but these efforts have not had a meaningful effect.

Currently, a much discussed issue is that of the privatization of state enterprises, including those involved in the production and distribution of drinking water. In Jakarta, PAM Jaya has been sold to Suez of Paris and Thames Water of London. Under the Indonesian constitution, control of water resources is a government prerogative. Privatization of these resources rests on the assumption that water resources are economic goods. In fact, the *subak* system shows that water resources are more efficiently managed as social goods, or community resources. I feel that the privatization of these resources requires extremely careful consideration before implementation.





One of the more extraordinary aspects of this incident was the manner in which the group had procured its weapons. As was later revealed, several days prior to the hijacking members of the group had attacked a police station in Bandung and confiscated the weapons they found there. Three policemen were killed.

One theory about this incident was that a person in Imron's group, one of the hijackers, had actually been working for the military and had tricked the young radicals into taking such a serious risk, thereby exposing themselves and making it easier for them to be caught. While this theory was never proved, the Woyla hijacking does reflect the intense behind-the-scenes conflict between the proponents of Islam and Pancasila.

Though only one of many incidents, the Woyla hijacking may have given President Suharto a pretext to revive his ideological chess game. Perhaps, however, he perceived a different threat.

In February 1980, a group of 26 prominent individuals

– retired military officers, elder statesmen, and intellectuals – submitted a petition to Parliament calling for a change in Indonesia's political institutions, particularly in Parliament itself which, in their view, had failed as a representative body. The only way to form a valid government, one that was acceptable to the majority of Indonesian citizens, they argued, was to hold completely free and honest elections.

This Petition of Twenty-Six, as it came to be called, was a clear critique of the Suharto government's method of controlling Parliament. The institution, long a target of public humor, was seen as an extension of the military and of Golkar, the so-called "[Government] Workers Group" that avoided calling itself a party but was in fact the state's primary mechanism for obtaining votes. The alliance between these two groups made for unfair and dishonest elections because Golkar and the government's other powerful supporters, with the help of the military, could easily intimidate voters.



▲ *President Suharto swears in new election officials in the presence of cabinet members, 1980.*

SANDRA MONIAGA

Sandra Moniaga feels fortunate to have been provided with extensive educational opportunities by the Ford Foundation. She states that the Foundation has empowered her to face challenges and to move forward, and provided the opportunity for continuous, life-long study – a great gift to those suited to this path. And yet, she recognizes this leads to a dilemma: when asked to list the major problems affecting her struggle to defend the rights of local communities, she cites excessive dependence on donor agencies. At present, the organization with which she is most closely associated is the Association for Community and Ecology-Based Legal Reform, or HuMa, funded by the Foundation. She said that this organization has a long way to go to achieve its goals, particularly in the more isolated regions of Indonesia.

When I began to work at WAHLI in 1988, I was asked to monitor the development of a new program that addressed both legal and environmental issues. Out of this program grew an increased awareness of the relationship between the human rights and environmental movements. This awareness was encouraged by the fact that Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, who then served as the executive director of YLBHI, and was chairperson of WALHI at the time.

After several years, I became convinced that problems were systemic. A fundamental issue was at stake: most legislation is enacted without any reference to the community it affects. Communities acknowledge their own local legal system, based on *adat*, or tradition. Villagers will have total faith in their claim to traditional lands – because *adat* law guarantees that right. So there is a division between legislation enacted by the government, usually without any reference to the community, and the *adat* law recognized by members of the community itself.

We have to do something to change the legal system. Society must be educated to realize that the law should not just support existing norms. People must understand the political realities that affect the enactment of legislation and the philosophical basis for any particular law. The distinction between traditional law and state-enacted laws must be understood. When I first started working with members of rural communities, I often heard people comment that the laws were well formulated, but they were enforced badly. This viewpoint however was based on a low level of understanding of what the laws actually were. When I went through these laws with members of communities, clause by clause,

the villagers found much that was unacceptable. For example, under a certain piece of legislation, traditional lands in a particular area had been reclassified as state forest, which had a number of practical implications for members of the community.



Sandra Moniaga holding one of her organization's publications on traditional law, 2003

So, villagers became increasingly aware of the affect of legislation and of the manner in which it is formulated. We need to work to achieve a simple understanding of the legal system throughout the community.

HuMa works to facilitate the development of a new legal paradigm, not just among the members of HuMa itself, but throughout a broader network of legal organizations. HuMa tries to spread its conception as widely

as possible. The view that the law is inherently biased against ordinary people and that it fails to respect the environment and human rights is the result of the old legal paradigm promoted by major power holders in this country.

We have tried to promote a legal system that is more responsive and more accommodating to social diversity. We promote values based on a vision of a pluralistic society. We also promote the values of conservation and democratization as integral parts of this vision.

The issue of dependence on donor agencies is extremely important. I feel that too often NGOs fail to establish links among communities facing similar issues across Indonesia. This limits us. In fact, it is only a small group of people who adopt a broader perspective.

There is a failure to involve broader segments of society. For example, outside their own community, few are aware of the issues facing the Dayak in Kalimantan, even though other communities throughout Indonesia may face similar issues. This narrowness is our major weakness, and overcoming it is our biggest challenge. Our programs should be funded by members of the broader Indonesian community.

This will only become possible by fostering a sense of ownership over and involvement in issues that ultimately affect us all. We should also involve the business sector by creating a membership-based organization supported by contributions from members who believe in HuMa's programs but who would be unable to implement similar programs by themselves. Fostering greater involvement is the only way to achieve a more equitable legal system.

Rigged elections might have produced the results the government wanted but they did not guarantee peace of mind; at least not for Suharto who, having been in power since 1966, seemed to view his position as increasingly shaky. After having navigated the hazards of previous threats and demands – fomented primarily by student groups in 1978 – the president apparently began to sense that he was in danger of being supplanted. By mid-1979 more and more public figures were voicing the need for Indonesia to prepare for a presidential succession.

In late 1979, Suharto tipped his hand when he submitted to Parliament a proposed amendment to the nation's election laws. The extraordinary aspect of this amendment was the large number of seats that were to be reserved for government appointees. When added to the number already set aside for the military – one third of all the seats in Parliament – the number of non-elected seats was nearly equal to the number chosen by voters through their representative political parties.

This was the focus of criticism leveled by the signatories of the Petition of Twenty-Six. Their combined voices held little sway. Yet when Suharto submitted his amendment to Parliament the response was not as acquiescent as he might have hoped. Fifty members of PPP, all of whom were members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the popular and influential grassroots Islamic

organization, refused to support it – even though they refrained from openly opposing it.

For Suharto, political security was equated with unanimous support and the stance of these NU members disturbed him. This was not the first time that NU had failed to support his plans. In 1978, for instance, the organization had refused to approve a government-sponsored program for the obligatory teaching of Pancasila in schools. NU leaders contended that the program was akin to turning Pancasila into a religion.

Suharto apparently felt it necessary to take a hard line toward this threat – or perceived threat – to his authority as president. At a meeting of military officers in Pekanbaru in March 1980, Suharto spoke extemporaneously after reading the prepared text of his speech. He stressed the need for the military to continue to support Golkar and, in a threatening tone of voice, spoke of the existence of political parties that were guided by principles other than those of Pancasila. He went on to remind the audience that there existed a national consensus that both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, which formed the legal basis for his own leadership, must remain unchanged. Furthermore, to prevent any attempts to amend the constitution, he stated it might be necessary to kidnap certain Members of Parliament.



▲ *A billboard of President Suharto and his wife, Ibu Tien, leading a national fitness initiative.*

LASO' SOMBOLINGGI'

Laso' Sombolinggi' is Executive Director of Wahana Lestari Persada (WALDA), a non-profit organization working for environmental protection and the conservation of forest resources. WALDA is based in Lembang Madandan, a Torajan village near Rantepao, where Sombolinggi' grew up in a farming family. Concerned by the damage to local forests, both as a result of community members gathering wood and officials clearing land for cacao and coffee plantations, he established WALDA in 1986.

In 1986, the central government began to conduct reforestation programs in our area. These were largely unsuccessful due to the inept manner in which they were implemented. In particular, the government established programs without any involvement of or consultation with local people. Locals suspected that these so-called reforestation programs were actually being used to make land available to investors for coffee plantations. The government did not involve local people in these schemes at any stage.

We established WALDA both to facilitate reforestation and to improve the welfare of local people through programs based on agro-forestry. We did not rush in half-cocked. We began with research into the social and ecological aspects of the problems affecting the area. We worked with a research institute from Jakarta which employed the participatory action research method. On the basis of this research we began to implement our program in two villages, Madandan and Nanggala.

Both villages are in the Rantepao district. In 1987, we established an agro-forestry program in Nanggala with the assistance of the Ford Foundation.

We then began a similar program in Madandan with the assistance of the Dutch organization Hivos. Madandan had no forests left in its surrounding areas, while the forest around Nanggala had suffered significant degradation.

In Madandan, we helped farmers plant short-cycle crops such as vegetables, medium-cycle crops such as chocolate and coffee, and long-cycle plants such as trees

for windbreaks and shelter. Also, a land classification program labelled land as "productive" or "forested." All members of the village – some 30 families – were involved in this project.

In Nanggala, we promoted the use of land



Laso' Sombolinggi', 2003

outside the forest zone in order to reduce the pressure on the remaining forest. Members of the community were encouraged to rehabilitate land in this buffer zone, where an integrated farming project was started. Local farmers were urged to plant chocolate, coffee, vegetables, and beans. In 1995, we entered the second stage of the program with the introduction of vanilla as a cash crop. At this point, there were 15 groups of farmers

involved in the agro-forestry project, with each group consisting of 15 to 20 families.

The results were excellent. Madandan is now the richest producer of chocolate and coffee in the whole of Tana Toraja. In an average week, Madandan sends 60 tons of chocolate and coffee to the market. Nanggala is the richest village in Tana Toraja. After the 2002 season, one family yielded profits of one billion rupiah [about \$110,000] from the sale of vanilla. Even the least prosperous farmer in Nanggala yielded profits of 20 million rupiah [about \$2200]. Vanilla provides a new crop every eight months.

The economic crisis had no negative impact on this region. The agro-forestry program resulted in improved conservation of the forests and improved systems of agriculture. The only serious problem affecting the program was the theft of vanilla. The farmers formed a community watch, but it was not easy to prevent theft due to the dispersed nature of the village and the lands surrounding it.

In 1987, when the Ford Foundation began to assist the program in Nanggala, the agro-forestry program involved 900 hectares. This has now been expanded to 5,200 hectares.

The Foundation became involved after a seminar in Makassar conducted by the District Office of the Department of Forestry. Three areas were nominated to take part in a pilot project: Nanggala, Gowa, and Maros. The program was not as successful in Gowa and Maros as in Nanggala however, maybe because the implementation there was poorly managed.

By mid-April that same year, Suharto appeared to adopt a different tack. In an address on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the Army Special Forces Command (*Komando Pasukan Khusus* – Kopassus), he spoke of the accusations frequently made against him and his wife, particularly their alleged acceptance of bribes and commissions. The reason behind these accusations, he argued, was that certain parties were bent on eliminating him. But these parties, he told the soldiers, had apparently forgotten that if such a thing were to happen, the entire Indonesian military would stand as one against anyone who attempted to threaten Pancasila or to promulgate an alternative ideology.

For Suharto, it seemed that he and Pancasila were one and the same. He also saw Indonesia as a nation divided into camps: those who supported him, and those who did not. In May 1980 another petition was announced, this one signed by 50 prominent citizens, nearly twice as many as had signed the previous appeal. This so-called Petition of Fifty was, as the

signatories called it, a “statement of concern” about the nation. Few Indonesians were able to read it, however, because the local press would not publish it. News about the petition emerged only in the foreign media.

The Petition of Fifty was a clear and hard-hitting critique of the president and his policies: Suharto had used Pancasila as a weapon to threaten his political enemies. Further, he also saw himself as the personification of Pancasila to such an extent that even idle rumors about him were considered to be a challenge to the state ideology. Two months after the petition was submitted to Parliament, 19 members – two from the Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* – PDI) and the rest from PPP – sent a letter to the President asking for an official response to the “statement of concern.”

Suharto responded, albeit indirectly, in his 17 August Independence Day speech. While he was clearly trying to avoid provoking a new controversy, he did take steps to stifle the opposition as represented by the Petition of Fifty.



▲ A meeting of the Petition of Fifty signatories with members of the National Forum of Indonesian Youth expressing their dissatisfaction with President Suharto, Jakarta, 1980.

► An emotional counseling session at Rikfa Anissa in Yogyakarta, 2003. This grantee has been assisting victims of domestic abuse for over a decade.

NURSYAHBANI KATJASUNGKANA

Nursyabbani Katjasungkana once attracted notoriety by protesting the case of a woman divorced by her husband on the grounds that she wasn't a virgin at the time of her marriage. Many observers said it was none of Nursyabbani's business, that the matter was a private domestic issue. That argument has never carried much weight with her. Since the Legal Aid Institute Indonesian Women Association for Justice (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan – LBH APIK) opened under her management, it has offered assistance to hundreds of women who have suffered from domestic violence. For her, it is clear that all of these cases have one common cause: the inequalities between men and women in both the domestic and public arenas. Furthermore, she says, these inequalities are often reinforced by an inherently biased legal system.

In 2003, there are more than 15 autonomous branches of APIK in Indonesia, each of which is a fully independent legal entity. Since the establishment of these branches, counselors have handled an extremely large number of cases of domestic violence. Through our experience we have come to understand the weaknesses in the legal system. These weaknesses relate to the nature of existing legislation, to the manner in which the laws are enforced, and to community attitudes. We have staged interventions in all three areas.

These interventions have taken various forms. For example, we have helped formulate legislation regarding domestic violence. We have been involved in creating training courses for members of the police force as well as for judges and prosecutors. We have worked to create “women’s desks” – centers staffed by women who have been trained specifically to deal with victims of domestic abuse and other forms of violence. We have also conducted paralegal training programs for members of the community, working in cooperation with religious councils. These are examples of the interventions we have staged in the area of legislation, law enforcement, and community attitudes.

With the political changes that have occurred since 1998, we have had to adapt our strategies. We cannot keep up a confrontational approach with the government because it simply isn't effective. We have had to change our methods to achieve results.

Sometimes, when it comes to achieving constructive change, NGOs are just as bad as government agencies. For example, in 2000, the Indonesian government asked NGOs to participate in the formulation of a national plan against domestic violence. We



Nursyabbani Katjasungkana speaking in Jakarta, 2002.

all worked together, facilitated by the Canadian International Development Agency, to develop the action plan. But, after it was formulated, nothing happened. The plan remains a piece of paper and nothing more. So, NGOs are often just as bad as the government when it comes to bringing about real change. As soon as a project is considered complete, they don't want any further involvement, even if no real results have been achieved. Really, the action plan


should form the basis for promoting an ongoing program conducted in cooperation with the government. Otherwise, it's just a waste of billions of rupiah spent on foreign and local consultants, all for nothing.

NGOs must consider who it is that they represent in order to achieve legitimacy. At present, many of these organizations claim to represent the interests of the people, but it is not always clear to whom they are responsible. A member of parliament once attacked a coalition of NGOs, saying, “Who do you represent? You accuse us of not representing the community, but at least we went through the electoral process. Who elected you?” In fact, the criticism that NGOs do not have a strong grassroots basis is one that must be answered.

A related issue is dependence on foreign aid. Unfortunately, foreign aid means that NGOs are often more oriented towards pleasing donor agencies than towards meeting the needs of their constituents. This creates difficulties. Actually, I think foreign aid can be useful. Foreign aid demonstrates the world's solidarity with our cause.

However, funding doesn't necessarily have to come from abroad. It should be possible to raise funds from sources within Indonesia. The concept of alms is well-entrenched in Indonesian society. Look at the amount of funds raised by newspapers such as *Republika* and *Kompas* for humanitarian purposes. Individuals and private-sector institutions have demonstrated a willingness to provide funds when they are convinced of the value of an initiative.





The government recognized that the signatories were not just ordinary citizens. They included retired general A. H. Nasution, former governor of Jakarta Ali Sadikin, and two former prime ministers. As their arrest or detention would be sure to cause even greater commotion, another method was employed: silence. The mass media was forbidden to print news about them. Those among the signatories who were businessmen suddenly found that their commercial permits would not be renewed. When one individual submitted a tender for a government project, the proposal was dropped from consideration. Banks denied them credit.

Three years later Suharto launched the offensive that sparked the Tanjung Priok Incident, that is, the requirement that every organization adopt Pancasila as its guiding principle. Pancasila had become a mantra of unity, as if it were a magic formula that would make all conflicts disappear. In this venture Suharto may have wanted to demonstrate that national ideology was at stake, and not his own political future. In a bureaucratic, militaristic regime, however, it is typical for unity and integrity to be the nation's first and last agenda.

Indonesia, however, is not a singular vision. Diversity is part of the national character. But differences are inconvenient for a regime that wants to work efficiently and effectively toward national development, toward "progress." And in this regard, difficulties for the New Order government were not limited to

those having to do with state ideology.

In the government's top-down development approach, diversity at the local level was often considered a hindrance, even in a field such as agriculture. Thus the drive to increase the nation's level of food production favored the adoption of a new, hybrid type of rice throughout the country. The results of what became known as a Green Revolution were impressive:

the nation's rice harvest doubled in size and caloric intake increased by 50 per cent per capita. But there were serious side effects. In an area where the populace depends upon a single strain of its subsistence crop, the risk of severe food shortages because of crop loss due to pestilence increases exponentially.


Concerns about the impact of this unitary development approach on local diversity led a group of scholars to establish the Indonesian Agro-Ecosystem Research Network (*Kelompok Penelitian Agroeko Sistem – KEPAS*) in 1983 with funding from the Foundation. KEPAS documented and analyzed problems relating to the productivity of marginal land



in East Java, South Kalimantan, the eastern part of the Lesser Sunda islands, the north coast of Java, and Papua. According to Flores native Tony Djogo, who worked on the project in the 1980s, the researchers and activists who were involved also had to study local politics, often because the government's centrally based, top-down agricultural policies did not stimulate production on the ground. "The programs did not build on the strengths and knowledge of local communities, there was

▲ A farmer working in a flooded paddy field in Kota Agung, West Java, 1985.

▶ Forest rangers and Ministry of Forestry officials inspect the Gede-Pangrango National Park in West Java, 1985.



▲ A farmer brings produce to market in Sukatani, West Java, 1985.

▼ A Foundation-funded field researcher confers with local agricultural extension workers in West Java, 1984.





TONY DJOGO

Until 1997, Tony Djogo was the director of the State Agricultural College of Kupang (Politeknik Pertanian Negeri Kupang) in East Nusa Tenggara, a position he held for more than 13 years. After working for the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), an international forestry research institute based in Bogor, Djogo now works for Konphalindo (The National Consortium for the Preservation of Forests and Natural Resources in Indonesia) in Jakarta, where he is involved in the conservation of natural resources and community-based development.

I graduated from the Bogor Institute of Agriculture in 1980, and chose to work in my native region, East Nusa Tenggara. I was born in 1957 in Boawae, Flores. In Kupang, I was a teacher at the University of Nusa Cendana from 1982 until 2000.

I became involved in NGOs through World Neighbors [a US-based NGO that works on community development around the world] in 1983. In 1984, I worked with the Ford Foundation to train young researchers. The Foundation made a great contribution by training researchers to present their materials in such a fashion that rural people could use the findings as the basis for community development programs.

In 1990, I helped establish the organization that was to become the Community Development Consortium of Nusa Tenggara. Unfortunately, the approach adopted was not developed throughout East Nusa Tenggara. Colleagues from universities and NGOs became overly specialized and technical in their approach. They lacked the capacity to analyze their findings to present them in a form that would make them useful to government agencies.

Another major challenge was the lack of a clear institutional mechanism to facilitate clear communication between research institutions and the users of their research findings, both government and non-government bodies. As a result, much research served no clear purpose.

On the other hand, many academics were trapped in conventional paradigms of research. They were too abstract and

theoretical, too removed from the realities in the field. In fact, this problem still persists. Academics live in their own world, content to perform research that only their peers will ever look at. This occurs everywhere,



Tony Djogo in the CIFOR nursery in Bogor, 2003.

even in Jakarta, not just in Kupang. Even good research is not utilized optimally, and is often not translated into a development strategy plan.

For me, the ecosystem, the community, the system of agricultural production, government policy, and economics are all

linked, and all affect agricultural production and the conservation of natural resources. All these factors need to be considered for agricultural development. We have to understand the political situation.

I have always tried for a pragmatic approach. I work to translate my research findings, the results of discussions and workshops so that they serve some useful purpose. We used the results of these and of my field experience with an NGO to develop a concept: everything goes back to the community to be implemented by the community. The lack of relevance of much research is an ongoing issue.

Does Indonesia need research? That is difficult to answer. I have frequent contact with colleagues from the research and development section of the Department of Forestry. They are often frustrated because the results of their research are not utilized to form policy.

I have often raised these issues at CIFOR or at meetings with the Department of Forestry. Can the research be socialized? Can we convince the public that the findings are relevant and useful? We can't afford to publish widely, but we have to create a situation in which there is a demand for useful research.

I have given great thought to this issue. Ideally, a member of the private sector, or of a community or government organization, should call me and say: "Please send me a summary of the latest research findings." But how can we create a climate in which that happens? We have to work to achieve that.





no local participation,” he said. Or in the words of Helmi, a researcher at Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra, this was a case of supply-driven development: “The government had the money, its own staff, and implemented its policies without consulting the people.”

The government’s approach proved ineffective precisely because it ignored the conditions specific to the different regions around the country. The problem was exacerbated when, in 1979, the secretary of the interior enacted an ordinance standardizing the form of village government over the entire archipelago “in accordance with the character of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.” Numerous local village systems around the country, each of which had grown out of its unique history and culture, were suddenly forced to assume a common, distinctly Javanese form, with a political district administered by a *lurah*, or village chief, and branches of central government agencies reaching into virtually all aspects of local affairs.

Such standardization made administration of the country more manageable for Jakarta. And it also became far easier for the central government to involve itself in the development – and exploitation – of natural resources, often with disastrous

results. Depletion of rich forest reserves accelerated rapidly in places like West Sumatra for example, where imposition of the new form of village government undermined traditional roles of local residents, including the job of safeguarding the forest that historically had been an integral part of their lives. Even attempts to restore some element of local engagement were ill-conceived. In 1984 the Department of Forestry launched a program to administer vast areas of forest lands that enlisted local communities in the process. Yet their participation was severely circumscribed by state policy and managed according to government-approved systems.

From the very beginning of the New Order, the government embarked on a campaign to unify the disparate voices in Indonesia. It permitted the existence of only one labor organization, the All-Indonesia Workers Union (*Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia* – SPSI). Civil servants were allowed to join only one organization, the Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (*Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia* – Korpri), whose loyalty could only be to Golkar. And there was only one approved organization of journalists, the Indonesian Journalists Union (*Perserikatan Wartawan Indonesia* – PWI).



▲ A Korpri anniversary at Senayan Stadium, Jakarta, 1981.

◀ Grantees’ work on community-based natural resource management has led to enhanced agricultural production, Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, 2003.

HELMI

Helmi teaches at Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra. He believes that local irrigation systems provide a model for the management of resources for the mutual benefit of all stakeholders. He also believes that most local communities are fully capable of managing available resources to meet their own needs. Ironically, what prevents local self-management programs from succeeding is government interference, with the government often setting priorities at odds with the needs of community members. With support from the Foundation, Helmi is working with community irrigation systems to achieve the broader goals of democratization and economic self-empowerment. In his view, the manner in which irrigation systems are managed deeply affects the social and economic lives of communities, so these systems are a good point of departure for making broader changes.

In the past, research has been conducted by institutions working alone, without interaction with other major stakeholders. Only after research has been completed have the results been made available to a wider audience. We adopted [beginning in the 1980s] a more multi-layered, inclusive strategy. Frances Korten, who was at Ford at the time, had extensive experience with similar environments in the Philippines, and we drew on this background to formulate a strategy for constructive research – research that yielded direct benefits.

We sat with bureaucrats from the Department of Public Works to determine what the real problems were and how they should be addressed. We tried to work out what actual developmental issues were and to address these through our research. Thus, research became an integral part of project implementation, rather than just being for its own sake.

Bureaucrats felt involved in the process, and the results were relevant to real problems they were facing. In academic terms, there may have been compromises. Frankly, we did not adopt a purely scientific approach. Our objective was to facilitate change. Thus we had to take the interests of the bureaucracy into account and accommodate these interests in our findings.

Despite these compromises, there is no question that the level of interaction yielded extremely positive results. At each stage, we discussed all issues with Public Works to ensure that our research remained focused. These stages included setting the terms, conducting fieldwork, interpreting results, and formulating policy recommendations. We

worked to achieve consensus among the various stakeholders.

This approach yielded many benefits. One concrete success was the formulation of an official irrigation systems policy, implemented in 1987. The development of this highly successful policy was the result of extensive



Helmi, 2003.

discussions involving all stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, universities, and the bureaucracy.

Based on this project, cooperative models to establish policy and legislation have since been adopted in a range of areas, including forestry, agriculture, and maritime affairs.

The government often assumes a very low level of community capabilities. It assumes that all the resources to develop irrigation systems will come from outside the community, and

that these will have to be provided by the government. Often, this assumption results in the disempowerment of communities and the creation of a vicious circle.

Take, for example, the construction of irrigation systems. In Bali, over hundreds of years, communities have developed traditional systems of irrigation in which the division of water is automated through the use of planks of wood drilled with holes. This is a highly efficient, low-tech system. Once the system is established, the flow of water is almost fully automated. Then, the Public Works Department comes along, with its assumption that the community is backwards and old-fashioned. They implement a system of irrigation that depends on locks and water gates, which must be monitored continuously to prevent mishap. If, as occasionally happens, a mechanical failure occurs, whole fields can be flooded and destroyed.

This kind of development is supply-driven: the government has the funds and the human resources to implement projects, and decides when and where. We are trying to change the paradigm to a system that is a balance between supply-driven and demand-driven. Under the demand-driven paradigm, the government must work with communities to establish what the problems and issues are, what the communities need, and how these needs can be met.

Modernization of irrigation systems is vital, but it must be conducted after full consideration of the context. We do not oppose the involvement of the government, nor do we oppose modernization. It's just important to find the correct balance.

COMIC ENERGY: UMAR KAYAM

In the 1980s Umar Kayam liked to cruise the streets of Yogyakarta in his battered Toyota, eatery-hopping with his artist friends. This man indeed was many things: novelist, columnist, government official, activist, public intellectual, actor, art critic – and gourmand.

Kayam's interest in food is a clue to his appeal. Much of the respect he inspires today isn't just because of his impressive resume or his literary legacy. It is because of the relaxed generosity and down-to-earth leadership that made him a magnet for so many lives. Even while a student "Kayam was behind every art event at UGM," said Koesnadi Hardjosoemantri, a former rector.

How does a man keep himself both together and everywhere?

For a start, Kayam, who died in 2002 at age 69, never took himself seriously. He poked fun at his own flaws, enjoyed being teased, made jokes. A Yogyakarta-based dramatist remembered how he was once "punished" by Kayam for a minor misdemeanor – by having to perform in a play.

Rendra, the prominent theater figure, felt Kayam had "immense talent" as a stage director, but "that it wasn't his destiny." His destiny lay elsewhere.


At one time Kayam wanted to work within the political system.

After he became disillusioned with the totalitarian tendencies of Sukarno's Old Order, he joined behind-the-scenes politicking to pave the way for the New Order. Later, Suharto appointed him director general of Radio, Television, and Film.

Although doubtless an important figure in the government's propaganda machine, Kayam was too independent-minded to serve as a mere tool. For example, he allowed private radio stations to operate, and permitted public TV and radio stations

to advertise, thus reducing their dependence on state funding. He taxed imported movies in order to fund an independent body supporting Indonesian filmmakers. All the while, Kayam wrote, acted, politicked – and ate to his heart's content.

Predictably, the New Order government discarded him before long. Later, when the



Umar Kayam, the first director of the Ujung Pandang Social Sciences Research Training Center, visits South Sulawesi in 1974.

Jakarta Arts Council elected him as chairperson and entrusted him with managing programs at the *Taman Ismail Marzuki* arts center, he produced what critics remember as "the Golden Age of Indonesian performing arts." Kayam seemed less concerned about success and prestige than about the inherent value of his contribution. Perhaps this is why he flew from "nest to nest," restlessly seeking new challenges.

His early New York short stories were written during the spartan years of his

graduate studies at Cornell University. They feel like reminiscences, like reports from a past all of us have had, wherein people share the merest hint of something unfulfilled, maybe even something never begun. The language is free of verbal flourish, the characters shorn of personal history and inner voice. There is no moralizing, no "knowing-ness." The details exist only in our private memories.

His wife remembers him "typing his short stories in front of the open fridge" because they could not afford air conditioning. Kayam spoke of drawing stories from newspapers and gazettes discarded by neighbors. Evidently, the whole story interested him less than the snippets and snatches. By not revealing too much, he encouraged textual interpretation. This low-key 'non-technique' was irrevocably literary in that it conveyed a shimmering suspension of multiple realities.

In his later novelettes, *Sri Sumarah* and *Bawuk*, Kayam allowed context to claim a larger role. The protagonist, in other words, now enters history. But herein may lie a problem, for it meant that Kayam had become less a storyteller than an explainer of things Javanese.

Sri Sumarah's name hints at her character: resilient, submissive, resigned to her fate.

She is a poor villager who accepts the values and customs of the Javanese *priyayi*, the educated, aristocratic elite. Kayam wanted to see how far she would go to reconcile her social destiny with modern realities. Sri Sumarah has indeed lost much, "a husband, a daughter, a son-in-law," and she has fought against much. She is a lonely widow who must care for a grandchild, a masseuse who must fend off poverty and the unwanted advances of men. But still she remains proud and faithful to *priyayi* values.

In *Bawuk*, set during the 1965 upheavals,



Political scientist Mochtar Pabottingi, a Ford grantee, reading a eulogy at a memorial held on the first anniversary of Umar Kayam's death, Yogyakarta, 2003.

Kayam becomes bolder, stretching the same theme to embrace a rebelliousness that is met, predictably, with failure. Nothing this courageous young woman does would not incur the wrath of the Javanese gods. Bawuk abandons her young children, runs off with a communist, and lives her life as a fugitive. She is such an enigma she becomes the novelist's ultimate achievement: an unforgettable heroine.

Kayam's major novel, *Para Priyayi* (The Elite) was written under a Foundation grant, the first ever given to an Indonesian for fiction writing. He created in the end not so much fiction as a fictionalized sociology. Gone was the elusive authorial presence.

Here he was no longer Umar Kayam the note-taker, but instead Umar Kayam the social scientist and historian of the Javanese elite, the *priyayi* of the title.

In telling the story of three generations of the Sastrodarsono family, Kayam took care to give equal voice to his characters. Still, many autobiographical elements remained. We all recognize Sastrodarsono, a teacher serving the colonial government, and his offspring to be *priyayi* types. Disasters such as the Japanese occupation, the Communist uprising in Madiun, and the alleged coup of 1965 strengthened rather than diminished their belief in the aristocratic value system, where deviations

from the norm inevitably meant misfortune.

The success of Kayam's folksy newspaper columns, later collected under the title *Mangan Ora Mangan Kumpul* (Strong Sense of Togetherness), owed much to another side of him, a sprightly comic energy. In a modern rendering of the standard comic scene (*goro-goro*) in Javanese shadow plays, Kayam leavened the problems of class conflict with humor and irony. Though ultimately still serving the highest Javanese values – peace and harmony – he found authenticity in the trivial, in “dailiness,” and invited everyone to share in the fun.

This campaign did not eliminate differences; it bureaucratized them. What differences remained were those that had received official sanction. Political parties were forcibly grouped together until only two remained besides Golkar. Members of the old PNI were compelled to merge with PDI, along with members of Catholic- and Protestant-affiliated political parties. Into PPP were folded former members of NU and Muhammadiyah.

Even religious or spiritual beliefs were subject to government control. Confucianism (known locally as *Kong Hu Cu*), Javanese mysticism (*kebatinan*), and *Aluk to Dolo* of the Torajan peoples in South-Central Sulawesi were either rejected or transformed. Whatever one's belief system, every citizen was obliged to subscribe to an officially approved religion. In the end, traditions that fell far outside the realm of the recognized religions were forced to accommodate themselves. This is why the animist Kodi peoples of West Sumba, for instance, stressed those elements within their belief system that were consistent with Christian practices. The Wana peoples of Central Sulawesi,

whom the government characterized as a marginal minority, constructed a "religion" from their indigenous regulations regarding food, burial, and medicine.

Categories became important, even paramount. While local traditions were "respected" by the authorities, this meant, in fact, that they were to be "developed." But standards for development were determined by the state-appointed official in control of that particular region. So, for example, in 1980 outside the Central Sulawesi city of Palu, the local government compelled a "primitive tribe," the Da'a, to add an unfamiliar element, dancing, to its oral music tradition, the *lalundu dan roya*, thus making it more consistent with the dominant Palu culture.

"Local culture," as described by the government, was given to mean the "apex of that local culture." It was not clear, however, who was in charge of determining what the apex was or upon what standard this determination was based. Often, what was considered "high culture" (in Javanese, *adiluhung*) existed only in myth. And yet, all too often tangible manifestations of what



▲ Musicians from Rote, East Nusa Tenggara, 2003. The instrument, hidden within a lontar-leaf resonator, is a bamboo tube-zither called a sasando.
 ► Dancers in the Belu district, western Timor, 1997. Their songs were recorded for one of the Smithsonian/MSPI CDs (see page 194).

EDI SEDYAWATI

Although the former director-general for culture, Professor Doctor Edi Sedyawati, is a government insider of high standing, she also has an excellent reputation for communicating with the broader community. This is no small skill. Particularly under the New Order regime, Indonesian bureaucrats generally did not place a high priority on developing public relations skills. Her engagement in museum development required a high level of interaction with educators, museum managers, and the public. With the typically refined and charming manner of the senior Javanese functionary, Ibu Edi explains the reasons behind the lack of appreciation for museums in Indonesian society and the efforts she and her office have made to overcome this.

The education program, which is conducted in cooperation with the Ford Foundation, began before I became director-general of culture. Throughout my period in office the program continued, with a number of people receiving training, including a few members of staff who were sponsored to participate in master's programs. These programs were intended to improve the skills and broaden the outlook of current and potential managers of museums. We hope to inculcate an appreciation of professional standards, regarding both the care and maintenance of collections and the duties of museum managers to the public. Hopefully, those undertaking these studies will be inspired to achieve international standards in all Indonesian museums.

Throughout my tenure I strove to foster an increased appreciation for museums among the community. However, in order to achieve that, the first step was to motivate museum managers to improve standards and to become more relevant. With increased competition from a range of other activities available to today's youth, managers must focus on creating displays that are attractive and educational. They must work both to arouse and to satisfy curiosity in order to fulfill the needs for knowledge among members of the community. Efforts to achieve this have perhaps been more successful in some places than in others, but that is only to be expected.

At any museum, programs and activities relate to two different kinds of displays: permanent and special. Special displays are often accompanied by supporting events such as discussions, performances, films and so on. Integrated events and special displays of

this kind have been conducted at a number of venues. For example, the National Museum recently held a display of children's toys, with demonstrations, discussions, and so on. However, we recognize that even with an



Edi Sedyawati in Jakarta, 1986.

increasing number of events such as these, we have a long way to go to overcome community prejudice regarding the value of museums.

An obstacle to achieving this is the common perception that museums are boring and ugly. The study of history is regarded as irrelevant, and the work of those who manage museums is considered of little value. Traditionally, museums have not played a major role in Indonesian society, and have not been seen as a major national resource. The community has a very low level of expectations

regarding the potential of museums to entertain or to educate. We must work to change community perceptions of what a museum is.

In Indonesia, efforts to improve the level of appreciation for museums have included making visits to museums a compulsory part of the school syllabus. The program was implemented in cooperation with the education department and its agencies throughout Indonesia. This program is a step in the right direction, but the quality of these visits needs to be improved.

Often, for example, groups are too large. As a result, individual members of the group are unable to benefit from the services of a guide. There is also the problem of the format of visits and associated tasks. Too often, children are obliged to make a visit and then prepare a report, which may involve little more than merely writing down the information provided on labels on the exhibits. These kinds of visits do not foster a genuine appreciation. In order to achieve this, we need members of museum staff who are genuinely committed to a teaching approach. Also, teachers themselves need to be convinced of the value of these programs.

Some members of museum staff do engage in extensive preparation, visiting schools before students come to the museum, meeting with teachers, and providing background information so that visitors gain the maximum benefit from their excursion. With this kind of preparation, students gain a completely different impression from their trip. Unfortunately, this kind of experience is still the exception rather than the rule.





local people might truly regard as high culture were allowed to decay. When American scholar Nancy Florida microfilmed Javanese manuscripts in the library of the Mangkunegaran palace in Surakarta, Central Java in the 1980s, she was shocked to see the deteriorated state of these treasures. They were torn, moth-eaten, soiled and dusty. Some had not been opened in decades.

Nevertheless, there was a strong movement to “improve,” or else to eliminate altogether, cultural elements that fell outside the domain of “high culture.” Ethnomusicologist Endo Suanda says that during that time “marginal cultures were erased from the map. The focus was always on the strongest or the best.” In discussions of West Sumatra, for instance, the expressive culture of the Mentawai Islands wasn’t even mentioned, having been overshadowed by the dominant Minangkabau culture of the mainland.

Bureaucratization of differences pushed aside the unique

and eliminated it. Cultures that did not fit into a category were seen as peculiar or even invalid, especially if they did not have any political strength to support them. *Wayang potehi*, the Chinese shadow puppet theater of Java, was rarely performed even inside Chinese temples. Followers of Confucianism were required to become Buddhists. Not surprisingly, Indonesians of Chinese ancestry felt alienated. In order to protect themselves, their traditions and their business interests, they were forced to maintain close relationships with government officials – from the sub-district all the way up to the president. Most of the time these relationships involved the payment of unofficial fees.

This situation, in turn, bred resentment against the Chinese minority who were seen to gain special favor over those who could not afford to “buy” justice or favorable treatment for themselves. Thus, in November 1980, anti-Chinese riots spread through a number of cities in Central Java. Over the



▲ Fires in the street during the 1980 anti-Chinese riots in Solo.

ENDO SUANDA

Endo Suanda knows how it feels to be dismissed as a crude, unpolished artist. In his youth he was frequently belittled as a “village dancer” and his performances were attacked for being unsophisticated. Perhaps these criticisms made him more sensitive to issues of cross-cultural judgment. In fact, the manner in which one’s own cultural values affect one’s judgment of other cultures was an integral part of his ethnomusicology course at Wesleyan University. Endo is saddened to admit that, in Indonesia, the view still prevails that some ethnic cultures are more advanced or better than others. As an ethnomusicologist he feels it is his duty to oppose this concept. In cooperation with Ford, he has been involved in a number of programs intended to foster pluralism by increasing awareness of issues related to cultural values.

After studying ethnomusicology at Wesleyan, students began to address the big question: “Are values universal?” Through our discussions, we became aware of the vast differences among cultures. We also came to understand that our own values did not provide us with the tools to understand other cultures.

Until the 1970s there was little awareness of these issues in Indonesia, in the academic world or anywhere else. We were completely under the influence of the development approach. The talk was of how to “raise” Indonesia’s myriad cultures. One sad consequence of this approach is that members of rural communities have become indoctrinated to believe that the cities were the source of all progress, all power, and all good. They are brainwashed into believing that the arts must conform to a standardized format, and that this format is determined by modern, middle class, urban values.

This means that rural art forms are made “more sophisticated” by adding technological gimmicks and increasing the number of performers. The belief that bigger and brighter is better has been so deeply inculcated that members of rural communities have lost touch with their own values. Each year, performing arts competitions are held in rural areas. These competitions clearly reinforce the message that performances should be clean, gleaming and grandiose – in short, modern. But in these areas people cannot afford to present a “modern” performance, and they have become ashamed of staging a more modest performance. In effect, they are becoming disenfranchised.

Of course, I am not promoting a return

to some golden past. Rather, I feel that rural performers must become aware of who and what they are, and for whom they are performing. Through the study of anthropology and ethnomusicology, we become aware that the boundaries between the traditional and the modern are not as clear as they might first seem. The



Endo Suanda, ready to document a performance, Jakarta, 1997.

traditional is not something dead and embalmed. Living traditions are going through a constant process of change – but these changes should be the result of internal evolution, not external pressure.

My focus is on cultural pluralism, particularly on how to understand it through the arts. I think the arts provide the clearest means for gaining an understanding of the differences and similarities among cultures.

We aim to foster an approach to the study of the arts that is based on

appreciation and respect. At present, there is a tendency to eliminate marginal cultures from consideration, because these are not considered worthy of respect. Commonly, each province selects a range of art forms that it presents as representative of that province. These are tweaked and modified so as to become entirely respectable, while other forms are ignored or actively discouraged. There is a process of selection that favors groups and forms that conform to a construct of what modern Indonesia is. For each province, there is one representative form of architecture, another of traditional dress, and so on.

In recent years there has been a search to uncover an “original culture” untainted by external influences. This seems to be an extreme reaction, based on a feeling that traditional cultures have been lost, and that this must be redressed by resurrecting art forms to create a sense of identity for their owners. This has resulted in an exaggerated and unrealistic tendency to seek out and recreate “pure” local traditions. There is a belief that the foreign influences can be scraped off, like barnacles, to reveal a form that represents the true identity of the community in which the corrupted form is performed. This is laughably naïve. The search for pure cultural traditions is a chimera.

We must avoid such extreme positions. Perhaps the problem is that we are not accustomed to dealing with complexity in general; we are trained to look for obvious, clearly defined problems. Areas of ambiguity are ignored, although it is only through coming to terms with ambiguity that a society evolves.



▲ A performer of the Balinese gambuh theater, Peliatan, 1985. Gambuh was the object of one of the Foundation's earliest grants for revitalizing traditional performing arts.
▼ Dancers in a curing ritual of the Benuaq people in East Kalimantan, 1995.



course of several days, almost 250 stores and homes were burned. Twenty-three factories were destroyed. Tragic as such occurrences were, they help to explain the lack of surprise when the Tan Kio Liem family perished in their home at the time of the Tanjung Priok Incident four years later.

The government's bureaucratization of difference contained the seeds of violence. Identity was shaped and welded into a hardened and unyielding collective unit. Regardless of the differences among them, all Muslims were seen as part of a unified Islamic community, just as all Christians were seen as a unified and inseparable group. Even the official notion of "Java"

ignored the plurality within Javanese culture. The language spoken in Tegal is different from that spoken in the court center of Surakarta, yet that fact was not formally recognized. It was as if Java were a unit without tension or class, unlike the aristocracy depicted by Umar Kayam in his novel *Para Priyayi*, struggling to protect itself within a constantly changing society.

"Islam," "Christian," "Javanese" – it didn't matter. In the end, each religious and ethnic group was placed into neatly defined categories. But from the Tanjung Priok Incident, we know that in a pluralist society, there can be no coerced singular identity. Force leads to fracture.



▲ Torajan women in a funeral procession, Tana Toraja, South Sulawesi, 1994.

CHAPTER FIVE:
A JOURNEY, A NATION



A JOURNEY, A NATION

The ceremony lasted only ten minutes. No special decorations adorned the Presidential Palace. There was no receiving line, no national anthem. But in those ten colorless minutes, an important chapter ended. Suharto, the head of state who had held power longer than anyone in Indonesia's modern history, stepped down from office. The atmosphere was like a neighborhood meeting where the ward chairman turns over his position to his replacement.

On 21 May 1998, at 9:05 AM, Suharto spoke into the microphone in his usual monotone voice. His dark, short-sleeved safari suit looked much like the uniform of any other Indonesian official. He announced his resignation. He shook the hand of his successor, B. J. Habibie, then left in his own car with his eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti "Tutut" Rukmana. He never returned.

Thousands of students had occupied the Parliament building and its grounds for more than three days to signify their defiance of Suharto's rule. They cheered for joy. Some jumped into the fountain at the front of the building. Some knelt and touched their foreheads to the ground as if in prayer. The Red-and-White, which had been flying at half-staff, was hoisted and allowed to billow freely. For a moment, Indonesia breathed easy.

It was not a junta with an armed division of soldiers but these protesters, noisy and enthusiastic young people – some acting as if on a picnic, others ready to go into battle – who finally brought Suharto down.

◀ *Students celebrate President Suharto's resignation, Jakarta, May 1998.*



Suharto ruled for such a long time, yet stepped down so quickly – this perhaps was the paradox of his presidency. His administration, which had dominated the country for more than three decades and had overseen an impressive record of economic growth, neglected to establish a power structure with truly sturdy institutions. Over time, the person of the president had increasingly become the center of the Indonesian universe. Likewise, he also became the focal point of the nation's problems when the country was buffeted by the powerful shock of the monetary crisis in 1997.

This shock resulted in more than just a monetary emergency for Indonesia. Its origins can be traced to the rupiah's depreciation, which followed the fall of the Thai baht. The decline was so severe and of such concern that the government immediately asked the World Bank and the IMF for help. For Indonesia to overcome such a dramatic monetary crisis, its citizens would have to trust the country's institutions. Yet they did not.

Earlier in the year, Suharto had been reelected as president by the Parliament for a seventh time, predictably by a

unanimous vote. Public opposition against this quintessentially passive institution, however, was becoming increasingly widespread and open. It was no longer limited to the campuses.

For a time Suharto did not react. Perhaps he was convinced, as in the past, that after his inauguration he could quickly and easily silence the barking of the opposition – even after his appointment of a highly controversial Cabinet. He had named his beloved daughter Tutut as minister for social affairs. The minister of industry and trade was no longer a technocrat, but Mohammad “Bob” Hasan, the “timber king” with whom Suharto played golf three times a week.

It was Bob Hasan who carried out Suharto's wish to take control of a number of banks and who ran the various enterprises the president had established. By the 1990s Hasan held exploitation permits for vast tracts of forested land and headed a number of business associations linked to the timber processing industry. In a country where industry operated under government control, Hasan exercised near complete authority over the market, having been giving the right to set export volumes and thereby influence prices.



▲ Restocking reserves after a run on one of the country's ailing banks, Jakarta, 1999. Mass withdrawals were a common occurrence during the monetary crisis as confidence in both public and private institutions crumbled.

► Illegally-cut logs floating on the Kapuas river outside of Pontianak, 2003. Rampant deforestation is a crucial challenge for many Foundation grantees working in natural resource management.



TABOOS OVERTURNED: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

The first half of the 1990s, everyone agrees, was the period of Indonesia's "reawakening." The New Order government had breached its social contract, and oppressed groups stood up and defied the authorities.

The June 1994 banning of three respected news publications, among them the legendary *Tempo*, *Editor*, and *DeTik*, triggered acts of public insubordination in support of freedom of expression and association. Suppressed groups began to institutionalize their non-compliance with the established order by creating an alternative "social space." Labor organizations, women's NGOs, and student alliances all broke from their state-sanctioned formats. A burgeoning sub-culture of resistance produced satire, graffiti, "happening" art, sexual innuendo, and other forms of anarchic popular culture. The government responded with clamp-downs, bannings, detentions, and even extrajudicial killings. These were regarded as the desperate retaliatory acts of a delegitimized state.

The quest for freedom, democracy, and human rights continued while more taboos were overturned. Sparked by the unprecedented success of the 1989 Kedung Ombo demonstrations against land appropriations for public works, grass-roots protests gained wide currency. Controversial topics such as a government-sponsored lottery, the amendment of the General Elections Law, justice for political prisoners, the role of the military in parliament, as well as human rights abuses in the archipelago, found heightened public expression.

The cancellation of the printing and publishing licenses of the three publications – allegedly for "sowing discord" and threatening national stability – was a unilateral decision. "It looks as if press freedom in Indonesia is still a matter of personal whim," said Sidney Jones, then director of Human Rights Watch/Asia. The muzzling of the publications also triggered a shift in relations between the state and civil society, judging by the unprecedented scale

and swiftness of nation-wide protests. Furthermore, while the 1990s had seen a rise in middle class dissent, never had a single cause united so many disparate groups. And the bannings sent journalists to the streets and further fuelled the courageous movement that was to reverberate beyond economic, cultural, even national borders.

Important events followed. In August 1994, 85 journalists from various media signed a joint declaration honoring freedom of expression, and created the Alliance of Independent Journalists (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* – AJI). "It was an extraordinary



A defiant Goenawan Mohamad in front of the Supreme Court, Jakarta, 1996.

time," said Santoso, co-founder and first Chairperson of AJI. "There was so much energy and spontaneity, and we worked practically around the clock." AJI's first eight months were indeed productive – public discussions, seminars, and media training sessions proliferated.

Many of its members faced government harassment. This culminated in March 1995 when three editors of *Independen*, a popular alternative magazine, were arrested on charges of publishing without a licence. The magazine was banned and its editors jailed for two to three years – without trial. By this time, AJI's tribulations had caught the attention of the international media and human rights organizations. This led to an increased

exchange of information between local and international media, and gave added legitimacy to efforts toward democratization in Indonesia.

AJI did survive, and now in the new millennium must consider its next tasks. According to Santoso, "The struggle now is to fight for journalists' welfare through labor unions, and to continuously elevate the standards of journalism in Indonesia."

The Foundation seems to share this view. Over the years, it has supported the training of journalists in different ways, for example, by underwriting Nieman Fellows and by giving grants for media resource and training centers like the Yogyakarta Institute of Research, Education, and Publications (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerbitan Yogyakarta* – LP3Y). Another area of focus has been enhancing journalists' skills in analyzing and presenting information on matters of public policy, like HIV/AIDS or "sensitive" political events. For example, funds were provided for journalists from East Timor to travel and study how other countries solved problems related to issues of autonomy and independence.

The Foundation also assisted the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (*Institut Studi Arus Informasi* – ISAI), which in 1997 compiled a series of investigative reports on different areas of conflict and human rights abuses. ISAI, a secular NGO, was established only a few months after the 1994 bans. "This seemed to be the right kind of group to promote change and professionalism in the media," said Mary Zurbuchen, then the Foundation's Representative. "If younger journalists were to be able to meet this challenge, they would need experience and support in the difficult area of in-depth investigative techniques." Later, assistance went to *Pantau* (Monitor), a journal monitoring media in Indonesia, and also to an integrated program of training and workshops for print media professionals.

To the office of vice president, Suharto appointed B. J. Habibie. Habibie, an engineer by training, had lived in Germany for many years and was no stranger to Suharto; he had known the president since childhood and called him “uncle.” Earlier, in 1989, Suharto had given Habibie wide-ranging powers and cabinet-level status, putting him in charge of ten strategic state-owned companies, including weapons manufacturing, steel mills, shipyards, telecommunications, an electronics production unit, and the national aviation production facility known as IPTN (*Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara*). As government minister he enjoyed a close relationship with Suharto, and it was from this position that he was chosen to be vice president.

Bob Hasan and Habibie were symbols of the privilege to be obtained from knowing the president. They reinforced in the minds of many the perception about what such a special relationship could bring, namely control over large-scale projects in which calculations of cost and price were not a factor.

On 14 March 1998, following the announcement of the new Cabinet, the market showed its anxiety. The rupiah fell even further to around 10,000 to the dollar, marking a drop in value of nearly 80 per cent since the beginning of the monetary crisis.

The general public also grew more concerned and began to lose faith in the government, especially after seeing Suharto appoint one of his own children a government minister. The nepotism that had long marked the New Order government had never been so evident or shameless. Around that time, a new acronym began to be bandied about – KKN, standing for “collusion, corruption, and nepotism.”

It had long been known that special business rights were frequently accorded to the president’s family and close friends. Their reach extended to an increasingly wide range of ventures, from cloves to insurance, from plastics to petrochemicals. The year before the crisis hit, the family-owned assets were valued in the tens of billions of dollars, most of which had been obtained through government assistance or intervention.



▲ *The ill-fated N-250 aircraft under manufacture at the IPTN hangar in Bandung, 1997.*



▲ Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad (center) with Bank Indonesia Governor Soedradjad Djiwandono (right) promoting the “I Love Rupiah” campaign, in an attempt to rebuild domestic confidence in the local currency, 1997.

One glaring example was the Clove Marketing Board (BPPC) run by Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala Putra, the president’s youngest son. Established in 1991, this board exercised full control over the sale of cloves, and was the sole buyer of farmers’ harvests. Its control was so great that it was able to obtain low-interest credit of hundreds of millions of dollars from the state.

The president’s son (who in 2002 was imprisoned for ordering the murder of a judge) received even more exceptional treatment from the government when he was given special permission to build a “national car,” which in fact was produced by the KIA corporation of South Korea.

When the financial crisis hit the country, the common hope was that such practices and privileges would be eliminated. The economy had been shaken and people had been hit hard. Everyone was being asked to help bear the burden together. But that was not what appeared to be happening. In late January 1998 the government announced that regulation of the clove trade through BPPC would continue. In early February, Tommy’s national car company was awarded a special incentive in the form of a tax exemption on the import of fully-assembled sedans.

To the general public it looked as if Suharto was unwilling to sacrifice the interests of those close to him. The IMF’s faith in Indonesia was nearly destroyed as well. In fact, it was becoming increasingly clear to a number of senior officials that the biggest obstacle to Indonesia’s overcoming the crisis was Suharto himself.

The president, however, did not seem to notice. On 4 May 1998, in the midst of the ongoing economic crisis, he gave his permission for the government to raise the price of fuel by 70 per cent. Anger and protests erupted. Riots took place. In Medan, two people were killed. Shaken by these events, Parliament rejected the fuel price increase, an unprecedented move on its part.

As if oblivious to what was happening around him, on 9 May Suharto departed for Cairo to attend a summit meeting of developing countries. On 12 May, with Suharto out of the country, an anti-government demonstration was held on the campus of Trisakti University in West Jakarta. In a clash between demonstrators and police, four students were shot and killed. The country reeled.

AMNA KUSUMO

Amna Kusumo is not an artist, as she freely admits. However, she has a profound understanding of the dynamics of the performing arts in Indonesia. She understands both the outstanding potential of Indonesia's performing arts and of the enormous difficulty in realizing this potential. For more than 25 years, she has been involved in the details of managing a range of types of performances. With support from Ford, in 1999, Amna and a number of colleagues established the Kelola Foundation to promote the growth of the arts in Indonesia by providing learning opportunities, access to funding, and access to information. Kelola is also supported by Asialink (Australia), Asian Cultural Council (USA) and HIVOS (the Netherlands).

Indonesia has plenty of talent, but we lack supporting institutions. Even with talented performers, you still need an audience and supporting institutions. There has to be a synergy between artist, audience, and institutions that can manage the interaction between the two. For example, in the 1970s, TIM drew large audiences because it operated with a clear agenda, it established set timetables, and it facilitated high quality performances. TIM made sure that standards were met. Over time, TIM educated audiences and raised their expectations.

TIM and the Jakarta Arts Council provided funding to support artists' performances. The level of funding was sufficient. TIM handled publicity and other logistical matters. For example, they prepared and distributed brochures. Artists just had to supply the information. All artists had to think about was the production. Without an institution of that kind, artists have to engage in superhuman efforts just to survive. They have to work to attract audiences, sell tickets, obtain funding, and still look after the production on top of it all.

The Kelola Foundation was born out of a perceived need after a series of discussions with several individuals actively involved in the arts, including Jennifer Lindsay of Ford and Rhoda Grauer, an arts administrator from New York who came to see the Indonesian Dance Festival. We all agreed that the lack of supporting institutions had a negative impact on the sustainability of the arts and organizations that supported them.

We decided to begin with a survey of cultural organizations. From this survey, a

pilot study emerged, and from that came Kelola. Kelola emerged as a direct response to the needs of the arts community.

Kelola opened up a range of opportunities for arts workers in Indonesia. For example, it offers scholarships to take part in arts



Amna Kusumo at home in Solo, 2003.

management, festival management and stage lighting workshops. Kelola works with LPPM (Jakarta) to provide management training. There are also opportunities to study through work placement in established arts organizations, both at home and abroad. For this internship program, Kelola works with sixteen different partners. If an individual performed well in a workshop, we advised him or her to apply to our internship program. Similarly, if an arts worker had participated in Kelola's national internship program, we encourage him or her to apply for an international program. Interest in these

programs has been extremely high. More than 300 people registered each year, even though there are only places for 16 individuals.

From our experience with the workshops, we've found that the hardest thing is to convince people of the importance of planning. Artists often find that hard to accept. However, they are becoming aware of the need to structure their organizations. That's already a step forward, although many are not ready to change. It is difficult to alter established patterns of behavior.

It is also difficult to establish funding strategies for the arts in Indonesia. Lack of funding has always been an obstacle in the path of artistic development and the staging of quality performances. The Kelola Arts Funding Program offers an alternative system of funding that is open, competitive, and accessible to individual artists and art groups throughout Indonesia. Technically, this funding program was implemented to develop management skills. It is not just access to funds that is important, but the development of a system.

So far, most of our partners are from the urban areas. We know that the arts in the rural areas are more complex and more tightly integrated into the existing social structure. In the rural areas, the arts do not exist independently. In order to understand the arts in the rural areas, we are in the process of studying the management of traditional art forms. Even though those involved are often not consciously aware of it, these forms involve their own systems of management. We are trying to understand the values that underlie these systems.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS: REINTERPRETING CLASSICAL TEXTS

In a peaceful rural area near Magelang, Central Java, stands the *Pesantren Asbolihat*, a Muslim boarding school. Nearby is a sleepy *musholla* (prayer house) and dormitories so minuscule that packing 15 *santri* (students) into each seems a minor miracle.

Hibatun Wafiroh was born in this district in 1972. The eldest of four children, she grew up watching her parents preside over the education of young *santri*, mostly between four and 18 years of age. She watched how *kyais* and *nyais* (teachers) were held in awe by their pupils, how the teachers were consulted about all sorts of personal problems, from drugs to choice of suitors. She learned how the role of women has been defined in sacred Islamic materials, in particular in the *kitab kuning* (“yellow books”) – local shorthand for centuries-old handbooks of classical texts that make up the bulk of reading in Javanese *pesantren*.

Hibatun's father, K.H. Sakdulloh, the founder of *Pesantren Asbolihat*, is a member of the provincial parliament and an activist in Muslim social organizations. Her mother, Nyai Haji Fasohah, a co-leader of the *pesantren*, is anything but self-effacing. “As a teacher, she was never denied autonomy,” said Hibatun. This desire for independence seems to have rubbed off onto her eldest daughter who, defying her parents, went her own way to determine the shape of her education.

“My parents wanted me to go to a *pesantren* in Kediri – a traditional one,” she recalled. University, meanwhile, was regarded as off-limits to her. But Hibatun was unfazed. Having “cried all night” on the eve of being packed off to the Islamic senior high school that was chosen by her parents, she feigned illness and bought herself more time at home. She used this time to collect information on the State Islamic University in Semarang. After a long struggle, she was

accepted there.

In 1997 she returned from university “enlightened,” and was promptly entrusted with leadership of her *pesantren*'s female *santri*. She also threw herself into Muslim study clubs and organizations. “University life has equipped me with a sense of self-worth and autonomy. I want more women to feel like I do. Yet despite so much Qur'anic evidence about the significance of women, gender reform has been stubbornly resisted.”

Hibatun's interests flourished. Around this time, in Java, discussions about gender

of Fatayat Members (*Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fatayat*) – also a Ford grantee – is instructive. She says, “I realize how potent the approach is, linking issues of social injustice, gender, and reproductive health within Islamic jurisprudence. It truly is a bottom-up approach, especially in the rural areas where what you get out of the *pesantren* is pretty much your whole worldview.”

The movement has re-examined religious texts such as the *kitab kuning*, which has long been used as a tool to entrench the dominant male view of women's role in Islamic society.



Reading from the yellow books at the Krapyak pesantren, 2003.

in Islam and about notions of pluralism were just beginning to happen. Workshops, seminars, and new publications reflected increased efforts to reinterpret Islamic texts in the direction of legal reform and eliminating discriminatory practices aimed at women.

Thanks to the pioneering efforts of the Muslim non-governmental organization – and Ford Foundation grantee – the Indonesian Society for Pesantren and Community Development (*Perbimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat – P3M*), the movement to promote dialog on reproductive rights among women in *pesantren* across rural Java and Madura has shown signs of success. Hibatun's own involvement in the Forum for the Well-being

A leading effort here has been the Study Forum for the *Kitab Kuning* (*Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning*) and its reinter-pretation of *Uqud al-Lujjayn*, a text focusing on the rights and responsibilities of husbands and wives. The result of this three-year study, a book entitled *Wajah Baru Relasi Suami-Istri* (*The Modern Face of Husband and Wife Relationships*), was published with Foundation funding in 2001. Even though the hermeneutic approach is still confined to elementary review of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), the

project has been widely held as a worthy “first effort,” for it succeeds in conveying that, in any just social order, women must be treated as active and contributing agents rather than as mere subjects. Yet these efforts to take women's rights from a theological perspective have to move gradually.

Other Foundation-financed publications address specific issues such as polygamy, HIV/AIDS, family planning, abortion, and women's sexual rights. These materials serve to challenge traditional beliefs that perpetuate women's subordination in society. This slim and accessible series is either written by or incorporates the views of people like Hibatun Wafiroh – the new generation of male and female leaders of the *pesantren*.

The next day, riots exploded throughout Jakarta. In the mayhem, thousands of shops, hundreds of banks and ATM machines, tens of shopping malls and hotels were destroyed or burned. As many as a thousand people burned to death. No less horrific, the perpetrators not only burned and attacked homes, they also raped women of Chinese descent.

On 15 May Suharto returned to Jakarta. No signs were evident that he would resign. As protests against his government spread throughout Indonesia, and as thousands of students occupied the Parliament complex in Jakarta, the president's closest retainers finally decided that their venerable "father of development" could no longer be supported. On 18 May the unexpected happened: Harmoko, head of Parliament and famous for his skill at currying favor with Suharto, officially requested that the president resign.

The year 1998 saw the power of the New Order shrink and a large measure of the government's support disappear. For three decades, Suharto had gained his legitimacy from rapid economic expansion. In the early 1990s, the World Bank was calling Indonesia "the economic miracle of Southeast Asia." Bank statistics showed the proportion of the population living beneath the poverty line dropping from 60 per cent in 1965 to less than ten per cent in 1997. Nonetheless, this remarkable achievement did not appear to have strengthened the nation's resiliency, and when a true financial crisis hit, Suharto's administrative system proved ineffective.

After so many years it became obvious that the New Order style of management was neither a constant nor stable. The Suharto government had both changed and declined with the times. A regime that in its early days aimed to carry out a rational economic plan gradually experienced what economist Sumitro Djojohadikusumo termed an "institutional disease."



▲ A rioter hurls a Molotov cocktail at police during the protests that preceded President Suharto's resignation, Jakarta, May 1998.

The source of this disease was not apparent at first. In fact, after the fall of Sukarno, it looked as if Suharto had found an effective cure for the nation's economic ills. In the beginning of his presidency, Suharto had worked to restore failing institutions. He organized the holding of orderly elections, which Sukarno had shunted aside during the period of Guided Democracy. As a means of bolstering the national economy, his administration put together a series of five-year development plans. Each plan, called Repelita (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*), was spelled out in a well-organized budget which the president submitted to Parliament for approval.

At the beginning of his rule, Suharto exercised great caution and did not initiate measures based on snap judgments. It was true institution building. Yet his management style, even while fostering a stable system of government, had another side to it. There was within it a kind of paranoia that made it fragile.

Even after emerging successfully from the violence that

accompanied its birth, the Suharto government continued to view Indonesia as a nation at war. One always had to be on the lookout for threats to national stability – whether coming from the PKI, PSI, Masyumi, the extreme left, or the extreme right.

Any opposition was considered a threat. Any source of political power other than the government was seen as potential competition and therefore had to be subjugated. The Suharto government meddled constantly in the selection process for political party leaders. The president determined who held the reigns of the military and who sat on the Supreme Court. His security apparatus kept a close watch on community organizations and, after the outbreak of protests by students in 1978, tightly reined in all student activities on campuses.

This was where the institutionalization process did not function in a normal fashion. The nation's political parties, and even Parliament, did not serve as true conduits for the public's hopes and aspirations; their role was effectively as a prop for Suharto's legitimacy. Links between political parties



▲ Handling out clean needles at a Foundation-supported HIV clinic in Kampung Bali, Jakarta 2003.

MARIA M. HARTININGSIH

Maria M. Hartiningsih is a reporter with the daily newspaper Kompas in Jakarta. Since the beginning of her career she has been interested in the problems of poverty and marginalized groups in society. In 1987 she received an award from UN Habitat for a report on the homeless in Jakarta. In 1997-1998 she was a visiting scholar at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.

I began my career as a journalist reporting on urban poverty. The issue was very complex, because it was connected with the government's strategy for development. Environmental destruction was also tied up with this. After covering the huge environmental conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, I began to ask, what is sustainable development, and who benefits from it? After that conference, I was chosen as a member of the Indonesian Cohort-1 program in Leadership of Environment and Development (LEAD). This was a program of the Rockefeller Foundation, collaborating with other foundations and universities studying the problem of sustainable development. The program ran from September 1992 until the first quarter of 1994. Participants from seven countries met for international sessions in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

In 1995, I began to examine the problem of HIV/AIDS and found that journalism aroused my empathy. HIV/AIDS is not just an issue of health; it has social and economic dimensions too. It is very closely related to the problem of poverty in the broad sense, and most of its victims are people from the productive age-group.

HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest threats to Indonesia, especially since in the last three years the number of infected persons has risen as a result of an increase in the use of injected narcotics. The World Health Organization estimates that in 2002-2003 there were 80,000-120,000 Indonesians with HIV. The actual figure may be ten times that.

I believe we have only seen the tip of the iceberg: considerations of "morality" are obscuring the true dimensions of the problem.

In August 1997, with funding from *Kompas* and the Ford Foundation, I conducted in-depth coverage of the effects of AIDS on women and children in villages



Maria Hartiningsih at the Kompas office, Jakarta, 2003.

in Thailand and Cambodia.

After the Rio conference in 1992, *Kompas* often sent me to other UN conferences: to Cairo in 1994, Copenhagen and Beijing in 1995, and the Conference on Habitat in Istanbul in 1996. In August 1996 I covered the World Congress to Eradicate Sexual Exploitation of Children, held in Stockholm.

While I was in Seattle, the Ford Founda-

tion gave me a monthly stipend. This enabled me to travel to New York, Atlanta, Miami, and San Francisco to study the course of AIDS in the US since the early 1980s.

Since returning to Indonesia I have begun to study feminism. I want to use the feminist perspective as a way to think about oppression. I am doing this because the knife of Big Theory is not sharp enough to dissect such problems as rape, which occurs both in peaceful times and in situations of unrest and armed conflict.

For a long time now I have felt that women's sexuality has been used as a tool of the state for borrowing money. Just look at the Family Planning program. Women's sexuality also becomes a tool for defeating groups regarded as opponents. Consider the rapes of Chinese women in Jakarta in May 1998. Women's sexuality is also part of the strategy for defeating enemies in wartime. Just look at East Timor and Aceh.

I have come to think that many problems are tied to neoliberalism. The neoliberal economic system strangles developing nations with large debt. It makes us prisoners in our own country. Neoliberal economics turns everything into a commodity, including human emotions and physical youth. The media become a tool for influencing and shaping people's way of life. Environmental destruction, poverty, HIV/AIDS, oppression and exploitation, including the traffic in women and children – all the problems that lead in the end to enslavement and materialism originate in neoliberalism.

and their grass-roots constituents were terminated and only Golkar, the government party, was allowed to operate at the village level. Mass media publications required permits that could be withdrawn whenever the government saw fit. Judicial administration was a mere formality; decisions were made by decree, on an extralegal basis.

It was the students who balked at these restrictions. It began in early 1978 when groups from four Jakarta universities took to the streets demanding that Suharto not stand as presidential candidate in the next election. Thereafter, the government, through the military, froze the activities of these universities' student councils.

That same year, Suharto appointed Daoed Joesoef as minister of education and culture. On the president's orders, presumably, Joesoef immediately set out to change student life at the universities by decreeing that students were no longer allowed to participate in political activities. He put in place an agenda to "normalize" campus life. According to Joesoef, students were to spend their time "reading, writing, and conducting research, not wasting their time in the streets."

The ministry required all students to study full time – between 48 and 52 hours per month. Student union activities were to be overseen by the university's assistant rector, and

activities limited to sports, the arts, and "scientific discussions."

At first these restrictions spurred opposition. Activists at UI encouraged students to boycott classes, a campaign that succeeded for about two months. During the next two or three years, however, the new regulations effectively kept students busy and tame.

As it turned out, this situation had its benefits. Students were more interested in preparing for a career than engaging in political activities. Opportunities awaited them following graduation, as state and private investment proliferated in the early 1980s. A host of new companies sprang up. The number of existing businesses grew threefold, indicating that glittering careers beckoned. Campuses no longer resounded with protests and demonstrations.

Even then, however, it was clear that the government's agenda to eliminate political activity from campuses could not succeed. Four years after the program to normalize campus life was imposed, a new variety of study group emerged – small gatherings of students with changing membership that engaged in serious discussions on a variety of socio-political problems. Within five years of their first emergence, their number rapidly expanded – at least in the larger cities. In Yogyakarta alone, there were around 20 such study groups.



▲ Udik, published by PIAR in East Nusa Tenggara, is an influential weekly covering political and cultural issues, 2003.

SARAH LERY MBOEIK

Sarah Lery Mboeik is coordinator of the Association for the Development of Initiative and Community Advocacy (Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat – PIAR), based in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara. In 1999, Mboeik won the prestigious Yap Thiam Hien Award for her contribution to the struggle for human rights. She is well known throughout East Nusa Tenggara for her advocacy on behalf of those whose rights she feels the government has infringed, from refugees from Timor Leste to followers of traditional religions not recognized by the government. As a result of her strong criticisms of the government, she was once arrested and detained by the army while she was in an advanced state of pregnancy. The Ford Foundation has assisted PIAR since the fall of the Subarto government in 1998.

Since May 1998, members of local communities in East Nusa Tenggara, in Timor, Flores, Rote, and the other islands, have suffered flagrant violations of their social, economic, and cultural rights.

Most of these violations stem from the implementation of a 1974 policy in which land previously regarded as *tanah adat*, or traditional land, would be reclassified as state land. This decision launched a long conflict between the state and members of local communities.

Perhaps 80 to 90 per cent of East Nusa Tenggara's people belong to *adat* communities. An *adat* community is defined as a group of people within a defined area who have specific traditional values and cultural traits.

One problem is that local people are unable or unwilling to become involved in politics, because in the past the government was quick to brand such people as communists. Even traditional religious rituals can be branded as "atheistic," and hence associated with communism. On this basis, these rituals have sometimes been forbidden.

Next to the state the biggest offenders are representatives of recognized religions. On Rote, traditional religions have been declared *balaik*, or atheistic. The recognized religions first entered East Nusa Tenggara through Rote, and this is where the greatest degree of stigmatization has occurred. The effects of the stigmatization have been far-reaching, even leading to the destruction of *adat* houses. Although I myself am Protestant, and my brother is a minister, my father was a tribal

chief. Members of our extended family burned our *adat* house on the grounds that it represented atheistic values. *Manenito*, or local ritual specialists, have been described as devil worshippers, although in fact they are repositories of traditional lore. Even the reading of traditional prayers and spells is attacked as *balaik*.



Sarah Lery Mboeik in her office in Kupang, 2003.

The destruction of *adat* houses has had a dramatic effect. Since *adat* community organizations are centered around these houses and important decisions are made there, this destruction weakens the legitimacy of traditional decision-making processes.

There are many different ethnic groups in East Nusa Tenggara. These groups are called *klan*. There is for example the Rote *klan*, which is divided into 18 communities. The *klan* is further divided into *manggi*,

which consists of *fam*. My *fam* is Mboeik. So, as you can see, society has an intricate, formal structure.

Outsiders often identify East Nusa Tenggara with poverty. Sometimes politicians promote that view for their own benefit. They make big profits out of poverty programs. But poverty is really the result of an inappropriate development paradigm. The model for development here is very centralist, based on a capitalist economic system with markets, banks, and so on. East Nusa Tenggara must be developed in a manner appropriate for an island ecosystem. It cannot be sectoral, with one district implementing its own programs without regard for the other districts. That is impossible because of the island's ecosystem. A building project in one place can cause erosion and disaster somewhere else. So this model of development does not help the people here. I wonder how much better it would work if traditional communities were given opportunities to manage natural resources within clearly defined areas.

I am not an economist. I am a villager who has learned from the village community. But I can see that many of the recommendations by experts are not appropriate for communities characterized by economic systems that vary significantly from area to area. Economists place humans within the context of a capitalist system. For them, a forest has potential value as timber. For traditional communities, however, the forest is a complete ecosystem in which humans are but a small part.

MUSIC OF INDONESIA: THE SMITHSONIAN/MSPI CDs

To hear Philip Yampolsky tell it, the adventure began in 1989 with preparations for the Festival of Indonesia in the United States, which the Ford Foundation was assisting.

The Smithsonian Institution had just acquired Folkways Records, a private label specializing in folk and ethnic music from around the world. This was the perfect vehicle for making the “two new records of Indonesian music” that the Foundation first proposed. Alan Feinstein, the Ford program officer working on the Festival, suggested to the Smithsonian that they involve Yampolsky, at that time one of the few ethnomusicologists who had done research on lesser-known Indonesian genres. Ford had already brought Yampolsky to Medan’s North Sumatra University in 1983 and 1984 to help build the ethnomusicology department there.

“No,” was Yampolsky’s surprising answer. In what he calls “one of the smartest moves I ever made,” he agreed to help with the project only if it was expanded to 12 CDs. Luckily, Ford agreed, and in the end, after further expansions, the complete *Music of Indonesia* series stands at 20 volumes.

Recording started in 1990 and eventually spanned 23 provinces. The project was a collaboration with the Society for Indonesian Performing Arts (MSPI, *Masyarakat Seni Pertunjukan Indonesia*) and involved Indonesian ethnomusicology teachers and students, anthropologists, and local cultural experts. Each year, Yampolsky spent five or six months recording in the field with small teams of Indonesian colleagues, hopping from island to island, creating, as it were, “an aural textbook on Indonesian music.” Then it was back to the US for the task of editing, annotating, and compiling the material. The final volumes of Smithsonian Folkways’ US edition appeared in 1999; the Indonesian edition, published by MSPI, is scheduled for completion in 2003.

Team member Jabatin Bangun, now a dean at the Jakarta Arts Institute (*Institut Kesenian Jakarta*), said that one of the main challenges was finding material in unexplored locations. He was sometimes

sent ahead to sound out uncharted territories and make initial contacts. “Central Flores, for example,” he said. “We had practically no information about the place. And there were cases of miscommunication with local people.”

“One time,” he reminisced, “we were seated underneath a clump of *lontar* (palm) trees, recording a beautiful song that was hard to get right. We had tried several takes already. Some visitors approached, their footsteps making a racket on the dry *lontar* leaves. Philip put up his hand to halt them. This gesture confused the singers, who



stopped abruptly, ruining the take yet again. We had to coax them to sing it one more time, and that one finally went off without a hitch.”

“Naturally,” Yampolsky says, “the aim was not comprehensiveness, for it was not possible to represent every island or every ethnic group. Rather, it was to make available respectful recordings of the astonishing range of Indonesian musical styles.” The editorial principle was not “one short sample of everything you could possibly hear in one

place,” but rather a more extensive presentation of selected genres with compelling musical or cultural interest.

And such glorious and startling differences emerge! Volumes 8 and 9, for instance, cover a surprising variety of singing styles from the relatively small island of Flores, ranging from dissonant duets strikingly similar to some Balkan music to large powerful choruses with very different musical characters. Indonesia is famous for its gamelan orchestras, but how many people knew, before the recording project, of the many forms of string music found in Kalimantan (volume 13) and South Sulawesi (volume 15)?

And what of the well-known genres such as *gamelan* and *wayang*? Volume 14 presents three lesser-known varieties: *wayang Sasak* from Lombok, a lively mixture of Javanese-style puppets, Islamic stories, and Balinese and Sasak musical idioms; *gamelan Banjar* from South Kalimantan, clearly related to but dramatically different from the Javanese model; and *dbalang jemblung* from Banyumas in Central Java, a ‘low-rent’ take on the classical theater tradition using only four actor-singers and no instruments or puppets.

“The records are aimed at open-minded, non-specialist listeners,” said Yampolsky, “the kind of people who would pick up an album of music from Timor or Mentawai and think, Gee, I’d like to know how *this* sounds!” Here is precisely where ethnomusicology becomes useful, both as an academic discipline and as a model for approaching Indonesian cultures. Its origin as a “movement” within musicology away from the domination of the western musical framework allows it to combine musical analysis with ethnographic contextualization in exciting ways. “It leads to new interpretations of how musical sound carries meanings within a particular culture,” said the ethnomusicologist Endo Suanda.

The *Music of Indonesia* series, in other words, shows us the mystery of other people’s experience – different ways of organizing sound, which ultimately reflect different ways of making sense of life.



▲ Scenes from the recording project, clockwise from top left: a Kayan Mendalam woman playing the jews harp, West Kalimantan, 1995; dancers from Biak, Papua, 1994; Toba Batak tuned drums, North Sumatra, 1990; Toraja musicians, South Sulawesi, 1996; singers from the Belu district of western Timor, 1997; a Mongondow kulintang player, North Sulawesi, 1997.

This is where the students talked and honed their analytical abilities. In their partially sequestered forums, students enjoyed relative freedom in voicing critical perspectives on the New Order government. Inspired, perhaps, by the general rise in national prosperity, there also grew within these groups a desire to help society's less fortunate. Some taught poor children to read, others put together educational programs for pedicab drivers.

"For all of us, our starting point was the Left," said Rizal Mallarangeng, currently director of the liberal Freedom Institute. In the 1980s Mallarangeng was an activist in an underground study group at UGM in Yogyakarta, a school that holds a prominent place in the history of leftist thought in Indonesia. Later, after seeing the changes that took place in the Soviet Union when Gorbachev was in power, Mallarangeng abandoned his leftist views. He saw that that kind of socialism, where market forces were controlled by the central government, only resulted in stagnation.

The nation's liberals also joined in opposing Suharto, especially in the late 1980s when his rule grew increasingly autocratic and – as evidenced by his support for the clove trading board and the so-called "national" car project – when state intervention became indistinguishable from support for his family's businesses. Attempts to liberalize industry and eliminate monopolies – measures for which the IMF and the technocrats had lobbied – were aimed at returning the New Order to its original goals.

By the late 1990s Suharto's base of support was steadily shrinking. His legitimacy as president had eroded and even the military, whose leaders were of a younger generation, began to

treat him as more of an acquaintance than as a friend.

What was to be done? Indonesia, with its lack of true political experience, had no institutions to replace its head of state. Thus the old methods were repeated. The students broke out of the confines of their campuses and took to the streets, demanding loudly that Suharto resign, just as they had done in 1978. But this time the situation was different because the students were not alone. Further, demonstrations were



happening not only in Jakarta and other large cities on Java, but also in college towns in Bali, Lombok, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. Tens of thousands of students were on the streets. Neither the military nor the police could stop them. Clashes occurred, but unlike the later violent protest at Trisakti, no one was killed.

Where no opposition political parties existed as a gathering point for the resistance movement, informal groups – NGOs for the most part – emerged to serve that purpose from a wide range of fields. Another group arose from the growing middle class: the working professionals. Factory

workers and even the general public joined.

As if the moment had been predefined, these widely varied groups, whose members occasionally competed and fought among themselves, began to coalesce and form networks and alliances. Though coordination among the bodies was at times chaotic, it was these groups, in the end, that acted as a civil society, something that had been almost non-existent in Indonesia.

That is how a political opposition movement emerged – even though it was haphazard – and that, too, is why Suharto fell.

RIZAL MALLARANGENG

As a student at UGM, Rizal Mallarangeng played an active role in the intellectual life of the university. In the 1980s, like most of his fellow student activists, he adopted a socialist perspective. However, not long after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he changed his viewpoint. During a period of study in the USA, he became increasingly associated with the right wing in politics. He completed his dissertation with assistance from the Ford Foundation, Fulbright and the daily newspaper, Kompas. Currently, he heads the Freedom Institute. He has occasionally been called upon to assist in the writing of speeches for President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

In the eighties, I was a student at Yogyakarta. At the time, issues such as good governance or empowerment were not in vogue. I don't even remember if the term "civil society" had been coined yet. Non-government organizations were not yet in vogue either. If people from NGOs tried to take part in debates, they were dismissed as irrelevant. There were a lot of problems with government organizations, too. Quite a few of those involved in development projects were able to buy nice cars and houses. At the time, student discourse was dominated by charismatic figures such as Goenawan Mohamad, Umar Kayam, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, and Arief Budiman.

By the end of the eighties, NGOs were associated with the struggle against the Suharto regime and with efforts to raise grass-roots awareness of political rights. The journal *Prisma*, which contained the writings of Dawam Rahardjo and Abdurrahman Wahid, was very influential.


Gus Dur became involved in activism not through his role as chairman of NU, but as the head of an NGO. Gus Dur was chosen as the chairman of NU in 1980. One of his programs was to establish a number of small NGOs in NU strongholds.

By the early nineties, student activists and NGOs became more unified. This was largely the result of the Kedung Ombo case. The phrase "civil society" began to emerge. Student activists from Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta joined NGOs after completing their studies, or established new ones themselves. Activists involved in Kedung Ombo were involved in the establishment of the PRD.

These activist organizations came in various shades of left. There was the extreme

left, those who identified with communism, but most were leftist social democrats. They were suspicious of business, and saw free trade as detrimental to the interests of the disempowered. But rightist economists take the opposite view. They believe that free trade will actually assist the poor.

We all began as leftists. As activists, we read Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Tan Malaka, or Sutan Sjahrir. They were all socialists.



Rizal Mallarangeng, Jakarta, 1992.

Throughout Indonesian history, socialism has been identified with idealism. The Indonesian intellectual tradition is painted in different shades of left. There is no intellectual tradition associated with the right.

Those who came back from abroad brought popular leftist theories with them. In the eighties, Arief Budiman, Amien Rais, and Nurcholish Madjid returned to Indonesia and invigorated the intellectual life of the country. Socialism was also associated with opposition to Suharto, because Suharto was so influenced by rightists such as Widjojo Nitisastro.

Amongst student activists, I was the only

one associated with the right wing, in the sense that I supported free trade. All the senior figures, such as Arief Budiman and Y.B. Mangunwijaya, were associated with the left.

I remember when Amien Rais just came back from America. At the time, Arief's book, *The Peaceful Road to Socialism*, had just been published. I chaired a panel to discuss the book. We invited Arief to come from Salatiga. Amien Rais critiqued the book. When I invited him, he agreed, saying: "Yes, I support socialism."

In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. I was one of the few activists to study political science systematically. I was from the Faculty of Political Science, whereas my colleagues were from philosophy or law. So, I studied Gorbachev's rise and the difficulties faced by the Soviet Union. From my studies, I came to the opinion that socialism was intrinsically flawed. My friends said that it was only the implementation of the ideology that was wrong. I didn't agree. After that, I became a liberal. Most of my friends remained on the left.

At present, the issues are different. The function of NGOs has been taken over by the political parties. The biggest challenge now is the institutionalization of democracy. We have to improve the quality of social and political participation. The political parties are the key players. If we want good governance, there has to be a consolidation of the political parties. The political parties must work to develop themselves. The question is not whether they are worthy of our trust, but rather, what other choice is there? Without the political parties, there would be no democracy. The only solution is to improve the political parties. How is that to be achieved, that is the question.

Was Suharto truly alone in the end? The night before his resignation, Suharto convened a meeting at the Presidential Palace with nine men, all distinguished figures in the Islamic community – a sign, it would seem, of the growing influence of Islam in Indonesian politics. Two of those present, Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, were prominent intellectuals. A number of *ulama* from NU were there, but the person who stood out was Amien Rais, head of Muhammadiyah who already had openly challenged Suharto.

The president explained his reason for calling the meeting: the students were demanding reforms, and he would make these reforms. He also said he would be prepared to resign once elections could be organized, hopefully very soon. “I’ve had it with being president,” he said, as reported by Nurcholish Madjid.

Though Suharto gave the impression that he was willing to concede defeat, Nurcholish Madjid then told him in a polite but clear voice, “*Reformasi* means that you must step down right now.” Only Abdurrahman Wahid disagreed. He felt that such a move would destroy the man. Instead, he proposed that they take the president at his word. After the meeting, Wahid, confined to a wheelchair and half-blind from a stroke suffered

several months before, called on students to cease their protest.

In the end Suharto followed Nurcholish Madjid’s suggestion. He must have realized that night that he was truly alone. Even his trusted minister of information, Harmoko, had cast him aside. Earlier when he had announced plans to restructure the Cabinet, 14 of his prospective candidates refused to join. And when he asked Nurcholish Madjid to head up a “Reformation Committee,” his request was denied.

Even at the height of his rule, Suharto did not seem to realize the true nature of his support. The Parliament he had crafted was not truly representative. Those who called for his resignation could not claim to be representative, either. Yet the students in the Parliament complex clearly opposed him as did countless individuals and organizations around the country.

According to the old Malay saying, “When there is no eagle, even a grasshopper can appear like one.” In those heady days, students and community activists emerged as a strong opposition force presenting a united front, even though previous alliances between them had seemed quite fragile. A decade earlier, students had generally distanced themselves from community-based organizations, particularly ones that had been established with government assistance for the purpose of



▲ President Suharto addressing Muslim leaders at the palace in Jakarta on 20 May 1998, the day before his resignation. Among those present is the future president, Abdurrahman Wahid (in wheelchair).

STEPANUS DJUWENG

In 1990, a group of young Dayak people gathered to express their frustration at the marginalization of Dayak culture in West Kalimantan. They established a study group under the auspices of Pancur Kasih, a Dayak community empowerment consortium in Pontianak. It engaged in research and published material related to Dayak culture and society. Later, this group was established as an independent entity, the Institute for Dayak Studies. This institute has worked to promote and defend Dayak cultural identity within the framework of a multi-cultural Indonesian society. A key figure in the movement is Stepanus Djuweng.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Dayak formed the largest single ethnic group in West Kalimantan at about 40 per cent of the population. Despite this, there was little attempt to promote Dayak culture in the province. Even in terms of anthropological and social research, there was little interest. The Dayak were considered primitives, nomads, slash-and-burn cultivators, and members of a backward tribe. This was very different from the respectful manner in which the Dayak of Sarawak were treated. Please note that our group did not blame any particular party for this state of affairs. We realized however that for the Dayak to win respect for their cultural values and traditions, there was a need to establish some kind of organization to research Dayak culture and to publish the findings. This research could also facilitate a decision-making process that is based on the true aspirations of the community.

The Dayak have suffered from oppression for centuries now, with their traditional lands being seized and exploited without consultation. The irresponsible exploitation of natural resources has been facilitated by a process of officially sanctioned discrimination. During the New Order period, four main pieces of discriminatory legislation and 200 associated regulations had a dramatically negative impact on the Dayak. In particular, these include the Forestry Act and the Rural Government Act.

While still a university student, I served as executive secretary of Pancur Kasih. I joined with other young people to establish an or-

ganization that provided advocacy and that published material related to Dayak culture. This began with a small study, an analysis of the political situation in Sambas and Sarawak, that was published in the daily *Kompas*. From



Stepanus Djuweng at work in Pontianak, 2003.

there, we became increasingly involved in research and development. In 1992, we established the Institute for Dayak Studies, Research and Development [*Institut Dayakologi Research and Development*]. In 2002, the organization was restructured to become an association rather than a foundation. At the same time, it was renamed the Institute for Dayak Studies [*Institut Dayakologi*].

In 1994, major conflicts occurred between Dayak and Madurese communities in Pontianak. There were further major conflicts in Pontianak during 1996-1997, and again in 2000. These conflicts, involving horrific violations of human rights by members of both communities, affected our perception of our role. Whatever the

provocations, murder is never justified.

If you look at the history of West Kalimantan, the conflicts that have occurred have usually been engineered by power holders. For example, the conflict between Chinese and Dayak communities in 1967 was engineered by the military to disrupt rebel supply lines. The military used the Dayak to eliminate the Chinese presence in rural areas. It's very clear that ethnic tensions are not the underlying cause of the conflicts. From the statistics, you can see that after the Dayak-Madurese conflict in 1950, there was a gap of 17 years until the Dayak-Chinese conflict in 1967. However, since 1967, there have been 14 major conflicts between the Dayak and Madurese communities. That means an average of one major conflict every 2.6 years.

Compared to the previous period, this represents a dramatic increase in the level of conflict.

The increased conflict occurred because of a conspiracy among power holders to increase the influence of the military. There is plenty of evidence to support this claim.

The Institute for Dayak Studies is involved in activities to promote reconciliation and peace-building. These aims are achieved not just through such conventional means as seminars, workshops, and so on, but also through programs intended to empower members of local communities and to improve their economic well-being. In this fashion, we hope to see an end to the tensions and conflicts that have afflicted Dayak and other communities throughout West Kalimantan.

alleviating development-related problems. The change might be traced to the adoption of the term ‘Community Self-Help Organizations’ (*Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat* – LSM) for these groups, as opposed to the previously used “non-governmental organizations,” or NGOs. In 1983 the members of these organizations were forced to act with caution. Perhaps, in their minds, the term LSM sounded less confrontational. Ten years on, however, the situation had changed, and confrontation was what they sought.

These NGOs, whether or not by intent, were driven by the situation to become more involved in influencing public policy. Politics had become an important part of their existence. For example, YLKI could not stop at simply providing information to the public. It had to devise and promote consumer protection laws and, in so doing, had to work with a weak and indifferent Parliament. That was the state of the power structure. That structure had to be broken down before real change could take place.

WALHI had been established for the purpose of protecting and improving the environment through education, study, and training. For it to be able to make an impact, however, it too was forced to confront the government. In mid-1994, WALHI activists took the Suharto government to court, alleging that it had siphoned off 400 billion rupiah from the budget for forest rehabilitation to subsidize IPTN, the aircraft company built by then Minister of Technology B.J. Habibie.

More frequent were confrontations between YLBHI and the government. This organization, which had been founded to provide legal assistance to the indigent, soon realized that the legal process in Indonesia was strongly influenced by the existing power structure. In turn, YLBHI’s constant support for the poor, whose grievances had formerly gone unaddressed, made government officials furious. They simply were not accustomed to dealing with opposition, especially from the voiceless poor.



- ▲ *A VCD store owner in Surakarta, Central Java, 2003. He is one of many individuals who have benefited from Talenta Foundation’s programs to build skills and confidence among differently-abled people.*
- ▶ *An informal discussion among farmers, traditional community leaders and staff of grantee Eltayasa in West Sumatra, 2003. This NGO promotes citizens’ participation in local government planning.*



ZOEMROTIN K. SUSILO

After the fall of Suharto, Zoemrotin K. Susilo entered politics, a dirty word for many activists. She even established a political party and accepted a nomination to be a member of parliament. Zoemrotin was not elected, but she still believes in the importance of parties in a democratic system. She believes that nobody should consider herself or himself too pure to become involved in politics. Nonetheless she has grave reservations about the women's parliamentary quota of 30 per cent. In addition to her other commitments, Zoemrotin is active as a member of Komnas HAM, the National Commission for Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia). Previously, she was head of YLKI.

At the beginning, YLKI was entirely voluntary. For the first seven years, YLKI did not receive any funding from donors. My salary was not enough for bus fares, let alone taxis. Because of this, the majority of us were reasonably well-off housewives, doing something with our spare time. We kept going regardless whether funding was available. Ford was the first agency to assist our program, although prior to that Friedrich Naumann Stiftung provided funds for institutional development.

Before the fall of Suharto, NGOs were considered highly political because they were involved in advocacy. Under the New Order, advocacy was considered by the government to be “political opposition.” Even during this period, however, people and organizations were involved in strengthening civil society. At the end of the Suharto period, everyone had to work together. Sometimes we traded favors. One of our biggest problems was lack of money. As a result of the lack of funds, sometimes our results didn't seem that impressive.

At the time, there were two alternatives: protesting from outside the system, or working within it. I decided to get involved in politics. There was little connection, however, between those inside the political system and those outside. I was isolated. Those involved in politics were considered odd. That made me lonely. Working is much easier when you feel that you are working together with other people. I got involved in party politics thinking that I wanted to create a synergy between those inside and

those outside. After I was involved, if I met my friends, they laughed at me. They would say, “She's the one with Amien Rais [Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly].” It doesn't sound like much, but it gets to you.

When I wanted to register as a candidate, I had to resign from a number of organizations. That was very difficult for me. I had been involved with YLKI for 25 years. When I went to campaign in Cilacap,

know some NGOs draw strong lines between themselves and the government. There is no sympathy or understanding between the two sides. I'm not saying NGOs are always pure. Everyone knows that there are lots of corrupt ones.

At present, there is one issue within the women's movement that should be addressed. Women are campaigning for a quota of 30 per cent in the House of Representatives to secure strategic positions within the political system. But the reality is that women with the most potential, the ones who should be represented, don't want the job.

This could be because of a political atmosphere that militates against the effective involvement of women. There has been no real democratization, no real development of critical attitudes. Women's groups are reluctant to enter party politics because party officials have such a bad reputation. I know that conflict is an inevitable part of democracy, but there

must be rules to the game. Most political parties have not yet developed a system of ethics.

I am concerned that those who are campaigning for a quota are not ready for involvement in the political system. In my opinion, women must consider the implications of the quota very carefully. If women with potential and ability are not willing to enter the arena, the 30 per cent quota will only be achieved through the selection of low-quality representatives. That will do far more damage than good to the women's movement.



Zoemrotin K. Susilo testifies at a public parliamentary hearing, 2002.

I got on the train and thought about my situation. I was thinking, “What am I looking for? I'm abandoning my NGOs, and I don't really know who my friends are in politics.” I thought about the fact that I didn't have any friends left.

At the time, I thought that there was a need for a high level of idealism within the political parties. I thought, surely my experience with NGOs would be valuable in developing a political party. But it seemed not. I still think it is foolish of us to refuse to work with politicians or the government. The government cannot just be dismissed. I

FARHA CICIEK

Unhappy with the system of recruitment into student organizations when she attended university, Farha Ciciek refused to join them. Among other things, she felt that the orientation of student organizations at the State University for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negara – IAIN) was not in accord with Islamic values – even less so, in fact, than at the explicitly secular Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah (OSIS), a student body with which she had been involved during high school. However, her non-involvement in student organizations did not prevent Ibu Ciciek from promoting the interests of women, during her university years and beyond. Working together with Ford, Ibu Ciciek now leads Rabima, an organization that addresses women’s issues by adopting a religious approach.

Rahima’s adoption of a religious approach to women’s affairs goes back to Yogyakarta, where my student friends and I formed a discussion group. Many such groups focused on issues of interest to the student body; ours focused on women’s issues. When we instituted a public discussion, an extraordinarily large number of students expressed interest. People had to squeeze into the library. We were shocked to discover how important these issues were to the student body, what strength of feeling existed.

So, back in 1987, we tried to open a forum for a women’s perspective on economic and political issues, as well as other issues specifically affecting the status of women. Of course, many people felt threatened by us, and many attacked us on religious grounds.

Their fears were based on a very narrow perception of what religion is. Even though I was at school at IAIN, I was considered a leftist, because I openly addressed economic and social issues. In fact, I maintained a religious perspective while addressing these questions – even my thesis was on “Poverty from the Perspective of the Koran.”

Our group believed that attempting to address economic and social issues in no way conflicted with religious values. We believed that God was on the side of justice, which includes social justice. We were also well aware that interpretation of the Koran is heavily influenced by the prejudices of the interpreter, who can promote a range of viewpoints.

So, we endeavored to interpret the Koran from a women’s perspective. Our strategy was to analyze the context in which the Koran was delivered. We examined the

reasons why inheritance laws appeared to favor men, why polygamy had been regarded as permissible. Despite our limitations, we translated books on women’s rights and Islam. These efforts were accompanied by lively discussions.

Since the establishment of Rahima, I



Farha Ciciek speaking at a seminar in Madura, 2002.

have seen a number of developments. These involve an evolution in the consciousness of the women involved, as well as changes in the social, political and economic context. Other issues that have come up include religious radicalism, and the lack of a connection between traditionalist women’s groups and modernist groups.

In a country like Indonesia, pluralism is inevitable. Through our publication, *Suara Rabima* [Voice of Rahima], we have

addressed a range of contentious issues related to pluralism. One such is the question of Islamic law. In order to explore the issue, we sought funding from Ford. Members of other religions, in particular, need to be educated about Islamic law, so we sought funding to publish information on the issue. We published 3,500 copies of our publication, and distributed it through friends and associates from women’s groups associated with other religions.

Still, the issue of religious law remains contentious. Some community groups are struggling to promote the implementation of Islamic law, according to a very narrow interpretation of what that entails. Their version of Islamic law is what I would describe as “frozen” – my apologies to those who adhere to this interpretation of Islam. Their view of Islamic law is based on perceptions that are centuries old.

We are not opposed in principle to Islamic law. It’s just that we vary in our interpretation of what Islamic law is. We disagree with those who insist that Islamic law is a signed and sealed package. Islamic law must be interpreted according to the time, period, and place in which it operates. It is by nature flexible. And it is our commitment to this viewpoint that has created friction with more traditionalist streams of thought.

Speaking personally, I am opposed to the idea of the unity of state and religion. An attempt to create such a unity will result in the erosion of religious values. Religion will be used to achieve political ends, and will therefore lose validity and legitimacy as a spiritual path. For me, religion is a personal matter. In dealing with this world, we should use the intelligence God gave us to solve problems, rather than invoking religion.








A diverse group of these self-help organizations eventually grew into a resistance movement. According to Zoemrotin Susilo, a founder of YLKI, when every instance of advocacy launched by community organizations was seen as opposition, they had no other choice. In the words of the “disappeared” grass-roots poet Wiji Thukul, “There is only one word, and that is ‘Fight!’”

The opposition initially found common cause in 1986 in the poor area of Central Java known as Kedung Ombo. Located 90 kilometers southeast of Semarang, Kedung Ombo was the government’s choice of a site for the construction of a large dam and reservoir. Most of the farm families from the 37 villages along the Serang River that would be affected by the project had lived in the area for many years. Even though the government set aside new land for them and gave its promise of resettlement assistance, not all of the families were willing to leave. They argued that the land promised was insufficient for

their needs and that the compensation being offered was either too low or had been siphoned off by greedy officials.

In the face of this refusal to vacate, local officials used a method they had found to be effective in the past: force. One example was 60-year-old Samadi, a resident of the hamlet of Nglanji. When he refused to accept the compensation package on offer from the government, he was taken to the office of the local military official. There, in the presence of the sub-district head, he had his face slapped until he finally consented to putting his thumbprint on the agreement. In doing so, he relinquished 2700 square meters of land (approximately three-quarters of an acre) for the token price of 1.5 million rupiah.

Samadi also owned a small parcel of rice paddy with a hut. *Tempo* magazine, in an extensive report on Kedung Ombo, detailed how he erected a ten-meter flagpole in front of this hut from which he flew the Indonesian flag. By doing so, he said, “I can still feel I own a piece of my country.”



- ▲ Local farmers stake their claim to land converted into a golf course in West Java, 1998.
- ◀ Fishing boats rest on a riverbed left parched when waters were diverted as a result of the Kedung Ombo dam, 1992.
- ◀◀ Studying at the Krapyak pesantren in Central Java, 2003.

Regardless of whether it was his country, Samadi and his neighbors were disenfranchised. A number of local residents were arrested on charges of stealing logs from state owned land. Dozens of others, when receiving new identity cards, saw that the letters “ET” had been stamped on them. Signifying “*Eks Tahanan (politik)*” or “Former Political Prisoner,” this code was a fearsome accusation that the card’s bearer had been involved with the banned PKI. Residents were informed that if they were willing to join the government’s transmigration resettlement program, these letters would be removed from their cards.

At the end of August 1986, a group of the Kedung Ombo area residents took their complaint to the Yogyakarta office of YLBHI. In February 1987, after learning that their compensation package had been reduced, they brought their case to the Central Java Regional Parliament in Semarang. Then, after a futile six-month wait, they filed a complaint with the main office of the YLBHI in Jakarta.

By this time, a number of community organizations had become involved in the case. The students were the most active organizers. Joining them was the late Y.B. Mangunwijaya, a priest and famed author, who soon became the leading figure of the movement. Activism on behalf of the farmers gained widespread publicity.

The government attempted to stifle coverage of the issue. It put curbs on the press, forbidding it to mention the dispute.



When the activists enlisted the support of foreign NGOs, however, the situation changed. Involvement by the International NGO Forum for Indonesia (INGI) was not something the government could easily brush off. Legal activist Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, who headed INGI, organized support within the forum for the Kedung Ombo farmers. This primarily took the form of sending reminders to the World Bank that it was providing a major portion of the funding to build the dam. Now the Bank was forced to listen.

Scholar and activist Arief Budiman remarked, “The Kedung Ombo case was the first in Indonesia in which co-operation between Indonesian and international NGOs produced visible results.”

The Kedung Ombo model was not, in fact, indicative of the kind of political resistance that would emerge a decade later. However sharp their criticism of the government, the NGOs advocated gradual change in the power structure. Even so, the Kedung Ombo experience helped to instill in community

organizations a greater sense of confidence when confronting the government. They gained political support and funding from Indonesia’s official foreign donors as well as from private organizations in those countries. Although government supporters accused them of being unpatriotic, it was not so easy for the government to act against its perceived foes. Because by then the government could no longer rely on the steady flow of petrodollars, it was forced to bow to pressure and take world opinion into greater consideration.

LIES MARCOES-NATSIR

After graduating from IAIN in 1986, Lies Marcoes-Natsir became involved in research through her work with a small group of Dutch academics. She became increasingly interested in anthropology and in issues related to gender. Ibu Lies is now involved with an American donor agency in Jakarta.

The involvement of religious communities in economic development programs was first implemented through LP3ES during Dawam Rahardjo's time. LP3ES had a program for Muslim communities involving community development among the *pesantren*.

LP3ES believed that the *pesantren* could form the basis for economic development. In 1987, P3M was founded with the support of a number of former LP3ES activists. P3M was involved in all aspects of *pesantren* life, and it used the *pesantren* culture, the prestige of *pesantren* leaders, and scriptural backing to achieve its aims.

But after several years these programs did not bring about the expected change. Unfortunately, I think our colleagues tended to romanticize the *pesantren* culture somewhat, and assumed a level of equality and simplicity within these communities that did not exist. In fact they found the *pesantren* to be extremely hierarchical, authoritarian, and resistant to change. This environment made the implementation of economic development programs problematic. Our colleagues benefited from their experience, however, and modified their programs accordingly.

At the end of the 1980s, there was still a great deal of resistance to gender issues because of the lack of a religious perspective on them. Even though I graduated from IAIN I was widely associated with Kalyanamitra in Jakarta, which was considered radical feminist in orientation. It was extremely difficult. There was no institutional backing for exploring gender issues from a religious perspective.

At about that period I joined P3M. I became aware that it was impossible to address gender issues without addressing

Islamic concerns regarding these issues. At P3M, we approached questions related to reproductive health from the perspectives of both gender and Islam.

In my opinion, of all programs conducted within *pesantren*, none has come close to achieving the success of the gender issues program that my colleagues implemented. This program assisted other, non-religious feminist groups to publicize gender issues.



Lies Marcoes-Natsir speaking at a women's peace rally in Jakarta, 1998.

At the time, there was widespread resistance to the feminist perspective, and feminists were ill-prepared to deal with religious objections to their arguments. However, the gender-issues program conducted at the *pesantren* went a long way to overcoming this resistance.

Also, this program gave the government momentum for its gender-mainstreaming program, which was initiated by an instruction issued by President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000. Gender issues were to be addressed at all stages of developmental planning. There was to be an assigned budget

for this purpose. The *pesantren* program greatly helped to win acceptance for the President's instruction.

I can understand those who say that we are using Islam to achieve our agenda of democratization. However, I don't think that is fair criticism. Let me go back to the issue of gender that I mentioned earlier. One of the factors that has promoted the movement's success has been the willingness of Islamic groups to acknowledge that there are problems within the Islamic community that need to be addressed. So, it is not secular feminists who first identified the problem, but Islamic groups themselves. And these groups were particularly open to the possibility of finding the answers to these problems in religious sources. The debate within Islam itself was extremely productive.

We are the most progressive of all countries in the Islamic world. Compare Indonesia to Malaysia or the Middle East. In some of those countries even the discussion of gender issues is explicitly forbidden. Our degree of progress is extraordinary, with the National Women's Committee and a large number of activist groups playing a significant role.

All these things were possible because Islamic groups were prepared to go through a process of introspection. As a result, the interpretation of Islam in Indonesia has been enriched.

Now we also have a 30 per cent quota for women in the DPR. Despite the debate on the quality of these representatives, gender issues are now an item on our nation's political agenda. This may make government more sensitive to the problems of other minorities and marginalized groups.

The Kedung Ombo experience sparked something else: a more radical orientation on the part of anti-Suharto forces. Some of the students who had helped defend the village farmers subsequently joined together to form the Democratic People's Party (*Partai Rakyat Demokratik* – PRD), the first political organization that would directly challenge the New Order.

A few years later, on the evening of 22 July 1996, at the neon-lit office of YLBHI in Jakarta, a 26-year-old activist by the name of Budiman Sudjatmiko led a ceremony to inaugurate the new party. The people in attendance, most of them young and scruffy-looking, all wearing red kerchiefs around their necks, were in open violation of the New Order's regulations against the formation of new parties. While it was true that not all other opposition groups agreed with PRD's positions, the party's emergence helped to foster more widespread determination and courage.

PRD argued that in order to bring down the New Order and to establish democracy, a clear political program and an efficient organization were needed – in other words, not an NGO. The country needed new political parties. PRD further argued that these parties would spark a new and lively political scene minus the ineffective and ailing government institutions that had proved useless, as was seen in Suharto's final days.

In August 1996, Budiman Sudjatmiko was arrested. Because of threats against his life, he and several colleagues had taken refuge at the home of a young Catholic cleric in the Jakarta suburb of Bekasi. But after ten days, state intelligence agents found them.

Soesilo Soedarman, coordinating minister for politics and security, announced that PRD was behind the riots that had taken place in Jakarta the previous month. President Suharto, apparently convinced that this was true, had already discussed this matter at a cabinet meeting. At the meeting, it was reported that Suharto likened PRD to PKI, the banned Indonesian Communist Party.

As was later revealed, there was in fact no connection between PRD and the riots of 27 July. On that day at around six AM, seven trucks pulled up outside the offices of the mainstream National Democratic Party, PDI, on Jalan Diponegoro in central Jakarta. With the assistance of military and police personnel, dozens of men with clubs and rocks in their hands jumped from the trucks. First they pelted the PDI offices, then stormed in. The dozens of people inside fought back, but they were soon overpowered and fled outside. The violence then moved beyond the perimeter of the complex. A crowd of angry young people, responding to the attack on the



▲ Head of the PRD, Budiman Sujatmiko, in a police vehicle after a court appearance, Jakarta, 1996.

IRID AGOES

Dr. Irid Agoes is Director of the Indonesian International Education Foundation (IIEF), which is currently administering the Indonesian portion of the Ford Foundation's International Fellowships Program (IFP) – the largest single grant in the history of the Foundation. Dr. Agoes is overseeing the annual selection of 45 marginalized students from a pool of 6,000 for fellowships to obtain a master's degree overseas. She hopes that through this program her dream of the world becoming a more peaceful place will be realized.

I had my first direct working relationship with the Ford Foundation in 1999, when I became the IIEF director. Ford is our biggest donor in terms of scholarship opportunities, and the first one I saw that year was the "Culture and Society" program offered to Indonesians accepted in graduate-degree courses, had a strong GPA and a great commitment to their education, but desperately needed financial assistance. Then in 2000, we saw an opportunity to help students from East Timor who could not finish their studies after the former province's referendum. Many East Timorese were studying in Indonesia at the time and they were cut off from their parents, and so we looked at this as an opportunity to help them, not only as individuals, but to help build the new country of East Timor. So we started the East Timor Scholarship Program, for East Timorese who were still at Indonesian universities and wanted to finish their studies. As a direct result of Ford and IIEF's starting that program many other donors started to help out, and by the time East Timor became completely independent, 200 of our students had graduated.

Our biggest program at the moment is administering the Indonesian portion of the Foundation's IFP. This, for Ford, is kind of a signature program. It provides opportunities for advanced study to exceptional individuals. By exceptional I mean not only the best and brightest, but, in particular, the marginalized. All the individuals applying for this program must come from disadvantaged or underserved societies, and in Indonesia that is mostly outside of Java. The program started in 2001 and we had 6,000 applications for 45 scholarships.

This is a program very different from other scholarship programs, because in Indonesia only 1.4 per cent of the population is educated above high-school level. If you

just consider Indonesian women, it is half a per cent. We look for students who have good track records with regard to their leadership experience in their communities. They can be academics, they can be people who are active in NGOs. And the great thing is, there is no age limit. This factor is especially important for women, because they do not always obtain their educational



Irid Agoes interviewing a scholarship applicant in Jakarta, 2003.

goals all in one go. They may have to interrupt their studies due to having to work, getting married, and starting a family, where traditionally the woman is the one who stays home with baby. Then, when the children are a little older they can resume their own education. For 2003 we have, again, 6,000 applicants, from which we must make selections to get 45 recipients.

With the experience gained from administering this program, we know it is not only Ford that must be involved as a funder – many more donors are required because the need is very clear, very big and very urgent. One obstacle faced by many

Indonesians, especially those coming from a marginalized background, is the fact that it is very difficult to get the English proficiency level that is expected for graduate studies overseas, or even within Indonesia; for example, UI asks for 550 TOEFL level. The way we overcome that hurdle is by training the students in English prior to their departure. Another challenge is their difficulty with writing academic papers. Ford and IIEF are helping by assisting universities outside of Java get training, but I think there is still a lot of hard work ahead, because our universities, as well as junior high and senior high schools will have to change the curriculum. If Ford really wants to have a successful program, we cannot do it halfway. We must figure out the real problems inherent in the Indonesian education system and correct them as soon as possible.

My involvement with the Ford scholarships is more than just a dream come true. I am an interculturalist; I was trained as an interculturalist; my degree is as an interculturalist; and an interculturalist's hope is to have a peaceful world. Marginalized people all over the world must have the chance to obtain a master's-level education. With their new skills and enthusiasm, they can then return to their homelands, to their home environment, to their villages, and help others. And while some programs focus on creating a better world through the elites of a society, Ford is looking at ways to have more equity, again through the marginalized. And I believe many of us administering this program know that it is not only the marginalized that are learning from us – it is we who are learning from them, as well. This is something that should be picked up and carried along by others so that the world can be a more peaceful place in the future.

BOOSTING BOOKS: PROGRAM PUSTAKA

It was 1998, a year after the Asian economic crisis had devastated the Indonesian economy, and shortly after Suharto's fall from power. Ira Suharno was a scientific researcher who put her faith in children – more particularly, in the education that would shape children into the new generation. She was impressed by a French book on environmental education that was aimed at children between the ages of five and 12. She carried the book around for weeks, until finally she decided to sit down and translate it, “just for the heck of it.” Four months later, she was done.

Initially, she wasn't too concerned about publishing her effort. “I would have been happy enough to use it as teaching material,” she said. She showed it to publishers and most of them agreed that it would be a tough book to sell.

Save one. Penerbit Djambatan, one of the country's oldest publishing houses, was interested. In October 2001, Suharno finally saw her name on the cover of her book. Academics, government officials, school principals, members of non-governmental organizations, and environmental advocates attended the launch. Soon, the book had started to make its way onto primary school curricula.

Belajar Mencintai Alam (Learning to Love Nature), was supported by the Ford-financed Program Pustaka. The program was founded in 1998 under the auspices of the Adikarya Foundation, a subsidiary of the Indonesian Publishers Association (*Ikatan Penerbit Indonesia*). Program Pustaka was originally set up to offset the crisis that at the time was paralyzing the book industry. The outlook was certainly bleak, because in just a few months the price

of paper had risen a staggering 250 per cent. Publishers around the country were wiped out virtually overnight.

The idea behind Program Pustaka was to subsidize publishers to encourage the production, not necessarily of popular books, but of high-quality titles in the social sciences and humanities. The relatively relaxed terms and conditions offered by the program were further relief to hard-pressed publishers. By the end of 2002, Adikarya had received some 1,800 manuscripts from over 100 publishing companies.

The Ford Foundation has determined only the grant structure. It has played no role in deciding the selection of books. That job rests with a local panel chosen by Adikarya and which, by most accounts, does its job with integrity.

The large number of useful books published so far has encouraged a battered industry and boosted the morale of local authors. From the beginning of Program Pustaka I to the end of Program Pustaka III in 2002, 445 titles were subsidized. The project reflects a healthy respect for reprints and translations, and a laudable effort to promote new talent. The Yogyakarta book industry has thrived precisely for this reason, as many small publishers there have burrowed into hitherto untapped material, such as local graduate theses previously buried in dusty university archives.

One heartening result of the program has been the rise of a new book design culture. This was fostered by Benteng Budaya, a Yogyakarta-based publisher. The use of exquisite artwork – traditional or

contemporary – in book covers has renewed the commercial appetite for titles in literature and the humanities. Suddenly books have become more attractive, and generally more affordable.

On the down side, meanwhile, relaxed monitoring has left loopholes in the program. Among the challenges have been profiteering from the extra pages that can be created by increasing font size and widening margins, deliberate overpricing, and patchy distribution. In Indonesia, distribution is the publishers' nemesis; in the worst cases, distributors gouge 50 to 70 per cent of the retail price. The practice is made worse by the false assumption that subsidized publications are naturally slow sellers. Publishers lack any commercial reason to sell the stock, which consequently rots in dusty warehouses rather than basks in the light of bookstore shelves.

Fortunately, the Ford Foundation has been supportive of the benchmarks achieved, and Program Pustaka was assessed and amended in 2002. Review and monitoring mechanisms are more stringent, with more scrutiny of the contracts that applicants must submit. New guidelines for retail pricing and print runs are enforced, and author consent is formally documented.

A new and encouraging thrust of the program focuses on regional publishing, with notable successes in Makassar and Pontianak. The program now provides additional assistance such as collaboration with local cultural centers in organizing activities like poetry readings and book galleries. And in the revised Program Pustaka, 20 per cent of the print run is now donated to libraries, book clubs, and book galleries around Indonesia.



LILIS N. HUSNA

Before the organization decided to remove itself from the political arena, many senior members of NU were involved in politics. Lilis N. Husna first became aware of the interaction between Islam and politics during her association with NU and the United Development Party. She also served a term in the People's Consultative Assembly. She was not selected for further terms because, she says, she was too critical of the status quo. Currently Ibu Lilis is involved in the Institute for the Study of Pesantren and Community (Lembaga Kajian Pesantren dan Masyarakat – Lakpesdam), a think tank operating under the NU umbrella. Since 2000, Lakpesdam has cooperated with Ford to implement the Forum Warga (Citizens Forums) program, which aims to create political space for the common people.

Community organizations should, of course, be involved in the process of democratization. However, many in Indonesia have been unable to develop into mass movements. For example, within NU, the *majelis taklim*, or council of elders, addresses itself exclusively to religious and spiritual issues. As a community organization, NU should be able to engage in negotiations to further members' interests and to create political space for them. The lack of political involvement results from the dysfunctional system left by the New Order. Unfortunately, it is not only the *majelis taklim* that is dysfunctional, but almost all mass-based community organizations.

Currently, most religious organizations are overwhelmingly preoccupied with ritual and dogma, not with facilitating change or representing the social and economic interests of their members. There is no concept of collective bargaining. Power is still regarded as the exclusive preserve of the elite. There is a lack of institutions representing civil society. That is what we are trying to change.

Forum Warga was established to help develop grass-roots democracy. It is a re-grouping of various elements within the community so that they have a voice in local decision-making. Most of Forum Warga's programs relate to good governance or decentralization.

Lakpesdam has helped establish Forum Warga in Jepara, Wonosobo, and Cilacap on the island of Java. We began with village workshops. These focused on economic and financial issues such as budgeting, an issue that has become increasingly important in the context of regional autonomy. We also facilitated the involvement of community members in the formulation of village policy.

It is the usual problem of development: how to ensure that programs meet the needs of those they are meant to benefit.

Several interesting lessons were learned from the Cilacap workshop. One of the major issues related to a prostitution complex



Lilis N. Husna in her office in Jakarta, 2003.

located in the village. There was some discussion as to how this complex could be eliminated. Some suggested simply burning it to the ground, arguing that it created conflict within the community. Eventually, representatives of the complex itself were asked to put their view. The meeting began with threats and recriminations, but ended in a compromise. It was agreed to build a fence to separate the complex from the village, and that one of the managers of the complex would continue to work with Forum Warga to develop mutual understanding. This

was a breakthrough – a group that had been completely ostracized from community affairs was engaged in a constructive dialog for everyone's benefit.

Next year another interesting event occurred. When the village conducted its annual audit, citizens were concerned about the source of revenues. An investigation found that a large portion derived from the prostitution complex. Each sex worker and each brothel manager had been required to contribute according to a formula. Many members of the community were shocked to discover that much of their municipal revenues derived from prostitution.

The council determined that the funds raised had been assigned to building the fence. However, some people were still unhappy, for three reasons. Religious law forbade prostitution, and therefore these funds were illegal. Regional regulations had ordered the complex to close, so it was wrong for the government to continue to collect revenue from it. And it was seen as inappropriate for a disadvantaged group such as prostitutes to be pressured to provide revenues for the community.

It was extremely unusual for these people to address such issues in a broad-minded fashion, particularly with religious officials heavily represented on the council. The case has still not been resolved. The important thing, however, has been the establishment of a framework by which such questions can be addressed. Other issues that Forum Warga has dealt with range from monopolies in the textile industry to intra-village conflicts. People understand that they have the right and the capability to express their views and defend their interests. Our role is to promote this idea, even if politicians have themselves not yet come to terms with its implications.

PDI office, went on a rampage. They set fire to several buildings in the area, including a government office. In all, five people died and 149 were injured.

The fury seen in the streets that day could be likened to a pressure cooker that had suddenly exploded. The PDI offices had become a symbol of the ongoing struggle between two factions in the party – one led by the government-supported Soerjadi, the other by Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia's first president, whom the government refused to recognize as the party's rightful leader. Because Megawati's faction considered her to be the rightful leader – she did in fact have more support than Soerjadi – its members had taken over the party's offices.

This was a clear challenge to the government. Unexpectedly, thousands of Jakarta residents and people from other cities showed their support for Megawati's camp by sending financial and in-kind donations. Visitors arrived in an

endless stream to show their support for the faction, which had refused to relinquish control of the party's offices. In a matter of days the site had turned into a center of resistance. Banners and posters jostled for space. A stage was erected. People made strident speeches against the New Order.

With this as their base, a number of groups active in the pro-democracy movement mobilized support for Megawati. President Suharto, who had simply wanted to rid the PDI of his predecessor's daughter, saw public sympathy abound for the very person he had wanted to oust. He ordered the military to take control of PDI offices, by force if necessary. This is what had sparked the riots of 27 July. PRD was not involved at all.

Unlike the past, in this conflict Suharto seemed to have lost his renowned ability for playing his cards with patience. In the public view, he was making a mountain out of a molehill. The PRD movement was militant, but small, and PDI's Megawati was no real threat to him.



▲ Police raid the PDI headquarters in Central Jakarta, 27 July 1996.

DEDE OETOMO

Dede Oetomo is a multi-talented person. Among his many skills and abilities he is a DJ. While working on his doctorate at Cornell, he once played at a party for the noted political scientist, Ben Anderson, whose favorite pop group, Dede says, is the Jackson Five. During his stay in chilly Ithaca, Dede played a major role in the social life of the town. On at least one occasion Abdurrahman Wahid, prior to his ascension to the presidency, spent a night on the plain mattress in Dede's guestroom. In addition to being a respected academic in linguistics, a member of the radical PRD, and an expert on gender in East Java, Dede, who was born in 1953, is one of Indonesia's foremost campaigners for gay rights.

The public discourse on HIV/AIDS in our community is still limited, and does not address the root causes of the disease or policies for treating it. Rather, confusion, misinformation, and complacency have characterized the whole issue, even though epidemiological research demonstrates a dramatic increase in rates of infection within specific groups, such as the users of injectable drugs and transsexuals, and within specific geographic zones, such as Riau and Papua.

While everyone is aware that AIDS is spread through sexual contact, little specific information is available. People are not necessarily aware that the most dangerous forms of contact are vaginal and anal intercourse, or that the receptive partner is at much greater risk. The level of knowledge about the transmission of HIV is still low. Thus, policies designed to protect the community have been extremely haphazard and poorly constructed.

Many policies designed to prevent the spread of HIV have been unrealistic. For example, there have been campaigns advising sex workers to refrain from having sexual intercourse, or advising them to remain faithful to a single partner. Slightly more realistically, many campaigns have focussed exclusively on condom use, without any attempt to publicize strategies for integrating condom use into a general pattern of safer sex, which may or may not entail the use of a condom. Regarding condoms, particularly in gay and transsexual circles, there is little discussion of the need for water-based lubricants, and so far no program for the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS provides lubricants for its clients. With the amount of unconstructive and ill-informed debate among policy makers

in the 1990s, it is little wonder that the public is confused.

I feel that most people are still reluctant to discuss issues related to sexuality openly and explicitly. There is a feeling that such discussion is not in accordance with "Eastern values." However, this reflects a hypocritical



Dede Oetomo at a conference in Surabaya, 1987.

elitist viewpoint. Among members of the working class, discussion of sex-related issues tends to be relatively open. The Ford Foundation has been developing a range of programs to foster open discussion of issues related to sexuality; to recognize the diverse range of sexual behavior; and to address lethal hypocrisy.

I studied English at junior high school with a book, *English for the SLTP* [junior high school], which was developed through

funding provided by Ford. Several of my lecturers were educated at IKIP [Teachers' Training College] Malang, where the English department was established with funding provided by the Foundation.

I received travel grants from Ford to go to Cornell in 1978 and in 1984. Cornell's Modern Indonesia Project, where I engaged in Indonesian area studies while I taught the Indonesian language, was established by Professor George McTurnan Kahin and Professor John M. Echols in the early 1950s with funding from the Ford Foundation. I received a research scholarship to assist with my dissertation from the Social Science Research Council, during 1983-1984, which was also funded by Ford. After I graduated, I became involved in research projects on gender, sexuality, and HIV/AIDS in Indonesia, many of which were and are funded by Ford.

Those to whom I have taught the Indonesian language have included many who have gone on to become significant scholars, including Robert Hefner, Joseph Errington, Joel Kuipers, Daniel Fietkiewicz, Yoshiko Yamamoto, Margaret Wiener, Abby Ruddick, Suzanne Siskel, John McDougall, Jeffrey Winters, Jeff Hadler, Audrey Kahin, Greg Acciaioli, Matthew Cohen, Jan Mrázek, Brenda Yanni, Anne Schiller, Suzanne Brenner, Karl Heider, Leslie Morris, Frances Gouda, Tim Jessup, Barry Drummond, Terry George, and Peter Slomanson.

I still remain in contact with many of these former students, both to discuss matters of professional interest and out of personal friendship. In fact, many of these people send their own students to me if their research areas focus on East Java, the Chinese in Indonesia, gender, sexuality, or HIV/AIDS.

For the government, however, the establishment of PRD and the growing popularity of Megawati were sure signs that something more dangerous was afoot. Pro-democracy groups that had never before been known for their effectiveness had begun working together. Some had been active for several years. There were other, newer ones as well, including the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), established after the government forced the closure of three magazines, *Tempo*, *DeTik*, and *Editor*. In 1996, these diverse groups banded together to form the Independent General Election Monitoring Committee (*Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu* – KIPP). Its aim was to observe the general elections to be held the following year and to guard against the government’s manipulating the voting process in favor of Golkar, as it had been accused of doing in the past.

The theory was that if KIPP served as an effective watchdog, there would be a reduction in the number votes reported for Golkar. PDI, which had advanced Megawati as its presidential candidate, would then have a greater chance of mounting a serious challenge to Suharto (at the time, presidential elections were indirect, with parliamentarians

casting the ballots that chose the president). This would demonstrate that Suharto would not forever be elected by a docile Parliament. No less important was the desire to show that elections need not be a forced ritual.

KIPP had yet another agenda: the establishment of a united opposition front. This paved the way for 30 NGOs and other organizations that supported Megawati to found the Indonesian People’s Council (*Majelis Rakyat Indonesia* – MARI). This became the central force in the pro-democracy movement.

The organization was not yet one year old when the 27 July riots took place, but from the very time that MARI was established, the government seemed willing to do anything to crush it. Two days before the July riots, Suharto himself had spoken publicly of the danger of “bald-faced devils” who were contributing to the political tension of the day. These devils, he said, must be exorcised.

In late October, Minister Soesilo Soedarman announced that of the more than 6000 registered community organizations in Indonesia, 32 were “problematic.” At the same time, he made a veiled threat. “Don’t be surprised,” he said, “if, at some point,



▲ Besides newspapers and magazines, even certain theater performances were banned – such as the Opera Kecoa (Cockroach Opera), a production of the Comma Theater led by Nano and Ratna Riantiarno.

RATNA RIANTIARNO

High-school students these days know all about handphones and designer shoes. But when Ratna Riantiarno brings them to the Jakarta Arts Building (Gedung Kesenian Jakarta – GKJ) or the Taman Ismail Marzuki to watch a performance, they look around in surprise and say, “Wow, this is the first time I’ve ever been here!” As an artist whose career in the theater is about twice as long as those students are old, Ibu Ratna is moved. Working with the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – DKJ) she directs a program to build high-school students’ appreciation for the performing arts.

We started from a concern about society’s declining interest in and appreciation of the arts. People see the arts as just entertainment – it’s OK if we have it, it’s OK if we don’t. They don’t see the arts as integral and necessary for a normal human life. In order to inspire interest in the arts, we at the DKJ have been conducting a program in “Performing Arts Appreciation for High-school Students” since 1998.

The program has two parts. First, we bring artists and their performances right into the schools so students and teachers can enjoy the arts directly. Second, to give students and teachers a more complete picture of what the arts involve, we also bring them to professional-level theaters and performance halls, where they can look behind the scenes at the backstage areas, the sets, properties, costumes, and lighting.

After any performance in our program, whether it is at a school or in a theater, we hold a question and answer session so the students can talk with the artists and performers.

Our program has made it possible for students to see performances by well-known artists and performing groups such as W. S. Rendra, the late Gusmiati Suid, Putu Wijaya, Boi Sakti, Teater Koma, Teater Payung Hitam, Teater Kubur, Dhalang Suket, Teater S’Mas, Seni Didi Mime, and Agus PM Toh. We have also offered presentations of traditional arts from many regions and ethnic groups of Indonesia – from Papua, Nias, Jambi, and Cirebon, from the Bugis, Minang, Badui, Betawi, and Batak.

Why should people appreciate the arts? I

see it like this: attending a performance is one element in the process of experiencing art. Even though the audience is passive, it has “prepared its heart,” made it available to art. This is the necessary first step to appreciation and respect for art.

The next step is to investigate how to

work of art.

When I was young, I saw a performance of Balinese dance. Really beautiful. I immediately began to study it, and I enjoyed it greatly. Later, when I was practicing Balinese dance at TIM, I saw Arifin C. Noer’s actors rehearsing theater. I thought, since I was already experienced in dancing on stage, that theater would be easy for me. After I joined the company, I found that there was a lot that I still had to learn. So the whole of the process of watching and then performing takes place inside us and can expand our understanding of the experience of art.


This complete process is what we are now trying to promote through DKJ. Our performances got warm and positive responses from students, but there were also requests for opportunities to learn how to play instruments, how to dance, how to act – basically, how to become performers. Because of this, we eventually added a new program in which we provide extracurricular instruction – mainly in traditional arts, so far – at selected high schools.

Students tell us that before our program they never knew about arts events and theaters in Jakarta; their parents or schools don’t take them to performances. So this is not a problem of their not having the money to attend. The calendars of events from the cultural centers also don’t reach them. As for an arts curriculum in the schools, it doesn’t exist. Our hope is that through this program students will gain a more complete understanding of the arts they see, study, and perform.



Ratna Riantiarno (left) in Tenung, an adaptation of Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, Jakarta, 1992.

become an active participant in performance, so that a shift of roles occurs: the individual moves from the passive role of audience to the active role of performer. For this one needs “strength of heart” and also time in order to undergo the process of creating a



▲ A street mural in Yogyakarta, 2003, created as part of an artistic exchange project. Yogyakarta artists, the Apotik Komik group, visited San Francisco with Foundation support, and the Clarion Alley Mural Project from San Francisco came to Yogyakarta. Each group created public murals and installations in the host city.

FRED WIBOWO

Recently, the proportion of television time dedicated to portraying traditional art forms has increased. This has not happened by accident; it is the result of intensive advocacy. In 1996, Fred Wibowo and several of his colleagues in Yogyakarta expressed their dissatisfaction with the way that television portrayed the traditional arts. Commercial television ignored them, while government-controlled stations saw them merely as aids to propaganda. With colleagues, Fred Wibowo worked to create an increased acceptance of these forms among the mass media. To some extent this advocacy has succeeded. The current popularity of traditional arts on commercial television indicates that these "old-fashioned" forms are both commercially viable and relevant to audiences.

I first became involved in traditional arts broadcasting in 1996. Prior to that, I had often discussed such issues with Jennifer Lindsay, then Ford program officer. I expressed my dissatisfaction with Indonesian television which then fell into two categories. There was TVRI, which was more or less a government propaganda organ, and there was private television, which was extremely commercially oriented. Stations in both categories showed little appreciation for the traditional arts or for any expression of regional values.

There was a perception among Indonesia's artists that the government was trying to standardise the arts across the nation and to make them subordinate to the propaganda needs of the ruling regime and the commercial interests of businesses associated with it. Like many other artists, I was appalled at this development and deeply worried that the true expression of regional and traditional values contained in the customs and arts of Indonesia's communities would be suppressed. This would amount to something approaching cultural genocide, the wilful destruction of an entire social environment.

I told Jennifer that I thought the media were the key. Radio and television did not allow traditional artists to engage with audiences on political and social issues. There was a need to create the possibility for such engagement.

One of the problems was that the owners of private radio and television remained unconvinced that broadcasts of traditional arts could be commercially viable. On the other hand, the managers of TVRI considered

the arts merely as a sweetener to make government propaganda more palatable to village audiences.

We encouraged representatives of private radio and television stations to take part in workshops and in other interactive processes with traditional artists in order to create pilot programs suitable for broadcast. If these



Fred Wibowo (standing) in his studio in Yogyakarta, 2003.

programs achieved high ratings, the private sector would naturally be expected to show more interest.

We wanted to establish that even though radio and television stations are managed as commercial ventures, they could be involved in fostering a multi-ethnic, pluralistic society in which every segment, every ethnic group, has a means of self-expression. We sought to establish that the media could play a bridging role in the establishment of a cross-cultural context that respected all the manifestations of human expression.

We have reached the stage where the owners of radio and television stations are convinced that at least some forms of traditional

arts can be commercially viable. We now see television broadcasts of *wayang kulit* [shadow puppetry] on Indosiar, *Kethoprak Humor* on RCTI, *Ludruk Glamour* on SCTV, *Lenong Rumpi*, and other genres. These popular programs demonstrate, however, that when the traditional arts are performed on radio and television, significant modifications to the form usually occur. There is an inevitable process of interaction with the media. As media guru Roger Fidler states, the media create change while at the same time are affected by change. He calls this "media-morphosis." Through a process of interaction between the media and the art form, something new emerges.

Unfortunately, to date, almost all performances of traditional arts on television have been Javanese. By contrast, radio stations have broadcast genres of traditional music from different areas and cultural groups, including relatively obscure and isolated ones.

Traditional arts are usually intimately related to the social structure and values of the group from which they emerge, but when only small segments of a performance are staged or broadcast, this link is often broken. It might be easiest to address this issue by using documentaries. Unfortunately, this format is still unpopular with Indonesian television stations. After being subjected to intensive lobbying, SCTV has created a documentary program covering the traditional arts, under the name *Potret* [Portrait]. Indosiar and ANTV have also begun efforts in the same direction.


the government takes steps against these organizations.” Although he did not provide a list of names, the number was about the same as the list of organizations that had joined to form MARI. Thirty people from among the council were later arrested, a move by the government that caused most activists to duck and cover.

After that, the 1997 general elections proceeded as the government had planned. Suharto was elected president for the seventh time. He thought he had succeeded in showing that KIPP, MARI, and the other opposition groups had no real power, that they were but short-lived voices of dissent. He was wrong. As repression became more widespread, there came to be more and more agreement among the opposition groups and the public that Indonesia needed a change of regime.

The monetary crisis, which had begun as a distant tremor, eventually – and unexpectedly – provided the opportunity for change. When Suharto began to fall, there was no one to support him.

Thus, with a terrific jolt the 1990s ended without Suharto. Since that time, the country has been experimenting with democracy in ways sometimes nerve-racking, but often inspiring. The experiment began after that colorless, ten-minute ceremony on 21 May 1998, when B. J. Habibie became the third president of Indonesia. Amid the reservations of many, Suharto had selected Habibie as his vice president. For Suharto, though, his choice of vice president had always been immaterial – the position was decorative at most.

As was the case with so many of the more prominent figures in the New Order government, Habibie had no experience as a political leader. What’s more, having lived in Germany for many years, he was often unable to interpret the nuances of Indonesian politics. The question was: would he be able to survive? He did, though only until the general elections the following year. Even though they resulted in his dismissal, they were the freest elections Indonesia had seen since 1955.



▲ *President Suharto’s seventh, and final, inauguration. 11 March 1998.*

RIBUT SUSANTO

Riau is a province extremely rich in oil, but under the Suharto regime most of its wealth was siphoned to Jakarta. Local residents, particularly those of Melayu descent, are increasingly protesting what they view as unfair central government policy. With the fall of Suharto, the question of control of oil resources has come under heavy debate, with a strong argument being made for increased control by locals. Ribut Susanto, of the Riau Mandiri Foundation, is one person from his province who has made it his mission to seek justice from Jakarta.

The fall of President Suharto and the subsequent enactment of the Regional Autonomy Law have resulted in a great direct benefit for Riau. Riau has received a significant cash inflow due to its forest and other natural resources. In the past, Riau's annual budget was around 400 billion rupiah. Now, the figure is closer to 8 trillion. This has enabled regional and city governments to carry out more local development programs, such as the building of bridges, hospitals, roads, and schools. Of course, there have been power struggles between provincial and district governments, and the inevitable claims of budgetary irregularities.

Unfortunately, the increased budget has not resulted in an improved level of community participation in the planning and formulation of development projects. This is what the Riau Mandiri Foundation wants to facilitate – we want to bring autonomy to the community. This could be achieved through the village planning process, for example.

At present, if a community wants to improve the welfare of its members, there is no clear path to achieve this. At the village level, the Regional Development Planning Board may make proposals, but it does so without community participation. Usually, the headman decides by himself. Over the past two or three years, however, the community has begun to become empowered. In 1999, Riau Mandiri, together with 13 other organizations, launched a civil action against the local government, on the grounds that the budget had been formulated without sufficient consideration for community interests.

Riau Mandiri runs several programs. It has established the Riau Forest Resources Network to conserve forest resources. It also conducts programs to address issues related

to environmental waste, disadvantaged people, and land cases. It provides education to develop the resources of organizations throughout Riau. NGOs have developed rapidly in Riau. In June 1998, five community self-help organizations existed; now there are 400. This has created an almost euphoric



Ribut Susanto outside his office at Riau Mandiri, 2003.

atmosphere among those in this sector.

Riau Mandiri was originally established by a group of friends involved in the Riau University Nature Lovers Club. The group felt that it would be able to achieve little within the confines of the university, and so Riau Mandiri was established in 1989. In 1999, Riau Mandiri worked with Ford to establish a program to foster community involvement in the formulation of the state budget. This program has expanded from a single city to three districts. At first, Ford sponsored the

program only in Dumai.

Recently, there have been increased calls for an independent Riau. This is partly a reaction against perceived central government injustices. It is also something of a negotiating gambit. It is extremely ironic that Riau is the second poorest province in Sumatra after Lampung. In the 1970s and 1980s, Riau's oil reserves provided Indonesia with up to 60 per cent of its foreign exchange.

The increase in the budget to 8 trillion rupiah is still not enough. Caltex alone pays Pertamina 17 trillion rupiah each year. Pertamina passes on a mere 6.2 trillion to the Department of Finance. Riau only receives 1.2 trillion of that. So, of 17 trillion rupiah, only 1.2 trillion comes back to Riau. Of course the local community considers that unfair.

Riau is also suffering an identity crisis, something experienced also in Papua and Aceh. For example, it is now expected that the heads of city, district, and provincial governments will be members of the Melayu ethnic group. At present, all government heads are Melayu. A large number of Riau's residents, however, come from other groups. If I'm not mistaken, 45 per cent of the population of Riau comes from non-Melayu backgrounds.

In the past, outsiders dominated Riau. I can understand why locals felt disenfranchised. They were unfairly discriminated against. For example, with the division of land by a palm-oil operation, newcomers would get two hectares, while locals who surrendered their land received nothing. Many injustices occurred under the Suharto regime. Now, the community is claiming back assets that they feel were taken from them. That's why unrest has occurred throughout Riau, with struggles over land frequently taking place between locals and newcomers.

Under Megawati, the faction of the Indonesian Democratic Party that she led reestablished itself as PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. It quickly emerged as the nation's leading political contender. Megawati's own prestige had been greatly bolstered by the so-called "27 July Incident." The public saw her as having been unjustly persecuted. In the 1998 general election, her party prevailed.

PDI-P's victory did not automatically give Megawati the presidential chair her father had occupied. The party, enthralled perhaps by its victory at the polls, had not bothered to form a coalition in Parliament. Thus, when Abdurrahman Wahid stepped forward and nominated himself as president, Megawati found herself without the votes to defeat him. So Wahid, himself an unelected Parliamentary representative, became Indonesia's new president.

Wahid was inaugurated as Indonesia's fourth head of state with Habibie in attendance, and with that the world witnessed a peaceful changing of the guard unprecedented in Indonesia's history. The country's new president made no high-sounding promises. The outgoing leader did not complain. In his final

speech as president, Habibie asked only that he be remembered as a person who had restored democracy in Indonesia.

But democracy could not, of course, be restored by one person, let alone by someone who had been so close to Suharto and who had never been known as a supporter of democratic freedoms. History will note, however, that under Habibie the press was unshackled, political parties were allowed to form freely, and the country's regions were granted autonomy. Notably, East Timor was also freed – 20 years after Suharto had brought it into Indonesia by force – even though the process was precipitous and resulted in bloodshed.

It is possible that Habibie had no real plans for reform on this scale – he was after all a "Suharto man" – but was forced to take these measures. Habibie had been the target of continual attacks by students and the pro-democracy movement – the actual victors in the felling of Suharto. His position was like that of the military. He was not integral to change. In fact he was viewed with suspicion and as a possible barrier to change. But with the surge of democratic sentiment around him, Habibie had no choice but to adapt.



▲ *Abdurrahman Wahid is congratulated by B.J. Habibie, marking Indonesia's first peaceful presidential succession, Jakarta, 1999.*

► *Pancur Kasih is one of a number of NGOs throughout Indonesia that helps villagers use maps to protect communal lands from external encroachment, Pontianak, 2003.*

YAYAH KHISBIYAH

Muhammadiyah is often considered unsympathetic, even antagonistic, to Indonesia's local arts and cultures. Yayah Khisbiyah has worked to overcome this divide between the highly influential Islamic organization and the arts community. Ibu Yayah hopes that members of Muhammadiyah will learn to appreciate local cultures and art forms, without considering them antagonistic to their religious beliefs. She says that there is still a tendency among members of Muhammadiyah to identify with the Arab world in matters related to the arts, rather than with their own cultures, on the grounds that anything derived from the Arab world is intrinsically Islamic. Ibu Yayah, who graduated with a degree in psychology from the University of Massachusetts, teaches at Muhammadiyah University in Surakarta (Solo).

The concept for the program that I developed in cooperation with the Foundation emerged after I started teaching in Solo, in 1997. I had just finished college in Massachusetts, prior to which I had been in Yogya. I quickly became aware that the academic environment in Solo was extremely isolationist. There was a strong orthodoxy deriving from a conventional and narrow interpretation of Islam.

When I looked at the bigger picture, I came to realize that the university was not unusual. There was a strong prejudice against the arts, particularly those influenced by local cultures. This prejudice derived from a perception that local cultures have been heavily influenced by the values of other religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. Thus, local arts were deprecated or even considered *haram*, forbidden under religious law.

Within Muhammadiyah there is a body, *Majelis Tarjih*, whose function is to issue rulings on doctrinal issues. These rulings are presented in an easy-to-understand format, in books and pamphlets and so on. One such book is entitled *Muhammadiyah Guide to Living in Accord with Islam*. This book, which is still in use, states that the arts are intrinsically *makruh*, detrimental to believers, because they distract people from God.

In order to create a dialog, I tried to facilitate discussions between religious figures from *Majelis Tarjih* and experts in local culture and society.

Muhammadiyah fulfils both a social and a religious function. Two focus areas for the organization are health and education, and

there are many Muhammadiyah hospitals and schools around the country. I worked in the area of education. Muhammadiyah operates 160 higher educational institutions throughout Indonesia, as well as thousands of secondary and primary facilities. So, I felt that we could achieve change by changing school policies.



Yayah Khisbiyah at a seminar in Surakarta, 2001.


I am currently conducting a pilot study with Ford support for developing appreciation of local arts in six schools. I have become aware that while discussions with religious figures within Muhammadiyah are important, it will take a long time before they result in direct change. So, we are also involved in fostering an appreciation of art in schools. We are focusing on primary schools, where there is still hope for the kids. The program is not intended to develop accomplished artists, but at least an appreciation of local cultures in a pluralistic society. I want Indonesia's younger generation, including the students of Muhammadiyah, to appreciate pluralism,

which is an intrinsic part of life in this country.

At times, we have been considered too radical in our attempts to foster an appreciation of the arts within Muhammadiyah. Within the organization there is a school of thought that supports the arts only so far as they can be used in missionary activities. For example, *wayang* [puppetry] is adapted to present Islamic teachings. Dance is modified so that no body parts are exposed. We don't really object to this, but we do feel that it misses the point that the arts should be appreciated on their own terms, as articulated by artists, and not made to serve some didactic purpose. That viewpoint is still rejected by many conservative religious figures. The arts are still expected to conform to Islamic values, which have been defined in narrow terms.

Of course there has been resistance to our ideas. We expected that and planned for it. The best means for overcoming this resistance is through discussions between arts and religious figures.

We have also tried to change the way of thinking of Muhammadiyah leadership. For example, we held a special performance for them in which we invited Sardono W. Kusumo to stage a performance of his *Opera Diponegoro*. That was quite controversial. The leaders asked why Nyai Loro Kidul was portrayed so provocatively. At first, they didn't see this in the context of Prince Diponegoro's resistance to the blandishments of the queen, of his struggle for purity, but we had a lively talk afterwards. Frequent discussions are extremely important, but we are fully aware that it will take time to achieve change.





During Habibie's short-lived presidency, Indonesia shed much of its fear. The military, which for years had been used by the government to suppress dissent, saw its power diminished. In the face of strong opposition from the pro-democracy movement, Habibie backed away from pushing a proposed Internal Security Act through Parliament. The nation was no longer marching in one step. Noisily, messily, sometimes even frighteningly, Indonesia was rediscovering its pluralism.

This search continued during Wahid's presidency. He was not the most capable executive, perhaps, but as the leader of NU and as a respected figure in the NGO movement, he was no stranger to differences.

The role of Pancasila in national life was demoted from that of being the sole guiding principle for organizations. Village governments ceased to have to conform to a single centrally-determined structure. Traditional communities were no longer threatened with being torn further from their roots. Laborers as well as journalists could form their own organizations. Islam no longer meant one community with a single interpretation. Indonesians of Chinese descent no longer were afraid to stage *wayang potehi* performances at their Confucian temples. Women were no longer defined as mere pillars of the bureaucracy, but became active in bringing forward progressive ideas, from issues of reproductive rights to new interpretations of scripture.

Not all was painless, however. In Papua and in Aceh, local calls for separation from the republic intensified. In West Kalimantan, horrifying clashes ignited between the indigenous Dayak people and Madurese settlers. In early 1999, conflict between Muslims and Christians erupted in Ambon, a fierce dispute that spread rapidly and proved difficult to quell.

With Indonesia's legal institutions as corrupt as ever, and with the nation's security apparatus blithely offering assistance in the form of men and arms to whatever party would pay for them, conflict resolution continued to take place outside the courtroom, often with violence. In many areas, particularly in large cities, groups of uniformed thugs sprang up. Acceptable methods that might entice conflicting parties to come to the negotiating table were abandoned. Compromise no longer existed.

Amid the country's institutional ruins, the political parties that had come out ahead in the elections proved to be incapable of stimulating change. The elections, which had been organized in the space of just one year, brought representatives with no political experience to Parliament. With a nearly complete lack of exemplary models from the New Order's 32-year history, they had nowhere to look for guidance. In addition, the system that brought them to office had been in place since Indonesia's beginnings: legislators gained their seats not through direct elections but through appointment by their political parties. With no obligation to answer to the electorate, legislators could get away with practically anything, including the buying and selling of votes.

Indonesia finally faced the reality that democracy, a system for dealing with differences, would not lead down a well-ordered garden path. Instead, it was a road full of deep potholes, strewn with sharp nails, filth, and ill-intentioned people. Not everyone could survive there.

That was the issue that the people who had sought to topple Suharto now faced: how to promote the democratic freedoms they had so recently found? Many chose not to travel the political route. In fact, going into politics was a step they avoided. According to Zohra Andi Baso, an activist from Makassar, they were filled with "romantic notions." They thought that by keeping their independence from political parties and Parliament, they could remain untainted. In fact, it left them without the leverage they would need to institute change.

The outburst of diversity after the fall of the New Order paved the way for a variety of modes of political engagement. For example, Lilis N. Husna, an activist in NU, established a Forum Warga whose mission was to steadily build influence within the existing political structure. She hoped that the messy democratic methods of the early post-Suharto days would evolve into more stable and civil forms.

Democracy is indeed a huge experiment. It offers no promise of perfection. It is a continuous journey to improve, to change, and to give shape to a better society through orderly and non-violent means. It is a journey that demands humility. And in this story, that journey is called Indonesia.



APPENDICES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADC	Agricultural Development Council	IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)	IIE	Institute of International Education
APIK	Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (Indonesian Women's Association for Justice)	ILO	International Labor Organization
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning Board)	IMF	International Monetary Fund
BKKBN	Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Planning Coordinating Board)	INGI	International NGO Group on Indonesia
BPN	Badan Perancang Nasional (Central Planning Bureau)	IPB	Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Institute of Agriculture)
BPPC	Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (Clove Support and Trading Board)	IPTN	Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Indonesian National Aircraft Industry)
BPS	Badan Pendukung Soekarnoisme (Sukarnoism Support Group)	IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
BPTRI	Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia (National Center of Higher Education)	ISAI	Institut Studi Arus Informasi (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information)
CGMI	Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students Movement Center)	ISEI	Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Economists)
CIFOR	The Center for International Forestry Research	ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations	JEN	Jaringan Epidemiologi Nasional (National Epidemiological Network)
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies	KEPAS	Kelompok Penelitian Agro-eko Sistem (Agro-Ecosystem Research Group)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)	KIPP	Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (General Election Monitoring Committee)
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration	Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Human Rights Commission)
FEUI	Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia (Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia)	Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)	Kopkamtib	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
HSI	Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Scholars)	Leknas	Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (National Institute for Economics and Social Research)
HKBP	Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (Indonesian Batak Protestant Church)	LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students Federation)	LKEN	Lembaga Kajian Ekonomi Nasional (National Institute for Economic Research)
IAIN	Institut Agama Islam Negara (State Institute for Islamic Studies)	LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information)
IFP	International Fellowships Program		

LP3Y	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerbitan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Institute for Research, Education, and Publications)	PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
LPEM	Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat (Institute of Economic and Social Research)	PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
LPPM	Lembaga Pengembangan dan Penelitian Manajemen (Institute for Development and Management Research)	PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratic Peoples Party)
LSM	Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Community Self-help Organization)	PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic)
Malari	Malapetaka Limabelas Januari (The January 15 th Incident)	PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
MARI	Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian Peoples Council)	Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan)
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians)	Seskoad	Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Staff College)
MIPI	Majelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Science and Learning)	Sticusa	Stichting Culturele Samenwerking
NICA	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration	TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army)
NIGO	Nederlandse Indische Guerilla Organisatie (Dutch Indies Guerrilla Organization)	TIM	Taman Ismail Marzuki
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama	TMII	Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature)
P3M	Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (Indonesian Society for <i>Pesantren</i> and Community Development)	TRIP	Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar (Republican Youth Army)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)	UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)	UI	Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
Permesta	Perjuangan Semesta (Universal Struggle)	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
PIAR	Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat (Association for the Development of Initiative and Community Advocacy)	USIS	United States Information Service
PKBI	Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association)	WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (Indonesian Environmental Forum)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)	WALDA	Wahana Lestari Persada (Movement for Preservation of Homeland)
PMKRI	Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Catholic Students Association)	YIIS	Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial (Social Sciences Foundation)
		YLBHI	Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)
		YLKI	Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (Indonesian Consumers Association)
		YPMD	Yayasan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Advancement Foundation)

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AR=Assistant Representative, atR=assistant to Representative, aR=Acting Representative, R=Representative, AA=Administrative Associate, PA=Program Associate, TA=Training Associate, PS=Project Specialist, APO=Assistant Program Officer, RD=Representative Designate, RA=Research Assistant, PO=Program Officer, C=Consultant

CONSULTANTS

Over the past 50 years, a very large number of people have served in a wide range of advisory, administrative, and consultative positions. Some consultants served long term, while others had very brief assignments. In the case of a few expatriates, only a surname was listed in available reports. We have endeavored to include all consultants, but the possibility exists that some names inadvertently may have been omitted.

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MENYAMBUT INDONESIA

Lima Puluh Tahun dengan Ford Foundation 1953-2003



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Lima Puluh Tahun dengan Ford Foundation 1953-2003

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◀ *Perempuan dari desa di Tengger, Jawa Timur, 1990.*

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P E N G A N T A R

SEBUAH PERAYAAN

Cerita tentang 50 tahun keberadaan Ford Foundation di Indonesia terkait dengan dua isu besar yang mewarnai hubungan antar bangsa pada paruh kedua abad ke-20: berdirinya negara-bangsa serta terjadinya modernisasi dan pembangunan. Cerita ini juga membeberkan riwayat sebuah organisasi Amerika Serikat yang berusaha berperan efektif dan relevan di dunia yang berubah dengan cepat. Karya Ford Foundation, di Indonesia dan di tempat lain, berakar pada budaya filantropi Amerika. Budaya ini muncul pada akhir 1800-an dan merupakan akibat dari tiga hal: perluasan industri di Amerika, cita-cita tentang reformasi sosial, dan sistem perpajakan yang mendorong tumbuhnya kedermawanan.

Sejak awal berdirinya, Ford Foundation tidaklah berfungsi sebagai badan amal (*charity*), yang menyediakan jasa atau bantuan langsung kepada mereka yang membutuhkan, tapi sebagai *filantropi*. Menurut kamus, *filantropi* berarti “suatu usaha aktif untuk memajukan kesejahteraan manusia.” Ford Foundation bekerja untuk menciptakan perubahan positif di bidang kerja yang strategis. Misi Ford Foundation adalah: memperkuat nilai-nilai demokratis, mengurangi ketidakadilan dan kemiskinan, mendukung kerjasama internasional, dan meningkatkan karya manusia.

- ◀ *Memajangkan tenun ikat Dayak di Pontianak, Kalimantan Barat, 2003. Membantu pewarisan seni tradisional, termasuk tenun dan tekstil, ke generasi muda merupakan salah satu tema dari kegiatan pendanaan Ford Foundation di Indonesia dalam bidang seni dan budaya.*

Ford Foundation didirikan pada 1936 sebagai organisasi filantropi lokal di negara bagian Michigan, Amerika Serikat, dengan memanfaatkan sumbangan saham Ford Motor Company dari Henry dan Edsel Ford bersaudara. Sesudah kekacauan dan kehancuran Perang Dunia II, dan dengan mengantisipasi tambahan hibah dari keluarga Ford, maka Ford Foundation melakukan sebuah studi (yang dikenal sebagai “Laporan Gaither”) untuk mencari arah baru. Pada 1950, Dewan Penyantun Ford Foundation mengambil keputusan yang bersejarah dengan memperluas kerja organisasi ini menjadi sebuah yayasan nasional dan internasional. Keputusan tersebut mengutamakan perdamaian. “Di antara semua masalah hubungan antarmanusia,” demikian Dewan Penyantun, “tantangan yang paling besar adalah mewujudkan perdamaian di seluruh dunia.” Dewan Penyantun mengatakan hanya dengan meningkatkan kondisi sosial dan ekonomi masyarakat di seluruh dunialah maka perang bisa dihindari. Mereka mengamanatkan agar dana Ford Foundation dikelola sebagai sumber daya yang bisa mendukung cita-cita dan pekerjaan itu secara abadi. Lama-kelamaan Ford Foundation juga melakukan divestasi saham Ford Motor Company, dan keluarga Ford tak lagi dilibatkan dengan urusan-urusan organisasi ini.

Di bawah presiden pertama, Paul Hoffman, Ford Foundation mulai bekerja di luar Amerika, dengan memusatkan perhatian pada negara-negara yang baru muncul atau merdeka, mereka yang tengah berjuang membentuk pemerintahan yang demokratis. Sebelum memimpin Ford Foundation, Hoffman adalah salah satu arsitek utama Marshall Plan di Eropa. Ia mengembangkan program luar negeri dengan memusatkan perhatian pada kebutuhan setiap negara, berkonsultasi dengan pemerintahnya tentang kepentingan mereka, dan membangun kantor perwakilan Ford Foundation agar mereka bisa bekerja tidak jauh dari kegiatannya. Ini prinsip operasi Ford Foundation di seluruh dunia yang bertahan sampai hari ini.

Di negara-negara tempat Ford Foundation mulai bekerja sejak 1950-an, hanya dua yang masih mempunyai kantor perwakilan: India (kantor dibuka pada 1952) dan Indonesia (1953). Saat ini di Asia, Ford Foundation juga mempunyai perwakilan di Cina dan Vietnam, dan pernah mempunyai kantor di Bangladesh, Burma, Jepang, Malaysia, Pakistan, Filipina, dan Thailand. Pada 1950-an Ford Foundation memandang Indonesia sebagai “sebuah negara yang mempunyai makna unik.” Alasannya: perubahan di Indonesia berlangsung cepat dan bergejolak, dari negara jajahan menjadi negara merdeka; kebutuhannya besar untuk meningkatkan sumber daya manusia; dan karena Indonesia kelihatannya (dalam paradigma politik zaman itu) memiliki “suatu peluang yang nyata untuk membangun secara demokratis.” Memang pada masa-masa awal Perang Dingin, para pemimpin Ford Foundation, sebagaimana juga pemerintah Amerika, prihatin dengan merebaknya komunisme di Asia, dan Indonesia dipandang sebagai wilayah pertarungan antara totalitarianisme dan masyarakat merdeka.

Pada 1952, sebuah tim Ford Foundation yang mengunjungi Indonesia berkesimpulan bahwa Indonesia sangat memerlukan para administrator yang cakap dan harus meningkatkan produksi beras, mutu kesehatan, dan mutu pendidikan bahasa Inggris. Indonesia waktu itu berpenduduk 75 juta, populasinya keenam terbesar di dunia. Ia juga mempunyai sumber daya hutan yang luas serta kekayaan laut dan mineral. Tapi penduduknya melarat karena meluasnya kemiskinan sesudah masa Malaise, pendudukan Jepang, serta perang kemerdekaan 1940-an. Hanya sepuluh persen orang Indonesia yang mampu membaca. Ini beda dengan India, di mana penduduknya dididik oleh Inggris untuk menduduki jabatan dalam birokrasi. Kebijakan kolonial Belanda sangat membatasi kesempatan “penduduk asli” untuk mendapatkan pendidikan.







Pemerintah Indonesia menyambut kedatangan Ford Foundation, dan Presiden Sukarno sendiri merestui program peningkatan bahasa Inggris dan pelatihan pegawai negeri. Dalam sebuah memoar yang tak diterbitkan, salah satu wakil Ford Foundation pada masa-masa awal di Jakarta, John Bresnan, menyatakan bahwa “sebuah organisasi filantropi swasta Amerika seperti Ford Foundation bisa menjadi sebuah alternatif [bagi Sukarno] ketimbang pemerintah Amerika Serikat” (negara yang dengan enggan mendukung perjuangan kemerdekaan Indonesia). Sebuah kantor di Hotel des Indes dibuka pada Juni 1953, tapi kegiatannya berjalan sangat lambat. Baru dengan kedatangan seorang mantan aktivis buruh bernama Michael Harris, yang mengambil alih kepemimpinan Ford Foundation di Jakarta pada 1955, organisasi ini bergegas memainkan perannya.

Selama 50 tahun kerjanya di Indonesia, Ford Foundation telah mengeluarkan dana sebesar US\$420 juta (dalam dollar sekarang) di berbagai bidang. Untuk seluruh dunia, jumlah hibah dan pinjaman Ford Foundation sebesar \$12 milyar. Ford Foundation tetap merupakan organisasi independen, nirlaba, dan nonpemerintah, yang tak menerima sumbangan dari pemerintah atau lembaga donor mana pun. Dewan Penyantun Ford

Foundation menetapkan kebijakan dan mendelegasikan wewenang penyaluran dana dan operasi kepada presiden dan staf senior yang bekerja di New York dan 12 kantor (sekarang ini) di berbagai negara. Program-program di Indonesia dikaitkan dengan program di negara-negara lain di seluruh dunia, guna mendukung pertukaran gagasan dan strategi, serta mendukung kerja sama internasional di antara para staf dan penerima hibah.

Keadaan Indonesia hari ini sangat berbeda dengan 1953. Sekarang terdapat 212 juta penduduk dengan tingkat melek huruf mendekati 90 persen dan pendapatan per kapita tumbuh dari \$30 pada awal 1960-an ke sekitar \$900 saat ini. Sekolah, sarana kesehatan, komunikasi modern, dan prasarana dasar sudah menyebar ke seluruh pelosok negeri. Berbagai pemerintah – dari Demokrasi Terpimpinnya Sukarno ke Orde Barunya Suharto, disisipi kepemimpinan singkat B.J. Habibie dan Abdurrahman Wahid, hingga pemerintahan Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri – berjuang untuk meningkatkan taraf hidup rakyat, keadilan sosial, dan toleransi terhadap keragaman. Berbagai kebijakan pemerintah dan dampaknya, bersama dengan perubahan sosial-ekonomi global dan lokal, menjadi konteks bagi semua upaya Ford Foundation.



▲ *Michael Harris, wakil Ford Foundation di Indonesia, dengan sekretarisnya, Miss Cunningham, di kantor mereka di Hotel des Indes, 1957.*
 ◀ *Hotel des Indes, tempat Ford Foundation membuka kantor pertamanya di Indonesia pada 1953.*

Selama masa 50 tahun ini, program-program bantuan Ford Foundation di Indonesia juga berubah dan berkembang. Perubahan terjadi sesuai dengan hasil analisis para staf tentang bagaimana cara mereka mencari peluang untuk mewujudkan perubahan yang diharapkan. Kegiatan pada dasawarsa pertama dipusatkan pada pendirian fakultas-fakultas ekonomi, lembaga pelatihan guru, dan peningkatan kemampuan berbahasa Inggris. Kebanyakan hibah pada waktu itu diberikan untuk bidang pendidikan; ada lebih dari 300 guru dan pejabat pendidikan yang belajar di luar negeri. Belakangan, banyak dari mereka yang menempati posisi kunci dalam pemerintahan dan universitas. Yang paling terkenal dari mereka adalah sekelompok “teknokrat” yang belajar di berbagai universitas terkenal di Amerika Serikat seperti University of California, Berkeley, dan Massachusetts Institute of Technology, dan sering disebut “Mafia Berkeley.”

Pada 1965, ketegangan politik memaksa penutupan sementara kantor Ford Foundation di Jakarta. Ketika dibuka kembali pada 1967, Ford Foundation memutuskan untuk menambah kegiatan baru dengan mendukung program Keluarga Berencana, penelitian tentang padi, pelatihan di

bidang ilmu-ilmu sosial, dan perencanaan pembangunan nasional. Perhatian itu menjadi tonggak kerja Ford Foundation pada 1970-an, tapi ia tetap mendanai pendidikan tinggi bagi orang-orang Indonesia. Pendekatan Ford Foundation kali ini sangat dipengaruhi oleh analisis antropolog Clifford Geertz pada 1971 tentang pendidikan ilmu-ilmu sosial. Geertz menulis bahwa “kehidupan intelektual di Indonesia bersifat sentralistis, terlalu diatur, praktis, dan sangat dipengaruhi oleh para ekonom.” Geertz mengatakan bahwa ilmu-ilmu sosial perlu digugah melalui suatu program pelatihan lewat universitas-universitas di daerah, “dengan warna kedaerahan,” yang analisis dan metode penelitiannya didasarkan pada kerja lapangan daripada teori-teori abstrak. Hasilnya, Ford Foundation membantu pendirian Pusat Pelatihan dan Penelitian Ilmu Sosial, dan memperluas dukungannya untuk ilmu-ilmu sosial selain ekonomi.

Memasuki 1980-an, perhatian kepada ilmu sosial ini memperkuat kapasitas Ford Foundation untuk membantu Indonesia memerangi kemiskinan di daerah pedesaan, tempat tinggal 80 persen penduduknya. Pada 1982 Bank Dunia menggolongkan Indonesia sebagai “negara berpendapatan



▲ Taufik Abdullah (Cornell), Alfian (Wisconsin), Harsja Bachtiar (Harvard), Soedradjad Djiwandono (Wisconsin), Mely G. Tån (UC Berkeley), dan Algamar (Wisconsin) di depan Sather Gate, UC Berkeley, untuk sebuah pertemuan para penerima beasiswa Ford Foundation yang diseleksi oleh Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), 1966.





▲ dan ► Para peneliti dari Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, sedang mewawancarai petani tentang cara mereka bercocok tanam. Penelitian ini didanai Ford Foundation. ◀ Konservasi naskah kuno dalam Keraton Surakarta. Ford Foundation membantu mengawetkan, menyusun katalog, serta membuat mikrofilm dari naskah-naskah lapuk sejak 1984.

menengah.” Bersama negara-negara ASEAN lainnya, Indonesia dinilai telah memiliki stabilitas politik dan pertumbuhan ekonomi lumayan selama beberapa tahun. Tapi stabilitas ini diwarnai dengan tekanan militer, pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, dominasi elit bisnis dan militer Indonesia, dan membesarnya jurang antara miskin dan kaya.

Kedadaan ini mendorong Ford Foundation untuk semakin menekankan program-programnya dalam pengelolaan sumber daya air dan tanah oleh masyarakat setempat, peningkatan hasil agro-ekosistem yang memperhatikan sektor tenaga kerja informalnya, dan peningkatan keterlibatan masyarakat pada pembangunan. Program lain pada masa ini adalah bantuan untuk berbagai organisasi nonpemerintah yang baru tumbuh dan berjuang untuk penegakan hukum dan hak asasi manusia, lingkungan hidup, kepentingan konsumen, dan kesetaraan gender. Yang juga sama pentingnya adalah meningkatnya bantuan untuk pekerjaan di bidang penafsiran dan penghargaan budaya, agar orang Indonesia bisa tetap

mempelajari, mendokumentasi, dan melestarikan tradisi-tradisi di Indonesia yang begitu kaya dan beragam.

Antara 1981 dan 1995, kantor di Jakarta juga merangkap sebagai kantor wilayah Ford Foundation Asia Tenggara, sehingga perhatian geografis serta dampak kerjanya semakin meluas. Pada masa ini pemberian dana di Indonesia, Filipina, Thailand, dan Vietnam dikelola dari Jakarta, dan staf di Indonesia seringkali menangani kegiatan yang sejajar di negara-negara itu.

Pada 1990-an, makin jelas bahwa gerakan melawan rezim Orde Baru – yang sebelumnya terpecah-pecah – semakin meningkat dan muncul dari berbagai sektor. Gerakan ini dipicu oleh kesenjangan ekonomi, korupsi, dan tidak adanya kebebasan berpolitik. Para penerima hibah Ford Foundation juga makin banyak bekerja untuk mewujudkan keadilan sosial. Ada yang bekerja dengan organisasi budaya minoritas memperjuangkan “hak berbeda,” ada organisasi perempuan yang berusaha meningkatkan kesehatan reproduksi dan kesejahteraan wanita, ada yang mendukung kampanye





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▲ Seorang pelatih dari Rifka Anissa, mitra Ford Foundation dalam kesehatan reproduksi, bicara pada sebuah latihan untuk polisi Yogyakarta tentang cara menanggapi kekerasan domestik, 2003. ◀ Seorang ibu dengan bayinya di depan sebuah klinik di Bandung, 1985. Memperbaiki kesehatan ibu-anak merupakan salah satu fokus bantuan pendanaan Ford Foundation pada 1980-an. ▶▶ Seorang pekerja seks di Singaraja, Bali, belajar bagaimana memasang kondom di sebuah klinik milik Citra Usadha, mitra Ford Foundation, 2003.

kebebasan pers di kalangan wartawan, dan ada kelompok masyarakat yang menuntut hak-hak mereka atas sumber daya hutan.

Selama 50 tahun bekerja di Indonesia, Ford Foundation tetap menekuni masalah pendidikan, dengan mendukung berbagai program beasiswa yang berkembang sesuai dengan perubahan keadaan dan kebutuhan negeri ini. Program beasiswa awalnya dirancang untuk menyediakan dosen di bidang-bidang yang dianggap sangat penting bagi bangsa yang baru merdeka, misalnya pendidikan dan ekonomi. Program berikutnya ditujukan untuk menyediakan tenaga-tenaga ahli dalam bidang-bidang khusus, misalnya dokumentasi dan revitalisasi budaya, kependudukan dan kesehatan reproduksi, serta pembangunan desa. Saat ini kegiatan baru yang cukup penting adalah membantu studi pascasarjana untuk orang-orang berbakat dari daerah dan golongan yang “kurang dilayani,” yang di kemudian

hari diharapkan bisa menjadi pemimpin bagi masyarakatnya masing-masing.

Pada milenium baru ini ada beberapa bidang kerja yang juga baru buat Ford Foundation. Dukungan ini mencakup antara lain hibah bagi organisasi-organisasi Muslim yang mencari penafsiran alternatif tentang berbagai isu sosial dan gender; bantuan untuk lembaga-lembaga agama yang mengembangkan penghargaan terhadap kesenian tradisional; dan dukungan bagi para pendidik untuk merancang kurikulum kesenian di sekolah-sekolah yang menghargai keragaman budaya. Hibah baru di bidang pemerintahan lokal dan partisipasi warga juga berkembang pesat. Minat Ford Foundation pada praktek filantropi di Indonesia, termasuk juga perhatian pada kesinambungan dan pertanggungjawaban organisasi-organisasi warga dan lembaga nirlaba, juga terwujud dalam pemberian hibah. Semua kerja ini didasari prinsip-prinsip





Ford Foundation yang menghargai keragaman dan mengutamakan kehidupan bersama secara damai di antara berbagai budaya yang berbeda-beda.

Catatan hibah Ford Foundation kepada ribuan orang dan lembaga selama setengah abad ini juga menunjukkan adanya perubahan dalam pendekatan filantropis organisasi ini. Pada awal kerjanya, bantuan dana Ford Foundation sering dirancang bersama pemerintah Indonesia (termasuk universitas), tapi belakangan ia mengembangkan kerja sama yang makin beragam

dengan berbagai organisasi nonpemerintah dan lembaga swasta juga. Awalnya, pendekatan yang dilakukan terutama lewat pelatihan, penguatan lembaga, dan penyediaan ahli dari luar Indonesia. Belakangan, Ford Foundation banyak mendukung pembentukan jaringan antar mitra, pengawinan penelitian dengan kebijakan, dan pengembangan pengetahuan melalui prakarsa masyarakat. Ford Foundation terus berupaya membantu dan memudahkan kerjasama yang melibatkan organisasi nonpemerintah, peneliti akademis, dan pemerintah, serta menyediakan berbagai bentuk dukungan kelembagaan guna memulai pertukaran pikiran dan menguji gagasan-gagasan baru.

Dalam semua pekerjaannya, keluwesan, kesabaran, dan kesetiaan jangka panjang Ford Foundation pada isu-isu penting membuat sosoknya menonjol. Bantuan tak hanya diberikan untuk mendanai proyek jangka pendek, tapi juga diberikan untuk menjamin kesinambungan organisasinya. Bantuan dari Ford Foundation sering dilihat sebagai investasi kepada orang, lembaga, dan gagasan, tanpa selalu tertuju pada hasil jangka

pendek saja. Sebenarnya, ada banyak hasil sampingan yang tak diperkirakan tapi mempunyai arti penting, seperti ketika sebuah masyarakat mengelola pengaturan irigasi dan hutan, hal itu ternyata membuat warga mempunyai kemampuan memimpin, yang kemudian jadi menonjol sesudah diberlakukannya otonomi daerah di seluruh Indonesia.

Hubungan antara donor dan mitranya memang merupakan masalah yang paling peka dalam dunia filantropi internasional. Ford Foundation mewajibkan mitranya untuk



membuat laporan tapi tidak campur tangan atau mengatur secara berlebihan. Dalam ceramahnya pada peringatan 40 tahun Ford Foundation di Indonesia, ekonom terkemuka Widjojo Nitisastro mengatakan bahwa “sesudah menggerakkan suatu program, [Ford Foundation] itu tidak lagi mencampuri urusan sehari-hari di dalam pelaksanaan program itu.”

Kemauan untuk selalu belajar, mencoba, dan menyesuaikan diri, merupakan ciri kerja Ford Foundation di Indonesia dan tempat-tempat lain. Untuk mengukur kinerjanya, Ford Foundation berpendapat bahkan proyek yang gagal mencapai tujuannya pun masih bisa menghasilkan pelajaran dan pengalaman yang bermanfaat untuk masa depan. Kerja sama Ford Foundation dengan organisasi lokal, di mana proses saling belajar dan menemukan gagasan baru bisa berkembang, memerlukan sebuah lingkungan yang saling menguntungkan dan saling menghormati. Akhirnya, dialog serta pertukaran gagasan dan pemikiran kritis ternyata bisa sama pentingnya dengan aliran dana.

▲ *Presiden Suharto menyambut Presiden Ford Foundation Franklin Thomas (tengah) dan ketua Dewan Penyantun Ford Foundation Edson Spencer, 1989.*
 ▶ *Bermain di keramba ikan, Bukittinggi, Sumatera Barat. Perangkap ikan ini adalah temuan para petani yang bekerja bersama-sama WARSI, mitra Ford Foundation, yang mendukung pengelolaan sumber daya alam oleh komunitas setempat.*





▲ Kantor kedua Ford Foundation di Taman Kebon Sirih, Jakarta Pusat.

▼ Sidney Jones dan Brent Ashabranner pada 1978, ketika menghadapi banjir rutin yang sering dialami staf Ford Foundation di kantor Taman Kebon Sirih.



Pada awal 1960-an, untuk menuju kantor Ford Foundation di Taman Kebon Sirih, seorang pengunjung biasanya datang dengan becak menyusuri jalanan sempit Kampung Bali, atau menyeberangi sebuah jembatan kecil yang melintasi sungai di dekatnya. Waktu itu, Ford Foundation menempati sebuah rumah, sehingga tata letak ruang rapat, ruang kerja, dan gudang harus mengikuti gaya rumah hunian itu. Karena lokasinya yang rendah dan dekat sungai, pada musim hujan halamannya sering banjir, dan seringkali lantai kantor ikut terendam. Seorang mantan wakil Ford Foundation ingat bagaimana para staf harus menguras air yang merembes dari tembok, membawa pulang arsip yang basah – dan sekali-sekali uang kertas – untuk diseterika.

Hingga pertengahan 1970-an, staf program Ford Foundation cenderung dipilih dari orang Amerika, berkulit putih, dan laki-laki. Pada zaman itu orang yang mau dan mampu bekerja di luar negeri seringkali adalah mereka yang sudah bergabung dengan korps diplomatik atau organisasi bantuan luar negeri; jadi tak mengherankan kalau beberapa kali memang pegawai Ford Foundation diambil dari lembaga macam United States Agency for International Development

(USAID), dan Departemen Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat.

Ketika Ford Foundation mulai bekerja di Indonesia, terdapat kelangkaan di kalangan orang Indonesia yang bisa menangani kegiatan seperti pelatihan guru atau kursus bahasa, dapat mengajar keterampilan teknis pada pegawai negeri, atau mampu membuat perencanaan pembangunan. Satu-satunya cara untuk memenuhi keperluan ini adalah dengan mempekerjakan konsultan internasional dan dosen dari universitas-universitas Amerika. Para “tenaga ahli” itu ditempatkan di daerah-daerah seperti Malang, Medan atau Yogyakarta, sementara sarana pekerjaan dan pendukungnya diatur oleh kantor Ford Foundation di Jakarta. Pada 1970-an Ford Foundation menggunakan sebuah rumah di Jalan Daksa III, Kebayoran Baru, sebagai wisma tamu bagi para karyawan proyek dan konsultan yang berkunjung ke Jakarta. Banyak orang asing yang bekerja untuk proyek-proyek yang didanai Ford Foundation masih mengingat malam-malam menyenangkan ketika mereka saling berbagi cerita di “Wisma Ford” dan menikmati masakan legendaris Hasan, pengurus rumah itu.



▲ *Memeriksa konstruksi perumahan Ford Foundation di Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta: Kamaruszaman, Andrew Choa, F.F. “Frosty” Hill, Harrison Parker, Michael Harris, dan seorang kolega, 1957.*

► *Kantor Ford Foundation yang sesak di Hotel des Indes, 1957. Nama-nama yang ditulis di belakang foto: Kamaruszaman, Miss Cunningham, Bahasuan, June Kuntjoro-Jakti, Tony, Sukardjo, Andrew Choa, Hasanah, Harrison Parker, dan Miss Livingstone.*





Mulai akhir 1970-an di bawah kepemimpinan Franklin Thomas, Ford Foundation melakukan perubahan kelembagaan yang cukup penting, sehingga ia juga mengubah sosok kepegawaian dan misi publiknya. Penyusutan sumber daya juga mendorong Dewan Penyantun memutuskan tindakan penghematan sehingga karyawan Ford Foundation di seluruh dunia dicitutkan hampir separuh. Beberapa kantor ditutup karena Dewan Penyantun berpendapat akan lebih berhasil jika Ford Foundation mengurangi jumlah negara yang dilayani. Pada saat yang sama, Thomas mendorong para staf untuk menyediakan bantuan langsung kepada organisasi lokal, supaya mereka memutuskan kapan dan bagaimana bantuan teknis dari luar negeri digunakan; peran “tenaga ahli” dengan demikian berakhir. Semua perubahan ini mengurangi peran para staf program Ford Foundation dalam hal-hal operasional setiap proyek. Mereka bisa menjadi lebih terlibat dalam merancang dan memantau programnya.

Beberapa pertimbangan lain juga mulai mengubah sosok dan staf Ford Foundation di seluruh dunia. Keragaman gender, etnik, dan kewarganegaraan mulai diperhatikan dalam pemberian dana dan penerimaan karyawan. Ford Foundation memperhatikan ini pada semua aras organisasinya, termasuk

Dewan Penyantun. Di Jakarta, *program officer* perempuan pertama diangkat pada 1977; pertengahan 1990-an, wakil Ford Foundation dan tiga dari empat *program officer* adalah perempuan. Pada saat yang sama, kepemimpinan Ford Foundation membuka peluang untuk maju bagi orang berprestasi dari mana pun, sehingga makin banyak orang dari luar Amerika Serikat diangkat menjadi staf di New York dan di berbagai kantor wilayah, termasuk Indonesia. Proses “internasionalisasi” ini mendapatkan dukungan kuat dari Susan V. Berresford yang kini merupakan presiden Ford Foundation.

Bagi para pengunjung kantor Ford Foundation di Jakarta – yang pada 1990 telah pindah dari Taman Kebon Sirih ke lokasi yang sekarang di Jalan Jenderal Sudirman – wajah-wajah yang paling dikenal adalah para staf lokal yang mengabdikan kariernya pada kegiatan Ford Foundation di Indonesia. Karyawan-karyawan internasional datang dan pergi silih berganti, tapi orang-orang Indonesia yang menjadi staf administrasi, sekretaris, dan staf pendukung tetap menjadi kunci bagi terciptanya suasana lokal dan kelangsungan perluasan kerja Ford Foundation di Indonesia. Para staf lokal memiliki jaringan informal dan ikatan profesional yang sangat kuat; kesetiaan mereka tentu saja memperkuat prestasi Ford Foundation selama bertahun-tahun.



▲ Sopir dan pembantu kantor Ford Foundation di depan Hotel des Indes: Winata, Totong, Sukardjo, Sarwani, Abas (berdiri), Basir dan Bahasuan, 1957. ► Dari masa ke masa: staf Ford Foundation dari Indonesia dan kantor-kantor lainnya di Asia Tenggara.

Ketika para staf Ford Foundation bertemu untuk mendiskusikan rencana perayaan 50 tahunnya di Indonesia, kami sepakat bahwa sejarah perlu ditulis untuk mitra dan rekan kerja kami di Indonesia dan luar negeri. Selain berjibunnya laporan, penilaian, brosur, majalah, dan buku mengenai kegiatan mitra, menurut kami juga diperlukan suatu renungan tentang Ford Foundation dalam konteks setengah abad kemerdekaan Indonesia. Buku yang paling baik, kami kira, bisa menunjukkan karya Ford Foundation melalui mata dan suara orang Indonesia – mereka yang telah berinteraksi dengan lembaga ini.

Maka staf Ford Foundation mulai bicara dengan orang-orang yang bisa jadi subyek maupun aktor dalam proyek buku ini. Kami beruntung karena salah satu esais terkemuka, Goenawan Mohamad, redaktur pendiri majalah *Tempo* dan mantan Nieman Fellow dari Harvard, bersedia menulis naskah utama. Dia kemudian menyusun sebuah tim yang kuat, termasuk: antropolog dan wartawan Sandra Hamid; wartawan dan juga mantan Nieman Fellow Andreas Harsono; dan penulis Laksmi Pamuntjak. Mark Hanusz dari penerbit Equinox dengan tak kenal lelah mengelola sejumlah penerjemah, editor, korektor, dan fotografer. Tim ini diberi kebebasan dalam memeriksa arsip-arsip Ford – dari dokumen persiapan program hingga penilaian eksternal maupun kritik internal, serta daftar lembaga dan perseorangan yang telah menerima dana. Para periset mencari gambar dari setiap dasawarsa yang ada dalam buku ini; dan mantan pegawai Ford Foundation maupun staf sekarang juga memberikan foto-foto koleksi pribadi.

Akhirnya, para penulis membuat sebuah karangan yang berisi wawancara, kenangan pribadi, dan sampiran (*sidebar*). Mereka bebas untuk menyajikan isi dan menafsirkan makna, dan bebas juga memilih orang untuk diwawancarai. Hasilnya, sebuah pandangan yang kritis terhadap pembangunan negeri ini, maupun orang-orang yang terlibat di dalamnya, dengan mengungkapkan beberapa isu besar dan tantangan yang dihadapi Indonesia dalam 50 tahun terakhir. Para penulis memilih untuk menjelaskan isu-isu ini dan aktor-aktor yang ada di balik sejarahnya. Tujuannya bukan menghakimi dengan standar masa kini, tapi juga bukan menawarkan kesan yang dipercantik terhadap warisan yang mereka tinggalkan untuk generasi mendatang.

Mengingat luasnya topik ini – yang mencakup bukan saja segala macam pekerjaan Ford Foundation, tapi juga kompleksitas Indonesia selama 50 tahun pertamanya – kami sadar bahwa para penulis buku ini harus sangat selektif. Ia pasti tak akan mampu

menggambarkan semua aspek kehidupan Indonesia modern. Banyak orang, lembaga, program, dan pegawai yang terkait dengan Ford Foundation yang tak terhindar untuk tak disebutkan di sini. Tapi kami berterima kasih atas kerjasama mereka dengan Ford Foundation. Kami berharap potret Ford Foundation di Indonesia ini bakal bermakna untuk semua mitra dan kolega kami dalam lima dasawarsa terakhir.

Kalau meletakkan buku ini dalam konteks sejarah, bolehlah dicatat bahwa gagasannya mulai muncul sesaat setelah serangan teroris 11 September 2001, di mana suasananya penuh ketegangan, ketakutan, dan ketidakpercayaan di antara berbagai masyarakat di seluruh dunia. Kami tak menduga bahwa ketika persiapan buku ini mulai berjalan, ternyata ada bom-bom meledak sehingga Indonesia pun jadi bahan liputan media internasional. Indonesia mendapat serangan teroris di tanahnya sendiri, oleh warganya sendiri, dan negeri ini pun segera melesat dari sebuah negeri yang agak jarang diberitakan menjadi sebuah negeri yang dianggap sarang teroris. Bukan inilah citra Indonesia atau gambar tanah air yang dibayangkan oleh mereka yang suara dan wajahnya muncul dalam buku ini. Seperti Goenawan Mohamad menulis pada akhir buku ini, orang-orang Indonesia kini sedang menjalankan sebuah eksperimen besar, yang bagi sebagian besar dari mereka, adalah perjalanan menuju masyarakat yang adil, sejahtera, dan inklusif. Eksperimen ini sekarang jadi lebih penting agar visi dan cerita mereka bisa dimenangkan.

Buku ini juga merupakan sebagian dari suatu hajatan besar untuk memperingati 50 tahun Ford Foundation di Indonesia. Kami ingin merayakan keragaman dan kemajemukan negeri ini. Kami juga ingin menghormati kinerja para kolega dan mitra kami, serta menyatakan penghormatan kami yang sedalam-dalamnya atas keteguhan dan daya cipta orang Indonesia ketika mempertahankan kemerdekaan bangsanya dan menghadapi cobaan di masa depan. Buku ini menyajikan suara dari beberapa orang yang berperan membangun negeri ini selama 50 tahun serta menggambarkan tantangan yang pernah mereka hadapi. Kami bersyukur karena sempat ikut mengambil peran, bagaimana pun kecilnya, dalam upaya membangun Indonesia. Sekarang pun kami gembira melanjutkan perjalanan panjang ini, bersama-sama dengan mitra kami, yang lama maupun yang baru, untuk memasuki Indonesia di abad XXI.

*Suzanne E. Siskel dan Mary S. Zurbuchen
Jakarta, Oktober 2003*





**BAB SATU:
ORANG-ORANG DARI SALEMBA**



ORANG-ORANG DARI SALEMBA

Sejarah, ternyata, bisa bermula di sebuah sekolah yang centang perenang. Cerita ini dimulai dari sebuah bangunan dengan arsitektur kolonial yang hambar di Jalan Salemba No. 4, Jakarta. Tak jauh dari kamar mayat milik rumah sakit umum, yang dulu disebut oleh sopir opelet dengan “CBZ” – kependekan untuk bahasa Belanda “*Centraal Burgerlijk Ziekenhuis*” – tapi kini dikenal sebagai Rumah Sakit Umum Pusat Dr. Cipto Mangunkusumo, ada sebuah jalan kecil. Gang itu memisahkannya dari gedung bernomor enam, bangunan yang beberapa tingkat lebih cantik, tempat kuliah Fakultas Kedokteran Universitas Indonesia.

Jika berbelok ke kiri, kita akan melewati semacam gerbang. Lewat pintu itu, kita akan memasuki sebuah halaman dan akan melihat dua ruang kuliah serta sebuah aula yang terkadang disebut “amfi” – mungkin karena susunan tempat duduknya yang kian meninggi ke arah belakang.

Kita masih harus berjalan terus beberapa meter lagi, dan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia (FEUI), sekolah yang dimulai dengan tambal sulam itu, terletak di sana. Di tahun 1950, tak ada seorang pun yang berpikir bahwa salah satu bagian dari sejarah Indonesia modern berangkat dari sini.

Tapi hasrat untuk sebuah Indonesia yang modern bukan sesuatu yang asing di gedung-gedung Salemba itu. Hanya sebulan setelah proklamasi kemerdekaan diumumkan, di ruang kebidanan CBZ bertemulah beberapa orang dokter. Mereka disertai beberapa orang lain yang bukan dokter, sebab mereka



◀ *Reuni mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia di Jalan Salemba No. 4, 1958.*

▶ *Fakultas Kedokteran UI, Jakarta, 1956.*





tak sedang berunding soal medis. Mereka membahas perlunya sebuah lembaga yang mempertautkan Fakultas Kedokteran – yang benih dan bentuknya sudah ada sejak abad ke-19, ketika masih sering disebut sebagai “sekolah dokter Jawa” – dengan jurusan-jurusan lain. Di ruang itulah ide untuk melahirkan Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia (BPTRI) diolah pertama kali. Sebutan “universitas” atau “universiteit” tak dipakai sebab dianggap kebarat-baratan.

Orang-orang yang bertemu di ruang kebidanan itu sadar bahwa sebuah republik yang baru dilahirkan dengan modal hanya 1.000 orang berpendidikan modern – 1.000 di antara 70 juta penduduk – membutuhkan sebuah lembaga pendidikan yang lebih tinggi. Pemerintah kolonial Belanda praktis tak meninggalkan apa-apa.

Tapi cita-cita itu nyaris kandas di tengah jalan. Menjelang akhir 1945, pasukan Sekutu menduduki Jakarta dan kekuasaan Belanda datang bersamanya. Nederlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) didirikan untuk mengatur Indonesia. Tak urung, banyak cendekiawan menolak berada dalam penjajahan kembali. Sebagian dari staf Fakuliteit (kemudian “Fakultas”) Kedokteran dipindahkan ke Jawa Tengah yang masih dikuasai pemerintahan Republik Indonesia, yang belum lagi berumur enam bulan. Sebagian yang lain tetap di Jakarta, dengan pertimbangan bahwa rumah sakit CBZ masih

memerlukan tenaga mereka, atau bahwa siapa tahu, sebuah kesempatan nanti akan terbuka untuk mengembangkan diri.

Tapi di tahun 1948, NICA mengirim dua pegawai Belanda, seorang kolonel dan seorang dokter, untuk mengambilalih CBZ. Beberapa tenaga Indonesia yang masih tinggal menolak untuk bekerja sama. Mahasiswa kedokteran pergi kuliah bukan lagi ke Salemba No. 6, gedung di sebelah rumah sakit itu, tapi ke rumah para dosen. Dengan cara itu BPTRI, sebagai ekspresi semangat “*republikan*” yang setia kepada Republik Indonesia, bertahan. Ketika kemudian NICA mendirikan *Nood Universiteit van Indonesië* atau Universitas “Sementara” Indonesia di akhir 1949, para pengajar juga menampik untuk ikut.

Toh NICA melanjutkan rencananya. Beberapa fakultas didirikan di kota-kota lain: Surabaya (Fakultas Kedokteran dan Kedokteran Gigi), Bandung (Fakultas Teknik), Bogor (Fakultas Pertanian dan Kedokteran Hewan), dan Makassar (Fakultas Ekonomi). Semua fakultas itu digabung dalam sebuah universitas yang disebut *Universiteit van Indonesië*. Perguruan tinggi inilah yang kemudian menjadi Universitas Indonesia, lazim disingkat “UI,” setelah Belanda akhirnya mengakui kedaulatan Republik pada Desember 1949. Pada tanggal 2 Februari 1959, BPTRI bergabung dengan Universitas Indonesia, meski melalui perundingan yang panas.



▲ Kuliah di Universitas Hasanuddin, Makassar, 1952.

SAYUTI HASIBUAN

Sayuti Hasibuan termasuk dosen Universitas HKBP Nommensen yang dikirim studi lanjut pada 1961 ke Amerika Serikat. Sebagian besar rekannya berasal dari Pulau Jawa tapi Hasibuan datang dari Medan. Hasibuan belajar ekonomi sumber daya manusia di UC Berkeley. Pertikaian internal Nommensen, karena isu marga maupun agama, membuat Hasibuan, seorang Muslim, merasa tak tenang dan keluar. Dia pindah ke Jakarta dan kini bekerja sebagai dosen Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Al-Azhar Indonesia. Dia tertarik dengan teori tentang Islamisasi ekonomi dan pemakaian syariah Islam di Indonesia.

Universitas Nommensen didirikan pada 1954. Fakultas Ekonomi memakai banyak dosen Belanda yang bekerja di perkebunan. Saya masuk Universitas Nommensen tahun 1955. Pada tahun-tahun itu ada maksud pengembangan bersama Ford Foundation. Saya berangkat ke Berkeley 1961. Saya kembali 1965 sambil menyelesaikan disertasi dan mengajar. Waktu itu Partai Komunis Indonesia sangat aktif.

Saya aktif di Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam. Saat itu suasananya tegang antara mahasiswa Islam dan komunis. Saya berpikir untuk pergi dari Medan. Kebetulan ada tawaran studi lanjut dari Ford Foundation. Ini kesempatan baik. Sewaktu saya jadi dosen, perselisihan tambah keras. Saya di sana sampai 1971.

Tahun 1971, saya diminta Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo untuk membantu Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI). Mereka waktu itu mengeluarkan banyak tenaga kerja yang harus dirasionalisasi. Saya membantu membuat perencanaannya, diangkat Departemen Perdagangan sebagai asisten Sumitro, tapi tugasnya memperbaiki dan menyiapkan tentara-tentara yang dirasionalisasi.

Setelah selesai, Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro minta saya gabung ke Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS). Saya kerja di berbagai bidang yang menyangkut sumber daya manusia.

Sumitro selalu kurang sreg dengan Widjojo dan kawan-kawan sebab Sumitro pendekatannya kerakyatan atau bisa dikatakan sumber daya manusia. Tapi hal ini tidak pernah diartikulasikan. Sumitro, walaupun kurang sepakat, tetap terkungkung oleh pola pikir Barat, John Maynard Keynes, yang dibangun oleh Adam Smith, sejak ratusan tahun lalu di Barat.

Kritik Sumitro ke kelompok Widjojo, ini

juga soal senioritas. Saya kira soal senioritas dan pendekatan dalam menentukan kebijakan ekonomi, seperti melawan Presiden Suharto. Sumitro ini melawan, sedang Widjojo tak pernah melawan. Kepada Ali Murtopo, asisten pribadi Suharto, dia juga melawan.



Sayuti Hasibuan di Jakarta, 1995.

Dalam sebuah laporan Ford Foundation dikatakan ada masalah internal di Nommensen sehingga laporan keuangan tak jelas. Ini terjadi karena secara mendasar Ford Foundation membuat satu kekeliruan. Mereka menganggap pengembangan kelembagaan itu sebagaimana di Barat. Mendidik orang, dapat dana, dan membangun, kenyataannya tidak sederhana itu. Umpamanya, dia mengatakan mau membangun FEUI dengan tenaga-tenaga berkualitas. Itu juga tidak terjadi kan? FEUI itu tempat pengajaran

saja. Orang pintarnya memang banyak tetapi koneksitas dosen FEUI itu hanya beberapa jam.

Universitas Nommensen sampai sekarang belum terbangun. Memang mahasiswa banyak, tapi kontribusi *human knowledge* itu apa? Bukan Nommensen saja, tapi seluruh universitas di Indonesia. Saya harap saya salah.

Tidak mudah membangun Nommensen. Di sana terjadi pertentangan antara yayasan dan universitas. Berebut siapa kuasa? Siapa dosen? Siapa rektor? Nommensen dikuasai yayasan dan yayasan dikuasai gereja HKBP. Yayasan biasanya penuh konflik, mulai dari gaji dosen, siapa yang dikirim dan siapa yang tidak boleh dikirim, siapa yang menjadi rektor, hingga bagaimana menggunakan dana. Ini dulu sewaktu saya di sana, entah sekarang.

Kerja sama antaruniversitas, misalnya antara universitas di Indonesia dengan di Amerika, memang baik karena ada kontak antara lokal dan asing, timbul bermacam pertentangan, inilah yang merusak keseimbangan tapi membawa pembaruan.

Kalau membandingkan ketiga universitas yang dibantu Ford Foundation, hanya FEUI yang punya pengaruh luar biasa. Rata-rata dosennya masuk pemerintahan. Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) jauh di Yogyakarta dan Nommensen ada di Medan. Tapi pengaruh UGM dan Nommensen berbeda dari FEUI. Orang FEUI melaksanakan paradigma ekonomi klasik yang dikembangkan Keynes, Adam Smith, dan sebagainya. Tapi pelopor untuk keluar dari paradigma ini, untuk pembangunan bangsa Indonesia, bukan dari UI. Itu termasuk kritik-kritik Sritua Arief dari Nommensen.





Fakultas Ekonomi mengikuti sejarah ini – dengan problem yang agak berbeda. Sebelum Indonesia merdeka, sekolah ekonomi tak terdapat secara khusus di Jakarta, melainkan di Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan. Itu pun terbatas pada masalah pengelolaan usaha dan juga tak sepenuhnya berjalan. Di sana tak ada pengajar yang memadai. Di Jakarta, ilmu ekonomi hanya dikaji di jurusan sosial-ekonomi Fakultas Hukum dan Ilmu Masyarakat. Maka jika orang hendak mendapatkan tempat mempelajari ilmu ekonomi, orang harus bersekolah di tempat lain di luar Salemba No. 4. Di luar bangunan itu, tapi tak jauh dari sana, sebuah yayasan swasta, Perkumpulan Memajukan Ilmu dan Kebudayaan, mendirikan Akademi Nasional dalam waktu yang hampir bersamaan dengan lahirnya UI.

Di sanalah mula-mula belajar beberapa orang yang kelak menjadi ekonom Indonesia yang terkenal, seperti Daoed Joesoef, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, dan Panglaykim. Menurut Daoed, seorang pelukis muda sejak di Medan, Sumatera Utara, yang ikut perang kemerdekaan, belajar di Akademi Nasional, adalah sebuah pernyataan sikap “republikan.” Tak heran bahwa bersama dia juga Suhadi, yang ikut perang gerilya selama di pasukan Tentara Pelajar di Jawa Timur bersama Widjojo Nitisastro, tokoh yang kemudian perannya lebih menonjol dari kawan-kawannya dalam sejarah. Dalam

pandangan Daoed, perguruan tinggi di Salemba No. 4 itu bagaimana pun dilahirkan NICA. Kaum republikan yang memilih di luarnya, lebih suka belajar di akademi yang miskin itu, menyewa ruangan di sebuah jalan dekat rumah sakit St. Carolus, tak jauh dari gedung UI. “Kadang-kadang kuliah dilakukan malam hari, menggunakan lampu minyak,” begitulah Daoed mengenang.

Tapi akhirnya sebuah fakultas ilmu ekonomi dibentuk di UI pada 18 September 1950. Ia lebih sering disebut dengan singkatan “FEUI.” Para mahasiswa dari berbagai penjuru bergabung, baik kaum republikan yang datang dari gerilya maupun yang “kurang republikan” yang datang dari sekolah yang didirikan NICA di Makassar. Dengan membayar tiga ratus rupiah untuk setahun pelajaran – dan sesudah itu gratis – ada 300 mahasiswa yang mendaftar dan diterima.

Hampir semuanya masih berada di tahun pertama, tingkatan yang disebut *propaedeutis* kala itu. Sebutan itu menggambarkan sesuatu dari masa awal itu. Meskipun semangat republikan berapi-api, istilah Latin masih sering dipakai. “Kuliah umum” yang diselenggarakan setiap pekan di aula, masih disebut *studium generale*. Lagu gembira *Ius Vivat*, juga lagu khidmat *Gaudeamus Igitur*, masih dinyanyikan di saat pesta dan upacara kampus – seperti yang dilakukan orang nun jauh di Leiden atau Rotterdam.



◀ dan ▶ Masa perkenalan mahasiswa baru Universitas Indonesia, Oktober 1950.

DAOED JOESOEF

Daoed Joesoef, orang Aceh yang besar di Medan. Ayahnya mempunyai perusabaan susu sapi di pinggiran kota Medan. Joesoef jadi dosen pertama FEUI yang belajar di Sorbonne, Prancis, ketika rekan-rekannya kebanyakan belajar di Amerika Serikat. Dia dikenal karena menjadi Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan pada era Presiden Subarto dan memperkenalkan konsep man of analysis bagi mahasiswa dan bukan man of public meeting pada akhir 1970-an.

Pada awal 1950-an, saya asisten Dekan Sumitro Djojohadikusumo dalam pengembangan ilmu ekonomi di FEUI. Saya ditugasi mengembangkan jurusan ilmu ekonomi di universitas daerah, antara lain Makassar, yang didirikan Belanda dan kelak jadi Universitas Hassanuddin. Saya sebenarnya pernah mengirim surat ke Wakil Presiden Moh. Hatta, sehabis pengakuan kedaulatan 1949, minta agar sekolah ekonomi Makassar itu dibubarkan. Alasannya, efisiensi dan juga karena sekolah itu tak sejalan dengan semangat Republikan. Sumitro mengatakan yang lalu harus dianggap lalu. Indonesia sudah bersatu kembali. Indonesia Bagian Timur juga memerlukan pendidikan tinggi yang baik. Saya menerima dan jadi dosen terbang. Saya juga membantu sekolah tinggi ekonomi di Palembang dan Lampung.

Pada 1956 meletus pemberontakan PRRI-Permesta. Satu hari saya terbang ke Makassar untuk mengajar. Ternyata bandar udara Makassar dibom pasukan pemberontak. Saya terperangkap di Makassar. Ini ironi kedua, sebab di antara pemimpin pemberontak ada Sumitro.

Tapi jasa Sumitro sangat menentukan dalam pembentukan FEUI. Dia memperkenalkan ilmu ekonomi Keynesian ke Indonesia. Dia juga yang mendekati Ford Foundation agar membantu peningkatan tenaga dosen FEUI. Dia juga mendatangkan para pengajar dari Amerika Serikat. Waktu itu, FEUI di bawah para dosen Belanda, ekonomi Keynesian tak dikenal. Perpustakaan terdiri dari banyak buku Belanda.

Ford Foundation membantu dan dikirimlah Widjojo Nitisastro, Ali Wardhana, dan sebagainya ke Amerika. Saya tak pergi karena terikat tugas. Ibu saya juga sakit. Saya takut bila sesuatu yang buruk terjadi pada ibu sebab ketika ayah meninggal, sebagai anak lelaki pertama, saya tak hadir.

Waktu itu saya juga suka menulis. Salah satu kritik saya pada pendapat Hatta soal tak perlunya cadangan emas bagi rupiah. Waktu

itu, ada ketentuan cadangan emas harus 20 persen untuk tiap lembar nilai mata uang. Karena keadaan politik tak stabil, maka pemerintah membiayai anggaran dengan cetak uang. Hatta menyarankan ketentuan cadangan emas ditiadakan. Saya membantah lewat *Mimbar Indonesia*. Bagi saya, cadangan emas tetap perlu, hanya besarnya ditentukan berdasarkan nilai kebutuhan impor.



Daoed Joesoef di Jakarta, 1978.

Tak lama kemudian, saya mendapat surat undangan untuk ikut dalam rombongan Wakil Presiden Hatta mengunjungi koperasi di Tegal, Pekalongan dan sebagainya. Kami naik kereta api istimewa dan saya satu gerbong dengan Hatta. Hatta mengajak bertukar pikiran. Tak ada hasil yang konklusif, tapi saya masih muda dan merasa dapat perhatian istimewa.

Menjelang akhir 1950-an, saya merasa ilmu ekonomi yang dipelajari di FEUI tak mempersiapkan mahasiswa menghadapi peran negara atau *public economy*. Ada buku karya Meier and Baldwin, *Economic Development: Theory, History and Policy*, yang percaya bahwa persoalan pembangunan terlalu penting untuk hanya diserahkan ke tangan para ekonom. Maka saya membentuk jurusan baru: *public*

economic administration. Untuk itu dibutuhkan tenaga pengajar yang terlatih dan dana. Ford Foundation bersedia mendanai pendidikan pengajar. Saya memutuskan agar Sorbonne jadi tempat tujuan studi karena Prancis terkenal dengan pendidikan kader administrasi negara tingkat pascasarjana dalam *Ecole nationale d'administration*.

Ternyata tak ada calon pengajar yang bersedia sekolah di Paris. Bahasa Prancis tak mereka kuasai dan orang memperhitungkan penggunaannya nanti hampir tak berarti di Indonesia. Hanya saya yang mau. Saya memang terpujau dengan Paris. Saya suka melukis dan Paris adalah kota seni serta ibukota keintelektualan dunia. Namun jalan tak segera lancar. Widjojo Nitisastro, wakil dekan FEUI, menolak menandatangani persetujuan saya berangkat ke Paris. Ford Foundation tak mau mengirim orang studi lanjut tanpa tandatangan atasan mereka.

Saya sempat beradu pendapat dengan Frank Miller dari Ford Foundation. Miller akhirnya setuju tapi syaratnya harus ada persetujuan pemerintah. Saya datang ke Menteri Perguruan Tinggi dan Ilmu Pengetahuan Syarif Thayeb, seorang dokter-jenderal dari Aceh, dan dia heran mendengar Widjojo menolak tanda tangan surat saya. “Bukankah Sorbonne lebih tua ketimbang Berkeley?” katanya.

Saya delapan tahun studi di Sorbonne. Ketika kembali jurusan saya sudah dibubarkan. Pandangan kelompok teknokrat dan saya berbeda dalam masalah pembangunan ekonomi. Soal-soal ekonomi terlalu penting untuk hanya diserahkan ke tangan para ekonom. Pembangunan nasional harus dinyatakan *in terms of social space* dan bukan *in terms of national income* serta diletakkan dalam rangka perkembangan peradaban. Ketika masuk kabinet, sebagai menteri pendidikan, saya berharap konsep saya bisa dipakai. Tapi Suharto mengatakan agar “Doktor Daoed” cukup mengurus bidang pendidikan – soal ekonomi sudah ada yang mengurus.

Para dosen dan mahasiswa UI mungkin membayangkan diri sebagai bagian dari tradisi perguruan-perguruan tinggi Eropa yang telah berumur ratusan tahun. Sampai akhir 1950-an, para mahasiswa di Salemba juga mengikuti, dengan cara sendiri, gaya hidup rekan mereka di Belanda. Waktu itu yang berlaku adalah “studi bebas”: seorang mahasiswa dianggap cukup dewasa untuk menentukan pilihan kuliahnya sendiri, bahkan ia boleh tak hadir di kelas, asal dapat membuktikan kemampuannya dalam ujian. Ia bisa mengulang ujian sampai kapan saja bila ia gagal. Orang bisa jadi “mahasiswa abadi” di sana.

Salah seorang mahasiswa Fakultas Hukum, yang kemudian terkenal, adalah Harry Tjan Silalahi, yang akhirnya mendirikan lembaga *think tank* pertama di Indonesia, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ia praktis tak pernah datang ke Salemba No. 6. Datang dari keluarga miskin di Yogyakarta, Silalahi harus mencari nafkah menjadi guru. Pergi ke kuliah baginya adalah sebuah kemewahan. Pada suatu hari ia datang untuk ujian. Masuk ke ruangan, ia bahkan tak tahu mana dosen mata kuliah yang hari itu diujikan.

Bila mahasiswa seperti Silalahi punya waktu senggang dan datang ke Salemba, ia akan lebih sering duduk di warung di seberang CBZ, menunggu saat mahasiswi-mahasiswi Fakultas Sastra lewat.

“Kami hidup dengan buku, pesta, dan cinta,” kata Djunaedi Hadisumarto, ekonom yang kelak menjadi ketua BAPPENAS dalam pemerintahan Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid.

Suasana kehidupan mahasiswa waktu itu seakan-akan tak tersentuh oleh dunia di luarnya. Dengan kuliah yang sesukanya, mereka menghabiskan waktu senggang mereka: jajan di Miauw Seng, sebuah toko makanan kecil di seberang Salemba No. 4, berdansa di rumah-rumah teman, atau merayakan “inaugurasi,” hari akhir perploncoan, di gedung Harmonie. Yang gemar musik membentuk band yang kemudian sangat digemari: mahasiswa hukum Marihot dan Paul Hutabarat memainkan lagu-lagu ala *Bill Haley and the Comets* dan *The Platters* untuk mengiringi teman-teman mereka melantai. Minuman: limun atau sarsaparilla.

Di balik semua itu, sebenarnya, sejak semula, Indonesia tak pernah jauh dari UI. Jarak sangat dekat antara pengalaman para mahasiswa sehari-hari dan Indonesia yang melarat, pada usia yang belum lagi sedasawarsa.

Setahun setelah FEUI resmi dibuka di aula Fakultas Kedokteran, sekolah tinggi ini masih tak punya ruangan sendiri. Kadang-kadang kuliah diberikan di salah satu ruang Fakultas Sastra di seberang CBZ, atau di sebuah ruangan di Jalan Tambak, sekitar 200 meter dari Salemba No. 4, dan sejumlah ruangan di tempat lain. Pekerjaan sekretariat fakultas dijalankan dari sebuah kamar di gedung Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan di Jalan Kimia.

Perpustakaan juga harus menumpang; para dosen dan mahasiswa harus pergi ke tempat lain untuk meminjam buku, termasuk ke kantor lembaga kerja sama kebudayaan Belanda, *Stichting Culturele Samenwerking* (Sticusa). Akhirnya, ketika FEUI mendapatkan tempat sendiri, perpustakaan adalah sebuah ruangan di antara sebuah warung dan bangunan kecil yang dipakai untuk memutar film oleh Liga Film Mahasiswa. Tapi buku masih terbatas, juga jurnal ilmiah. Seorang bekas mahasiswa mengisahkan bahwa waktu itu ada jurnal yang hanya boleh dipinjam tak lebih dari satu jam di perpustakaan.

Para mahasiswa yang pintar kemudian mendapatkan akal untuk mengatasi itu: kuliah para dosen dicatat baik-baik, diketik, distensil dalam jumlah banyak, dan dijual. Menjelang akhir 1950-an, bisnis kecil ini khususnya dikerjakan oleh sebuah usaha yang menyebut diri Vivayuba. Salah seorang wiraswasta Vivayuba adalah Fikri Jufri, kemudian dikenal sebagai koresponden ekonomi majalah *Tempo*.

Tapi bila mutu pendidikan berada dalam keadaan darurat, itu bukan hanya karena para mahasiswa tak punya buku yang memadai. Di tahun-tahun awal, FEUI punya masalah yang lebih serius. Didirikan oleh para ahli hukum, dan dengan dekan pertama seorang ahli hukum pula, Soenario Kolopaking, fakultas itu praktis hanya punya satu dosen dan tak punya ekonom sama sekali. Kolopaking sendiri merangkap pelbagai pekerjaan selain sebagai dekan. Ketika pada akhirnya ia jatuh sakit dan mengundurkan diri, krisis terjadi.

Dalam keadaan ini, ketua Senat Mahasiswa, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, seorang pemuda pendiam yang bersungguh-sungguh, bertindak cepat. Bersama teman-temannya, sebagian dari Tentara Pelajar, ia datang ke Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengajaran dan Kebudayaan. Mereka mendesak pemerintah untuk mengatasi krisis FEUI. Tak jelas apa yang bisa dilakukan oleh pemerintah waktu itu, tapi sikap yang serius Suhadi dan kawan-kawannya menyebabkan seorang dosen mereka, Djoko Soetono – yang kemudian jadi dekan Fakultas Hukum –

tergerak membantu. Bersama-sama, mereka bahkan mendatangi pelbagai pihak: sejumlah murid yang hampir putus asa mencari guru.

Jumlah ekonom di seluruh Indonesia tak lebih dari 10 orang dan hampir semuanya tak tertarik mengajar. Salah satunya, yang punya perhatian kepada pendidikan, Mohammad Hatta, sudah jadi wakil presiden. Tapi “sejarah kadang-kadang terjadi karena kebetulan,” kata Widjojo Nitisastro, mengenang masa itu.



▲ Sebuah konser piano di Sticusa, organisasi kebudayaan Belanda (sekarang Erasmus Huis), Jakarta, 1953.

BEGAWAN EKONOMI: SUMITRO DJOJHADIKUSUMO

Pada suatu hari di akhir 1960-an, seorang tamu Amerika di Departemen Perdagangan kagum mendengar Menteri Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917-2001) berbicara. Ia bertanya, “Bahasa Inggris Anda sempurna sekali. Anda pernah belajar di Amerika?” Dengan kalem Sumitro menjawab, “Saya belum pernah belajar di Amerika. Saya hanya pernah mengajar di sana.”

Ia memang sering mengagumkan. Sekitar 20 tahun sebelumnya, sebuah delegasi mahasiswa FEUI menemui Sumitro. Misi mereka: meminta orang Indonesia pertama yang mendapat gelar Ph.D. di bidang ekonomi dari Netherlands School of Economics itu, yang telah menjabat menteri perdagangan dan industri, untuk jadi dekan FEUI.

Pascakemerdekaan Indonesia, pendidikan tinggi, khususnya di bidang ekonomi, sangatlah terbatas. Ford Foundation menaksir, pada 1949 Indonesia, dengan 70 juta penduduk, hanya punya 10 orang yang memenuhi syarat sebagai ekonom. “Tak ada orang lain yang lebih memenuhi syarat daripada dirinya,” kata Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, pemimpin delegasi mahasiswa itu.

Tak ada seorang pun yang mengira bahwa lelaki kurus yang tangkas bicara ini, anak seorang pegawai pemerintahan kolonial Hindia Belanda, akan membuat perubahan yang lebih besar ketimbang sekedar merombak sebuah sekolah.

Sumitro seorang multidimensional: ia seorang menteri, pelobby, akademikus, kosmopolit, juga pemberontak. Ia yakin bahwa tugasnya adalah memimpin negerinya. Kepercayaan pada diri sendiri begitu berkibar-kibar: pada 1952, ia menjelaskan pandangannya dalam sebuah debat publik dengan Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, gubernur Bank Indonesia pertama dan advokat pembangunan pertanian. Sumitro berpendapat hanya pertumbuhan industri yang cepat, yang dapat memperkuat posisi tawar Indonesia di antara negara-negara berkembang lainnya.

Sumitro gigih membangun institusi. “Orang-orang dari Ford Foundation-lah yang seringkali berbicara tentang membangun institusi,” kata John Bresnan. “Tapi jika Anda memusatkan perhatian pada seseorang, mencari orang-orang cerdas yang bisa Anda dapatkan di mana saja, *merekalah* yang kelak membangun institusi.” Sumitro adalah salah satunya. “Ia jadi salah seorang pelopor kajian ekonomi modern di Indonesia,” tulis ekonom Thee Kian Wie dari Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia.



Sumitro Djojohadikusumo di Jakarta, 1971.

Di awal masa jabatannya sebagai dekan, Sumitro yang kemudian juga jadi menteri keuangan, membangun infrastruktur fakultas itu sedari awal. Hasilnya: staf pengajar yang tangguh, ruang belajar yang pantas, perpustakaan dan unit penelitian yang lengkap, administrasi yang efektif. “Sebelum Sumitro memimpin, FEUI tak memiliki ruang belajar yang memadai. Kuliah biasa diberikan di Gedung Kesenian, *Adhoc Staat*, Gedung PTIK, dan kadang-kadang di bawah pepohonan kampus UI sekarang,” ujar ekonom Emil Salim pada 1993.

Sumitro tak hanya mengubah gedung. Pada awal 1950-an, aliran pemikiran ekonomi yang diwariskan Belanda dianggap tak cocok lagi dengan kebutuhan negara berkembang seperti Indonesia. “Pendekatannya sangat teoritis dan filosofis,” ujar Emil Salim. Sementara itu Sumitro sudah menaruh perhatian pada pendekatan baru “Ekonomi Pembangunan” dan ia ingin mengembangkan pemikiran ini di FEUI. Pada 1955-1956, kurikulum dirombak dengan mengutamakan pembahasan masalah ekonomi di negeri ini. “Sumitro-lah yang memperkenalkan ekonomi makro di Indonesia,” kata Emil Salim pula.

Saat itu, hampir semua profesor dari Belanda yang semula mengajar di FEUI sudah kembali ke negara mereka. Sumitro telah siap menghadapi hal ini. Ia membangun kerja sama antara FEUI dan University of California, Berkeley, untuk mendatangkan para profesor dari Amerika Serikat. Sebagai gantinya FEUI mengirim mahasiswa terbaiknya untuk belajar di Berkeley, MIT, Stanford, New York University, dan Cornell. Maka dimulailah pembangunan ilmu ekonomi Indonesia.

“Perbedaan yang langsung terasa adalah budaya debat mahasiswa dan dosen,” ujar Saleh Afiff, yang kemudian jadi menteri ekonomi. “Sebelumnya, seorang profesor selalu jadi orang yang mahatahu.”

Kerjasama FEUI-Berkeley bukanlah upaya pertama Sumitro untuk membuat pembaharuan. Mula-mula ia berupaya memperkenalkan metode pendidikan “Anglo-Saxon.” Tapi ikhtiar awalnya untuk mendatangkan para pakar dari Inggris lewat British Council gagal. Lewat Rockefeller Foundation, ia juga mencoba menjalin kerja sama dengan Cornell University. Tapi suksesnya bermula dengan sebuah lembaga bantuan yang lain.

Sumitro pertama kali mengajukan permohonan bantuan pendidikan kepada Ford Foundation pada 1951, lewat ekonom Everett Hawkins. Sementara itu para



Sumitro memberi kuliah di Surabaya, 1955.

pemimpin Indonesia lainnya mulai meminta bantuan Ford Foundation pula; pada tahun yang sama, Ali Sastroamidjojo, duta besar Indonesia untuk Amerika Serikat, mencari dukungan untuk proyek perbaikan penguasaan bahasa Inggris di sekolah-sekolah Indonesia. Pada 1952 para utusan Ford Foundation mulai melakukan survei untuk mendapatkan data rencana bantuan mereka bagi Indonesia. Pada akhirnya, kerjasama pun terlaksana.

Bakat Sumitro lainnya muncul lewat Lembaga Penelitian Ekonomi dan Masyarakat (LPEM) yang didirikan pada 1953 dan mempersiapkan “alih kepemimpinan” dan kader. Dibantu oleh para mahasiswa dan koleganya sefakultas, LPEM jadi usaha pertama Sumitro untuk mencari bentuk kebijakan ekonomi yang tepat. Lembaga itu juga jadi penghubung utama antara FEUI dan pemerintah.

Seperti sentuhan Sumitro lainnya, LPEM yang dikembangkan oleh para pemikir muda yang belum terlalu berpengalaman, segera jadi lembaga yang disegani. Banyak orang kagum dengan gagasan tersebut karena reputasi Sumitro. Ia bersahabat dengan mereka dan memberi mereka pengalaman baru. Ia menyediakan kesempatan besar kepada orang-orang

yang berhasil di dalamnya untuk duduk di Biro Perencanaan Pusat dan Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun pada 1952. Ia mengenalkan mereka kepada dunia para ekonom papan atas. Ketika orang-orang muda ini kemudian jadi pengambil keputusan ekonomi Indonesia, mereka memandang kepadanya dengan berterima kasih.

Pada 1955 Sumitro mendirikan Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia yang kini telah berkembang jadi organisasi profesional. Jumlah ekonom kian bertambah. Pada awal 1960-an, FEUI mulai mendorong tumbuhnya kepemimpinan lokal. Sebagai institusi “pelopor,” FEUI didukung oleh fakultas ekonomi lainnya dari universitas negeri seluruh Indonesia. Para teknokrat mengingat dengan baik bagaimana “dosen terbang” dari FEUI dibawa dengan pesawat ke Universitas Sawerigading (sekarang Universitas Sriwijaya) di Palembang, atau ke cabang Universitas Indonesia di Makassar.

Dalam kehidupan selanjutnya, Sumitro ternyata bisa punya jangkauan yang terkadang mengagetkan. Daoed Joesoef, yang belakangan jadi Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, bercerita ketika ia jadi “dosen terbang” di Makassar pada 1957. Pada saat itu, pelabuhan udara baru saja

dibom para pemberontak Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia. Ternyata Sumitro jadi salah satu pemimpin gerakan ini. “Sumitro-lah yang pertama meminta saya untuk mengajar di Makassar; ia juga yang mengirim para pengebom ke sana,” kata Daoed Joesoef setengah bergurau.

Peran Sumitro dalam pemberontakan ini meninggalkan stigma yang sulit hilang. Dia bekerjasama dengan dinas rahasia Amerika Serikat, CIA, dan orang sering menghubungkan ini dengan pemikiran ekonomi “liberalnya.” Sebenarnya ini adalah label yang meragukan; Sumitro selalu mempertahankan keyakinannya pada pentingnya intervensi negara sebagai lembaga pengambil kebijakan publik yang efektif. Analisisnya yang banyak dikutip ketika terjadi krisis ekonomi Asia pada 1997-1998 – “Indonesia sedang menderita sakit kelembagaan” – menunjukkan betapa buruk kebijakan publik Indonesia karena Presiden Suharto kian mengutamakan kepentingan bisnis keluarganya di atas kepentingan umum.

Pernyataan itu – yang khas Sumitro – secara tepat menunjukkan sisi terbaiknya sebagai seorang ekonom yang juga intelektual publik, yang tak kenal lelah mencari visi alternatif.

Kebetulan waktu itu ada seorang pemimpin mahasiswa yang punya dedikasi seperti Suhadi. Dan kebetulan waktu itu ada doktor ekonomi yang masih muda, 34 tahun, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, alumnus Nederlands Economische Hogeschool di Rotterdam. Kebetulan pula bahwa doktor ilmu ekonomi ini baru saja berhenti sebagai menteri keuangan. Dan ia tak menolak. Ia memang bimbang sejenak ketika para mahasiswa memintanya jadi dekan.

Bagi Sumitro, seorang dekan harus bergelar profesor, umumnya berjenggot, sedangkan ia tidak. “Saya masih muda,” katanya, sebagaimana dikutip dalam biografinya, “dan belum berjenggot sama sekali!” Tapi ia menerima, dan tipikal Sumitro, ia bekerja keras dan tuntas untuk itu dan kelak ia akan mengatakan bahwa membangun FEUI adalah satu hal yang paling membanggakan dalam hidupnya yang panjang dan berliku.

Tipikal Sumitro pula, ia bekerja dengan rencana. Rencana Sumitro ini kelak ternyata berpengaruh dalam sejarah Indonesia. Tapi sebenarnya agenda itu sangat elementer dan terbatas jangkauannya: mendirikan sesuatu dari titik nol. Pertama, melengkapi korps dosen FEUI selekas-lekasnya. Kedua, melengkapi susunan tata usaha dan peralatannya. Ketiga, menyusun rencana pelajaran. Keempat, membangun susunan fakultas dengan bagian-bagiannya, misalnya perpustakaan dan lembaga riset. Kelima, berusaha agar FEUI punya gedung sendiri.

Dengan cepat Sumitro bekerja. Untuk melengkapi korps dosen, keadaan menyebabkan ia harus membujuk beberapa sarjana Belanda yang ada di Indonesia untuk ikut mengajar, meski sebenarnya tak puas benar. Para guru besar itu kebanyakan bukan ekonom. Meskipun ia lulusan Rotterdam, Sumitro tak pernah benar-benar menyukai Belanda terutama orang Belanda yang di Indonesia. Dalam pandangannya, “orang-orang Belanda yang ada di Indonesia jauh lebih kolot dari yang ada di negeri Belanda sendiri.” Akibatnya, kurikulum FEUI pun masih “kolot.”

Awal tahun 1950-an adalah zaman berpendarnya ahli ekonomi Inggris John Maynard Keynes dalam pemikiran

ekonomi. Gagasan yang ia paparkan dalam karya besarnya, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, yang diterbitkan pertama kali di tahun 1936 setelah “zaman malaise” yang melumpuhkan ekonomi dunia, disambut hangat di mana-mana ketika prasarana hancur oleh Perang Dunia II. Bantuan Marshall Plan dari Amerika Serikat ke Eropa menunjukkan betapa pentingnya campur tangan pemerintah dan betapa terbatasnya ekonomi “liberal” yang mengandalkan sikap *laissez-faire* untuk memperbaiki keadaan. Pandangan ekonomi klasik terguncang sejak itu.

Sumitro, yang belajar di Rotterdam sampai ia menjadi doktor di tahun 1945, mengetahui perkembangan ilmu ekonomi ini dari jarak dekat. Seorang yang lulus dalam usia masih 25 tahun, dengan kritis ia menampik pandangan ekonomi klasik yang masih mempengaruhi ekonom Belanda. Di FEUI, ia mencoba mempertautkan pandangan Keynesian dan pasca-Keynesian dengan keadaan konkret di Indonesia. Ia memimpikan membangun “Jakarta School of Economics.”

Sumitro berniat mengisi staf pengajar FEUI dengan tenaga yang cocok untuk ekonomi pembangunan yang sedang dikembangkannya. Ia, yang pernah mengikuti beberapa kuliah di London School of Economics – dengan guru besar seperti Harold Lasky, dengan alumni seperti Jawaharlal Nehru yang kemudian memimpin India, dan Kwame Nkrumah yang memimpin Ghana – ingin mengirim kader-kadernya ke Inggris. Tapi pemerintah tak punya biaya untuk itu dan British Council tak bisa membantu. Akhirnya, Ford Foundation yang dipilih.

Tapi jalan tak lempang ke sana. Permintaan awal Sumitro diajukan ke Ford Foundation di tahun 1951, melalui seorang ekonom Amerika, Everett Hawkins, yang waktu itu bekerja di Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) di kedutaan AS. Dana yang diperlukan \$400.000, untuk membiayai sejumlah pakar ekonomi AS yang didatangkan guna mengajar di Indonesia selama tiga tahun. Tenaga ahli itu dimaksudkan untuk mengisi kekurangan pengajar dan menggantikan pengajar Belanda yang sedang meninggalkan Indonesia.

Permintaan Sumitro tak segera ditanggapi. Dalam sebuah penilaian konfidensial yang ditulis atas permintaan Ford



▲ dan ▼ Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX dan Letnan-Gubernur Belanda
Hubertus van Mook pada upacara penyerahan kedaulatan Indonesia pada 27 Desember 1949.



TEKNOKRAT NOMOR SATU: WIDJOJO NITISASTRO

Widjojo Nitisastro sering dijuluki “teknokrat nomor satu Indonesia,” “arsitek ekonomi Orde Baru,” dan secara kurang bersahabat, “Bos Mafia Berkeley.” Label apapun yang diberikan kepadanya, ia memang seorang pemimpin intelektual dari satu generasi ekonom Indonesia.

Lahir pada 1927 dari sebuah keluarga nasionalis, Widjojo besar di Surabaya. Tahun 1945, ia duduk di sekolah lanjutan ketika revolusi pecah dan ia bergabung dengan Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar. “Ia sungguh seorang pemberani,” ujar seorang teman lamanya, Pansa Tampubolon. “Ia hampir saja terbunuh di suatu tempat antara Ngadlik dan Gunung Sari, tapi ia terus melawan dan melemparkan granat.”

Cerita itu menggambarkan pribadi yang berbeda dari seorang lelaki yang kemudian sering dituduh tak patriotik karena “menjual” negaranya kepada International Monetary Fund dan Bank Dunia. Dalam kenyataannya, sebagian besar hidup Widjojo dicurahkan untuk tanah airnya.

Sebagai mahasiswa FEUI dan University of California, Berkeley, ia sering memimpin diskusi membahas masalah Indonesia. “Waktu itu dialah yang selalu memimpin dalam diskusi itu,” kata Ali Wardhana, seorang koleganya. Ketika Widjojo mengepalai BAPPENAS, ia selalu bekerja hingga larut malam. Tak seperti beberapa pemimpin Orde Baru lainnya, ia tak pernah menodai kerjanya dengan korupsi.

Ketika para mahasiswa berdemonstrasi atas praktek korupsi yang dilakukan para jenderal Orde Baru, Widjojo mengatakan diam-diam bahwa mereka melakukan “hal yang benar.”

Lebih jauh lagi, ia pernah melakukan manuver menjatuhkan Mayor Jenderal Ibnu Sutowo dari kedudukannya sebagai direktur Pertamina, yang menghamburkan hasil pendapatan minyak dan terlibat utang besar-besaran. Widjojo selalu curiga pada

proyek-proyek besar. Diam-diam dia tak setuju kepada rencana Ibu Negara Tien Suharto membangun Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (TMII).

Widjojo mencemaskan timbulnya sikap takabur akibat derasnya petrodolar dan merasa skeptis bila industri dengan teknologi tingkat tinggi jadi salah satu mesin pertumbuhan. Semangatnya tampak bila ia membahas perbaikan hidup tingkat desa, misalnya soal sekolah dasar dan



Widjojo Nitisastro, Jakarta, 1971.

pelayanan kesehatan rakyat. Petugas keamanan di BAPPENAS mengingatkannya sebagai pejabat yang peduli terhadap “orang kecil” seperti diri mereka. Mereka juga membicarakan dengan hangat perilaku Widjojo yang bersahaja, yang senantiasa mengelak dari perangkap kekuasaan – juga kegemarannya akan jajanan pinggir jalan.

Ia jelas bukan semata-mata “boneka Barat,” seperti kritik kaum kiri kepadanya,

tapi ia juga bukan orang yang bersimpati pada Marxisme. Masa pembentukan dirinya sebagai ekonom bersamaan dengan maraknya sosialisme di Dunia Ketiga. Ia menganjurkan strategi alternatif: ekonomi Keynesian dengan wajah Indonesia. Ia berpendapat, contohnya, koperasi tak cocok dengan kebutuhan negara modern. Ia lebih tertarik pada ekonomi langsung di bawah pemerintah untuk merangsang pertumbuhan, tapi ia juga menyadari birokrasi Indonesia tak selamanya bisa dipercaya. Ia percaya pada perencanaan yang baik, yang disusun dan diawasi oleh para ekonom yang terlatih.

Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, kala itu dekan FEUI, melihat kecerdasan Widjojo muda, juga bakatnya dalam memimpin, keuletannya, dan hal lainnya: ia gampang menyesuaikan diri dengan kehidupan desa.

Ketika Sumitro mengirim mahasiswa masuk ke desa, Widjojo memang orang yang cocok. Lapornya, yang ditulisnya bersama Julius E. Ismail, menarik perhatian wakil Ford Foundation Michael Harris. Orang lain juga terkesan. Di awal 1950-an, ketika ahli demografi Harvard University, Nathan Keyfitz, jadi konsultan Badan Perancang Nasional (BPN), ia bosan bukan alang kepalang. Keyfitz pun pergi ke pedalaman, di sebuah desa di Jawa Timur dan melakukan penelitian. Widjojo yang kala itu masih seorang asisten mahasiswa di BPN, menemaninya. Hasilnya dipublikasi-

kan secara luas dan digunakan sebagai buku pegangan berjudul *Soal Penduduk dan Pembangunan Indonesia*.

Hampir tak terelakkan bahwa Widjojo lah yang mewarisi kepemimpinan FEUI dari Sumitro. Pada 1986, dalam sebuah wawancara Sumitro mengatakan, “Pada 1955 saya bilang ke Widjojo, ‘Inilah hal terjauh yang bisa saya lakukan sebagai guru.’ Tak lama kemudian, setelah memperoleh gelar sarjana, saya mengangkatnya sebagai direktur LPEM.”



Presiden Subarto, Widjojo Nitisastro, dan John Bresnan, 1972.

Tentang cepatnya karier Widjojo, rekannya, Mohammad Sadli, dengan bercanda mengatakan, “Itulah bagus. Kalau semua orang sama-sama cerdas, tak akan ada perbedaan hierarkis yang alami.”

Irma Adelman, seorang anggota komite penguji Widjojo di Berkeley, mengatakan pada akademikus Karen Brooks pada 1996, “Kami selalu merasa sejauh ini Widjojo-lah mahasiswa Indonesia yang paling cerdas dan energetik. Waktu itu kami pikir, Widjojo sendiri saja sudah cukup untuk jadi imbalan yang setimpal bagi seluruh proyek Indonesia-Berkeley – dan kami pada bertaruh kelak ia masuk penjara atau jadi perdana menteri!”

Pada akhirnya, bersama teman-temannya,

para ekonom terbaik Indonesia masa itu, yang punya pemikiran cemerlang tentang ekonomi, ia diangkat jadi pejabat. Kelompok ini dikenal sebagai “teknokrat,” yang mendominasi pengambilan keputusan ekonomi yang dibuat di awal Orde Baru pimpinan Presiden Suharto dan mendorong Indonesia keluar dari jurang kemerosotan 1960-an.

Para teknokrat pertama kali memperkenalkan visi mereka kepada Suharto pada Agustus 1966, saat seminar militer di Bandung. Sang jenderal secara blak-blakan bertanya, “Jika Anda punya kesempatan untuk mengubah ekonomi, apa yang akan Anda lakukan?”

Di sinilah, kata banyak orang, Widjojo memperoleh kepercayaan Suharto. Ekonom

A.R. Soehoed bercerita soal para teknokrat ini, “Mereka pandai menakut-nakuti si Bapak. Mereka mengatakan, jika ia tak mengikuti saran mereka, masyarakat akan tanpa sandang pangan, ekonomi tak akan tumbuh.” Pandangan lain mengatakan bahwa Widjojo menarik perhatian Suharto karena ia mampu menggabungkan sopan-santun Jawa dengan kepandaian mengemas soal-soal yang kompleks jadi jelas dan meyakinkan.

Apapun penjelasannya, ketika Suharto memberikan kepercayaan kepada Widjojo dan rekannya dengan kekuasaan, mereka mengambil kesempatan tersebut, dan sejarah ekonomi Indonesia berubah secara besar-besaran.

Foundation, State Department (kementerian luar negeri AS) – yang tampaknya masih berpengaruh pada lembaga pemberi dana dari swasta – meminta agar permintaan Sumitro ditunda untuk dipertimbangkan, sebab pemerintah AS “gusar” (*piqued*) karena aplikasinya tak dilakukan melalui “saluran yang sepatutnya.”

Di awal 1952, sebuah tim penjajakan dikirim Ford Foundation dari New York ke Indonesia atas permintaan pemerintah Indonesia. Tim itu mengukuhkan perlunya bantuan untuk latihan bahasa Inggris, yang diminta oleh Duta Besar Indonesia untuk AS, Ali Sastroamidjojo. Juga disebut perlunya bantuan untuk UI dan UGM. Tapi usul Sumitro tak dibicarakan secara khusus.

Ketika Juni 1953, datang ke Indonesia perwakilan Ford yang pertama. Harapan Sumitro juga tak segera terpenuhi. Orang itu adalah Elmer Starch. Sedikit yang diketahui Starch, petani gandum dari Montana ini, tentang Indonesia. Geraknya di Jakarta juga terbatas. Karena belum punya rumah tinggal, ia hidup selama dua tahun di sebuah kamar untuk satu orang di Hotel Des Indes (kini jadi pusat perbelanjaan Duta Merlin, dengan arsitektur yang sudah berubah). Sekretarisnya, seorang Amerika, tinggal di kamar yang lain. Kantornya di kamar berikutnya. Des Indes satu-satunya hotel prestisius di Jakarta waktu itu – salah satu perundingan internasional untuk kemerdekaan Indonesia diselenggarakan di sini – tapi tak bisa dikatakan memadai untuk sebuah tempat kerja.

Juga belum banyak yang diketahui orang Indonesia

tentang Ford Foundation. Umar Kayam, misalnya, yang kelak menjadi guru besar dan penulis terkemuka Indonesia. Waktu itu dia mahasiswa jurusan paedagogi UGM. Mendengar bahwa lembaga ini menyediakan bantuan untuk usaha pendidikan di Indonesia, dia memberanikan diri datang ke kamar di Hotel Des Indes itu. Ia meminta bantuan untuk aktivitas penerbitan di kampusnya. “Tidak usah berupa mobil sedan, diberi mobil *pick-up* saja sudah cukup bagi kami,” kata anak muda itu dengan



bahasa Inggris terpatah-patah. Starch, seorang tua yang kusut dan baik hati, tertawa. Dijelaskannya bahwa Ford Foundation, meskipun pernah ada hubungannya dengan perusahaan mobil Ford, tak membagi-bagi kendaraan.

Keadaan Indonesia waktu itu tak menguntungkan. Kabinet Wilopo baru jatuh. Konflik di kalangan politik menajam, dan “Peristiwa 17 Oktober” di tahun sebelumnya, ketika Angkatan Darat mendukung demonstrasi anti-Parlemen, menunjukkan militer mulai gelisah. Di kalangan pemerintah dan masyarakat, keti-

dakpastian dan in-konsistensi meruyak ke mana-mana.

Dalam satu naskah tentang pengalamannya pada 1960-an yang tak pernah diterbitkan, John Bresnan, orang Ford Foundation yang kemudian mendapat Bintang Jasa Pratama dari Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri, melukiskan sulitnya keadaan waktu itu. Dia menulis bahwa Starch “bukanlah orang untuk berurusan dengan pemerintah.” Starch juga tampaknya bukan orang yang cukup gesit untuk berurusan dengan Sumitro dan FEUI. Selama dia di Indonesia, proposal dari Salemba itu tak bergerak jauh dari kantor Starch.

▲ Ruang tamu yang sesak di kantor Ford Foundation di Hotel des Indes. Papan menunjukkan jadwal pemakaian mobil dan penugasan sopir, 1957.

SELO SOEMARDJAN

Selo Soemardjan (1915-2003) dikenal sebagai guru besar sosiologi Universitas Indonesia. Soemardjan memulai kariernya sebagai birokrat Jawa. Dia jadi camat di sebuah desa di Yogyakarta. Pada masa revolusi Indonesia 1945-1950, dia bekerja sebagai sekretaris Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX – sultan Jawa yang membantu proses kemerdekaan Indonesia. Soemardjan melanjutkan studinya di Cornell University, kembali pada 1959, lalu bekerja di berbagai tempat terutama Universitas Indonesia, dan Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial (YIIS). Dia ikut mendirikan YIIS dan menjadi ketuanya selama tiga dasawarsa.

Pada 1948 seorang mahasiswa Amerika bernama George McTurnan Kahin bikin penelitian di Yogyakarta. Kahin bertemu Menteri Pendidikan Ali Sastroamidjojo. Kahin minta dibantu mencari seseorang untuk memudahkannya melakukan penelitian dan wawancara.

Kebetulan saya ada di sana. “Itu orangnya,” kata Sastroamidjojo. Saya bekerja sebagai pamong praja, tepatnya sekretaris Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Sultan punya pengaruh di kalangan gerakan kemerdekaan Indonesia. Sultan pula yang menawarkan Yogyakarta sebagai ibukota Indonesia pada masa revolusi.

Saya bawa Kahin ke mana-mana sampai ketemu Presiden Sukarno dan Wakil Presiden Moh. Hatta. Sesudah penelitiannya selesai, Kahin kembali ke Amerika Serikat dan menerbitkan tesisnya *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. Dia lalu jadi profesor Cornell dan mendirikan Modern Indonesia Project. Suatu saat dia menghubungi saya, “Pak Selo mau belajar di Amerika?”

“Mau, mau banget. Tapi nggak punya uang.”

“Duit saya cari,” jawab Kahin.

Mau belajar apa, saya tak tahu karena hanya lulusan sekolah menengah zaman Belanda. Bahasa Inggris, saya bisa, tapi logat Yogyakarta. Tapi saya selalu terkesan pengalaman jadi camat semasa pendudukan Jepang. Susah sekali karena beras dan sapi diminta, laki-laki dipaksa kerja rodi.

Lantas revolusi. Ramai lagi. Banyak orang diculik. Perubahan sosial itu menarik perhatian saya. Maka saya bilang ingin belajar sosiologi. Kahin minta saya membuat surat untuk studi di Cornell dan sponsor dari Ford Foundation.

Pada Februari 1956, saya pergi ke Cornell. Nama Sultan mulai dikenal dunia. Dia diundang ke Cornell atas biaya Ford

Foundation. Itu pertama kali Sultan ke Amerika. Pengaruhnya luar biasa. Pandangannya berubah banyak.

Pada 1958, saya menemani Sultan jalan-jalan selama sebulan lebih. Kami pergi ke tempat-tempat penting. Dari Chicago ke Wisconsin, kami diantar tiga pejabat Amerika. Sesudah kami di

profesor saya ikut khawatir. Saya diluluskan, mungkin karena mereka kasihan.

Pulang ke Indonesia, oleh Mohammad Sadli dari FEUI, saya diminta mengajar sosiologi. Saya jadi akademikus nonekonom. Nama mata kuliahnya *Non-economic Factors in Economic Development*.

Ketika Suharto menggantikan Sukarno, Sadli dan kawan-kawannya jadi arsitek ekonomi Indonesia. Saya ikut sebagai *non-economic factor*. Para ekonom ini hasil beasiswa dari Ford Foundation, termasuk saya.

Widjojo Nitisastro yang mengatur pendekatan di parlemen, terutama mengenai rencana pembangunan. Kalau bikin rencana saja akan tak berguna kalau tak didukung parlemen maupun pemerintah. Maka teknokrat-teknokrat itu jadi menteri. Ali Wardhana jadi menteri keuangan. Sadli jadi menteri tenaga kerja. Emil Salim masih di Berkeley.

Kami bekerja jujur. Pada 1970-an semua teknokrat dilarang Nitisastro berhubungan dengan pengusaha. Ini sampai anak-anak Suharto dewasa. Suharto mau ikut dapat duit dan ekonom-ekonom itu dilepas pelan-pelan.

Pada 1974-1984 Ford Foundation membantu pengembangan ilmuwan sosial di Indonesia bersama YIIS. Tiap tahun kami memilih 15 orang untuk dilatih penelitian. Saya ketua yayasan itu.

Kalau sekarang direnungkan, saya lihat beda bantuan dari Uni Soviet dengan Amerika Serikat. Uni Soviet langsung membantu rakyat, antara lain lewat PKI. Bantuannya berupa makanan, alat pertanian, dan sebagainya. Amerika Serikat membantu kaum intelektual, lewat beasiswa. Harapannya, orang-orang ini kalau sudah pulang jadi pemimpin dan timbul *trickle down effect* pada warga.



Selo Soemardjan di Jakarta, 1971.

dalam kereta api, mereka pulang. Ternyata tiketnya salah. Kami segera keluar. Beliau membawa dua koper besar dan saya satu. Lalu saya beli tiket baru dan ternyata digratiskan. Tapi namanya juga Sultan, akhirnya saya juga yang angkat semua kopernya.

Di Cornell saya belajar sosiologi menurut teori-teori Eropa. Beasiswa saya hanya tiga tahun padahal saya ingin mendapatkan Ph.D. Saya belajar keras. Pada Februari 1959 kembali ke Yogyakarta untuk riset tesis Ph.D. selama enam bulan. Lalu kembali ke Cornell untuk menulis tesis dan ujian.

Ketika ujian, ada granat diledakkan di Perguruan Cikini. Sasarannya Presiden Sukarno. Presiden selamat, tapi empat anak saya sekolah di sana. Saya khawatir. Profesor-



Di tahun 1955, Starch pergi dari Indonesia, dari kamarnya yang sempit di Des Indes. Seorang yang lebih efektif menggantikannya: Michael Harris. Dalam biografinya, Sumitro menyebut Harris sebagai “kawan lama.” Mereka pertama kali bertemu tahun 1951 di Jakarta. Waktu itu Harris bekerja di satu tim survei yang menjajaki kemungkinan pemberian bantuan seperti Marshall Plan di Indonesia. Harris adalah orang pilihan Presiden Ford Foundation, Paul Hoffman.

Harris memang sosok yang sulit dilupakan. Ia “seorang yang tinggi besar, penuh dengan energi yang gugup, sudah biasa dengan koridor kekuasaan,” begitulah Bresnan melukiskannya. Orang ini, yang tak pernah duduk di perguruan tinggi, dengan karier awal di kalangan organisasi buruh Congress of Industrial Organizations, tampaknya cocok dengan Sumitro yang memang cenderung mengagumi “*men of action*.” Pada 1957 Harris memindahkan kantor Ford Foundation keluar dari kamar Hotel Des Indes. Ia membeli sebuah kantor di Jalan Taman Kebon Sirih dan dua buah rumah di daerah Menteng, membangun lima rumah gaya Skandinavia di daerah baru yang

disebut Kebayoran. Di bawah kepemimpinan Harris, Indonesia merupakan sebuah entitas besar di Ford Foundation. Dalam catatan Bresnan, di tahun 1957 saja, biaya administrasi di Indonesia memakan separuh dari seluruh biaya kantor Ford di luar negeri.

Harris, yang kemudian tinggal di Indonesia selama enam tahun, tak pelak lagi seorang pejabat yang efektif. Dan ia memang harus demikian menghadapi Sumitro. Orang dari Salemba No. 4 itu tak punya banyak waktu lagi untuk menunda rencananya bagi FEUI. Ketika Harris datang, Sumitro sudah nyaris melupakan Ford Foundation. Ia telah membuat kesepakatan dengan pemberi dana yang lain. Dalam kesepakatan itu, Rockefeller Foundation akan membantu FEUI dengan memakai Cornell sebagai lembaga penunjang.

Tapi harapan ke arah Cornell dan Rockefeller Foundation gagal. Dana yang dijanjikan oleh ECA buat mengimbangi tak kunjung muncul. Kini tinggal Ford Foundation yang ada. Harris pun bekerja keras dan membawa UC Berkeley ikut serta dalam programnya.



▲ Konstruksi perumahan untuk staf dan konsultan Ford Foundation di Kebayoran Baru, 1957. Ketika Ford Foundation menutup kantornya di Jakarta pada 1965, rumah-rumah ini dihibahkan kepada para mitranya.
 ◆ Miss Cunningham, Andrew Choa, dan Hasanah di ruang administrasi Ford Foundation di Hotel des Indes, 1957.

Sejak Mei 1956, secara resmi UC Berkeley mengambil peran – dan mulailah sebuah kerja sama yang kemudian ternyata bersejarah. Ford Foundation menyetujui hampir semua ide dasar Sumitro, termasuk mengirim sekitar 20 mahasiswa ke AS, beserta keluarga mereka. Dalam bantuan itu dialokasikan juga anggaran untuk mendatangkan pengajar dari Berkeley ke Indonesia. Mereka akan mengisi kekosongan sementara tenaga di FEUI. Sebuah dana besar, lebih dari \$2 juta, disediakan untuk itu.

Kini orang terus berdebat, apakah semua itu berakhir sebagai sebuah cerita sukses. Mohammad Sadli, teknokrat yang berada dalam tim Widjojo Nitisastro ketika duduk dalam pemerintahan Presiden Suharto, menilai program Ford Foundation gagal dalam membantu program Sumitro. Sebab tujuannya adalah untuk memperkuat FEUI, sedangkan hasilnya adalah sesuatu yang lain: praktis semua ekonom yang disiapkan melalui program itu akhirnya direkrut ke dalam pemerintahan. Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Subroto, Daoed Joesoef, J.B. Sumarlin, Saleh Affif, Emil Salim, Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, Julius E. Ismael, Djunaedi Hadisumarto, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, dan termasuk Sadli sendiri adalah nama yang lebih dikenal sebagai orang pemerintah ketimbang guru besar dengan karya-karya ilmiah yang dipakai

di kampus. Akhirnya, FEUI tetap sebuah fakultas yang belum juga kukuh dalam melahirkan akademisi.

Namun “kegagalan” itu berkait dengan keadaan Indonesia: di negeri di mana tenaga terdidik masih langka ini, seorang staf akademis yang mampu harus bekerja untuk segala macam hal. Mereka dituntut oleh kebutuhan hidup, permintaan masyarakat, dan tugas fakultas. Meskipun demikian, orang bisa menunjukkan bahwa ada sesuatu yang tumbuh dari “rencana Sumitro” itu. Di tahun 1958, kurikulum FEUI diperbarui, meninggalkan warisan Belanda. Cara belajar bebas diubah, menjadi *guided study*. Kriteria untuk diterima kuliah diperketat dengan ujian masuk. Sementara itu, bagaimana pun juga, pengetahuan ilmu ekonomi di Indonesia mungkin tak juga berkembang pesat seandainya program dengan Berkeley itu tak ada. Emil Salim, salah seorang lulusan dari program ini, menjawab dalam sebuah wawancara, “Semua pengetahuan saya tentang ilmu ekonomi datang dari Berkeley, dari dasar sekali, bahkan sejak kalkulus.”

Emil Salim tahu benar apa bedanya. Sebelum Berkeley, di Salemba No. 4, para mahasiswa belajar di bawah guru besar Belanda yang lebih fokus hanya pada persoalan mikro-ekonomi. “Bagaikan pohon,” tulis Emil mengenang masa 50 tahun FEUI, “apa dan bagaimana hubungannya dengan hutan ekonomi



▲ Mohammad Sadli menerima ijazah doktornya dari FEUI, 1957.

secara agregatif tidak dijelaskan.... Sementara itu di dunia ilmu pengetahuan sedang berkecamuk ajaran ekonomi Keynesian dengan pendekatan makro-ekonomi.”

Kritik yang lain, yang lebih galak, ditembakkan ke arah hubungan para ekonom dari Salemba itu dengan kekuatan politik di luar kampus. Sebenarnya hubungan itu bukan hal baru. Di tahun 1950-an, hadirnya Sumitro di sana menyebabkan FEUI dianggap sebagai wilayah Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). Sumitro memang anggota PSI yang sadar.

Para ekonom seperti Widjojo, Ali Wardhana, Suhadi, dan Emil Salim tak pernah menyatakan diri sebagai anggota PSI atau anggota partai apapun. Tapi beberapa staf pengajar lain, terutama Tan Goan Po, dikenal sebagai PSI, dan orang-orang sosialis tampaknya punya pengikut luas di sini. Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis cukup mendapatkan dukungan. “Bahkan tukang parkir sepeda di kampus juga ikut memakai lencana PSI,” tutur Silalahi yang merupakan seorang pemimpin Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (PMKRI).

Di tahun 1950-an, serangan kepada PSI, atau segala sesuatu yang dikaitkan dengan partai itu, datang dari Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI) dan Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Kian lama serangan itu kian keras, dan PSI, yang praktis kalah suara dalam pemilihan umum 1955, terdesak.

Bersamaan dengan itu, Sumitro beberapa kali dipanggil oleh Corps Polisi Militer untuk diperiksa dengan tuduhan korupsi. Merasa bahwa ini adalah cara untuk memenjarakan, ia lari dari Jakarta.

Ia bergabung dengan para perwira militer yang membentuk PRRI di Padang, dalam usaha membangkang pada Jakarta dan Presiden Sukarno. Keadaan tegang, meskipun para perwira militer pembangkang tak yakin benar Jakarta akan mengirim pasukan untuk menindak mereka, persiapan militer dilakukan juga. Sumitro bekerja sama dengan CIA untuk menggulingkan Sukarno.

Para pemimpin PSI, yang tak menyetujui langkah Sumitro, menskorsnya. Tapi tak menolong partai itu. Presiden Sukarno – yang telah membubarkan Parlemen dan menyatakan Indonesia dalam keadaan perang – tetap membubarkan partai itu di tahun 1960. Pemimpinnya, Sutan Sjahrir, dipenjarakan. Di masa itulah, kata PSI, berkat kampanye PKI yang efektif, mulai jadi semacam stigma. Stigma itulah yang mengenai FEUI.

“Ini adalah minggu-minggu yang paling gelap dalam sejarah singkat Fakultas Ekonomi,” tulis Bruce Glassburner, salah satu staf pengajar dari Berkeley yang diperbantukan di Salemba No. 4. Sejak itu, FEUI berada dalam posisi defensif.



▲ Perploncoan anggota baru Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia di Pasar Baru, Jakarta, 1958.

SEMALAM BERSAMA TEKNOKRAT

Suatu malam, Maret 2003, ketika orang ramai bicara rencana Presiden George W. Bush menyerang Irak, di sebuah hotel Jakarta diadakan sebuah wawancara unik. Lima wartawan mewawancarai sembilan ekonom senior Indonesia. Widjojo Nitisastro datang bersama sebagian rekan-rekannya dari FEUI yang dulu memperoleh pendidikan ekonomi di Amerika Serikat dalam rangka kerja sama antara FEUI dan UC Berkeley, yang dibiayai Ford Foundation.

Ada Subadi Mangkusuwondo, Subroto, Julius E. Ismael, dan Mohammad Sadli. Widjojo diapit Saleh Afiff dan Subroto. Agak jauh ada Ali Wardhana, Djunaedi Hadisumarto, dan Sri Hadi. Mereka dulu menduduki berbagai jabatan kunci: badan perencanaan, departemen keuangan, perindustrian, perdagangan, pertambangan, perhubungan, maupun mewakili Indonesia di International Monetary Fund. Widjojo mula-mula memperkenalkan para koleganya. Rekan-rekannya bergurau. "Dia dipanggilnya Pak Lurah." seloroh Sadli.

Malam itu mereka bicara pengalaman mereka. Semula mereka studi lanjut di Amerika Serikat pada 1950-an dan 1960-an untuk jadi dosen FEUI. Kemudian mereka bekerja dalam pemerintahan Presiden Subarto membantu mengendalikan ekonomi Indonesia.

MAFIA BERKELEY

Widjojo: Dalam sejarah selalu ada yang namanya keberuntungan. FEUI beruntung mempunyai Prof. Sumitro Djohadikusumo. Keberuntungan lain, waktu itu permulaan 1950-an, ada senat mahasiswa yang ketuanya Suhadi Mangkusuwondo. Ketika Prof. Sunarjo Kolopaking, dekan pertama FEUI, tak mau lagi jadi dekan, senat mahasiswa berinisiatif mencari dekan. Pilihannya Pak Sumitro. Kalau tidak ada mereka, ya tidak ada apa-apa di FEUI itu. Perkembangannya akan lain sekali.

Suhadi: Pada waktu itu, Pak Sumitro satu-satunya ekonom yang bergelar doktor ekonomi. Yang lain bidangnya sosial dan hukum. Ada juga doktor ekonomi, namanya Dr. Saroso, pernah di Departemen Perdagangan, tapi sebagai ekonom kurang dikenal.

Widjojo: Prof. Sumitro memimpin FEUI yang guru besarnya sebagian besar orang Belanda. Lalu ketegangan terjadi dengan Belanda (soal Papua). Mereka mau pergi. Prof. Sumitro berinisiatif mencari guru besar lain dan yang dipikirkan dari Amerika Serikat. Dia membandingkan, "Ini sistem *continental* dan ini sistem Anglo Saxon," masing-masing ada kekuatan dan kelemahannya. Prof. Sumitro lalu menghubungi Ford Foundation untuk memperoleh bantuan membiayai rencana tersebut.

Ada faktor kebetulan lagi. Perwakilan Ford Foundation, Mr. Michael Harris, ternyata cocok dengan Prof. Sumitro. Ada kesepakatan Ford Foundation akan mencari lembaga pendidikan di Amerika Serikat untuk jadi *counterpart* FEUI dan akan membiayai program kerja sama

tersebut. Prof. Sumitro tak menyarankan nama universitas di Amerika. Hal ini diserahkan ke Ford Foundation yang kemudian memilih di UC Berkeley.

Dua guru besar dari Berkeley dikirim ke sini. Prof. Paul Taylor, ketua Department of Economics, dan Prof. Thomas Blaisdell, guru besar *political science*. Di sana Prof. Frank Kidner mengurus administrasi, mulai memilih guru besar untuk dikirim ke Indonesia hingga mengurus mahasiswa yang datang dari sini.

Pengiriman guru besar terdiri dari *full professor*, *associate professor*, dan tenaga muda. Mereka datang mulai 1956. Seingat saya ketuanya Prof. Leonard Doyle yang sering bertengkar dengan Sumitro. Jadi tidak semuanya berjalan baik. Orang kedua Prof. Leon E. Mears. Ini orang jadi penting karena menulis buku *Rice Marketing in Indonesia* bersama Saleh Afiff. Yang ketiga, masih muda, namanya Hans Schmitt. Dia erat dengan Ali Wardhana, karena keduanya mendalami bidang fiskal dan moneter.

Untuk keberangkatan kita ada seleksi oleh Prof. Sumitro dan sekretaris fakultas, Prof. Tan Goan Po. Tiap tahun ada keberangkatan. Misalnya, Suhadi, Julius Ismael, saya, dan beberapa kawan lain pada 1957. Itu *the first batch*. Pada 1958 Ali Wardhana, Sumarlin, dan lain-lain. Tahun 1959 Emil Salim, Saleh Afiff, Batara Simatupang dan lain-lain. Sesudah itu masih cukup banyak yang pergi ke berbagai universitas.

Ketuanya sesudah Prof. Doyle adalah Prof. Malcolm Davisson. Bidangnya *public finance*. Lalu ada orang yang cukup lama di sini dan cukup banyak kenalan, namanya Prof. Bruce Glassburner.

Bagaimana dengan Prof. Andreas Papandreou yang mengajar di Berkeley (1955-1963)? Ini menarik karena Prof. Papandreou seorang sosialis yang belakangan jadi perdana menteri Yunani (1981-1989, 1993-1996). Papandreou jadi ketua Department of Economics sesudah Prof. Paul Taylor. Ketika di Berkeley, Prof. Papandreou mengajar *mathematical economics*. Saya ikut kuliahnya. Pada waktu itu, pada Prof. Papandreou tidak ada *inclination* ke arah politik.

MEMILIH JURUSAN

Widjojo: Ketika belajar tertarik pada apa? Misalnya, Ali Wardhana tertarik pada *finance* dan moneter.

Afiff: Saya di FEUI mulainya di jurusan ekonomi perusahaan dan Mears memberi pelajaran *marketing*. Waktu itu ada penelitian *rice marketing*. Mears cari asisten dan saya terpilih. Tapi waktu ke Berkeley, saya masuk ke *business administration*.

Widjojo: Pilihannya bisa macam-macam. Itu ditentukan sebelum berangkat. Berkeley mencarikan universitas yang cocok. Artinya, bukan ditentukan tapi ditawarkan.

Yang penting, bagi FEUI waktu itu, bukan tenaga yang dikirim ke luar negeri, tapi juga yang mengurus di Indonesia. Prof. Sumitro pada 1957 pergi (karena pemberontakan di Sumatera dan Sulawesi). Prof. Djoko Soetono, dekan Fakultas Hukum, merangkap tugas dekan FEUI. Tapi sehari-hari ada dua orang Fakultas Ekonomi yang sudah kembali dari Amerika Serikat. Subroto sebagai sekretaris fakultas dan Mohammad Sadli sebagai direktur lembaga penelitian. Jadi kita bisa pergi dengan

tenang. Andaikata mereka mengatakan, “Sudah nggak usah diurus lagi, semua pulang.” Ini kan bisa terjadi dan perkembangan FEUI akan menjadi lain sekali.

Subroto: Pada waktu itu ada tekanan kuat terhadap FEUI. *Pressures* paling banyak dari gerakan kiri. Yang menjadi benteng atau payungnya adalah Prof. Djoko Soetono. *Pressures* itu kebanyakan mau memasukkan orang-orang kiri sebagai dosen FEUI. **Afiff:** Ford Foundation tak hanya memikirkan *individual scholarship*, tapi juga perpustakaan. Pokoknya *institutional building*. *Timing* juga beruntung. Belanda keluar kita dapat Amerika. Amerika pulang, kita sudah kembali. Jadi bisa mengambil alih apa yang dikosongkan mereka. Ini kebetulan.

KRISIS EKONOMI 1965-1966

Widjojo: Krisis ekonomi dewasa ini (mulai 1997) bukan satu-satunya krisis yang kita kenal. Tahun 1965 juga ada krisis. Waktu itu ekonomi Indonesia merosot sekali. Mau contoh kemerosotan ekonomi lagi? Waktu zaman pendudukan Jepang (1942-1945), ekonomi hancur.

Pada 1965 ada perubahan besar. Ketika itu ada kejadian penting yang dipelopori antara lain mahasiswa. Pada 10 Januari 1966 Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI) FEUI bikin seminar. Pembicaranya antara lain Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Adam Malik, kemudian dosen-dosen Fakultas Ekonomi. Salah satunya Sadli yang mengatakan, “Kita harus akui kurang modal untuk memperbaiki ekonomi apalagi membangun. Kita perlu modal dan modal dalam negeri kurang. Jadi kita harus cari. Kita perlu modal dari luar.” Mengatakan bahwa Indonesia perlu modal asing dan pinjaman dari luar negeri berani sekali. Sesudah itu ada pembagian kerja, ada seminar, ada aksi.

Fakultas Ekonomi sebelum 1965 diminta mengajar di Seskoad. Sadli yang pertama. Komandan Seskoad Jenderal Suwanto kenal Sadli. Kemudian ada seminar Angkatan Darat dimana Subroto

dan Sadli bicara. Pak Harto naik tahun 1966. Kita ketemu pada seminar kedua Angkatan Darat. Pak Harto minta kita membantunya.

Waktu itu prioritas pemerintah tidak ke pembangunan besar-besaran tapi stabilisasi dan rehabilitasi. Stabilisasi artinya pengendalian inflasi yang sangat tinggi waktu itu. Rehabilitasi terutama pada prasarana: pengairan, jalan yang sangat rusak, memperbaiki fasilitas pedesaan, dan pertanian. Konsep stabilisasi dan rehabilitasi ekonomi itu hasil pertukaran pikiran dengan Pak Harto.



Para “teknokrat” menjawab pertanyaan tentang ekonomi Indonesia pada sebuah pertemuan pers di Departemen Penerangan, 1971: Subroto, Radius Prawiro, Sumitro Djojodikusumo, Widjojo Nitisaastro dan Ali Wardhana.

KEPEMIMPINAN WIDJOJO

Ali Wardhana: Kita beruntung punya Sumitro, Subroto, Sadli, Suhadi, tapi juga Widjojo. Ketika mahasiswa, saya sebelum ujian *ditentir* Widjojo di tempat tinggalnya di asrama mahasiswa di Pegangsaan. Di Berkeley, kita diarahkan Widjojo untuk memikirkan keadaan negara itu terus sampai kembali ke sini. Maksud Widjojo agar kita tidak sekedar menjadi dosen yang pasif melihat keadaan sekeliling.

Indonesia mulai bergolak tahun 1965. Tahun itu sangat penting karena lahirnya Orde Baru. Mau dibawa kemana ekonomi ini? Itu kan Widjojo yang mikir. Widjojo mengambil inisiatif mengumpulkan pemikiran kita semua untuk mengatasi keadaan. Kumpulan pemikiran tersebut disebarluaskan dan menjadi landasan kebijakan ekonomi.

KRISIS INDONESIA 1997-1998

Widjojo: Krisis 1997-1998 ini bukan saja krisis ekonomi tapi juga krisis politik. Sama dengan krisis 1965 yang juga krisis ekonomi dan krisis politik.

Ada pertanyaan apakah Pak Harto lebih tak mendengarkan kami saat krisis? Pertanyaan itu mungkin betul juga. Kalau Ali Wardhana cerita, Pak Harto dulu bukan hanya mendengarkan, tapi mencatat. Misalnya saja soal *rescheduling* utang luar negeri pada Desember 1967. Harus diceritakan kepada beliau tentang *rescheduling* itu apa, bagaimana caranya, sistemnya di dunia yang berlaku bagaimana. Kalau mau mengurangi beban utang ini kita tidak bisa hanya menentang sistem itu. Kita harus mengetahui seluk beluknya. Pada waktu itu Pak Harto bersedia belajar.

Afiff: Saya pernah dengan Ali Wardhana menghadap Pak Harto mengenai deregulasi. Pertama masuk, belum bicara, sudah diberi kuliah. Tapi Ali terus bicara. Akhirnya Pak Harto setuju untuk deregulasi. Memang dulu Pak Harto menulis, sekarang kita yang menulis. Memang betul begitu. Tapi kita tetap *argue*.

Widjojo: Apakah krisis ekonomi 1997-1998 disebabkan paket deregulasi pada 1980-an? Deregulasi mulai 1985. Deregulasi itu meliputi banyak hal. Kita bisa bayangkan andaikata tak ada deregulasi, apa yang terjadi? Dulu orang mengimpor kedelai harus melewati sebuah pabrik pengolahan di Tanjung Priok. Negara mana yang mengurus ekonominya begitu? Jadi orang berpikir kembali. Begitu juga dengan perbankan. Dulu kalau orang mau menyimpan atau mengambil uangnya di bank pemerintah, tidak sedikit yang mengalami perlakuan tidak wajar. Ketika diberikan kesempatan kepada bank swasta, dan ada kompetisi, maka ada perbaikan di bank pemerintah. Bahwa ada hal-hal yang kurang baik itu jelas. Salah satu kelemahan kita adalah pengawasan.

Ketika “ekonomi terpimpin” diterapkan oleh Presiden Sukarno, dan pemerintahan “demokrasi terpimpin” berlangsung, pers dibredel dan beberapa tokoh politik dipenjarakan, FEUI tak bisa dengan terbuka menjadi mimbar yang bebas.

Dalam arti tertentu FEUI memang bisa mengatasi keadaan. Djoko Soetono, guru besar ilmu hukum itu, mengambil alih jabatan yang ditinggalkan Sumitro, meskipun ia hanya mau disebut sebagai pejabat dekan. Subroto, yang mendapatkan gelar master di McGill University di Montreal, Kanada, dan mendapatkan gelar doktornya di UI, bertindak sebagai pelaksana sehari-hari tugas dekan. Berkat Subroto, program dengan Berkeley – yang antara lain merencanakan mengirim sekitar 45 lulusan UI ke luar negeri antara 1956-1962 – diteruskan dengan teratur. Di tahun 1957, Widjojo dan Suhadi berangkat ke California, beserta J.E. Ismael dan Barli Halim. Rombongan berikutnya menyusul, seakan-akan tak ada hal yang terganggu.

Tapi banyak hal berubah di Salemba No. 4. Lagu *Ius Vivat* tak pernah didengungkan lagi. Kata “buku, pesta, dan cinta” dihapuskan dari hymne UI yang dinyanyikan tiap Dies Natalis dalam paduan suara yang menggugah. Kata “Manipol” – singkatan dari “Manifesto Politik” – menjadi

kata sakti; begitu juga kata “revolusi” dan “sosialisme.” Politik jadi sebuah aktivitas yang serius. Mahasiswa nasionalis dan komunis berhadapan dengan mahasiswa Islam dan Katolik.

Militansi naik – juga ke kalangan staf pengajar. J.B. Sumarlin, yang di tahun 1962 menjadi staf dekan, diserang oleh aktivis mahasiswa komunis dengan poster-poster. Ia dituduh sebagai “anti-Manipol.” Sumarlin kemudian bercerita bahwa ia memang menampik mahasiswa-mahasiswa kiri untuk menjadi asisten dosen.

Carmel Budiardjo, sekarang dikenal atas usahanya membebaskan para tahanan politik Indonesia selama Orde Baru, juga ditolak untuk mengajar. Carmel seorang kelahiran Inggris yang menikah dengan mahasiswa Indonesia, Budiardjo, di Praha, datang ke Indonesia di tahun 1954. Ia salah seorang pendiri Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia (HSI), sebuah organisasi yang dekat dengan PKI. Ia, yang dapat gelar di FEUI, mengetuai seksi ekonomi organisasi itu. Justru karena itu ia tak bisa diterima. “Salah seorang dosen Amerika yang mengajar sejarah ekonomi... membisikkan kepada saya bahwa kedutaan AS dan Ford Foundation bertindak mencegah pengangkatan saya,” kata Carmel mengingat masa itu.



▲ Subroto mempertahankan tesis doktoralnya di FEUI, 1957.

► Suhu politik dalam dunia pendidikan meningkat: sebuah undang untuk semua mahasiswa Jakarta mendukung pemerintah mengecam Sumitro Djohadikusumo dan PRRI.

S E H U A N

KEPADA SAUDARA MAHASISWA DI-IBU KOTA REPUBLIK INDONESIA

D J A K A R T A .

1. Hari ini tanggal 12 Maret 1958 mulai jam 17.00 bertempat di Gedung Pemuda - Merdeka Utara 14 Djakarta, Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA (C.G.M.I.) Djakarta Raya mengundang wakil2 organisasi mahasiswa/perseorangan mahasiswa dalam suatu pertemuan untuk membitjarkan :
"APAKAH SUMBERGAN MAHASISWA DJAKARTA, DALAM MEMBANTU TINDAKAN TEBAS PEMERINTAH/ ANGKATAN PERANG R.I. MEGACHIRI HIWAJAT PENGORIHATAN ACHMAD HUSSEIN -KOMITRE DJOJOHADIKUSUMO -Z. LUBIS -SAPRODDIE -MERHANSUDIN HARAHAP -SIBOLON DAN ERWAN KAWAN DENGAN APA JANG DINGJALAKAN PRIHATINJA".
2. Penghinaan Achmad Hussein es telah menjebekkan pula keangsuaraan bagi mahasiswa/poladjer di Sumatera Barat. Bagi mereka jang berada di Sumatera Tengah, dipaksa Achmad Hussein es untuk menghentikan studinja dan dimobilisasi untuk melawan Angkatan Perang R.I. Bagi mereka jang berada dikota2 lain karena kepentingan studinja, dengan rasa tjemas menunggu nunggu berita tentang apa gerangan nasib jang menimpa keluarganya sebagai akibat petualangan Achmad Hussein ini, belum lagi masih dirisaukan oleh kesulitan2 keuangan karena putusnja hubungan dengan rumah.
3. Kenyataan ini menjebekkan bahwa setiap mahasiswa jang setia pada tjita2 proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 nanti mengutuk pembontakan Achmad Hussein es dan siap sedia membantu Pemerintah/Angkatan Perang R.I. nebasni pembontakan tsb. Sebab makin tjepat berakhirnja pembontakan itu, makin tjepat pula kita segera melantjarkan kembali pembangunan nasional, dan ini bagi mahasiswa berarti suasana atau sjarat jang diperlukan untuk melantjarkan studinja setjara normal karena tidak didipersuak oleh akibat2 pembontakan disektor ekonomi, politik dan kult:il. Djedi tak usah mengherankan, bila kita menjanbut dengan gembira langkah pendaratan Angkatan Perang R.I. di Sumatera Barat -sebagai langkah jang bidjaksana untuk menjelamatkan Republik Proklamasi 1945 !
4. Tindakan bidjaksana ini pasti negara sentjapai tujuannya, sebab kekuatan raksa- na ada dibelakang Pemerintah/Angkatan Perang R.I., ialah kekuatan Rakjat Indonesia inklusif pemuda dan mahasiswaja ! Demikian pula apa jang dihasilkan oleh pertemuan nanti sore mempunyai arti penting karena dia memperkokoh kekuatan raksa- na tadi, karena dia mendukung nilai2 pengabdian kepada tanah air dan bang- sa.
5. Berdasar hal hal tersebut diatas, Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA (C.G.M.I.) Djakarta Raya, menjerukan kepada saudara2 para mahasiswa di Djakarta agar :
-- LEWAT HARIAN2, R.R.I. DJAKARTA, DAN SIARAN2 LAIN JANG DAPAT KAMI PERGUNAKAN MENGIKUTI DENGAN TERSEHAT APA JANG DIHASILKAN OLEH PERTEMUAN NANTI SORE ! --
-- IKUTSERTA DALAM BERALA AKTIVITET JANG DIHASILKAN OLEH PERTEMUAN TERSEBUT ! --

Hidup Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia Proklamasi 1945 !

Hidup Perguruan Mahasiswa Indonesia jang setia pada tjita2 proklamasi R.I. !

Djakarta, 12 Maret 1958, jam 17.00

Dewan Pimpinan Tjebang

CONCENTRASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA INDONESIA

Djakarta Raya.



PURI LUKISAN UBUD

Jalan Raya Ubud tergolong kecil, hanya cukup untuk dua jalur mobil, sehingga ramai apalagi di sana ada pasar, teater, warung internet, persewaan sepeda, dan bermacam kedai. Suasananya enak. Bau kemenyan terasa lembut. Dekat pasar terdapat sebuah museum penting bernama Puri Lukisan – tempat orang bisa merenung dan mengagumi karya-karya klasik seniman Bali.

Ada lukisan dinding karya I Gusti Nyoman Lempad. Ukurannya raksasa. Beberapa bagiannya rusak. Warnanya kalah melawan waktu. Di dalam ada karya Anak Agung Gede Meregge, *Bima mencari arwah ibu dan bapaknya* (1939).

Inilah Puri Lukisan. Ada mitologi Bali. Ada Bima. Garuda, Leak, dan bermacam cerita wayang. Tapi juga ada gambar gadis-gadis muda bertelanjang dada, mandi di kolam. Menurut Jean Couteau, seorang peneliti-cum-sastrawan Prancis, dalam buku *Museum Puri Lukisan*, koleksi Puri Lukisan merupakan saksi mata pembaruan seni lukis dan seni patung Bali.

Pembaruan ini terjadi pada masa kolonialisme Belanda. Seniman Bali hingga abad ke-19 berkesenian untuk melayani keperluan ritual agama atau aristokrasi. Ketika kerajaan-kerajaan Bali ditaklukkan Belanda, maka pengaruh orang asing pun pelan-pelan masuk ke Bali. Kolonialisme membuat kesenian Bali berubah. Seni ini pun makin marak dengan berkembangnya turisme Bali pada 1920-an.

“Sekarang koleksinya lebih dari 200 lembar lukisan, patungnya mungkin ada 80-an,” kata Tjokorda Bagus Astika, direktur Museum Puri Lukisan. Koleksinya kebanyakan dikumpulkan Rudolf Bonnet.

Bicara Puri Lukisan memang harus bicara tentang Bonnet, Walter Spies, maupun Tjokorda Agung Sukawati – tiga serangkai yang berperan besar dalam pembaruan seni rupa Bali.

Walter Spies kelahiran Moskow 1895 dari sebuah keluarga Jerman. Pada 1923 Spies pergi melihat Hindia Belanda dan

sempat bekerja sebagai musikus di keraton Yogyakarta. Di sana Spies bertemu seorang pangeran dari Ubud bernama Tjokorda Raka Sukawati – anggota *Volksraad* yang pernah belajar di Paris dan beristrikan perempuan Prancis. Si pangeran mengundang Spies ke Ubud dan memperkenalkan adiknya, Tjokorda Gede Agung Sukawati. Merasa cocok, Spies memutuskan menetap di kota kecil ini.

Dalam beberapa tahun saja Spies dianggap sebagai orang non-Bali yang



Museum Puri Lukisan, Ubud, 2003.

paling tahu soal Bali. Dia jadi kolektor serangga, pengarah musik, konsultan pembuatan film, menciptakan koreografi – termasuk tari Kecak – menulis artikel dan buku, serta membantu pengembangan seni rupa Bali.

Spies membuka pintu rumahnya untuk tamu mancanegara yang mulai berdatangan ke Bali. Seorang di antaranya Rudolf Bonnet dari keluarga Belanda keturunan Huguenot (orang Prancis beragama Protestan).

Kehadiran dua seniman Eropa ini membuat gerakan pembaruan seni Bali mendapat momentum besar. Spies dan Bonnet menyediakan materi dan teknik baru. Spies menjadikan rumahnya untuk melatih 12-15 anak muda Bali melukis. Tiga sekawan itu juga membantu pemasarannya.

Pada 1936 mereka mendirikan perkumpulan *Pita Maha*. Nama ini diambil dari bahasa Kawi kuno yang artinya “nenek moyang luhur.” Ketuanya Ida Bagus Putu dan komite artistiknya Tjokorda Agung, Bonnet, Spies, dan Lempad. Keanggotaannya tersebar pada semua sentra kesenian Bali: desa Peliatan, Padangtegal, Pengosekan, Mas, Nyuhkuning, Batuan, Sanur, Klungkung, dan Celuk. Anggotanya 120-150 seniman.


Tiap minggu pengurus bertemu di rumah Spies. Mereka menyelenggarakan pameran di Batavia, Bandung, Medan, Palembang, Surabaya, maupun Belanda, Paris, New York, Nagoya. Pendek kata, pembaruan seni Bali ini membuat publik kesenian dunia kagum – setara dengan kekaguman terhadap kesenian dari Cina, Jepang, maupun India. Kekuatan anatomis Lempad jadi termasyhur di seluruh negeri.

Perang Dunia II meletus. Spies dikeluarkan dari Pita Maha dengan tuduhan terlibat homoseksualisme. Bonnet protes dan mundur dari Pita Maha. Masuknya tentara Jepang membuat kegiatan Pita Maha berhenti. Beberapa seniman menghimpun diri dalam Golongan Pelukis Ubud.

Pada 1942 Pita Maha dibubarkan. Spies dan Bonnet ditahan pasukan Jepang. Malang nasib Spies, kapal yang membawanya pulang ke Jerman, tenggelam terkena torpedo Jepang dekat perairan Srilanka. Bonnet ditahan di Makassar tapi berhasil kembali ke Bali sesudah kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Masa revolusi dimanfaatkan Bonnet untuk riset, mendidik pelukis muda, dan mengumpulkan koleksi Pita Maha. Cita-cita membangun museum bersama Tjokorda Agung dihidupkan lagi.

Mereka membeli sebidang tanah dekat puri keluarga Sukawati. Pada 1953 terbentuklah Yayasan Ratna Wartha dengan tujuan membangun museum. Pada Januari 1954 Perdana Menteri Ali Sastroamidjojo, yang kebetulan teman dekat Tjokorda Agung, datang ke Ubud dan meletakkan batu pertama pembangunan museum.



"Labirnya Hanoman" (1936) oleh pelukis Bali I Gusti Made Deblog, kini terpajang di Puri Lukisan, Ubud. Lukisan ini disumbangkan kepada museum oleh Michael Harris, wakil Ford Foundation di Indonesia.

Donasi pun mengalir dari pemerintah Indonesia, lembaga kebudayaan Belanda Sticusa, serta Ford Foundation.

Dua tahun kemudian museum itu diresmikan Menteri Pendidikan dan

Kebudayaan Muhammad Yamin. Nama "Puri Lukisan" yang artinya istana karya lukis, diciptakan Yamin.

Bonnet dan Tjokorda Agung meninggal pada 1978. Jenasah mereka di-*ngaben*-kan

bersama pada 1979. Tapi Puri Lukisan maupun museum lain di Ubud tetap menarik minat seniman dari daerah lain, termasuk Affandi, S. Sudjojono, Dullah, maupun negara lain, untuk menggali ide serta belajar.

Dalam dokumen Ford Foundation tak ada catatan tentang itu, tapi ketakutan akan “komunisme” memang waktu itu menjalar, dan tak aneh bila orang-orang Amerika di Indonesia juga menyebarkanluaskannya, atau setidaknya tak imun terhadapnya. Juga kampus. Sumarlin dan Daoed Joesoef mengatakan bahwa waktu itu ada usaha-usaha PKI untuk menguasai FEUI dan itu harus dicegah.

Dengan stigma PSI yang kuat, FEUI merasa harus mempertahankan diri dengan segala akal. Ketika Bung Karno mengecam para ekonom yang terjerat dalam “*textbook thinking*” dan “dicekoki Keynes,” buku-buku yang bukan Marxis pun – dan tentu saja karya Keynes – dipindahkan dari perpustakaan. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, yang belakangan menjadi duta besar Indonesia untuk AS dan menteri koordinator bidang ekonomi dan keuangan pada masa Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri, waktu itu mahasiswa. Ia dapat semacam tugas dari Prof. Sarbini Sumawinata untuk menyimpan buku-buku “ekonomi kapitalis” ke kamar-kamar kerja dosen. Ada yang memindahkannya jauh di luar kampus: di kantor penjara Cipinang.

Beberapa mata kuliah bahkan diganti namanya, agar aman. Akuntansi, misalnya, berubah menjadi “akuntansi

sosialisme Indonesia.” Pelbagai risalah ditulis dengan bahasa politik yang telah jadi keharusan. Sadli menulis tentang “tata susunan industri dalam sosialisme Indonesia.” Ali Wardhana dan Subroto menulis “Kerjasama Ekonomi Antar New Emerging Forces.” Beberapa staf pengajar dikirim ke Eropa Timur, misalnya ke Yugoslavia, atau, seperti Widjojo, berkunjung ke Republik Rakyat Cina (RRC). Batara Simatupang, yang selesai dari Stanford University di tahun 1961, berangkat ke Polandia untuk belajar dari pakar ekonomi sosialis terkemuka, Oscar Lange, di Sekolah Pusat Perencanaan dan Statistik di Warsawa. Tenaga dari Berkeley, Glassburner, memandang semua ini dengan cemas, tapi Salemba No. 4 memang tampaknya tak ditakdirkan jadi sebuah menara gading.

Suratan itu sebenarnya sudah tampak sejak mula. Ketika Soenario Kolokaping menyampaikan kuliah perdananya di hari pertama FEUI dibuka, ia memilih judul, “Hubungan antara Ekonomi, Politik Ekonomi, dan Politik Negara Umum.” Tanpa disengaja, tulis Emil Salim dalam buku *50 Tahun FEUI*, pidato perdana itu memberi ciri khas pada sang almamater. Kemudian, menurut Salim, fakultas ini selamanya “sangat intensif menjalin satu pengembangan ilmu ekonomi, kebijakan ekonomi, dan pembangunan negara.”



▲ Anggota-anggota PKI pada acara ulang tahun kedua pendirian PKI cabang Jakarta, 1953.

Jalanan yang menentukan terjadi hampir satu dasawarsa kemudian, ketika Sadli bertemu dengan seorang teman sekolahnya di Yogya, di tahun 1940-an. Namanya Suwarto. Ia seorang kolonel, ketika itu wakil komandan Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad).

Bagi sebagian orang yang mengaguminya, Suwarto adalah seorang perwira militer yang jarang ditemukan di Indonesia. Ketika Suwarto pada 1967 meninggal karena kanker, cendekiawan Soedjatmoko menulis obituari dan menamakannya sebagai contoh “satria-pandita,” seorang intelektual di dalam tentara. Suwarto-lah yang mengubah kurikulum Seskoad dengan 50 persen mata kuliah diberikan buat ilmu ekonomi, hukum, ilmu politik, sosiologi, dan filsafat. Di tahun 1958, ia memulai kerjasama antara sekolah untuk para perwira Angkatan Darat itu dan FEUI, juga dengan UGM, ITB, dan Universitas Padjadjaran. Sebelumnya, sekembali Sadli dan Subroto dari AS di tahun 1957, mereka sudah mengajar di Seskoad.

Dalam buku *50 tahun FEUI* disebut bahwa kerjasama yang dibangun Suwarto termasuk dalam “upaya untuk memikirkan perkembangan ekonomi-politik masa itu, terutama dalam usaha membendung pengaruh komunisme.”

Bagi para dosen FEUI, forum di Seskoad setidaknya memberi sesuatu yang tak mereka dapatkan di tempat resmi lain: kebebasan untuk mengemukakan kritik mereka terhadap ekonomi terpimpin yang berlaku masa itu, sebuah sistem “sosialisme Indonesia” yang berusaha menegakkan kontrol yang pervasif atas produksi dan distribusi dan menimbulkan kemacetan ekonomi. Mereka juga berharap bisa “mengemukakan konsep dan strategi lain sebagai alternatif.” Bagi kalangan Angkatan Darat, buah pikiran para ekonom itu bisa jadi bahan penyusunan agenda politik yang mereka siapkan bila mereka punya kesempatan memegang kendali kekuasaan nanti – tentu saja setelah menyingkirkan PKI.

Memang agenda itulah kemudian yang dijalankan, ketika Mayor Jenderal Suharto menjadi presiden, wajah Indonesia berubah. Sejak 1966, dengan konsep para teknokrat dari Salemba, transformasi sistem ekonomi yang bersejarah berlangsung di Indonesia – dan agaknya merupakan perubahan besar pertama dari sebuah ekonomi terpimpin ke arah ekonomi pasar, 30 tahun sebelum Cina dan Vietnam menjalani proses yang sama. “Orde Baru,” di bawah Suharto, memang kabar baik bagi mereka yang melihat bahwa cahaya lebih terang di dalam “jalan kapitalis.”



▲ Hari pertama kursus Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat di Cililitan, 1951.



▲ *Kuliah di UI mulai lagi, 1966.*

Suharto sebelumnya tak mengenal Widjojo. Ketika ia mengikuti kursus C-II di Seskoad antara 1959-1960, mungkin ia hanya mengenal Sadli dan Subroto. Di awal 1966, ketika PKI sudah disingkirkan secara berdarah dari panggung Indonesia, para mahasiswa FEUI memprakarsai sebuah “pekan ceramah dan seminar” di aula Salemba No. 6. Suharto waktu itu masih seorang jenderal Angkatan Darat, tapi kekuasaannya sudah mulai jadi tantangan Bung Karno, setelah ia muncul dari Peristiwa 30 September 1965. Mahasiswa yang menentang Bung Karno dengan bersemangat mengundangnya untuk memberi sambutan pembukaan seminar di kampus itu.

Widjojo waktu itu dekan FEUI, ikut mengatur tema dan pembicara yang dimajukan. Ketika itu suasana Demokrasi Terpimpin belum hilang. Kampus masih takut untuk bicara bebas. Akhir seminar masih ditutup dengan pernyataan setia kepada “Pemimpin Besar Revolusi.” Tapi di ujung presentasi makalah, Widjojo mengeluarkan sebuah kritik yang tak sepenuhnya terselubung. Tindakan ekonomi dan keuangan pemerintah, kata Widjojo, “tidak bijaksana” dan “hanyalah menambah saja kesulitan-kesulitan ekonomi yang sudah ada.”

Di saat itulah agaknya Suharto menemukan sebuah sumber yang berguna untuk ide-ide rehabilitasi Indonesia setelah ia berkuasa. Dalam sambutannya, Suharto menghargai seminar itu. Sejak itu, bagi Widjojo dan kawan-kawannya, jalan mulai terbuka ke dalam balairung kekuasaan.

Bagi para neo-Keynesian ini, rehabilitasi ekonomi dari puing-puing Ekonomi Terpimpin tak berarti meniadakan “keterpimpinan” sama sekali. Seperti keadaan ekonomi di masa depresi di tahun 1930-an, keterlantaran Indonesia menjelang 1965 tak punya mekanisme yang bisa memperbaiki diri sendiri. Bagi para teknokrat dari FEUI, yang dibutuhkan adalah sebuah rencana yang rasional, dan rencana itu harus terjaga pelaksanaannya. Sebuah kekuasaan yang koheren dan efektif adalah niscaya. Resep itu terbukti manjur: jalan mereka inilah yang membawa Indonesia ke sebuah pembangunan ekonomi yang tercepat yang pernah dialami orang Indonesia setidaknya

selama abad ke-20.

Tapi tentu saja yang rasional belum tentu sama dengan yang demokratis. Bahkan demokrasi acapkali dilihat sebagai semacam kemewahan untuk merayakan kebebasan dan kebebasan hanya dilihat sebagai sesuatu yang merepotkan.

Tapi berangsur-angsur terasa, demokrasi juga sebuah kebutuhan. Kekuasaan efektif yang dipakai para teknokrat dari FEUI, seperti banyak hal lain di dunia, cepat atau lambat mengalami korosi. Pemerintahan Orde Baru yang berangkat dengan pembunuhan besar-besaran atas lawan-lawan politiknya di tahun 1965-66 berjalan sebagai sebuah tatanan yang darurat. Rasa cemas dan takut menyusup di mana-mana. Juga rasa takut itu tampil ketika orang harus memikirkan cara menghindari korosi dengan pembaruan kekuasaan.

Lambat laun, rezim otoriter yang mengandalkan birokrasi, tentara, dan teknokrat itu kian memusat pada satu pribadi: di Jalan Cendana, Suharto duduk dengan kukuh, juga sebagai ayah bagi anak-anaknya yang semakin tumbuh sebagai pemodal-pemodal besar. Agenda yang “rasional” tiap kali akhirnya harus menyesuaikan diri dengan para pemodal yang berkuasa itu. Sistem dan prosedur yang dibangun Widjojo dan timnya mulai diabaikan. Kata “keluarga Cendana” jadi kata yang sakti untuk membuat sistem dan prosedur itu tak relevan lagi.

Menjelang 1998, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo melihat korosi itu, dan berbicara dengan keras tentang “penyakit institusional.” Tapi terlambat. Waktu itu Widjojo dan timnya sudah lama tak lagi berada dalam kabinet. Bagi Suharto, ia sudah masa silam. Dalam buku otobiografi Suharto, *Suharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya*, nama Widjojo hanya disebut dua kali, dibandingkan dengan 17 kali nama B.J. Habibie – orang yang akhirnya bagi Suharto lebih penting, orang yang dianggap telah memperkenalkan sebuah jalan ekonomi baru yang tak dikenal di ruang-ruang kuliah di Salemba No. 4.

**BAB DUA:
AMERIKA, AMERIKA...**





B A B D U A

AMERIKA, AMERIKA...

Di tahun 1956, seorang ilmuwan dari Illinois berangkat ke Ternate. Tujuan: menemukan sebuah suku yang konon menggunakan siul – dan bukan kata-kata – buat bercakap-cakap. Ia tak menemukan suku luar biasa itu. Tapi itu bukan nasib paling sial bagi Lucien Zamarski. Di Ternate, tentara Indonesia menangkapnya. Ada sederet tuduhan dilontarkan kepadanya, antara lain membuat kontak radio dengan kapal selam Belanda. Lebih dari dua bulan lamanya ia ditahan. Tak ada tuntutan resmi. Setelah ada campur tangan Duta Besar Amerika Serikat John M. Allison, ia dilepas dan dengan segera terbang kembali ke Moline di Illinois.

Di tahun 1958, di Bukittinggi, seorang perempuan Amerika yang bekerja di laboratorium pengajaran guru bahasa Inggris ditahan. Waktu itu pemberontakan PRRI di Sumatera Barat baru selesai. Hanya sisa-sisa pasukan pembangkang yang bergerilya. Bukittinggi telah diambil alih pasukan Jakarta. Beatrice Sutherland, yang didatangkan Ford Foundation ke Indonesia – dan kemudian selama delapan tahun tinggal di sini – hari itu dituduh oleh komandan militer sebagai simpatisan PRRI. Bukti: ia memiliki sebuah rekaman bunyi tembakan.

Sutherland menjelaskan bahwa ia suatu hari tertarik akan kontras antara bunyi burung dan dentuman mesiu yang hampir tiap hari terdengar. Ia pun merekamnya, buat kenang-kenangan. Tapi bagi pejabat militer di Bukittinggi, rekaman itu dipergunakan orang Amerika untuk memberi isyarat kepada gerilya musuh.

Sutherland akhirnya dilepaskan dan terbang ke Jakarta. Ford Foundation meminta agar Kementerian Pendidikan melakukan investigasi terhadap tuduhan itu. Tak ada bukti sama sekali, demikian hasil penyelidikan.

◀ *Masa pergolakan pada 1960-an sering diwarnai demo massal anti campur tangan asing. Demo ini di Yogyakarta pada 1961 mengecam Belanda yang masih menguasai Papua Barat.*



Menjelang akhir tahun 1950-an sampai dengan menjelang akhir 1960-an, menjadi orang Amerika di Indonesia memang bisa merupakan pengalaman tak nyaman, termasuk bila mereka ingin menyelidiki suku aneh atau menyimpan rekaman bunyi yang tak lazim. Bukannya tanpa sebab. Jarak antara Amerika dan Indonesia mendadak “dekat,” tapi karenanya justru tegang – karena Perang Dingin, karena ketakutan Amerika terhadap “bahaya komunis,” dan dorongan untuk menjangkau tangan ke pelbagai urusan di pelbagai tempat.

Tanggal 11 Februari 1958, Menteri Luar Negeri AS John Foster Dulles mengatakan – dalam sebuah konferensi pers nun jauh di Washington DC – bahwa “Demokrasi Terpimpin” di Indonesia mungkin tak konstitusional dan tak memuaskan banyak orang.” Di Indonesia reaksi tentu tak bisa ramah. “Demokrasi Terpimpin” adalah salah satu sendi “Manifesto Politik” Bung Karno, doktrin bagi “revolusi Indonesia” yang tengah dibangkitkannya kembali.

Tapi Amerika tak hanya mengkritik “Demokrasi Terpimpin.” Adik John Foster, Allen Dulles, direktur CIA, melakukan sesuatu yang lebih berbahaya. Ia mengorganisasi bantuan bagi para perwira militer yang membangkang pemerintah pusat dalam peristiwa PRRI dan Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta Alam) di Sulawesi di tahun 1958 itu.

Bagi CIA, para perwira itu, bersama tokoh sipil anti-Sukarno, misalnya Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, merupakan mitra yang baik untuk mencegah komunisme menang di Indonesia. Berpeti-peti kayu berisi senjata dikirimkan buat

pasukan Permesta yang berontak di Sulawesi Utara, dan di tiap peti, merek Angkatan Laut AS tertera jelas. Lebih jelas lagi sebuah kejadian di bulan Mei 1958: seorang pilot Angkatan Udara AS, Allen Pope, yang menerbangkan pesawat pembom milik pemberontak, jatuh. Pesawat kena tembak dan ia ditangkap.

Pope tak pernah diakui sebagai penerbang Angkatan Udara AS, tapi sejak itu campur tangan Amerika tak bisa disembunyikan lagi. Angin berubah arah. Orang-orang Pentagon tak menyetujui tindakan CIA mulai dapat alasan untuk mendesak Departemen Luar Negeri buat mengubah wajah dan haluan. Menyadari dukungan CIA kepada para pembangkang adalah sebuah petualangan yang gagal dan merugikan posisi Amerika sendiri, bantuan untuk PRRI dan Permesta pun praktis dihentikan.

Sikap pemerintahan Presiden Dwight Eisenhower yang berubah ini menunjukkan betapa tak mudahnya hubungan internasional di masa Perang Dingin – dan betapa tak gampangnyanya berangkat dari sikap “siapa yang tak bersama kita

adalah musuh kita.” John Foster Dulles mengatakan bahwa bersikap netral di tengah konfrontasi “Dunia Bebas” dan “Komunisme” adalah “immoral,” tapi Indonesia adalah kasus di mana dikotomi terbukti hanya menyederhanakan soal.

Indonesia memang selalu punya ambivalensi terhadap Amerika dan kerumitan masa itu menegaskan. Bagi para diplomat Amerika di Jakarta waktu itu, Bung Karno mulai menjauh dari AS. Mereka merasa ia curiga bahwa Washington akan menjatuhkannya. “Kaum imperialis itu memang...



▲ Allen Pope menunjukkan kepada hakim rute pesawatnya sebelum ditembak jatuh, Jakarta, 1960.
 ◀ Menteri Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat John Foster Dulles mengunjungi Jakarta pada 1956.

imperialis!” serunya. Tapi pada saat yang sama, Bung Karno menunjukkan pula Indonesia tak menapik apa yang ditawarkan Amerika. Pragmatisme tak pernah ditinggal jauh, juga di tahun-tahun ketika retorika nasionalisme bergelora kembali.

Hanya empat bulan setelah Pope ditembak jatuh, Indonesia menerima bantuan militer dari AS senilai \$7 juta. Perlengkapan militer pertama dikirim dengan pesawat transport C-124. Bung Karno dengan senang hati ikut sebentar terbang di dalamnya.

Dibantu atau tak dibantu, membantu atau tak membantu – hari-hari itu, variasi atas tema itu bisa bermacam-macam. Tak ada contoh yang lebih menarik untuk menggambarkan kebingungan – atau lebih tepat ambivalensi – ini ketimbang hubungan pemerintah Indonesia dengan Ford Foundation, yang bisa bertahan melintasi tahun 1960-an yang panas, mendebarkan, dan akhirnya eksploisif.

Sejak awal, Ford Foundation memang punya posisi tersendiri dalam usaha Indonesia memperoleh bantuan dari luar. Indonesia juga punya tempat yang khusus – setidaknya

setelah India – dalam perhatian Paul Hoffman di kantornya di New York.

Presiden Ford Foundation ini mulai tertarik pada Indonesia secara kebetulan. Di akhir 1940-an, ketika bekerja di Eropa mengepalai program bantuan AS Marshall Plan ke negara-negara yang rusak oleh Perang Dunia II, Hoffman menemukan satu hal: ada sebagian bantuan AS hendak dipakai Belanda guna membiayai usaha menghentikan perlawanan prokemerdekaan di Indonesia. Ia menghentikannya.

Maka gayung dengan cepat bersambut ketika di awal 1952, Ali Sastroamidjojo, seorang tokoh nasionalis yang waktu itu jadi duta besar di Washington DC, menulis sepucuk surat ke Institute of International Education (IIE), meminta agar Ford Foundation membantu sebuah proyek pelatihan guru bahasa Inggris di Indonesia. Dengan segera Hoffman memutuskan mengirim Dyke Brown dan Edwin Arnold, dua konsultan Ford Foundation, untuk melakukan sebuah survei penjajakan ke Jakarta.

Antusiasme terasa di kantor Ford Foundation. Beberapa paragraf memorandum yang dikirim ke meja Hoffman oleh



▲ Sebuah pameran teknologi militer Amerika di Jakarta, sesudah insiden Allen Pope, 1958.

MAYLING OEY-GARDINER

Mayling Oey-Gardiner baru menjadi penerima dana Ford Foundation ketika kariernya sudah berkembang jauh. Namun keterlibatannya dengan Ford Foundation mulai jauh lebih awal sebagai sekretaris. Ia mendapatkan dua gelar master dan belakangan menjadi profesor perempuan pertama di FEUI sekaligus perempuan pertama yang jadi doktor di bidang demografi. Kini ia terlibat dalam International Fellowships Program (IFP), yang menyediakan pendidikan pasca sarjana kepada orang-orang di seluruh dunia dari komunitas terpinggirkan.

Pengalaman pertama saya dengan Ford Foundation dimulai sebagai seorang sekretaris di kantor Taman Kebon Sirih pada 1963. Saya baru selesai ikut suatu proyek FEUI ketika saya diminta gabung ke Ford Foundation oleh William Lightfoot, asisten wakil Ford Foundation. Ketegangan politik membuat kegiatan Ford Foundation menurun tapi Lightfoot dan Phineas Quinn minta saya tetap bekerja. Quinn datang ke Jakarta dari New York tiap dua bulan sekali tapi karena tak banyak kegiatan, dia minta saya mengajarnya bahasa Indonesia, sebaliknya dia mengajari saya bahasa Inggris. Bahasa Inggris Quinn versi Oxford English sehingga saya harus belajar Shakespeare. Ketika sedang belajar inilah, tiba-tiba dia bertanya, "Bagaimana kalau Anda sekolah ke Amerika?" Saya jawab, "Apa? Saya sekolah di Amerika?"

Awal 1960-an adalah periode yang sulit untuk menjadi orang Tionghoa di Indonesia. Saya menolak tawaran itu tapi orang tua mendorong saya untuk pergi. Quinn lalu memperkenalkan saya dengan rekan-rekannya di St. Xavier, Chicago, di mana saya mendapatkan tempat belajar. Pada 1964, beberapa saat sebelum Presiden Sukarno menutup politik luar negeri Indonesia, saya mendapatkan beasiswa Fullbright dan pergi ke Amerika. Saya memang tak mendapatkan dana dari Ford Foundation karena semua dana waktu itu diberikan lewat jalur pemerintah. Quinn juga membantu saya untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan musim panas di Cornell membantu John Wolff dengan bukunya tentang bahasa Indonesia. Saya juga mendapat pekerjaan membantu Dr. Widjojo Nitisastro mengerjakan disertasinya *Population Trends in Indonesia*.

Selama tinggal di Amerika saya tetap berhubungan dengan Quinn. Ketika lulus dengan gelar BA bidang sosiologi pada 1968, saya memutuskan tetap tinggal di Amerika karena situasi Indonesia masih tegang. Saya diterima untuk program master di William and Mary College. Sesudah selesai pada 1971, saya



Mayling Oey-Gardiner di St. Xavier College, Chicago 1965.

kembali ke Indonesia. Sekali lagi, mentor saya Quinn, mempengaruhi pilihan hidup saya. Dia membantu saya untuk mendalami bidang kependudukan. Saat itu, Dr. Widjojo memimpin BAPPENAS, yang berperan penting dalam memasukkan isu kependudukan dalam rencana pembangunan. Saat itu pemerintah Amerika Serikat juga memberikan bantuan dana besar-besaran kepada Indonesia untuk mengatasi ledakan penduduk. Amerika juga

memutuskan untuk tak memberikan dana lagi ke birokrasi tapi ke universitas-universitas untuk menjalankan program kependudukan. Jadi, ketika Harvard, yang menerima dana besar, datang ke Indonesia untuk mencari mahasiswa, maka saya pun diterima untuk program master di bidang ilmu kependudukan.

Pada 1976, dengan dua gelar master dan pengalaman kerja 15 tahun untuk Ford Foundation, saya jadi orang Indonesia pertama yang menerima dana dari Ford-Rockefeller Population Studies Award untuk mengerjakan riset tentang transmigrasi di Lampung, Sumatera Selatan. Sesudah selesai, Peter Weldon, orang Ford Foundation yang mendorong saya melamar dana itu, menyakinkan saya untuk mendapatkan Ph.D. dari Australian National University pada 1978. Saya jadi orang Indonesia pertama yang dapat Ph.D. di bidang demografi.

Sejak saya jadi sekretaris Ford Foundation, saya merasa orang-orang Ford Foundation inilah yang mempengaruhi hidup saya, jauh lebih banyak ketimbang institusinya sendiri. Apa yang sangat saya hargai dari Ford Foundation adalah mereka mau membantu orang-orang dari komunitas yang terpinggirkan, kebanyakan kaum minoritas, dan kini bantuan itu dilakukan lewat IFP. Saya merasa di banyak organisasi donor, orang-orang hanyalah merupakan angka-angka; mereka hanya penerima dana. Ford Foundation berbeda. Orang-orang Ford Foundation inilah yang senantiasa menantang saya dan mendorong saya untuk mengubah hidup saya sendiri dan saya percaya banyak orang juga mengalami pengalaman serupa dengan saya. Buat saya, Ford Foundation ada untuk menyediakan bantuan pembangunan dengan wajah yang manusiawi.

REVOLUSI HIJAU: SWASEMBADA PANGAN

Dewasa ini, istilah “bioteknologi” punya banyak makna: modifikasi genetik, perkawinan antargen, benih rekayasa, bibit transgenik, “frankenfood.” Ia juga meruah ke isu-isu lain, mulai dari perang dagang hingga kedaulatan bangsa, dari ikhwal kesehatan hingga masalah moral.

Tapi pada 1960-an, “bioteknologi” sinonim dengan “Revolusi Hijau”: satu-satunya harapan bagi negara berkembang di ambang bencana kelaparan. Istilah Revolusi Hijau sendiri mengacu pada perbaikan produksi pangan dengan menggunakan varietas gandum dan padi unggul.

Khusus untuk padi, revolusi ini dimulai pada 1966 ketika International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) dari University of the Philippines mengeluarkan jenis-jenis padi hibrida baru. Didirikan 1960, dengan bantuan Ford dan Rockefeller, IRRI sebuah organisasi nirlaba yang bergerak di bidang penelitian dan pelatihan. Kegiatan mereka atas nama para petani dan konsumen diperkirakan telah “menyentuh” sekitar separuh penduduk dunia. Terobosan ilmiah 1966 ini memang diproyeksikan untuk mencegah kelaparan massal yang diperkirakan akan melanda Asia pada 1970-an. Ternyata, teknologi ini bahkan mengubah politik ekonomi padi.

Pada akhir 1960-an, ekonomi Indonesia kacau balau. Pertumbuhan penduduk mencapai taraf yang mengkhawatirkan, dan negeri ini menderita kekurangan beras – sebuah faktor yang turut menumbangkan Sukarno. Impor beras tak hanya mahal, tapi untuk sebuah bangsa yang sombong, juga memalukan. Ketika Suharto mengambil alih kekuasaan, bibit padi unggul dianggap suatu anugerah: ia tak saja meningkatkan produktivitas padi, tapi juga membantu menstabilkan ekonomi dan mengembalikan harga diri.

Tapi teknologi baru selalu menimbulkan masalah baru. “Paket terpadu” yang mencakup penyeragaman infrastruktur irigasi, pupuk kimia, dan variasi benih membutuhkan investasi besar, sesuatu yang tak sulit bagi seorang pemilik lahan besar tapi

jauh di luar kapasitas petani miskin.

Suasana politik juga bermasalah. Akibat pembunuhan besar-besaran pada 1965, tentara Indonesia praktis mengontrol politik pedesaan di Jawa. Para penduduk desa, apapun politik mereka, tak bebas mengatasi masalah mereka sendiri.

Kombinasi antara masalah ekonomi dan tekanan politik ini – belum lagi ledakan penduduk – membawa perubahan besar bagi desa-desa Jawa. Para pemilik tanah tak punya kemauan untuk tetap mengikuti sistem bagi hasil. Ketika musim panen tiba, pekerjaan



Panen padi di banjar Abianbase, Bali, 1985.

menuai padi pun diberikan kepada orang luar, kebanyakan laki-laki, yang lebih banyak menggunakan arit atau alat sejenisnya, daripada ani-ani kecil yang biasa digunakan perempuan.

Pada awal 1970-an, Indonesia mengalami produksi padi terbesar selama sejarahnya. Varietas baru yang dikenal sebagai IR5 telah digunakan pada seperempat lahan pertanian negeri ini. Akibatnya, para pemilik tanah pertanian pun memotong jumlah tenaga kerja mereka, dan secara perlahan mulai menggunakan mesin. Ini terutama mempengaruhi buruh perempuan miskin. Ketika sosiolog Masri Singarimbun dari UGM bertanya pada beberapa perempuan bagaimana mereka mengatasi masalah ini, mereka menjawab, “Kami akan makan lebih sedikit lagi.”

Orang yang bertanggung jawab membawa masuk IRRI ke Indonesia adalah John Bresnan. Saat itu mantan atasan Bresnan di

Ford Foundation New York menjabat pemimpin IRRI; ia keberatan untuk memperluas kerja mereka di Indonesia akibat ketegangan antara Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat. Tapi Bresnan tetap bersikukuh menyakinkan sang atasan bahwa Revolusi Hijau baik untuk Indonesia, dan pandangannya diterima.

Prestasi IRRI memang mengagumkan, paling tidak secara statistik: *International Rice Genebank* punya koleksi 90.000 contoh padi; *Farmers' Primer on Growing Rice* diterjemahkan ke dalam lebih dari 48 bahasa; perpustakaan IRRI, dengan bibliografi padinya sendiri, berisi lebih dari 170.000 referensi padi dalam sekurangnya 80 bahasa. Tradisi kegiatan mereka bagi komunitas lokal – beasiswa, pelatihan untuk petani, program pemberdayaan perempuan – kukuh.

Tapi pertanyaan kritis tetap diperlukan. Beberapa orang mengatakan bahwa varietas baru ini lebih mudah diserang hama dan penyakit. Mereka menyebut, sebagai contoh, kerusakan yang dialami para petani Indonesia karena serangan hama wereng.

Ada juga yang mengatakan bahwa tanah jadi poros jika terlalu sering dibubuhi pupuk kimia. Pendapat lain: polusi ditimbulkan oleh pestisida. Lihat saja dampaknya pada ikan.

IRRI tak bergeming. Jawabnya: teknologi padi ini justru mengurangi penggunaan pestisida oleh petani, yang dampaknya positif bagi lingkungan maupun kesehatan manusia.

Pada 1984, Indonesia dinyatakan mencapai swasembada pangan, dan dengan demikian masuk peta dunia. Namun rapornya cukup berwarna. Penduduk desa yang melarat, yang putus asa karena pekerjaan di sawah menurun drastis, terpaksa melarikan diri ke kota untuk mencari pekerjaan di pabrik-pabrik. Sampai sekarang, beberapa dasawarsa sejak Revolusi Hijau, kita masih lihat dampaknya di mana-mana: pelacur, pedagang kaki lima, pemulung, yang berusaha bertahan hidup di pelosok kota, di negeri yang sudah “swasembada” ini.



Brown dan Arnold menyebutkan bahwa Indonesia tampaknya “punya kans yang cukup untuk berkembang menurut garis demokratis.” Konsultan itu juga mencatat, dibantu “oleh pengalaman, oleh keterpencilan geografisnya, dan kepercayaan Islam yang dianut 90 persen rakyatnya, Indonesia tetap sebuah negeri nonkomunis.”


“Komunis” dan “bukan komunis” memang merupakan kategori yang menguasai pemikiran orang Amerika waktu itu – dan dengan itu pula ditentukan adakah sebuah negeri perlu dibantu atau dimusuhi. Bagi Indonesia, perlunya bantuan tak bisa diingkari. Dan sebagai negeri “nonkomunis,” ada kesempatan baginya untuk mengetuk pintu ke Washington. Tapi sumber terbatas. Program PBB tak besar, dan bantuan AS di bidang teknis di tahun 1952 itu baru saja dipotong dari \$8 juta menjadi \$3 juta.

Hubungan dengan AS memang tak gampang. Problem dengan pemerintah AS, kata staf Ford Foundation pada waktu itu, ialah karena “Amerika telah menganggap ringan kekuatan nasionalisme Indonesia.”

Setidaknya AS tak cukup fleksibel dalam menghadapi pendirian Indonesia yang menolak untuk memihak dalam

Perang Dingin antara “Dunia Bebas” dan “Blok Komunis.” Indonesia selamanya meletakkan dirinya dalam posisi “bebas dan aktif” – kata lain dari “netral” dalam konflik tapi aktif dalam mengusahakan perdamaian. Konferensi Asia-Afrika di Bandung di tahun 1955 merupakan perayaannya yang pertama. Tapi AS tak selamanya memahami *non-alignment*. Ketidakcocokan politik luar negeri ini terjadi bahkan sebelum masa Dulles.

Di tahun 1952, ketika pemerintahan negara dijalankan oleh Perdana Menteri Sukiman, Indonesia siap menerima bantuan AS. Tapi akhirnya batal. Hambatan muncul karena ketentuan dalam Mutual Security Act tahun 1951 mengharuskan pemerintah Amerika untuk mengaitkan bantuan ekonomi dengan pertahanan “Dunia Bebas.” Negosiasi berlangsung untuk menghindari kesan bahwa Indonesia telah meninggalkan politik luar negeri yang tak hendak memihak. Titik-titik pertemuan sudah mulai kelihatan. Tapi oposisi terlanjur meluas. Kabinet Sukiman pun dihentikan mandatnya oleh Parlemen menjelang akhir Februari 1952. Insiden itu menunjukkan bahwa bagi Indonesia, bantuan luar negeri selamanya mengandung komplikasi yang tak mudah diluruskan.



▲ Sesi pertama Konferensi Asia-Afrika di Bandung, 1955.
 ◀ Sawah dekat Sumedang, Jawa Barat. Selama hampir dua dasawarsa para mitra Ford Foundation membantu petani merancang dan mengatur sistem irigasi sawah mereka sendiri.

SAJOGYO

Prof. Sajogyo dikenal sebagai dosen IPB. Ia lulus dari sana pada 1955 dan langsung jadi dosen di alma maternya. Dia terkenal sebagai pakar dalam bidang kemiskinan, pembangunan desa, pendidikan kesejahteraan keluarga, maupun sosiologi di Indonesia. Prof. Sajogyo memang menekuni masalah sosial pedesaan.

Ketika lulus sebagai sarjana pertanian di Fakultas Pertanian UI, sebelum diubah jadi IPB pada 1963, selama 10 bulan saya jadi asisten lapangan Prof. Karl Pelzer, geograf dari Yale University, di Sumatera Utara dan Selatan. Setelah kembali ke Bogor, saya jadi asisten di jurusan Sosial Ekonomi, Fakultas Pertanian UI, Bogor selama 1956-1957, sambil bekerja sebagai asisten guru besar tamu sosiologi Prof. W.F. Wertheim dari Universitas Amsterdam, Belanda. Pada Oktober 1957 saya lulus sebagai doktor pertanian (Wertheim promotor) dengan tesis "Transmigran Spontan di W. Sekampung, Lampung, Sumatera Selatan."

"Transmigran spontan," datang ke Lampung, tanpa dibantu pemerintah, dari Pulau Jawa, dari ujung barat sampai timur, mengikuti jejak perintisan oleh penduduk Jawa dari desa-desa lama di Lampung – generasi sebelum Perang Dunia II. Pendatang itu bukan saja membangun tanah usaha tani, melainkan juga membangun desa baru, lengkap dengan kelembagaan desa sambil memperjuangkan agar diakui oleh pemerintah kabupaten sebagai desa baru.

Pada 1950-an kata kunci di kalangan akademisi sosial adalah "community development." Kita bisa menelusuri pengembangan ide itu tapi organisasi yang ikut mendorong ide pengembangan masyarakat lapisan bawah antara lain Bank Dunia, ILO, WHO.

Awal proyek Survei Agro Ekonomi (SAE) di Departemen Pertanian terjadi pada 1964. Waktu itu Ford Foundation membantu antara lain membiayai kehadiran konsultan Dr. E. de Vries, pejabat pertanian di masa Hindia Belanda 1930-an. Pada 1964 saya dipinjam dari IPB untuk jadi ketua Badan Pekerja SAE, dengan dana dari Departemen Pertanian plus Ford Foundation, yang menanggung de Vries. Proyek itu diteruskan oleh Orde Baru, saya ketua SAE sampai 1972.

Ford Foundation, mendukung SAE, bekerjasama dengan Agriculture Development Council (ADC) yang khusus dalam pembangunan pertanian dengan fokus Asia Tenggara. Kerjasama ADC dengan SAE bertepatan dengan awal penyebaran bibit unggul padi yang berasal dari IRRI Filipina. Padi termasuk isu penting karena kebutuhan beras di Indonesia besar sekali. Dalam "Padi



Sajogyo di luar kantornya, Bogor, 1977.

Sentra," proyek intensifikasi padi semasa zaman Presiden Sukarno, yang dipakai adalah bibit unggul nasional.

Sesudah 1965 ADC makin banyak terlibat dalam pengembangan pertanian di Indonesia. IRRI mengadakan penelitian padi di Indonesia. Dosen-dosen IPB banyak terlibat dalam penelitian ini. Padi jenis *peta* yang tinggi dan bulirnya berjanggut dikawinkan sehingga jadi padi yang tanamannya pendek, tanpa janggut, dan ini yang kemudian disebut padi

sae. Ini cikal bakal dari padi bibit unggul yang hasil panennya besar dan membantu penyediaan pangan di Indonesia. Tapi bibit unggul ini juga butuh pupuk buatan pabrik sehingga ada pendirian pabrik pupuk urea, produksi pestisida, sistem distribusi, kredit dan sebagainya, yang melahirkan apa yang disebut sebagai Revolusi Hijau. Di sana juga ada kolusi dan korupsi antara birokrat dan pengusaha.

Dosen-dosen IPB tak terlibat dalam "penemuan" bibit unggul IRRI. Andil Indonesia adalah bahwa ada satu galur padi dari hasil silang di Indonesia yang dipakai di IRRI sebagai salah satu "sumber genetik" bagi nomor IRRI yang diciptakan itu. Memang ada jasa dosen IPB, yaitu dalam memperkenalkan bibit baru itu di tiga desa di Karawang, berkat penyuluhan yang intensif, tinggal selama enam bulan di desa bersama petani, untuk mendorong petani mencoba bibit baru itu. Hasilnya meyakinkan petani! Setelah itu Dinas Pertanian mengikuti jejak "pelibatan mahasiswa sebagai penyuluh petani padi," mahasiswa tingkat akhir diberi biaya tinggal enam bulan di desa dengan tugas penyuluhan dan laporannya jadi bahan ujian akhir! Tahun 1965 ada ratusan mahasiswa pertanian ditugasi oleh IPB.

Pada 1973 saya pergi ke Hawaii untuk menulis makalah untuk sebuah seminar Food and Agriculture Organization. Judulnya *Modernization Without Development* yang belakangan diterbitkan oleh *Journal of Social Sciences* terbitan Dhaka.

Orde Baru kurang memperhatikan reformasi agraria. Pada 1967 UU Pokok Kehutanan dikeluarkan di mana sekian ratus juta hutan dialihkan status jadi tanah negara. Ini membuka peluang dibukanya hak pengelolaan hutan oleh perusahaan besar. Kini kita tahu setelah 30 tahun, Orde Baru mewariskan hutan yang rusak. Ini contoh akibat pemerintah mendahulukan modal besar.





PARA PEMBELA WARGA: YAYASAN LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM INDONESIA

Ada suatu masa, tahun 50-an, di mana Adnan Buyung Nasution biasa melihat skenario semacam ini, antara seorang hakim dan seorang terdakwa. Hakim kepada terdakwa: “Gimana *tub*, kalau pajaknya saya tuntutan sekian?” Terdakwa, kulai di kursi, paras tanpa ekspresi: “Terserah Pak Hakim, saya pasrah aja.”

Nasution, ketika itu seorang jaksa muda, geram melihat kepincangan sistem hukum di Jakarta. Pengalamannya di pengadilan membuka matanya terhadap pemerasan oleh hakim dan polisi, hukuman penjara yang tak adil, dan ketakberdayaan orang miskin pada umumnya. Ia merasa negeri ini membutuhkan sebuah institusi bantuan hukum yang independen dan nirlaba untuk membela kepentingan publik.

Ide ini tentu saja bertentangan dengan karakter “revolusioner” rezim Sukarno. Satu dasawarsa pun berlalu sebelum ide ini bisa diterapkan. Sementara itu, awal 1970-an, satu hal semakin jelas: korupsi, ketidakadilan, penyalahgunaan kekuasaan merajalela di bawah rezim Suharto.

Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI) didirikan pada 1970 oleh sekelompok orang termasuk Martokusumo, Mochtar Lubis, P.K. Ojong, Suardi Tasrif, Yap Thiam Hien, Hasjim Machdan, Minang Warman, Victor Sibarani, Albert Hasibuan, dan H.J.C. Princen. Sumber inspirasi: Amerika, terutama melalui jasa pengacara publik dan *Neighborhood Legal Offices*-nya. Setelah dukungan datang dari Ali Sadikin, gubernur Jakarta penuh karisma, restu Presiden Suharto pun turun.

Dengan cepat YLBHI memimpin pembelaan orang tertindas, menjadi pusat kegiatan hak asasi manusia. Sampai sekarang, ia bekerja sama dengan sejumlah organisasi bantuan hukum, badan penelitian, dan kelompok advokasi; menerbitkan naskah hukum dan hak asasi manusia, mengadakan seminar, loka-

karya, dan pelatihan paralegal.

Awalnya, organisasi ini didanai “sendiri,” lewat firma hukum milik Nasution, yang dibangunnya atas desakan wartawan Mochtar Lubis dan ekonom Sumitro Djojohadikusumo demi menjamin kemandirian finansial. Belakangan, dana datang dari berbagai sumber lokal maupun internasional.

Kepeloporan YLBHI mendukung gerakan politik berbagai organisasi nonpemerintah makin jauh melejitkan namanya. Salah satu yang



Kantor YLBHI di Jakarta Pusat, tiga abad sesudah pendiriannya, 2003.

diperjuangkannya: membentuk masyarakat hukum. Jurus-jurusnya membangun koalisi dijadikan contoh oleh organisasi nonpemerintah lain. Keterkaitan ini memang semacam tali pusar bagi YLBHI: dengan kantor-kantor cabangnya sendiri, kelompok-kelompok lokal di tingkat provinsi, pos-pos di kota kecil dan desa.

Sejak 1976, kegiatan advokasi perburuhan YLBHI disalurkan lewat serikat-serikat buruh dan kegiatan usaha kecil. Model pendampingan ini juga meluas ke pengorganisasian buruh seperti pembantu rumah tangga dan pelayan toko perempuan.

Ketika hak-hak asasi manusia menjadi

perhatian banyak lembaga donor di seluruh dunia, kantor pusat Ford Foundation memberi bantuan kepada organisasi global seperti *International Commission of Jurists* dan *Human Rights Watch/Asia*.

Dukungan kepada *Human Rights Watch/Asia* termasuk program magang dengan YLBHI dan bantuan bagi individu yang mau belajar di luar negeri atau ikut konferensi internasional. Berseliweranlah pengacara-pengacara muda seperti Tatang Suganda, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara dan Todung Mulya Lubis – tokoh-tokoh yang terkenal kritis pada Orde Baru – ke tempat-tempat seperti Manila, Seoul, London, dan Geneva.

Bagian lain strategi Ford Foundation: meningkatkan kepedulian terhadap keadilan sosial melalui manajemen sumber daya alam, hukum lingkungan, dan gender. Ini termasuk upaya “... mencari bentuk pelatihan yang dapat mendekatkan LSM besar dan kecil,” seperti kata mantan direktur *Human Rights Watch/Asia*, Sidney Jones. Memang, tak semua organisasi nonpemerintah di Indonesia mengerti bagaimana mengatasi yang tak dapat dielakkan itu: friksi pribadi, pertikaian internal. Pada akhir 80-an, “tarik ulur” antar LSM di Indonesia belum saja selesai.

Tak dapat dipungkiri, prestasi YLBHI mengesankan. Di tangannya, pengembangan *community development* di Indonesia maju pesat: pemberdayaan kelompok lokal, penggerakan partisipasi rakyat dalam pembuatan keputusan, ide masyarakat sipil sebagai bahan pegimbang kekuasaan negara.

Ironisnya, organisasi ini dilanda kesulitan keuangan sesudah Suharto lengser. Persepsi internal dan keputusan Nasution menjadi penasehat hukum sejumlah jenderal Indonesia, yang dituduh melanggar hak asasi manusia menempatkannya pada posisi yang kontroversial.

Itu pula yang disimpulkan oleh Brown dan Arnold, setelah mereka mengunjungi beberapa kota di Indonesia selama sebulan sejak Agustus 1952. Kedua orang itu bertemu dengan Perdana Menteri Wilopo, Menteri Pendidikan Bahder Djohan, dan rektor dua universitas. Juga dengan Presiden Sukarno. Pertemuan 45 menit dengan pemimpin Indonesia itu memberi kesan yang positif bagi kedua tamu dari Amerika itu. Mereka menyimpulkan bahwa Sukarno “punya pandangan yang hangat terhadap Barat dan Amerika...” Kepala Negara itu bertanya kepada mereka, “Negeri lain mana yang mempunyai lembaga filantropi seperti Rockefeller dan Ford Foundation? Apakah ini karena orang Amerika begitu kaya, atautkah karena begitu manusiawi?”

Di sela-sela kehangatan itu, Brown dan Arnold menemukan setidaknya dua hal tentang Indonesia. Pertama, sifat pucuk kepemimpinan negeri ini, karena “ditempa oleh perjuangan revolusioner, sungguh-sungguh punya dedikasi untuk memajukan Indonesia.” Hal kedua ialah bahwa “Indonesia sangat lambat... untuk menerima bantuan dari pemerintah asing.” Sikap ini, menurut Brown dan Arnold, karena “Indonesia baru saja menjadi sebuah negeri yang merdeka,” dengan “kepahitan berjuang untuk muncul dari status sebagai koloni selama 300 tahun.” Maka harus dilihat “hipersensitivitas orang Indonesia berkenaan dengan kemandirian politik luar negeri mereka.”

Sebab itulah Ford Foundation dianggap merupakan pilihan yang pas. Lembaga ini bukan lembaga pemerintah AS. Bahkan Sukarno, menurut kesimpulan kedua penjajak itu, “sangat ingin Ford Foundation melakukan kegiatan di Indonesia.”

Tapi daftar sangat panjang untuk menyebut kegiatan apa saja yang harus dilakukan. Membangun sebuah republik seluas itu tanpa dana, tanpa rencana, dengan hanya sepuluh persen penduduk yang melek huruf, dan dengan administrasi yang terserak-serak, adalah pekerjaan yang tak pernah dihadapi kekuasaan manapun dalam sejarah Nusantara. Begitu besarnya tugas itu, tulis Frank Miller, salah satu wakil Ford Foundation di Jakarta, hingga patutlah bila timbul “perasaan sublim dalam kerendahhatian, atau sebuah ego dalam ukuran mahabesar.” Sementara itu di kalangan orang Indonesia ada satu tekad, kata Miller pula, “untuk tak jatuh kembali ke tangan orang asing,

atau menggadaikan diri melalui kewajiban dan aliansi-aliansi.”

Sebab itu respons Ford Foundation berhati-hati – dan tampaknya sulit untuk mempunyai atau mengikuti satu desain yang sudah siap. Yang paling mendesak, dan paling mudah disepakati semua pihak, tentunya melepaskan Indonesia dari rendahnya pendidikan. Khususnya pendidikan bahasa Inggris. “Orang Indonesia,” kata Miller pula, “dengan cepat melihat bahasa Inggris sebagai salah satu kunci bagi problem pembangunan.” Itulah agaknya latar belakang permintaan Ali Sastroamidjojo dan Bung Karno. Maka bahkan sebelum Brown dan Arnold kembali ke New York, dari Jakarta mereka mengetok kawat. Kedua utusan itu menganjurkan agar sejumlah guru bahasa Inggris dikirim ke Indonesia langsung dari Amerika untuk tahun ajaran 1953-1954.

Dalam sejarah Ford Foundation di Indonesia, agaknya tak ada program yang disetujui dengan begitu cepat seperti program ini. Sehari saja setelah Hoffman menerima kawat dari kedua utusannya, hibah pun di-*fiat*. Brown dan Arnold diberitahu untuk mengumumkan hal ini kepada Menteri Pendidikan Bahder Johan sebelum mereka meninggalkan Indonesia. Dokumen persetujuan yang diteken sederhana: dana sebesar \$150 ribu untuk mendirikan pusat-pusat latihan bagi murid yang akan masuk universitas dan untuk guru-guru di sekolah menengah.

Dalam perjalanan waktu, dokumen sederhana itu berkembang jadi sesuatu yang besar dan kompleks. Lebih dari satu dekade kemudian, dana yang disiapkan dan dibelanjakan untuk program pendidikan bahasa Inggris sudah mencapai sekitar \$1,5 juta – dan itu ketika Indonesia berada dalam keadaan ekonomi yang buruk dan suasana politik yang sengit.

Program ini bermula dari pelatihan untuk guru-guru bahasa Inggris secara bersahaja – hanya lima minggu – dan tujuan memperbaiki kemampuan lisan para guru. Ada 11 guru dari Amerika didatangkan ke pelbagai kota di pelbagai provinsi. Kemudian diciptakan sesuatu yang lebih melembaga: sebuah pusat pendidikan dua tahun untuk guru-guru bahasa Inggris, yang di tahun 1950-an terkenal sebagai “Standard Training,” singkatan dari Standard Training Courses. Dengan ini diharapkan akan lahir guru-guru yang akan mengajarkan bahasa Inggris dengan baik ke generasi berikutnya.

Sebuah evaluasi internal Ford Foundation memuji program ini: sebuah perubahan dramatis telah terjadi hanya dalam waktu 10 tahun dalam pendidikan bahasa Inggris di Indonesia. Jika di tahun 1953 sekitar 80 persen dari semua guru bahasa Inggris di Indonesia tak punya cara mengajar yang baku, hampir tanpa bahan pengajaran bahasa, dan tak punya lembaga untuk melatih mereka, maka di tahun 1963 “satu bangunan institusi, bahan, dan guru-guru sudah ada.”

Evaluasi itu juga menunjukkan hasil lain – menurut pikiran yang tipikal di masa Perang Dingin itu. Dengan bahasa Inggris yang memadai di kalangan orang terpelajar Indonesia, kata penulis evaluasi itu, “Dunia Bebas dan ideologinya akan memperoleh keunggulan politis yang penting.” Karena bahasa Inggris merupakan sarana komunikasi dengan orang asing, pemerintah Indonesia tak bisa membawa masuk guru-guru dari negeri komunis ke dalam universitas. Ini, menurut evaluasi itu, “akan membantu membatasi pengaruh negeri komunis ke Indonesia.”

Tak sepenuhnya harapan ini dikukuhkan kenyataan. Di awal tahun 1960-an, bersama dengan meningkatnya kredit dari Uni Soviet ke Indonesia yang mencapai \$800 juta, ada 300 teknisi Uni Soviet bekerja di Indonesia dibandingkan dengan 200 dari Amerika. Program perbaikan ketrampilan orang Indonesia dalam berbahasa Inggris pada akhirnya tak ada hubungannya dengan besar kecilnya pengaruh dari luar. Lagipula tujuan utamanya tak sepenuhnya berhasil, meskipun di samping Ford Foundation, ada lembaga seperti British Council yang aktif dalam program serupa.

Brosur Ford Foundation 1971-1972 sendiri mengatakan, “kemajuan yang sangat lambat dalam latihan bahasa Inggris” sebagai suatu usahanya yang “kurang menggembirakan.” Seperempat abad setelah guru-guru Amerika datang ke sekolah-sekolah di Indonesia, rupanya tak mudah melengkapinya orang Indonesia dengan bahasa asing itu.

Tak mengherankan bila dalam sebuah laporan panjang majalah *Tempo* 20 Juli 1974 dicatat, “kursus-kursus bahasa Inggris pun bermunculan bak kedai dan restoran.” Kurnianingrat Ali Sastroamidjojo, pensiunan dosen Fakultas Sastra jurusan Inggris UI, yang mengajar anak-anak di luar kelas sampai usia lanjut, dan istri Ali Sastroamidjojo (pemimpin Indonesia yang pertama kali meminta Ford Foundation untuk membantu pendidikan bahasa Inggris) mengutarakan pengamatannya, “Dari tahun ke tahun, anak-anak makin mundur – seakan-akan di sekolah mereka tak membaca apa-apa. Hanya yang bisa membayar yang dapat les privat.”

Kalau bukan ikut les yang mahal, mereka pergi ke kursus di mana saja, sampai di kampung-kampung miskin sekalipun. Mutunya beragam, dan memang tak ada standar. Sebuah kursus Inggris di daerah kumuh Jakarta, misalnya, yang diikuti buruh hotel dan tempat-tempat hiburan, menyediakan teks bacaan yang dibuat sendiri dengan kalimat seperti ini: “*What’s the matter has been so happened?*”

Tapi sesuatu toh lahir dari ikhtiar Ford Foundation di bidang ini, dan bertahan sampai sekarang: sepasang kamus.



- ▲ Pada akhir 1950-an, pengaruh Uni Soviet meningkat dengan penjualan kapal, pesawat terbang, dan senjata ke Indonesia.
 - ▶▶ Seorang pengasong menjual kamus bajakan Echols-Shadily di Jakarta Pusat. Pembajakan terjadi sejak kamus ini pertama kali diterbitkan. Diperkirakan dari 120.000 eksemplar kamus yang terjual setiap tahun, 80 persen bajakan.

HARYONO SUYONO

Haryono Suyono masuk dunia Keluarga Berencana (KB), suatu upaya untuk menekan laju pertumbuhan penduduk, lewat tulisan-tulisannya. Dikira wartawan, ia dipanggil Gubernur Jakarta Ali Sadikin, satu-satunya orang pemerintah pada 1960-an yang berani secara terbuka mendukung program KB. Naskah Haryono pula yang dibaca Ali Sadikin saat membuka Kongres Internasional KB di Indonesia. Berawal sebagai penulis, Haryono mengakhiri karier sebagai kepala Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, yang dibentuk pemerintah pada 1970, sebelum masuk ke kabinet sebagai salah satu menteri Presiden Suharto.

Saya awalnya menulis untuk harian *Kompas*, *Berita Buana*. Kemudian juga di majalah *Jaya*. Tulisannya masih mengenai peledakan penduduk.

Ali Sadikin menyuruh saya terus menulis. Waktu itu Sadikin jadi dewa gerakan KB, karena ia satu-satunya orang pemerintah yang berani berbicara secara terbuka. Karenanya Ali Sadikin “dimanfaatkan” Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (PKBI) sebagai jembatan. Saat itu Presiden Sukarno senang pada jumlah penduduk yang besar – dianggap dengan jumlah penduduk yang besar kita menjadi “bangsa yang besar.” Pemikiran seperti itu “diserang” dengan pendekatan yang murni kesehatan, sebab yang muncul dokter-dokter ahli kandungan dan sebagainya. Tapi Ali Sadikin tak saja menyinggung dari sudut kesehatan, tapi juga dari sudut yang lebih umum. Ia bicara kualitas manusia dan potensi sumber daya manusia.

Pada 1967 ada Kongres Internasional KB di Jakarta. Pemerintah mengirim Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat Idham Chalid. Saat itu ulama menentang program pengendalian jumlah penduduk. Mengutus Idham dianggap sebagai pendekatan yang tepat karena dia berasal dari Nahdlatul Ulama. Dengan sendirinya Nahdlatul Ulama menjadi pendukung pertama dari gerakan KB nasional. Di kongres itulah pemerintah memberikan semacam isyarat keseriusannya.

Isyarat dan kongres itu menjadi perhatian masyarakat. Bahwa pemerintah membuka secara resmi, betul. Namun PKBI pendorongnya. Selain itu, para donor juga membawa pesan dunia, deklarasi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa soal keprihatinan tentang kependudukan. Suharto sebagai pejabat presiden ikut menandatangani pesan dunia itu. Dari situlah ada semacam komitmen resmi dari pemerintah dalam

bidang KB. Itu sudah akhir 1967. Pada 1968 mulai gerakan-gerakan untuk menjadikan program KB secara resmi. Mulailah program-program seperti lembaga KB dan sebagainya.

Teman-teman dari komunitas donor bermain luar biasa. Ford Foundation, saya ingat persis, mengirim banyak tenaga untuk



Haryono Suyono di kantornya, Jakarta, 1979.

belajar. Saya kebetulan kebagian dari USAID.

Saya sendiri mempunyai empat anak. Istri saya hamil setiap tahun. Kalau terus-menerus begini, jumlah keluarga saya akan meledak. Saya mulai sadar. Saya ikut KB dua tahun sebelum programnya dimulai. Jadi masih menang, masih bisa untuk kampanye. Tapi waktu itu susah mendapatkan kontrasepsi. Hanya bisa didapatkan di klinik-klinik dan dokter tertentu.


Pasca pemerintahan Suharto, program KB ternyata tidak mengantisipasi pergantian pemerintahan yang begitu cepat. Persiapan ketenagaan agak terlambat. Karena pergantian presiden yang sampai tiga kali dalam waktu hampir setiap tahun tidak saja

mengganti lapisan paling atas dari birokrasi, tetapi juga lapisan di bawahnya dan di bawahnya lagi. Jadi semacam ini rezim Abdurrahman Wahid, ini rezim si ini. Itu tidak kita antisipasi. Karena dulu sangat stabil, proses regenerasi boleh dikatakan direncanakan secara bertahap. Ternyata yang terjadi lain. Kalau tahu begitu, dulu persiapan ketenagaannya menjadi lebih cepat lagi. Itu satu.

Kedua, program mempersiapkan warga untuk mandiri rupanya kurang gegap-gempita, sehingga ketergantungan warga kepada pemerintah masih tinggi. Dulu kita selalu dicukupi kebutuhan-kebutuhan untuk membeli kontrasepsi dan sebagainya. Sehingga biar pun jumlah orang yang mandiri sudah mencapai 50 persen atau lebih, tapi belum terjadi gerakan yang targetnya 100 persen. Karena asumsinya warga miskin, pemerintah harus membantu. Sekarang kalang kabut. Baru saya dengar pemerintah Megawati Sukarnoputri menyediakan dana Rp 100 milyar – itu tidak cukup untuk melayani mereka yang harus gratis. Ini nanti bisa timbul *drop* yang besar kalau memang tak cukup subsidiya. Sementara tak ada kampanye

mandiri. Mestinya keadaan yang begini harus diimbangi dengan kampanye mandiri supaya mereka yang tidak kebagian 100 milyar itu bisa beli sendiri. Jadi kalau kita tidak bisa menyediakan obatnya, kita sediakan informasinya bahwa toko itu ada, apotek itu ada, di depot itu ada, dan sebagainya. Ini tidak dilakukan.

Lebih-lebih lagi tak dilakukan persiapan yang matang untuk antisipasi otonomi daerah. Pemerintah harus segera bertindak. Kalau tak bisa akan terjadi peledakan penduduk yang baru. Bisa lebih dahsyat dari bom Bali atau bom J.W. Marriot!



**Kamus
Inggris
Indonesia**

An English-Indonesian Dictionary

**DR. ANNE DE FERRIS
DR. HASSEN SHARIF**

INDONESIA



John M. Echols, seorang pengajar linguistik di Cornell University, menyusun sebuah kamus Indonesia-Inggris selama kurang lebih sepuluh tahun bersama Hassan Shadily, seorang leksikograf yang kemudian aktif dalam Yayasan Franklin, sebuah lembaga yang menerbitkan terjemahan buku Amerika di Indonesia. Di akhir 1963, hasil kerja yang panjang itu terbit dengan bantuan \$3.000 dari Ford Foundation. Kamus Indonesia-Inggris bisa terbit dan bisa dijual murah.

Sebagaimana lazimnya kamus, ia tak bisa berhenti. Sejak 1962, atas prakarsanya sendiri, Echols mulai mengerjakan kamus Inggris-Indonesia. Ford Foundation memberinya dana \$170 ribu. Kembali ia bekerja sama dengan Hassan Shadily, dan jerih payah itu baru selesai di tahun 1970. Kamus itu, sampai hari ini, hampir tak punya saingan. Ia bahkan melanjutkan hidupnya sampai sekarang antara lain melalui tangan-tangan para pembajak buku.

Kamus itu disambut antusias di pasar dan di bangku-bangku sekolah, tapi sepasang kamus dan kemampuan berbahasa Inggris ternyata tak punya dampak yang berarti bagi pandangan orang Indonesia ke dunia, ketika suasana politik berubah dengan tajam.

Menjelang akhir 1950-an, politik punya arah dan

suhunya sendiri, yang digerakkan oleh trauma penjajahan, syak wasangka terhadap datangnya “kolonialisme baru,” Perang Dingin, perang saudara, dan segala macam kekerasan dan permusuhan politik yang berkecamuk di Indonesia.

Khususnya keadaan Darurat Perang, dikenal sebagai *Staat Oorlog en Beleg* (SOB), yang diberlakukan pada 1957 berhasil mengubah suasana politik itu secara drastis. Represi menjadi pola umum dalam menyelesaikan konflik. Sementara itu, mobilisasi dan militansi menaik, dimulai dengan tekad pemerintah untuk menuntut Belanda membebaskan Irian Barat. Kampanye anti-Belanda berkobar.

Di akhir 1958, buruh di perusahaan perkapalan Belanda, *Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij* (KPM), menduduki kantor pusat di Gambir, Jakarta, disusul dengan perusahaan dagang Geo. Wehry. Kemudian, semua orang Belanda yang tak bekerja diminta oleh Menteri Kehakiman G.A. Maengkom untuk meninggalkan Indonesia. Ada 46.000 warga Belanda yang segera berangkat kembali ke Nederland menjelang Natal. Seluruh perusahaan Belanda sudah diambil alih.

Pada saat itu kekuatan militer di bawah Jenderal Abdul Haris Nasution, yang didukung dan mendukung Presiden Sukarno, kian meningkat dalam kancah politik. Yang merosot



▲ Warga negara Belanda meninggalkan Indonesia dengan kapal Captain Cook, Jakarta, 1957.
 ▶ Nasionalisasi *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij*, sebuah perusahaan dagang Belanda, di Jakarta, 1957.
 ▶▶ Kongres Masyumi pada 1951.







adalah posisi partai-partai, kecuali PKI. Militer mencoba memotong kekuatan PKI yang kemudian dikenal sebagai partai komunis ketiga terbesar di dunia. Tapi tak berhasil. PKI adalah partai yang terbaik organisasinya, ulet, dan berani karena tradisi revolusionernya, dan dipimpin oleh orang-orang yang berpengalaman dalam menghadapi tekanan, sebagaimana sejarah partai itu sendiri. Tak kurang penting: Presiden Sukarno – yang tak punya dukungan rakyat yang terorganisasi – membutuhkannya.

Di bulan Maret 1960, Parlemen hasil pemilihan umum 1955, dibubarkan. Sebuah lembaga baru, Front Nasional, dibentuk. Setiap partai harus menyerahkan daftar anggotanya. Agustus tahun itu, PSI dan Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), dua partai yang dikenal pendukung demokrasi liberal, dilarang. Dampak pelarangan ini tak besar dalam hal PSI, yang dari pemilihan umum 1955 tampil sebagai partai kecil dan kalah. Dalam hal Masyumi, partai nomor dua pemenang pemilihan umum setelah PNI, dengan pengikut hampir delapan juta yang tersebar ke seluruh Indonesia, pengaruhnya akan meluas dan panjang.

Tapi waktu itu, tak mudah mendapatkan gambaran keadaan yang sebenarnya. Pers dalam keadaan tertekan. Koran PKI, *Harian Rakjat*, diberangus, meskipun pembredelan ini

sementara, tidak seperti yang dialami *Pedoman*, yang dipimpin Rosihan Anwar, yang baru bisa terbit kembali setelah Bung Karno jatuh. Demikian juga *Indonesia Raya*, yang pemimpin redaksinya, Mochtar Lubis, dipenjarakan. Kian lama pemberangusan dan penangkapan kian sering. Terkadang dengan tuduhan yang meragukan. Di awal Desember 1961, misalnya, ditangkap sejumlah orang yang dituduh tergabung dalam komplotan yang disebut NIGO (*Nederlandse Indische Guerilla Organisatie*) yang hendak “membunuh Presiden dan mengambil alih kekuasaan.” Salah satunya Syahriar Rasyad, guru besar Fakultas Kedokteran UI, seorang ahli radiologi yang tak pernah aktif dalam politik. Ternyata memang tak ada bukti ia bersalah, tapi Syahriar Rasyad tetap dikenakan tahanan kota.

Presiden Sukarno memang sudah empat kali terancam percobaan pembunuhan – dua kali dengan dilempar granat, satu kali ditembak dari udara – dan suasana yang kian keras dan tidak terbuka tak bisa dielakkan. Di dini hari pertengahan Januari 1962, atas perintah Penguasa Perang Tertinggi (Peperti), para pemimpin PSI dan Masyumi ditangkap. Tak ada pengadilan untuk mereka dan tak ada batas waktu yang pasti sampai kapan. Dalam kenyataannya, mereka baru keluar dari tahanan setelah kekuasaan Bung Karno jatuh; Sutan Sjahrir, bekas perdana menteri dan tokoh PSI, bahkan meninggal dalam



▲ Presiden Sukarno di Yogyakarta mengancam bertahannya Belanda di Papua Barat, 1961.

►► Peristiwa Cikini: empat orang diadili dengan tuduhan hendak membunuh Presiden Sukarno dengan granat. Agustus, 1958.

SUKADJI RANUWIHARDJO

Sukadji Ranuwibardjo lulus ekonomi dari UGM pada 1957. Setahun sesudahnya, Ranuwibardjo bekerja sebagai pegawai perusahaan kereta api di Bandung, ketika dia mendapat tawaran beasiswa master di University of California, Berkeley. Dia berangkat ke Amerika Serikat dan sepulangnya jadi dekan Fakultas Ekonomi UGM, lalu rektor UGM, serta direktur jenderal pendidikan tinggi departemen pendidikan dan kebudayaan. "Saya adalah orang Indonesia satu-satunya yang mempunyai pengalaman manajemen universitas paling lama, 36 tahun terus-menerus," katanya.

Pada awal 1950-an, ketika kerja sama UGM dengan University of Wisconsin dimulai, saya tak memilih hendak studi ke mana. Kira-kira seminggu sebelum berangkat, saya bertemu seorang guru besar Amerika yang mengatur persiapan kerja sama dengan University of Wisconsin. Dia mengatakan, banyak dosen UGM di Wisconsin, "Apakah berminat untuk pergi ke Berkeley?" Saya berminat.

Dua tahun di sana banyak pengalaman menarik. Di Berkeley, semua penerima beasiswa Ford Foundation dapat membawa keluarganya. Awalnya, bahasa Jawa dipakai para ibu muda yang sibuk di rumah dengan anak-anak yang masih kecil. Kalau mereka berkumpul, selalu berbahasa Jawa. Lama-lama menular kepada bapak-bapak. Bila di kampus, umumnya kami berbahasa Indonesia atau bahasa Inggris. Pengertian-pengertian Jawa yang menerobos dalam pertemuan keluarga terpaksa harus dijelaskan kepada mereka yang dari Minang, Tapanuli, Sunda dan lainnya. Jadi kita mengajar bahasa Jawa kepada Emil Salim, Sayuti Hasibuan, Bistok Sitorus, Arif Djanin, Panglaykim, dan Ang Giok Hun.

Di usia ke 31 tahun, saya diangkat sebagai pembantu rektor UGM sampai 1964. Saya katakan kepada Rektor UGM Prof. Herman Johannes, saya ingin belajar lagi dan berangkat ke Amerika pada 1964.

Ketika kerja sama dengan Ford Foundation sedang berlangsung, ada keputusan Sukarno agar dosen-dosen ekonomi tak perlu belajar ekonomi dari Amerika. Tapi kita manipulasikan. Mereka masih tetap berangkat ke Amerika dengan surat keputusan dari sekretariat kabinet dengan tidak menyebut ekonomi. Mereka

mengatakan belajar manajemen, statistik, atau lainnya yang sifatnya teknis. Ternyata sekretariat kabinet meloloskan mereka.

Pada awal kerja sama UGM hanya ada dua guru besar: Prof. Soenardjo dan Prof. Kertonegoro. Rapat senat guru besar UGM sangat tradisional. Prof. Kertonegoro pernah



Sukadji Ranuwibardjo di Yogyakarta, 1978.

menceritakan pada kami ketika beliau berkunjung ke Amerika Serikat. Beliau diberitahu oleh orang Amerika, "Kalau dosen Indonesia tidak dapat mengembangkan sendiri maka tutup saja. Proses pengajaran di UGM sangat lambat. Tidak perlu ada kerja sama dengan Amerika." Jadi sikap tradisional itu memang sangat kuat. Itu dikarenakan Yogyakarta adalah suatu tempat yang relatif tertutup. Sejak UGM dibangun pada 1949, lebih banyak lulusan Belanda, lulusan Leiden. Jadi kalau ada unsur asing akan sangat dicurigai. Selama perang kemerdekaan 1945-

1949, Yogyakarta menjadi ibukota Indonesia. Sesudah penyerahan kedaulatan pada 1949, sangat tajam kontroversi antara kaum NON (non kooperator dengan pemerintah Belanda) dan kaum KO (kooperator). Yogyakarta didominasi kaum NON, yang anti Belanda dan orang asing.

Pengalaman lain, terjadi saat McGeorge Bundy, presiden Ford Foundation, datang ke Yogyakarta kira-kira 1968 atau 1969 untuk meninjau kerja sama Wisconsin-UGM. Masih ingat lelucon yang tidak lucu. Kita suguhkan makanan Jawa antara lain *klepon*. Jadi dia menggigit klepon, gulanya itu muncrat mengenai dirinya. Bajunya kotor kena gula Jawa. *Wow, it's a crisis.*

Orang sering membandingkan FEUI dengan FE UGM dan FE Universitas Nommensen. Ketiganya didanai Ford Foundation. FEUI lebih berhasil. Tapi ada yang bilang, jadi menteri itu bukan keberhasilan. *We don't talk purely economics tapi politik.* Orde Baru dimulai di Jakarta. Waktu itu demonstrasi mahasiswa menumbangkan Orde Lama dilakukan dari UI. Suharto memilih orang-orang yang dekat dengannya macam Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil Salim, Mohammad Sadli, dan Subroto.

Suatu hari saya diberitahu Radius Prawiro, waktu itu menteri perdagangan. "Anda terlampaui lama tinggal di Yogyakarta. Sudah waktunya Anda pindah ke Jakarta," katanya. Saya diminta jadi sekretaris jenderal Departemen Perdagangan dan pindah ke Jakarta.

Saya tidak bersedia. Rekan-rekan UI itu jadi menteri atau jadi apapun masih setiap minggu memberi kuliah di Salemba. Kalau saya pindah ke Jakarta, saya tidak bisa memberi kuliah. Ini sebagai contoh bahwa *my commitment is to my university.*



PEMBELAJAN



status sebagai tahanan politik.

Tindakan seperti itu menjadi lazim, ketika kampanye pembebasan Irian Barat berkembang jadi pertempuran sporadis antara militer Indonesia dan militer Belanda. Akhirnya, melalui campur tangan PBB, Belanda menyerahkan wilayah di timur itu ke Indonesia. Tapi Indonesia telah terbiasa dengan kehidupan politik yang, atas nama patriotisme dan keamanan, membenarkan represi dan mengibarkan panji-panji militansi.

Keadaan Darurat Perang diakhiri secara resmi Mei 1963. Tapi bangunan kekuasaan yang sudah terbentuk, dan perangnya, tak berubah. Hukum yang normal telah digantikan hukum darurat. Tahanan politik yang sudah disekap tak dibebaskan. Penangkapan baru masih ada, terutama setelah terjadi kerusuhan terhadap warga Indonesia keturunan Tionghoa di Bandung. Bung Karno menuduh bahwa di balik kerusuhan itu ada kaum “kontrarevolusi,” dan itu adalah “PSI, Masyumi, PRRI, Permesta, dan subversi asing.”

Tuduhan “kontrarevolusi” sudah cukup membungkam orang. Ketika sejumlah seniman dan intelektual menyusun dan memaklumkan Manifesto Kebudayaan, mengutarakan perlunya kesenian mandiri dari kekuasaan politik, mereka

diserang oleh organisasi pro-PKI. Karya-karya mereka dilarang dibaca dan yang bekerja di universitas, seperti H.B. Jassin, seorang kritikus sastra terkemuka, disingkirkan.

Suasana militan dan represif itu meningkat, bersama kampanye “Ganyang Malaysia.” Mobilisasi massa dikabarkan berhasil menghimpun sampai 21 juta sukarelawan untuk bertempur, tapi pada saat yang sama politik kian tegang di dalam negeri.

PKI semakin menyerang lawan-lawan politiknya yang kian lama kian defensif. Kampanye mengganyang “setan kota” dan “setan desa” memojokkan mereka. Bentrokan terjadi terutama di daerah pertanian di Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, dan Bali ketika gerakan tani PKI menduduki tanah milik kalangan yang mereka sebut “setan desa.” Konflik itu meluas dan sengit. Sebab di satu pihak jumlah petani yang tak bertanah bertambah dari tahun ke tahun, namun di lain pihak kehidupan desa tak ditandai oleh dominasi tuan-tuan tanah besar. Hampir tak ada yang memusatkan pemilikan sawah ladang di satu-dua tangan, dengan kekuasaan luas dan gaya hidup sebuah kelas tersendiri. Seperti kemudian dikatakan seorang aktivis sayap kiri, aksi sepihak untuk membagi tanah hanya



▲ Perayaan ulang tahun ke-33 PKI, 1953.

MELY G. TAN

Dr. Mely G. Tan salah satu sosiolog terkemuka Indonesia. Ia terkenal karena karyanya tentang hubungan antar kelompok, misalnya tentang etnis Tionghoa di Indonesia, dan gender, termasuk kesehatan reproduksi perempuan. Ia memperoleh beasiswa dari Ford Foundation melalui LIPI untuk memperoleh gelar Ph.D. di UC Berkeley pada 1963. Sejak saat itu ia selalu memberikan kuliah-kuliah dan makalah-makalah pada konferensi-konferensi di seluruh dunia; dan telah menjadi anggota Komisi Nasional Anti-Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan (Komnas Perempuan), sebuah lembaga mitra Ford Foundation sekarang.

Ketika saya menyelesaikan MA di Cornell pada 1959, saya bertemu Prof. Selo Soemardjan, yang juga mengambil Ph.D. bidang sosiologi. Saya kembali ke Indonesia pada 1961. Pada 1963 Pak Selo menceritakan pada saya tentang sebuah program di mana LIPI sedang mencari orang untuk dikirim ke AS guna melanjutkan belajar. Setelah selesai orang-orang ini akan kembali ke Indonesia dan bekerja secara penuh bagi Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (Leknas). Saya tertarik dengan program yang didanai Ford Foundation ini, sehingga saya melamar. Saya menduga ada kira-kira 60 lamaran yang masuk untuk 12 posisi, dan saya beruntung terpilih untuk memperoleh Ph.D. di Berkeley. Di AS, saya tiba beberapa bulan sebelum Presiden John F. Kennedy tertembak pada November 1963.

Disertasi saya adalah tentang orang Cina di AS dan saya menyelesaikannya pada 1968. Saya ingat, waktu itu saya sangat khawatir dengan peristiwa 1965

ketika Ford Foundation menutup kantornya. Kami mengira beasiswa kami akan dihentikan. Untung, meskipun Ford Foundation menutup kantornya untuk sementara waktu, mereka tetap memberikan beasiswa.

Ketika kembali ke Indonesia, saya bekerja di LIPI sebagai bagian dari persetujuan awal. Pada saat itu tak banyak yang saya lakukan dengan Ford Foundation,

karena program beasiswa LIPI kemudian diatur oleh International Education Foundation. Tapi pada 1974 saya diminta untuk disertakan dalam tim evaluasi para pemenang beasiswa Ford Foundation di Asia

ilmu sosial di Indonesia. Yayasan ini dibantu oleh Ford Foundation dan sejak saat itu saya mulai terlibat, baik secara langsung maupun tak langsung, dalam upaya untuk memberikan kesempatan yang lebih luas bagi peran perempuan dalam ilmu-ilmu sosial.

Ford Foundation memberikan pengaruh besar bagi Indonesia, terutama lewat program awalnya, yang masih terus berlanjut, yang fokus pada pendidikan. Mulanya, ketika Indonesia menjadi sebuah republik, standar yang dipakai sangat tinggi, dan selalu mengutamakan pendidikan. Jadi, apa yang dilakukan oleh Ford Foundation dalam memberikan kesempatan kepada sebanyak mungkin anak muda untuk menyelesaikan pendidikannya adalah sesuatu yang sangat berharga.

Ford Foundation merupakan organisasi terhormat di Indonesia. Saya kira salah satu kunci kesuksesannya adalah kualitas para pemimpinnya. Saya ingat, pemimpin Ford Foundation pertama yang saya temui adalah Frank Miller, yang kemudian di-

ganti oleh John Bresnan, dan kemudian ada perempuan seperti Mary Zurbuchen dan Suzanne Siskel. Semuanya fasih berbahasa Indonesia! Ini penting, karena kefasihan dalam berbahasa Indonesia bisa membuat kesan yang sangat baik kepada orang-orang Indonesia, dan juga para perempuan ini sangat sensitif terhadap isu-isu yang dihadapi perempuan Indonesia masa kini.



Mely G. Tan dan Soedradjad Djuwandono di apartemen Tan di Berkeley, 1966.

Tenggara. Saya kemudian ditugaskan untuk pergi ke Filipina, Korea Selatan, dan Vietnam Selatan. Saya ingat bagaimana saya begitu tertarik bertemu dengan begitu banyak pemenang. Tak bisa disangkal Ford Foundation membawa pengaruh positif pada negara-negara tersebut.

Pada 1980, saya menjadi anggota YIIS yang diketuai oleh Pak Selo. Nama Pak Selo selalu muncul di setiap diskusi tentang ilmu-

menghasilkan “bentrok antara yang miskin dan setengah kaya.” Kemudian kita tahu bahwa konflik itu berujung pada pertumpahan darah yang mengerikan.

Di kota, militansi PKI terbatas di bidang yang tak langsung terkait dengan sumber-sumber ekonomi. Konflik tersengit di sini berkisar pada bidang ide, pers, dan kebudayaan. Mereka yang kena serang PKI umumnya berlindung di bawah proteksi tentara dan atau nama Bung Karno, misalnya sebuah gerakan wartawan dan aktivis yang mendirikan Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme (BPS). Nama Bung Karno ternyata tak banyak manfaatnya. Di pertengahan Desember 1964, BPS akhirnya dilarang. Sukarno menyetujui tuduhan PKI bahwa gerakan ini dibentuk untuk membunuhnya dan mematikan ide-idenya. Para pendukungnya diinterogasi. Beberapa bulan kemudian, 21 surat kabar yang mendukungnya dibredel.

Di kampus, mahasiswa dari Central Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (CGMI), organisasi mahasiswa yang berafiliasi dengan PKI, mengerahkan aksi mendesak agar Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), organisasi mahasiswa Islam terbesar, dibubarkan. HMI berhasil bertahan. Ketegangan di kampus-kampus ini berlangsung kurang lebih

sama dengan apa yang di luarnya. Demonstrasi dan pernyataan anti-Barat, khususnya Inggris dan Amerika makin bertambah seru. Ketika September 1963, begitu Malaysia terbentuk, beberapa ribu orang membakar Kedutaan Besar Inggris di seberang Hotel Indonesia. Rombongan lain mendatangi rumah warga Inggris, menyuruh mereka keluar dan membakar barang-barang mereka di jalan. Setahun kemudian, pemerintah Indonesia menutup kantor British Council dan cabang-cabangnya.

Di pekan pertama Mei 1964, 16 organisasi yang mewakili buruh, pemuda, wanita, dan orang film, mulai melancarkan boikot terhadap film Amerika. Menjelang akhir Juni, para pemain band “Koes Bersaudara” ditahan oleh Kejaksaan, karena menyanyikan lagu-lagu The Beatles. Di pertengahan Juli 1964, Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Prijono menginstruksikan agar murid sekolah tidak memanggil ayah mereka “pappie” atau “daddy,” ibu mereka “mammie” atau “mummy.” Pada kuartal pertama 1965, lima perpustakaan United States Information Service (USIS) dirusak, dan pemuda-pemuda Amerika yang ikut dalam Peace Corps – antara lain datang untuk jadi pelatih atletik – diusir.



SOPHIE SARWONO

Tergerak melibat kerja keras dr. Hoeroestiati Soebandrio (libat balaman 108), kawan dekatnya, Sophie Sarwono memulai aktivitasnya di dunia KB. Saat itu, di akhir 1950-an, titian menuju program KB masih harus dilalui dengan hati-hati. Sophie Sarwono masih ingat bagaimana Presiden Sukarno menentang gagasan pengendalian angka kelahiran di depan para tamu negara di Istana Bogor. Perempuan berusia 81 tahun yang pernah menjadi ketua PKBI ini punya beragam cerita tentang masa-masa awal program KB.

Selama di PKBI, selalu saya tekankan bahwa apapun yang secara politis dianggap “tidak benar” soal Soebandrio, suami Hoeroestiati, sebagai orang pemerintah, tapi kita mesti ingat bahwa yang telah membantu KB – yang disebut program kependudukan itu – adalah Hoeroestiati Soebandrio. Dalam semua keputusannya PKBI, namanya selalu disebut dengan penuh apresiasi dan rasa terima kasih. Dalam kedudukannya yang cukup tinggi ia memasukkan secara gelap kantong diplomatik, yang di dalamnya terdapat kondom, loops, dan diafragma. Waktu itu ada Klinik Ibu dan Anak yang didirikan pemerintah untuk perlindungan ibu. Klinik ini digunakan Hoeroestiati untuk menyalurkan kontrasepsi karena aman.

Hoeroestiati saat itu tidak bisa melakukannya dengan bebas karena Sukarno tidak setuju. Tiap ada tamu dari luar negeri, Sukarno memperkenalkan istri residen, istri kepala polisi, semualah, pada tamunya. Dan dia berkata, “Lihat Ibu ini, dia punya anak 12, lihat bagaimana rupanya.”

Para tamu negara bilang, “Wah, cantik sekali. Berapa anak Ibu?”

Hoeroestiati menjawab malu-malu, “Duabelas.”

Sukarno meneruskan, “Duabelas!

Lihat! Kita di Indonesia tidak perlu mengendalikan kelahiran seperti di negara Anda karena perempuan kami makin cantik dengan makin banyak bayi!”

Salah satu sebab mengapa KB di Indonesia tidak sampai dianggap subversif karena Hoeroestiati bisa main mata, bisa tari lenso – dan Dr. Soebandrio adalah “the King of Jive.” Hoeroestiati menari dan tertawa bersama Sukarno. Dia bisa mempesona Sukarno, bukan untuk menerima tapi setidaknya, tak melarang sama sekali.

Selain itu ada dr. Suharto yang membantu melahirkan anak-anak Sukarno.

Dia masih paman saya. Sebelum dia meninggal, saya tanya apakah dia pernah cerita soal KB pada Sukarno. Dia katakan, “Tidak, justru karena aku kenal Sukarno, jangan cerita apa-apa sama dia. Kalau kita cerita apa-apa dia akan merasa dipaksa – dan satu hal yang tidak bisa dilakukan adalah memaksa Sukarno.” Alhamdulillah, dalam KB semua punya kearifan untuk



Sophie Sarwono di Jakarta, 1979.

tidak memaksanya. Kalau tidak dilakukan dengan bijaksana, bahkan BKKBN mungkin tidak akan berdiri karena Presiden Suharto akan mewarisi suasana ini – tapi untungnya Suharto mewarisi keadaan di mana ada *birth control*, walau tidak dianjurkan tapi ditoleransi.

Dari awal, saat program KB di Indonesia masih baru dan orang mudah dibiasakan pada hal-hal baru, seharusnya warga dibiasakan membeli kontrasepsi dengan harga murah. Sehingga ketika mereka membeli kontrasepsi sudah seperti membeli odol kalau mau gosok gigi atau beli sabun

kalau mau mandi dan mencuci.

Kami katakan, tak perlu gratis – hanya murah saja, tapi jual. Tidak, mereka bilang, prinsipnya harus gratis. Sekarang lihat hasilnya. Karena tidak ada dana untuk memberi gratis, orang tidak mau beli. Bukan tidak ada uang, tapi memang tidak mau beli. Dulu gratis bertahun-tahun, kok sekarang disuruh beli? Kemarin saya baca bahwa BKKBN dapat 100 milyar. Itu tidak cukup! Warga tak dibiasakan untuk membeli walau dengan murah – apapun alasan BKKBN untuk memberi gratis, itu adalah sebuah kesalahan.

Kesadaran orang sudah ada tapi terbatas antara yang sudah terdidik – saya tidak bilang intelektual, karena sudah lebih ke bawah. Dibanding saat kita baru mulai, antara 1966 dan 1970, sekarang sudah ada kesadaran. Justru sekarang akan timbul frustrasi karena mereka sudah tahu dan merasa perlunya kontrasepsi, tapi tidak bisa membeli karena tidak biasa membeli. Ini yang sudah terdidik. Tapi bagaimana yang di bawah sekali? Padahal yang di bawah sekali itulah yang perlu.

Awalnya BKKBN sebetulnya hanya badan koordinasi, dan kita semua unit.

Di antaranya; PKBI, Muhammadiyah, organisasi Kristen, Departemen Kesehatan, Departemen Sosial, dan semua yang berhubungan dengan kependudukan jadi unit pelaksana program. Badan koordinasi hanya mengkoordinasikan, termasuk mengkoordinasikan dana kalau ada. Tapi lama-kelamaan BKKBN mau mengelola proyek yang didanai luar negeri. Karena itu mereka mengambil alih pelatihan, mungkin karena dana pelatihan besar. Padahal kami di PKBI punya tempat dan pengalaman. Banyak ide kita diambil, tapi tak pernah diakui.



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RUMPANG YANG SINGKAT

Apa kesamaan John Maynard Keynes, The Beatles, dan Koes Bersaudara? Semua masuk dalam daftar hal-hal yang tidak disenangi Presiden Sukarno. Suatu saat, Pemimpin Besar Revolusi ini mengeluh, “Anak-anak muda ini hanya bisa bicara [Joseph] Schumpeter dan Keynes. Waktu muda saya baca Marx!” Maka The Beatles dan Koes Bersaudara pun dimasukkan dalam kategori musik “ngak-ngik-ngok” yang terlarang itu, yang jadi contoh dekadensi Barat.

Awal 1960-an merupakan era jahar, aniaya, siaga, dan pidato-pidato penuh kecaman. Politik hanya berkisar seputar Istana Negara, tempat Sukarno bergulat mempertahankan koalisinya dengan komunis, Islam, dan militer. Sementara itu, hubungan Amerika Serikat-Indonesia semakin memburuk, dipicu oleh keterlibatan CIA dalam pemberontakan di Sumatera serta penolakan Amerika mendukung kampanye Sukarno terhadap pembentukan negara baru, Malaysia. Setelah pembakaran kedutaan Inggris pada 1963, Amerika menahan beberapa bantuan mereka sampai perselisihan dengan Malaysia reda. Dalam pidatonya yang terkenal, Sukarno berkata, “Go to hell with your aid!”

Pada 1962, Orville Schell, Jr., yang belakangan jadi dekan Graduate School of Journalism di Berkeley dan penulis buku klasik *Mandate of Heaven: The Legacy of Tiananmen Square*, magang di kantor Ford Foundation Jakarta. Ia terpesona pada Partai Komunis Indonesia. Tak lama, ia berteman dengan seorang yang menyebut diri “Kamerad Nata,” dan melaluinya ia coba selami gerak partai ini di pedesaan. Usaha Schell kandas; dalam sebuah rekayasa ia dan teman-temannya dituduh mata-mata Amerika yang menggunakan Ford Foundation sebagai kedok. Kwatir kantor mereka ditutup, wakil Ford Foundation di Indonesia, Frank Miller, segera memulangkan Schell ke Amerika.

Pertengahan 1964, hal yang sama terulang lagi, ketika Menteri Luar Negeri Soebandrio memberlakukan larangan belajar ke Amerika.

Ford Foundation, tentu saja, terpukul. Miller pun mendatangi Sukarno, saat Sukarno sarapan pagi; ia katakan bahwa tujuan Ford Foundation adalah “memungkinkan orang Indonesia melakukan apa yang Anda sendiri sering katakan penting – berdiri di atas kaki sendiri.” Sukarno, yang menyukai Miller secara pribadi, akhirnya mengizinkan semua penerima beasiswa pergi ke Amerika sebagai “perkecualian.”

Akhir 1964, aksi kaum komunis makin merajalela. *United States Information Service* (USIS) ditutup, *Peace Corps* hengkang. Sukarno



Frank Miller, 1972.

pun bereaksi berlebih. Ketika Malaysia terpilih menjadi anggota Dewan Keamanan PBB, ia mengumumkan bahwa Indonesia akan keluar dari organisasi tersebut. Dan jadilah: Malaysia masuk, Indonesia keluar. Di tengah eksodus pejabat-pejabat internasional dari Jakarta, Ford Foundation satu-satunya yang bergeming.

Meski sering mendapat serangan, Ford Foundation toh tak jadi sasaran politik kaum kiri. Status dan percaya dirinya sebagai sebuah lembaga donor swasta seakan melindunginya. Stafnya pun tetap teguh: “Semakin berat tugas kami, semakin kuat tekad kami bertahan,” kenang John Bresnan.

Bagaimanapun, New York tak sendirian,

terutama setelah Maret 1965, ketika kota Malang, Jawa Timur, penuh sesak oleh demonstrasi. Yang ditentang: kehadiran tenaga pengajar dari State University of New York (SUNY) di IKIP Malang, yang dibiayai Ford Foundation. Universitas kemudian memutuskan untuk mengeluarkan mereka atas dasar hubungan program itu “dengan pemerintah Amerika.” Segala milik SUNY pun diambil alih. Setelah pejabat eksekutif Ford Foundation George Gant diberitahu tentang keadaan ini, Frank Miller – yang tadinya dijadwalkan pulang ke New York hanya dalam beberapa bulan – ketiban tugas baru: menutup kantor Ford Foundation di Indonesia.

Bresnan menggambarkan Miller sebagai orang yang “perasaannya untuk Indonesia dan orang Indonesia sangatlah dalam.” Dengan biaya sendiri Miller terbang ke New York untuk mencoba mengubah keputusan manajemen. Gagal total, seperti telah diperkirakan, ia lalu kembali untuk memastikan dukungan Sukarno dalam menjamin keamanan karyawan Ford Foundation. Dengan demikian, mulailah tugas-tugas yang pedih: mendermakan gedung kantor, rumah, kendaraan, dan milik mereka lainnya; memberikan uang pesangon pada pegawai-pegawai lokal; mengatur hidup baru.

Proses ini lebih dari sekadar penanggalan kepemilikan. Saat itu, banyak tentara Indonesia menduduki rumah-rumah dan bangunan-bangunan yang telah ditinggalkan para ekspatriat. Ford Foundation tak urung membiarkan hal ini: sebanyak mungkin dari milik mereka diberikan kepada institusi-institusi sosial. Salah satu gedung, misalnya, diberikan ke Yayasan Asih Budi, sekolah untuk anak-anak yang terganggu mentalnya.

Akhirnya, Ford Foundation memang dibuka kembali pada 1967, di bawah kepemimpinan Miller. “Frank memang mendapat tugas yang tidak mengenakan ketika harus menutupnya,” kenang David Bell, seorang pejabat eksekutif Ford Foundation, “Oleh karena itulah ia layak mendapat tugas yang menyenangkan: membukanya kembali.”



▲ G30S: pemakaman para jenderal, Oktober 1965

Bulan Agustus 1965, sebanyak 22.000 buku produksi Amerika dan 250 piringan hitam The Beatles dibakar di halaman kantor polisi Jakarta.

Pada masa itu pula, hal-hal yang lebih gegap gempita terjadi. Akhir Maret 1964, Bung Karno menyerukan slogan “*Go to hell with your aid!*” Meskipun kalimat itu pada mulanya tersimpan di antara kata-kata bahwa Indonesia bersedia “menerima bantuan dari banyak negara,” namun menolak “bantuan yang disertai ikatan politik.” Di akhir tahun itu pula, ketika Malaysia diterima sebagai anggota Dewan Keamanan PBB, Indonesia menyatakan keluar dari organisasi dunia itu.

Dasawarsa yang gaduh, keras, bergelora, tak mengenal kompromi ini juga tahun-tahun yang kehilangan kesabaran untuk negosiasi. Ketika pada pagi dini hari 1 Oktober 1965 enam orang jenderal dan seorang perwira menengah Angkatan Darat diambil dari rumah mereka dan ditembak mati, kekerasan dengan cepat berangkat menuju klimaks. Dari peristiwa itulah kemudian PKI dituduh terlibat, dan kali ini, partai yang paling dominan di sepanjang dasawarsa ini mengalami apa yang telah jadi pola politik selama itu: mobilisasi massa, pengganyangan, dan represi.

Tapi kali ini, kombinasi antara dendam, ketakutan, konflik-konflik lokal, dan rencana politik yang brutal, melahirkan pembantaian. Diperkirakan antara 300.000 sampai dua juta orang yang jadi anggota PKI atau pendukungnya dibinasakan – termasuk pembunuhan terburuk di abad ke-20.

Tapi jelas bahwa AS bergembira dengan perubahan yang

terjadi di Indonesia. Meskipun demikian, seperti ketika orang-orang Ford Foundation datang ke Indonesia di awal 1950-an, antusiasme itu direm dengan sikap ingin peka terhadap perasaan dan kenyataan Indonesia. Yang dipilih adalah “profil merendah,” sebagaimana dikatakan para diplomat senior di bawah Duta Besar AS Marshall Green. Itu berarti bantuan akan disalurkan melalui lembaga multilateral, dan program-program AS dijaga “agar tetap sederhana” dan tanpa “tenaga yang berkelimpahan.” Terutama karena pemerintahan yang baru, setelah Mayor Jenderal Suharto muncul dari kegalauan dan kekerasan yang terjadi, masih dirundung ketidakpastian.

Menyebut diri “Orde Baru,” pemerintahan baru itu dibangun dari ketakutan dan pengharapan. Yang dihadapi adalah kekacauan bangunan politik, dan karena Sukarno abai dalam mengelola ekonomi, inflasi yang mencapai seribu persen di tahun 1965 dan utang internasional yang \$2 milyar. Suharto harus lolos dari kegawatan ini. Ia selalu takut bahwa komunisme akan kembali. Itu sebabnya ia waspada – juga terhadap kenyataan bahwa Indonesia menghadapi dua soal dasar yang telah ikut menggerogoti negeri ini sebelumnya: penduduk yang tumbuh pesat dan pangan yang tak memadai.

Mula-mula was-was, tapi lambat laun makin percaya diri, Suharto akhirnya melihat bahwa ia orang yang tepat untuk itu. Lahir dari kemiskinan, ia pelan-pelan naik ke pucuk kekuasaan dan, seperti ditulis dalam biografinya, “Saya menjadi seseorang yang berpikir, yang mempunyai perasaan karena pernah menderita.”

**BAB TIGA:
MALARI, MINYAK, DAN
MAHBUB UL-HAQ**





B A B T I G A

MALARI, MINYAK, DAN MAHBUB UL-HAQ

Sisa-sisa api seakan-akan hendak bersembunyi, tapi asap masih membubung. Di sana-sini tergeletak bangkai 900 sekian buah kendaraan, bangkai hampir 150 gedung; semuanya dibakar atau kena gempur. Jalan sepi. Lewat pukul 19:00 jam malam diberlakukan. Deretan mobil berlapis baja siap. Truk-truk militer menurunkan tentara berpakaian tempur.

Revolusi? Protes? Kudeta? Provokasi? Hingga hari ini, tak jelas apa sebenarnya yang terjadi pada tanggal 15 Januari 1974 itu. Yang pasti sekitar 50.000 orang turun ke jalan-jalan raya Jakarta, seakan-akan mengamuk, membakar mobil dan motor, dan kemudian juga membumihanguskan gedung-gedung, di antaranya Gedung Astra dan Proyek Pertokoan Senen yang baru. Belum pernah kota ini mengalami kerusuhan seperti itu.

Pers pemerintah kemudian menyebutnya “Malari,” singkatan untuk “Malapetaka Limabelas Januari” – mungkin dengan harapan, melalui akronim, sebuah kampanye bisa dilancarkan, dan sebuah stigma bisa diletakkan kepada musuh-musuh politik yang mengancam. Tapi siapa musuh politik itu?

Ribuan mahasiswa tiga universitas di Jakarta turun ke jalan. Mereka tak menyatakan akan menggulingkan pemerintah, tak menuntut Suharto turun. Mereka menentang kedatangan Perdana Menteri Jepang Kakuei Tanaka, sebagai tanda kemarahan mereka terhadap modal asing, terutama dari Jepang. Kemudian ternyata kedatangan Tanaka memang bukan sebuah unsur yang penting dalam cerita ini. Ada hal lain yang berlangsung.

◀ *Para mahasiswa berdemo depan Pasar Senen, Januari 1974.*




Para pemimpin mahasiswa sendiri tak menduga bahwa hari itu ribuan massa yang tak mereka kenal mendadak ikut arak-arakan di jalan. Dari kelompok inilah perusakan besar-besaran bermula. Siapa dan dari mana mereka datang sampai hari ini masih belum sepenuhnya diungkapkan. Tapi kian lama kian jelas bahwa bersama – atau mungkin malah mendahului – peristiwa itu, ada sebuah persaingan yang sengit tapi tertutup di tingkat atas bangunan politik Indonesia.

Dua orang di dekat Presiden Suharto sedang memperebutkan pengaruh dan posisi: Jenderal Sumitro yang mengepalai badan keamanan Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) dan Letnan Jenderal Ali Moertopo, ketua Operasi Khusus (Opsus) dan seorang asisten pribadi yang dipercaya Presiden Suharto. Keduanya ambisius. Mereka ingin saling menyingkirkan dan mengambil alih ruang kekuasaan di dekat Suharto – dan mungkin sesudahnya. Untuk itu bermacam cara mereka tempuh.

Beberapa kesaksian kemudian menyebutkan bahwa di tengah-tengah demonstrasi mahasiswa hari itu, ada provokasi

yang menjerumuskan protes anti-Jepang itu jadi kerusuhan dan kekerasan. Sadar akan bahaya ini, menjelang sore, mahasiswa mengundurkan diri ke dalam kampus UI di Salemba No. 4. Tapi huru-hara dan pembakaran tak bisa mereka cegah. Tak ada yang tampaknya bisa mencegah. Dan Jenderal Sumitro dianggap gagal mengendalikan situasi dan dicopot oleh Presiden. Dia kalah.

Dua hari kemudian, sejumlah orang ditangkap. Dalam daftar tahanan ada Hariman Siregar, ketua Dewan Mahasiswa UI; Adnan Buyung Nasution, yang perannya sebagai juri yang kritis makin kentara dalam Lembaga Bantuan Hukum; Syahrir, seorang pemimpin grup diskusi mahasiswa di UI; dan juga Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, seorang dosen muda di FEUI. Juga dipenjarakan Marsillam Simanjuntak, salah satu tokoh mahasiswa dalam aksi-aksi tahun 1966 yang menjatuhkan Bung Karno, dan Rahman Tolleng, pemimpin redaksi *Suara Karya*, harian dari Golongan Karya (Golkar) yang dicurigai sebagai simpatisan PSI. Sementara itu Soedjatmoko, cendekiawan Indonesia terkemuka dan bekas duta besar untuk Amerika Serikat, diinterogasi.



▲ Jenderal Sumitro bicara dengan mahasiswa, 1974.
◀ Satu dari sekian banyak mahasiswa yang ditangkap sesudah huru-hara Malari, 1974.



▲ Penulis Marzuki Arifin bersama wartawan Fikri Jufri, 1984.

Segera keterangan diberikan – meskipun sebenarnya malah tidak jelas. Laksamana Sudomo, yang menggantikan Jenderal Sumitro sebagai Panglima Kopkamtib, menuduh kaum “sosialis radikal” sebagai penggerak kerusuhan Malari, dan otaknya adalah anggota partai terlarang.

Siapa? Ia tak menyebutnya. Tapi kemudian terbit sebuah buku saku yang dicetak dengan kertas berkualitas tinggi, berjudul *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974*. Ditulis oleh Marzuki Arifin, seorang yang dekat dengan kalangan Opsus yang dipimpin Ali Moertopo, buku itu memaparkan bahwa PSI dan Masyumi-lah “dalang” kerusuhan. Editorial *Monthly Review* yang diterbitkan CSIS – lembaga kajian yang juga didirikan Ali Moertopo – ikut meneguhkan tuduhan ini. *Review* menyebut “bekas anggota PSI dan Masyumi” sebagai orang-orang yang menghasut mahasiswa dan memanfaatkan mereka.

Memang ganjil bahwa kali ini terdengar lagi bahasa yang dipergunakan PKI dalam mendesak lawan-lawan politiknya, dengan cara menempelkan stigma PSI dan Masyumi ke punggung mereka. Tapi *innuendo* memang telah jadi bagian dari intimidasi. Setelah itu: represi.

Dan itulah yang terjadi. Sejarah seakan-akan berulang. Seperti di masa tahun 1960-an – meskipun dengan pandangan politik pemerintah yang sudah berbalik 180 derajat – koran-koran ditutup. Termasuk *Pedoman*, *Indonesia Raya*, *Abadi*, *Nusantara*, surat kabar yang dikenal sebagai pers yang dilarang pemerintah Sukarno. Juga *Harian Kami*, koran yang lahir bersama gerakan mahasiswa 1966.

Memang tak mudah untuk menghubungkan PSI, Masyumi, dan koran-koran itu dengan kaum “sosialis radikal” yang disebut Laksamana Sudomo. Namun memang sudah beberapa lama sebelum 15 Januari 1974, di kancah perdebatan Indonesia terdengar kembali suara-suara yang memanggil sesuatu yang hidup dalam pemikiran kiri, yakni etos pemerataan. Etos itu memang terasa hilang di tahun 1970-an.

Ini memang sebuah dekade yang bisa menyesatkan. Perekonomian tak hanya tumbuh; ia mulai melaju. Desa-desa tambah makmur, terutama di Jawa – meskipun dengan kenaikan pendapatan per kapita yang lebih pelan ketimbang kota besar. Tapi seperti dalam banyak cerita tentang pertumbuhan, ada rasa sakit yang tak selamanya dimengerti.

Syabrir dikenal sebagai ekonom-cum-politikus. Dia mendirikan Partai Perbimpunan Indonesia Baru dan punya cita-cita jadi presiden Indonesia. Pada 1974 Syabrir seorang aktivis dan asisten dosen FEUI. Dia dibukum kejahatan subversi dalam buru-hara 15 Januari 1974 di mana banyak barang-barang Jepang, maupun toko-toko milik warga Indonesia yang menjual produk Jepang, dirusak atau dibakar. Syabrir mendekam di penjara selama empat tahun.

Pada awal 1974, saya tak berpikir ada peristiwa Malari karena sudah bersiap-siap berangkat ke Amerika Serikat. Saya diterima di Harvard sebagai mahasiswa pascasarjana di Kennedy School of Government. Saya seharusnya berangkat Juli tapi malah ditangkap, diadili, dan dipenjara selama hampir empat tahun. Tapi bagusnya Harvard dan Ford Foundation, yang membiayai program saya, tetap memberi kesempatan untuk saya. Saya keluar dari penjara akhir 1977, menikah dan pergi ke Cambridge, kuliah di Harvard. Mula-mula saya ambil program dua tahun, lalu diterima untuk program Ph.D. dan selesai pada 1983. Saya tidak membayangkan peristiwa Malari itu terjadi.

Menurut jaksa dan hakim tuduhan terhadap saya subversi. Saya dikatakan bersalah karena membangkitkan atau menyulut mahasiswa untuk bergerak. Ceramah-ceramah itu dilakukan pada masa-masa sebelum peristiwa Malari. Isinya ya kritik terhadap strategi pembangunan pemerintah. Ceramah itu dinilai mempunyai pengaruh dalam menggerakkan mahasiswa sehingga meletuslah peristiwa Malari.

Saya tidak tahu siapa yang punya ide menangkap saya tapi peranan dua jenderal, Ali Moertopo dan Sudjono Humardani, saat itu sangat besar terhadap penahanan kawan-kawan dan saya.

Mengapa Malari terjadi hingga kini belum seluruhnya terungkap tapi semua

orang tahu saat itu ada dugaan isu “pola kepemimpinan baru,” yang dikeluarkan Jenderal Sumitro, dan ditanggapi Ali Moertopo. Terjadilah konflik antara mereka. Suasananya memang mendukung. Ada ketidakpuasan. Dengan mahasiswa bergerak, mahasiswa menciptakan *killing ground*. Adanya *killing ground* membuat Ali



Syabrir di Jakarta, 1970.

Moertopo bisa menangkap semua orang sekaligus menyalahkan atau bisa membuat orang seperti Sumitro sebagai orang yang dianggap bertanggungjawab terhadap munculnya keresahan. Maka hilang pula peranan Sumitro dalam politik Indonesia. Itu disebut skenario dan sampai di mana benar tidaknya skenario itu masih belum sepenuhnya pasti.

Saat kerusuhan terjadi pembakaran dan pengrusakan. Dalam penjara baru kami tahu kalau ada tiga kelompok orang tahanan.

Kelompok pertama, disebut, istilah intelnnya, *kembang sepatu*. Ini orang-orang yang ada hubungan dengan Sudjono Humardhani. Kelompok kedua disebut *gladak*, antara lain Mardanus, yang dikenal sebagai tokoh nasionalis. Pengelompokan ketiga namanya *kelinci*. Alasan pengelompokan ini tentu ada tapi saya menduga-duga terkait dengan pembakaran. Pelaku pembakaran itu terbukti dalam sidang-sidang pengadilan. Ada tiga orang yang terbukti membakar tapi tak ada satu bukti pun bahwa pembakaran itu dilakukan mahasiswa. Dugaan saya Kembang Sepatu ikut dalam pembakaran. Tapi kelompok Kelinci yang dikorbankan. Semua orang yang diadili itu tak termasuk dalam kelompok kembang sepatu dan kelompok *gladak*.

Ketika bebas, Harvard menunggu saya, tapi yang berperan disitu adalah almarhum Soedjatmoko – seorang cendekiawan, mantan duta besar Indonesia untuk Washington, anggota dewan penyantun Ford Foundation, yang juga sempat diinterogasi dalam peristiwa Malari. Soedjatmoko membantu saya untuk mendapatkan beasiswa dari Ford Foundation. Dia juga membantu saya untuk melamar di beberapa universitas lain. Tapi saya maunya ke Harvard karena gagah saja. Kedua anak saya lahir di Boston. Istri saya sebenarnya diterima di Cornell tapi karena keduanya jauh untuk keluarga, maka dia kuliah di Boston University, dan mendapatkan Ph.D. yang sebagian juga dibiayai oleh Ford Foundation.

MASYARAKAT SIPIL DAN NEGARA: KAMPANYE KELUARGA BERENCANA

Jika ada penghargaan untuk pahlawan yang tak diakui, ini nominasinya: Hoeroestiati Soebandrio. Ia cerdas, berpandangan maju, seorang dokter profesional. Ia istri Soebandrio, menteri luar negeri Indonesia – orang yang begitu berkuasa pada zaman Orde Lama. Kunjungan luar negeri, acara makan malam diplomatik, menari lenso di Istana Negara: kesemuanya bagian kesehari-hariannya. Tapi, di saat-saat bersendiri, Hoeroestiati menyelundupkan kondom, spiral, dan diafragma ke Indonesia. Bersama para dokter, ginekolog, perawat dan sukarelawan perempuan, ia menyebarkan penggunaan alat kontrasepsi kepada perempuan di seluruh Indonesia. Tahun 1957, lahirlah PKBI.

Ford Foundation cepat menyadari nilai strategis PKBI. Bahkan sebelum pemerintah Orde Baru mendukung program KB, Ford Foundation telah secara “diam-diam” membantu PKBI mendatangkan Dr. Brooks Ryder, seorang ahli KB.

PKBI sebuah gerakan masyarakat pertama yang menunjukkan pentingnya hubungan KB dengan kesehatan reproduksi perempuan. Gerakan ini bukan saja tantangan bagi pemerintah, tapi juga bukti bahwa aksi masyarakat juga bisa efektif. Yang dilakukan: membangun jaringan kerja politik, memupuk kerja sama dengan para lembaga donor internasional dan organisasi nonpemerintah, seperti Margaret Sanger Institute, yang namanya sesuai dengan tokoh pemrakarsa penggunaan pil KB yang pernah mengunjungi Indonesia.

Dukungan Gubernur Jakarta Ali Sadikin mendorong perubahan yang cepat dan intensif. Bang Ali dikenal dengan kobaran semangatnya, keberanian politiknya, komitmennya untuk beraksi: ia segera mengesahkan dua proyek percobaan dan melancarkan kampanye KB besar-besaran di Jakarta. Sementara, pada September 1967, Ford Foundation memperbarui dukungannya kepada PKBI: masa bakti Dr. Brooks Ryder dilanjutkan, peran PKBI dalam program KB nasional masa depan diperjelas. Bantuan ini termasuk gedung untuk markas PKBI,

lokakarya, pelatihan untuk para penyuluh program KB, dan penyediaan informasi untuk para pembentuk opini.

Secara mengejutkan, kampanye ini sukses dengan pesat. Pada 1967, Presiden Suharto menandatangani Deklarasi Kependudukan PBB. Proyek percobaan di Jakarta meluas ke program Keluarga Berencana Nasional setahun kemudian. Pada 1970, gerakan KB berpuncak pada dibentuknya BKKBN.

Sukses disebabkan beberapa hal. Pertama, gerakan ini mempunyai banyak sahabat yang kuat dan berpengaruh. Banyak “kerja kotor”



Klinik Keluarga Berencana di Jakarta Selatan, 1969.

telah dilakukan oleh organisasi macam PKBI (yang aliansi institusionalnya dengan Federasi Keluarga Berencana Internasional) semakin memperkuat kredibilitasnya. Dan, tak kalah penting, kampanye didukung oleh sikap progresif yang telah berkembang dalam masyarakat – penting, mengingat bahwa hanya beberapa tahun sebelumnya, para pemimpin negeri ini kencang menentang KB.

Mulanya, BKKBN hanya dimaksudkan sebagai badan koordinasi berbagai unit kesehatan yang dijalankan oleh berbagai organisasi swasta seperti PKBI. Namun, pada 1976, di Jawa dan Bali saja jumlah klinik telah

membengkak dari 116 ke 2.700. PKBI kemudian hanya menjadi unit pelaksana, atau satu dari badan-badan yang ada.

Tentu, ada ketidakpuasan. “Klinik PKBI sering harus melayani klien KB yang mengalami kegagalan kontrasepsi karena BKKBN tak mau bertanggungjawab menangani kehamilan tak diinginkan,” kata Ninuk Widyantoro, yang turut merintis jaringan Wisma Panca Warga dari PKBI. Ford Foundation punya andil besar dalam mengembangkan wisma ini di 10 kota besar Indonesia. “Tapi, warga mulai datang ke wisma kami yang melengkapi KB dengan *counseling*. Mereka tak keberatan membayar lebih mahal untuk mendapat layanan medis yang dilengkapi dengan informasi dan *counseling* yang membuat mereka mantap dalam mengambil keputusan.”

Apapun kritiknya, program nasional KB ini mempunyai bobot dan jangkauan yang hanya dapat dihadirkan oleh sebuah aparatus negara. Di Bali, misalnya – yang dalam lima tahun angka kelahiran rata-ratanya berkurang dari 5,8 menjadi 3,8 – para kepala keluarga di desa bertemu dan berdiskusi setiap bulan, dengan KB sebagai topik tetapnya. Dalam ruang pertemuan, tergantung peta yang memuat semua rumah di desa tersebut. Rumah yang menggunakan IUD ditandai warna biru, yang menggunakan pil ditandai warna merah, yang menggunakan kondom ditandai warna hijau, dan yang tak menggunakan apa-apa dibiarkan kosong. Politikanya cukup cerdas: warna merah, misalnya, yang dianggap tidak menguntungkan dalam Indonesia yang antikomunis, adalah sebuah desakan halus ke arah IUD yang lebih murah dan efektif.

Di Jawa Timur, program KB juga berjalan lancar. Di tangan sebuah pemerintah daerah yang otoriter, perekrutan anggota baru kerap dilaksanakan secara spektakuler, tak jarang dengan bantuan tentara. Di beberapa desa, kepala desa memukul gong kayu sekali sehari untuk mengingatkan para ibu untuk minum pil. Hasilnya? Dari 4,6 anak setiap ibu pada 1971 menjadi 3,9 pada 1976.



▲ Menjelaskan kegunaan spiral pada seorang ibu muda di sebuah klinik KB di Jakarta Selatan, 1969.

▼ Soewardjono (duduk kanan) dan Haryono Suyono (berdiri kiri) di sebuah pertemuan KB di Jakarta, 1975.







 **Yapat RT/RW se DCI DJAKARTA** **24 April '71**
di ISTORA-SENAJAN **djam 08.30**



Pada akhir 1960-an, Indonesia terdampar dalam keadaan ekonomi yang hampir tak bisa bergerak. Satu-satunya jalan keluar ialah membuat perdagangan dan investasi lebih leluasa bergerak. Karena pemodal di dalam negeri tak memadai, modal asing diundang, dengan kemudahan yang memikat.

Mereka pun masuk dengan cepat. Di sekitar pertengahan 1970-an, 50 persen dari seluruh investasi di luar perminyakan datang dari luar negeri. Pelbagai barang konsumsi dan alat produksi mulai bermunculan, dimeriahkan oleh iklan dan reklame. Wajah kota-kota Indonesia, terutama Jakarta, dengan segera berubah – terutama karena barang-barang Jepang.

Dana dari Jepang memang datang dalam jumlah yang impresif: sepertiga dari seluruh jumlah bantuan pelbagai negara yang tergabung dalam Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). Bantuan itu dipergunakan oleh Jepang untuk juga memperluas pasar bagi produksinya. Dari sini berdatangan merek Toyota, Hitachi, Honda, Mitsui, Marubeni, dan entah apa lagi ke hampir tiap sudut.

Bahkan karena meningkatnya upah buruh dan harga tanah di Jepang, mulai ada dorongan dari sana untuk memindahkan pabrik ke Asia Tenggara. Tak mengherankan bila orang Jepang tampak muncul di mana-mana – di kantor-kantor dagang, bank,

industri, dan tentu saja di lapangan golf. Investasi mereka di Indonesia memang meningkat dengan cepat; di akhir 1973 sembilan kali besarnya dari investasi di Filipina.

Kehadiran Jepang itu, meskipun memeriahkan perekonomian Indonesia dan membuka lapangan kerja, tak selamanya menyenangkan. Dalam salah satu ulasan tentang investasi Jepang di Asia Tenggara, pakar ekonomi Panglaykim dari CSIS menyebut bahwa dalam bermitra dengan Jepang, pihak Indonesia “tak punya pilihan lain kecuali menyerahkan semua kekuasaan manajemen dan organisasi kepada pihak Jepang.”

Tapi lebih merasa tersisih adalah orang bisnis Indonesia yang tidak diajak dalam *partnership*: mereka yang secara politis disebut sebagai “pribumi.” Meskipun dalam persentase mereka jauh lebih besar jumlahnya, tapi seorang pejabat Kedutaan Besar Jepang pernah menyebut bahwa hanya sekitar 30 persen dari mitra bisnis Jepang datang dari kalangan pribumi.

Sisanya, sebagian terbesar, adalah pengusaha Tionghoa, yang memang lebih berpengalaman. Sementara itu pribumi yang berpengalaman dalam industri modern – dalam hal ini tekstil – justru nyaris punah. Mereka sudah anjlok nasibnya sejak keambrokan ekonomi di tahun-tahun terakhir pemerintah Sukarno, tapi di bawah Orde Baru nasib mereka tak menjadi



▲ Pemandangan yang lazim di seluruh Indonesia sejak 1970-an: penjualan sepeda motor bermerek Jepang, 1974.
 ◀ Gubernur Jakarta Ali Sadikin berpidato depan para pengurus RT dan RW seluruh Jakarta pada pemilihan umum 1971.

IBRAHIM ALFIAN

Ibrahim Alfian kini ketua bidang Ilmu-ilmu Humaniora Pascasarjana UGM. Pada 1975-1977 Alfian jadi direktur Pusat Latihan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial di Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh, program pelatihan ilmuwan yang diusulkan Clifford Geertz dari Princeton University dan didanai Ford Foundation. Ibrahim Alfian direktur kedua menggantikan Dr Alfian. Program ini senantiasa dipimpin dua orang doktor. Satu orang Indonesia dan satunya orang asing. Kolega Ibrahim Alfian saat itu adalah Lance Castles, ilmuwan sosial dari Australia.

Program itu dimulai adik angkat saya, Alfian, pada 1974. Saya menggantikannya pada 1975. Kami kenal lama karena sama-sama riset untuk doktor di Leiden, Belanda. Orang Belanda menyebut kami “de kleine Alfian” dan “de grote Alfian” atau “Alfian kecil” dan “Alfian besar” – karena ukuran badan kami besar dan kecil. Badan saya lebih besar maka disebut “de grote Alfian.” Pada 1977 saya digantikan Syamsuddin Mahmud, ekonom Aceh, yang belakangan jadi gubernur Aceh. Dalam dua tahun itu total ada 24 peserta dalam program kami.

Program itu bagus. Metode pengajaran, biaya penelitian, dan bimbingannya, semua dirancang bagus. Sesudah kuliah, peserta melakukan penelitian di Aceh. Apa taktik saya agar peserta penelitian mudah diterima para camat? Mereka jalan ke daerah-daerah, bukan? Saya punya taktik. Gubernur Aceh Muzakkir Walad biasanya mengundang peserta untuk makan malam. Di sana biasanya disuguhkan tari-tarian Aceh. Ini iklan untuk Aceh karena peserta datang dari Semarang, Bandung, Surabaya, Manado, Banjarmasin, dan sebagainya. Saya minta masing-masing peserta untuk foto dengan gubernur.

Foto ini dibesarkan jadi ukuran 4R dan ditaruh dalam buku catatan para peneliti. Jadi terlihat mencolok. Kalau mereka ke lapangan, tanpa diperlihatkan pun, sudah terlihat foto mereka dengan gubernur. Ini membuat pejabat-pejabat lokal membuka pintu untuk penelitian.

Saat awal program saya biasa bilang,

“Tak ada gadis cantik di Aceh. Tapi tiga bulan di sini, pohon asam pun akan terlihat cantik.” Benar terjadi. Ada peserta yang kejar-kejar perawat, ada yang kejar-kejar mahasiswi Universitas Syiah Kuala, ada juga

harga benar-benar murah. Peserta merasa senang.

Saya bangga bisa ikut mendidik 24 peserta itu. Dari semua pusat pelatihan Indonesia; Aceh, Makassar, Surabaya, dan Jakarta, yang belakangan paling banyak jadi doktor atau profesor adalah mereka yang dilatih di Banda Aceh, di antaranya Mukhlis PaEni (direktur Lembaga Arsip Nasional), Nani Tuloli (rektor Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan Gorontalo), Amir Lutfi (rektor Institut Agama Islam Negeri Pekanbaru), P.J. Suwarno (rektor Universitas Katolik Sanata Dharma, Yogyakarta), Hamid Abdullah (profesor Universitas Diponegoro), Syarif Ibrahim (profesor Pontianak), Durtje Durasit (profesor Banjarmasin), dan sebagainya. Program itu berguna sekali.

Tiap tahun ada pemilihan makalah terbaik. Pada tahun pertama yang terpilih karya P.J. Suwarno dari Yogyakarta. Dia dikirim ke Jakarta bersama peserta terbaik dari Makassar dan sebagainya, untuk ikut seminar dan membicarakan makalahnya. Suwarno orang

Katolik Jawa dan menulis soal ulama di Aceh Utara. Saya heran. Dia pandai membawa diri. Kalau masuk ruang buka sepatu. Jadi ulama-ulama Aceh Utara juga terbuka terhadapnya. Hasilnya, penelitian yang bagus sekali. Dia lantas ambil doktor di UGM, di bawah bimbingan saya dengan disertasi soal Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, dan belakangan jadi rektor Universitas Sanata Dharma.



Ibrahim Alfian dalam sebuah seminar di Yogyakarta, 1983.

yang mengaku belum berkeluarga, padahal sudah beristri.

Pada akhir program, saya bantu peserta membeli barang-barang impor dari Singapura atau Penang. Kala itu, Pelabuhan Sabang bebas. Jadi mereka beli mesin ketik, piring-piring cantik murah, alat elektronik, dan sebagainya untuk dibawa pulang ke kota masing-masing. Petugas bea cukai juga membantu sehingga



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lebih baik. Para perumus kebijakan ekonomi, yang ingin Indonesia lebih terbuka kepada modal asing, secara tak sengaja, membiarkan mereka tergulung.

Dalam keadaan itulah protes mulai diucapkan. November 1973, Ketua IGGI Jan Pieter Pronk berkunjung ke Indonesia. Di pelabuhan udara Kemayoran sekelompok mahasiswa dan pemuda menyambutnya dengan sebundel kembang – tapi juga dengan poster-poster: “Investasi Modal Asing Membuat Kolonialisme Intern,” dan “Indonesia Untuk Indonesia.”

Sebuah pernyataan yang dibacakan sore itu menyebutkan bahwa mereka tak merasa bangga melihat modal asing hanya melahirkan gedung tinggi, hotel, Coca-Cola, dan *nightclub*, sementara rakyat tak punya pekerjaan, rumah, dan tanah. Industri tekstil kami mati, seperti pada pernyataan itu pula. Hutan kami gundul. Minyak kami kering.

Akhir November 1973, sebuah diskusi yang menganalisis kerugian dan keuntungan modal asing diselenggarakan. Penutupnya menghasilkan sebuah manifesto. Para penandatanganinya, antara lain Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Yap Thiam Hien, Mochtar Lubis – mereka yang biasa menyuarakan pendapat kritis kepada

pemerintah – dan juga mantan Wakil Presiden Mohammad Hatta, yang biasa disebut sebagai bapak gerakan koperasi. Manifesto itu berjanji akan mengembalikan kebanggaan nasional yang sebagian telah ternoda oleh “segelintir kelompok sosial.”

Siapa kelompok sosial yang dimaksudkan itu tak begitu jelas. Mungkin para pengusaha Tionghoa. Mungkin para teknokrat yang membuka pintu bagi modal asing seluas-luasnya. Mungkin para jenderal yang punya hubungan dekat dengan bisnis Jepang. Bagaimana pula cara mengembalikan kebanggaan nasional tak diuraikan. Yang terasa waktu itu adalah keinginan perubahan besar. Apa yang terjadi di Thailand sebulan sebelumnya memberi inspirasi langsung pada para aktivis di Jakarta.

Tanggal 14 Oktober 1973, di Bangkok ribuan mahasiswa turun ke jalan sampai beberapa hari. Enam hari kemudian Marsekal Thanom Kittikachorn, perdana menteri Thailand yang berkuasa dengan dukungan militer selama 12 tahun, jatuh.

“Kita akan bikin Jakarta seperti Bangkok,” adalah ucapan yang mulai terdengar di bulan November di kalangan mahasiswa. Dan itulah yang terjadi pada tanggal 15 Januari 1974.



▲ Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, Mochtar Lubis, Maruli Panggabean, dan Suhadi pada diskusi tentang modal asing, November 1973.
 ◀ Mahasiswa berdemo mengancam ketua IGGI Jan Pieter Pronk di bandar udara Kemayoran, Jakarta, 1973.

Apa sebenarnya yang dikehendaki para pemrotes? Tampaknya ketakpuasan waktu itu tak bermula dan tak berakhir dengan sebuah agenda yang mantap yang bisa mempertemukan pelbagai kalangan.

“Mengembalikan kebanggaan nasional” bisa berarti menampik modal asing. Tapi di awal dasawarsa 1970-an, modal asing sebagai sumber keuangan pemerintah telah dikalahkan oleh besarnya penghasilan dari minyak. Di pertengahan 1973, harga minyak di pasar dunia naik dari \$2 per barel menjadi \$3,70 barel. Setahun kemudian harga itu melonjak menjadi \$12.

Tapi bahkan sebelum itu pengaruh minyak sudah mulai tampak dalam menumbuhkan, untuk memakai kata-kata pakar ekonomi politik Richard Robison, “nasionalisme ekonomi yang didorong negara.”

Ujung tombaknya adalah Ibnu Sutowo, direktur utama

Pertamina, perusahaan minyak milik negara. Seorang dokter dan jenderal dengan tubuh atletis ini, bahkan dalam usianya yang lanjut, adalah sebuah energi tersendiri. Sudah sejak 1967 ia memimpin Pertamina dengan kekuasaan monopolistik atas setiap segi industri perminyakan, dari eksplorasi sampai pemasaran bensin. Di awal 1970 karyawannya meluap sampai 40.000 orang. Efisiensi tampaknya memang bukan ciri kuat Pertamina. Sebagai perusahaan minyak, artinya kecil, produksi kurang dari 10 persen keseluruhan hasil minyak Indonesia, tak seberapa bila dibanding produksi Caltex. Tapi ia memberi makan banyak orang.

Sutowo tak hanya mengurus Pertamina. Mulai 1971, oleh Suharto, ia disertai sejumlah proyek pembangunan. Tak hanya itu, ia juga diberi hak untuk mencari sendiri pembiayaannya.



▲ Sesi pertama pertemuan OPEC di Bali, 1976.

JUWONO SUDARSONO

Akademikus-cum-politikus Juwono Sudarsono bukan saja dikenal karena karya-karyanya di bidang ilmu politik maupun hubungan internasional, tapi juga sebagai menteri pertambangan dalam kabinet Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid. Pada 1975, Sudarsono menerima beasiswa dari British Council dengan tambahan dari Ford Foundation untuk belajar di London School of Economics. Beasiswa ini memungkinkan istrinya, Priharumastinah, dan anaknya yang baru berumur satu setengah tahun, Vishnu, menemaninya di London.

Pada 1971, saya membantu Prof. Selo Soemardjan dan Prof. Harsja W. Bachtiar mengumpulkan bahan untuk sebuah studi tentang bagaimana memajukan ilmu-ilmu sosial di Indonesia. Studi itu dilakukan oleh Prof. Clifford Geertz dari Princeton University atas permintaan Ford Foundation.

Studi ini sebagiannya juga didorong oleh Dr. Soedjatmoko, mantan duta besar Indonesia di Amerika, yang waktu itu juga anggota Dewan Penyantun Ford Foundation. Dia percaya bahwa ilmu sosial Barat perlu “dipribumisasikan” dengan kenyataan dan kebudayaan lokal. John Bresnan, wakil Ford Foundation, mendukung upaya ini.

Laporan Geertz lalu jadi dasar untuk mendirikan pusat-pusat pelatihan ilmu-ilmu sosial di Banda Aceh, Jakarta, dan Makassar, yang didanai Ford Foundation, serta didukung LIPI dan Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

Pada 1970-an hingga awal 1980-an ratusan akademisi dari perguruan swasta dan negeri terpilih untuk ikut pelatihan itu dari berbagai macam bidang (kependudukan, pendidikan, sastra, sejarah, administrasi publik, ilmu politik, bahasa, arkeologi, antropologi-sosiologi). Mereka datang ke Banda Aceh, Jakarta, atau Makassar, untuk mengembangkan metode riset dan melakukan pekerjaan lapangan seraya menyiapkan tesis mereka, baik tingkat master atau doctoral, baik di Indonesia maupun luar negeri.

Alumni dari Banda Aceh, Jakarta, dan Makassar ini terbukti jadi *critical mass* dari dosen fakultas ilmu-ilmu sosial maupun peneliti di seluruh Indonesia. Mereka



Juwono Sudarsono bersama anaknya Vishnu di London, 1976.

bertemu dan bergaul sehingga pandangan, pengalaman, dan pengetahuan mereka yang datang dari Indonesia Timur dan Indonesia Barat bisa saling memperkaya.

Interaksi mereka dengan para instruktur, dan lebih penting lagi pergaulan dengan sesama mereka, membantu peserta

untuk memperkaya kesadaran keindonesiaan mereka. Para peserta memang datang dari berbagai pulau Indonesia. Mereka juga belakangan jadi mitra para ekonom dan teknokrat yang dikirim studi lanjut ke UC Berkeley oleh Ford Foundation pada 1950-an dan 1960-an. Ini sesuai dengan pengamatan Soedjatmoko pada 1954 bahwa keberhasilan pembangunan ekonomi Indonesia harus berunsurkan kebudayaan dan kemasyarakatan.

Hari ini, masalah yang dihadapi ilmuwan sosial Indonesia masih sama dengan hasil rekaman Geertz 1971. Ilmuwan sosial tak melakukan riset, gajinya kecil, dan sering terpaksa kerja sambilan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan hidup mereka. Ini terjadi karena ilmuwan kebanyakan juga pegawai negeri Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

Tapi setidaknya, kita mulai melihat kemitraan antara sektor swasta dan kampus-kampus serta lembaga penelitian. Ini perkembangan yang penting untuk membantu mengatasi masalah pendanaan. Riset harus dilakukan untuk melayani masyarakat sekaligus menghormati kekuatan pasar. Sayangnya, hanya peneliti

senior saja yang bisa menyediakan jasa sesuai permintaan pasar. Bagaimana caranya membuat peneliti muda bisa mengembangkan pendekatan yang lebih berorientasi pasar? Jawabnya mungkin menciptakan pengkaderan peneliti muda untuk kelak menggantikan senior mereka.

Sejak mula, ketika Pertamina belum ada – waktu itu yang ada barulah Permina – Sutowo memang telah menyediakan dana, dalam bentuk devisa, bagi Angkatan Darat. Kini ia kurang lebih melanjutkan pola kerja itu, dalam skala yang lebih besar. Juga dengan keberanian mencari kredit ke luar negeri yang lebih ambisius – didukung oleh naiknya pendapatan dari bagian ekspor minyak sejak awal 1970-an.

Tak selamanya jelas berapa besarnya utang waktu itu dan benarkah syarat-syaratnya menguntungkan. Tak ada yang mengontrol. Baru di tahun 1976, majalah *Tempo* dengan hati-hati menyingkap tabir utang ini. Terbukti bahwa utang yang dilakukan Ibnu Sutowo mampu mengguncangkan keuangan Republik. Sebagaimana dilaporkan Menteri Pertambangan M. Sadli ke Parlemen, utang Pertamina seluruhnya \$10,5 milyar. Ia juga mengatakan, “Sebagian besar dari kegiatan itu tidak ekonomis dan kurang berhubungan dengan fungsi dasar Pertamina.”

Sejak 1972 sebenarnya IMF telah memperingatkan pemerintah Indonesia agar harus ada batas jumlah utang jangka menengah yang bisa dilakukan pemerintah dan aparatnya. Tapi batas itu praktis bobol. Kreditor asing dengan agresif

menawarkan utang kepada Sutowo. Meskipun ada undang-undang yang mengharuskan meminta izin kepada para menteri yang membawahkannya untuk meneken utang, Sutowo tak melakukannya. Konflik antara Ibnu Sutowo dan para teknokrat di kabinet baru pun tak terelakkan. Sengketa itu baru berhenti

di tahun 1976 setelah Presiden Suharto memberhentikan Ibnu Sutowo.

Tapi ia tak pernah dihukum – meskipun ia melanggar undang-undang dengan membuat utang Indonesia ke luar negeri naik sekitar dua kali lipat. Dan meskipun Pertamina praktis jadi ajang korupsi skala besar.

Sebenarnya sudah di tahun 1966 harian *Indonesia Raya* mengungkapkan kebocoran di perusahaan itu. Tulisan, dengan data, diterbitkan selama berhari-hari. Tapi tak ada efeknya.

Pertamina bahkan praktis membawa semacam glamor

ke dalam kehidupan kelas atas Jakarta. Di tahun 1968, Ibnu Sutowo merayakan pernikahan salah satu putrinya dengan kemegahan yang masa itu tak adaandingannya, hingga harian *Pedoman* menulis editorial khusus tentang peristiwa itu. Gaya hidup ini berlanjut. Bila perlu, Sutowo dan keluarganya, dengan pesawat khusus pergi ke seorang dokter gigi di Houston, Texas.



ANUGERAH PEKERTI

Anugerah Pekerti seorang dosen Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pembinaan Manajemen (LPPM) di Jakarta. Dia mengambil Ph.D. manajemen dari University of Southern California (USC) dengan sponsor Ford Foundation pada 1978-1985. Ketika kembali ke Indonesia, Pekerti mengembangkan program MBA (Master of Business Administration) serta mengusabakan beasiswa untuk anak muda golongan masyarakat yang kurang akrab dengan bisnis untuk terjun ke bidang ini.

Pada akhir 1960-an dunia usaha Indonesia mulai bergerak. Modal asing masuk. Perusahaan-perusahaan didirikan. Tapi sumber daya manusia kurang. Para pengusaha sulit mencari manajer. Pastor Jesuit Kadarman punya ide mendirikan sekolah manajemen. Waktu itu dunia sedang ada gerakan mendirikan sekolah-sekolah manajemen baik di Turki, Filipina, Eropa, India, Belanda, yang semuanya dicontoh dari model Amerika Serikat.

Kadarman ingin menyelenggarakan sekolah ini lewat organisasi Kristen Protestan dan Katolik. Gagasan okumenisme yang maju. Gagasan ini ditawarkan pada almarhum T.B. Simatupang – seorang pensiunan jenderal dan tokoh Kristen Protestan. Simatupang orang yang berpandangan nasionalis inklusif. Simatupang bilang, “Oh jangan hanya Katolik dan Protestan saja, tapi harus melibatkan rekan-rekan yang Islam.” Jadi, lembaga itu didukung oleh berbagai kepercayaan. Awalnya Islam, Kristen, lalu Hindu kemudian Buddha. Ini menarik perhatian Ford Foundation. Simatupang, Kadarman, dan kawan-kawan pun sepakat pada 1967 mendirikan LPPM.

Jadi melibatkan orang-orang Islam yang punya *background* kuat seperti Syafruddin Prawiranegara dan Bahder Djohan membuat Ford Foundation tertarik yang kebetulan juga mengarahkan programnya pada pengembangan manajemen di berbagai tempat di dunia.

Saya bergabung dengan LPPM pada 1968. Sesudah sepuluh tahun bekerja di sana, saya mendapatkan beasiswa sekolah doktoral di USC. Waktu kembali 1986 saya dijadikan direktur program MBA. Waktu itu LPPM menyiapkan diri untuk bikin program MBA. Rancangannya didukung oleh USAID dan LPPM diberi dana USAID

\$4 juta untuk melatih staf, memperbaiki perpustakaan, menerbitkan majalah, dan mendirikan program MBA.

Hingga kini LPPM bisa mempertahankan jati dirinya sebagai lembaga tempat orang-orang berbagai latar belakang, kepercayaan, suku, keahlian untuk bekerja sama. Cita-cita, visi dan misinya luhur. Kami



Anugerah Pekerti di kantornya, 1990.

bekerja dengan nilai-nilai dan etika yang jelas, tak pernah menyuap, dan independen. Selama 32 tahun saya bekerja di sana dan selama 10 tahun menjadi direktur utama, kami tak pernah menyuap untuk dapat pekerjaan. Kami terkenal mempraktekkan keyakinan nilai-nilai kami.

Lainnya adalah misi PPM untuk memberi kesempatan pada orang-orang muda, yang tak berasal dari dunia bisnis, untuk masuk dunia bisnis melalui pendidikan manajemen. Di Indonesia, karena warisan kolonialisme Belanda, berbagai bidang dikuasai kelompok-

kelompok yang berbeda. Kalau kelompok bisnis dikuasai oleh orang keturunan Tionghoa.

Awal 1950-an, untuk mengoreksi ketimpangan sejarah, ada berbagai kebijakan. Salah satu kebijakannya oleh Menteri Perdagangan Sumitro Djojohadikusumo dengan *kelompok benteng* memberi kemudahan usaha pada orang-orang “pribumi.” Ternyata tak berhasil mengangkat mereka jadi pengusaha tangguh, malah menimbulkan eksekusi yang luar biasa besarnya. Ada yang disebut pedagang aktentas, yang memperjualbelikan izin kemudahan. Itu latar belakang timbulnya istilah perusahaan-perusahaan Ali Baba. Alinya di depan Babanya di belakang.

Kami mengambil upaya kecil untuk mengoreksi itu dengan satu kebijakan yang positif, bukan yang diskriminatif, dengan membuka peluang yang lebih besar untuk kelompok-kelompok yang tak berasal dari dunia bisnis masuk ke dunia bisnis. Pada 1986 beasiswa ini bisa menampung kurang lebih 30 orang karena sepenuhnya dibiayai LPPM. Saya pikir kalau 30 orang setahun berarti 100 tahun baru dapat 3.000 orang. Jadi dampaknya baru 100 tahun dirasakan.

Saya punya gagasan. Dari \$4 juta bantuan USAID itu sebagian diberikan kepada pembelajarnya. Saya menemui Direktur USAID William Fuller, “Saya usul sebagian dana itu diberikan kepada pembelajarnya.” Fuller setuju dan memberi \$367 ribu sebagai dana awal untuk *revolving fund*. Ketika lulus dan bekerja, para penerima beasiswa membayar dana pendidikannya ke LPPM, tapi dananya dipakai untuk anak muda yang lain. Sampai sekarang program beasiswa ini masih berjalan dan sekarang dikenal dengan program Wijawiyata Manajemen.

PROFESOR AMERIKA YANG MENCINTAI INDONESIA

Ketika Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri memberikan Bintang Jasa Pratama kepada John J. Bresnan pada Januari 2003, orang bertanya-tanya apa jasa Bresnan? Mengapa Bresnan menerima bintang yang sebelumnya diberikan kepada dua profesor kenamaan Amerika: George McTurnan Kahin dari Cornell serta Clifford Geertz dari Princeton?

Jawabannya muncul ketika *Kompas* mengutip diplomat senior Ali Alatas yang mengatakan Bresnan sangat instrumental dalam menciptakan sejumlah ilmuwan penting Indonesia. “Kritik yang ia sampaikan selalu konstruktif. Beliau tidak pernah tidak memberi jalan penyelesaian,” kata Alatas. Prof. Juwono Sudarsono dari UI mengatakan, “Dari dulu Bresnan menaruh perhatian sangat serius untuk pengembangan sumber daya manusia Indonesia, negara yang menurutnya sangat kompleks dan plural.”

Bresnan tiba di Indonesia pada November 1961 untuk membantu Frank Miller, wakil Ford Foundation di Jakarta. Dalam memoarnya yang tak diterbitkan, Bresnan menulis ia datang ketika Jakarta “banjir” politik nasionalisme.

Presiden Sukarno menuntut Belanda menyerahkan Papua. Uni Soviet mendukung dan memberi bantuan militer. Presiden John F. Kennedy menghimbau Jakarta maupun Belanda tak menggunakan kekerasan. Tapi sukarelawan Indonesia dimobilisasi masuk ke Papua.

Pada September 1963 perselisihan Indonesia dengan Malaysia meletus. Indonesia menuduh Inggris campur tangan urusan Malaysia. Sekitar 10.000 demonstran membakar kedutaan Inggris di Jakarta. Banyak rumah warganegara Inggris dijarah. Pada Maret 1964 Menteri Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat Dean Rusk menyatakan negaranya takkan memberikan bantuan kepada Indonesia. Sukarno gusar dan menjawab, “*Go to hell with your aid.*”

Menteri Luar Negeri Soebandrio segera mengeluarkan instruksi bahwa warga Indonesia tak boleh studi lanjut di Amerika. Ford Foundation kalang kabut. Ada 13 dosen Indonesia yang siap berangkat ke Amerika dengan beasiswa Ford Foundation.

Miller bergegas ke Istana Negara. Miller biasa datang untuk sarapan pagi bersama Sukarno. Momen ini biasanya digunakan Sukarno untuk bicara macam-macam, dari urusan negara hingga seni. Sukarno suka Miller. Sukarno bahkan pernah mengatakan akan berdansa dalam pesta pernikahan Miller jika Miller mengizinkannya mencari jodoh.

Pagi itu Miller menjelaskan masalahnya. “*Well,*” kata Sukarno, “dalam tiap aturan



John Bresnan menerima Bintang Jasa Pratama dari Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri, Januari 2003.

selalu ada perkecualian. Apa Anda punya perkecualian, Tuan Miller?”

“Semua tigabelas itu.”

“Aduh, Tuan Miller, *you are a hard bargainer.*”

Tapi Sukarno setuju. “Anda bilang saja pada Soebandrio bahwa saya bilang oke.”

Jakarta memang sulit tapi selalu ada momen di mana Miller maupun Bresnan merasa Indonesia bergerak ke arah positif.

Situasi politik makin tegang ketika Indonesia keluar dari Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa. Pada Maret 1965, sekelompok demonstran memprotes kehadiran profesor-profesor Amerika, yang bekerja di Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan

Malang. Mereka dibiayai Ford Foundation.

Informasi itu disampaikan seorang mahasiswa Amerika ke konsulat Amerika di Surabaya. Konsulat menghubungi Departemen Luar Negeri di Washington. Washington menghubungi markas Ford Foundation di New York. E.E. Hill, wakil presiden Ford Foundation, ragu akan keadaan di Indonesia. Hill mengirim surat kepada Miller minta kantor Ford Foundation di Jakarta ditutup.

Miller dan Bresnan tak setuju tapi terpaksa menutup. Beberapa bulan kemudian, Bresnan mendengar terjadi pembunuhan para jenderal Angkatan Darat. Drama ini disusul pembunuhan ratusan ribu pendukung Sukarno. Kekuasaan beralih tangan ke Suharto.

Ford Foundation membuka kembali kantornya di Jakarta pada 1967. Bresnan menggantikan Miller pada Juli 1969. Ia memimpin Ford Foundation untuk membiayai riset padi unggul, pendidikan ilmu sosial, program keluarga berencana, pendidikan manajemen, maupun konservasi kebudayaan. Bresnan juga melebarkan program ke Sumatera, Sulawesi, dan Kalimantan.

Bresnan berpendapat program yang memuaskannya adalah membawa IRRI ke Indonesia. Hasilnya? Bibit unggul. Jutaan ton beras dihasilkan. “Saya waktu itu tak tahu apapun tentang Revolusi Hijau tapi saya ingin hal itu terjadi. Keberhasilan ini sangat menyenangkan. Mungkin inilah usaha pribadi saya yang paling berpengaruh di Indonesia,” kata Bresnan.

Pada 1974 Bresnan ditarik untuk memimpin divisi Asia Pasifik. Posisi ini membuatnya tetap berhubungan dengan Jakarta. Pada 1982 Bresnan meninggalkan Ford Foundation dan bekerja di East Asian Institute dari Columbia University, New York. Dia mengajar tentang Asia.

Sekitar akhir 2001 banyak dosen yang dibantu studinya pada zaman Bresnan, berkumpul dan menyarankan Juwono Sudarsono, waktu itu menteri, untuk mempertimbangkan penghargaan Bintang Jasa Pratama kepada Bresnan. Maka Presiden Megawati pun mengalungkan bintang ini kepada Bresnan.

Dengan mudah ia bermain golf di Palm Springs, California. Di Jakarta, ia mengimpor Rolls Royce untuk dirinya.

Bertahun-tahun lamanya ia seperti tak terjamah, dan selama itu membangun jaringan bisnis untuk keluarganya – jauh lebih dulu ketimbang Suharto. Ketika Hotel Hilton di wilayah Senayan, Jakarta, misalnya, didirikan, Gubernur Ali Sadikin yang memberi izin bangunan menduga bahwa hotel bintang lima itu milik Pertamina. Ternyata kemudian itu milik keluarga Ibnu Sutowo. Tampaknya tak jelas lagi mana yang milik pribadi dan yang bukan: kurang lebih ada 35 perusahaan swasta yang dimilikinya, baik sebagian atau seluruhnya, yang berhubungan dagang dengan Pertamina.

“Mungkin akan lebih baik seandainya kita tak punya minyak,” keluh Widjojo Nitisastro kepada seorang kenalan waktu itu. Tapi minyak telah memungkinkan Suharto dan para jenderal lainnya menyaksikan kemajuan berderap cepat di depan mereka. Dengan uang dari minyak mereka mendapatkan keyakinan bahwa Indonesia, dengan kekayaan alamnya sendiri, bisa masuk ke dunia modern. Tak hanya mereka yang berharap.

Petrodollar juga menumbuhkan bisnis para kontraktor seperti musim hujan menjangkitkan cendawan.

Di sana-sini, terutama di kota dan di sektor modern, wajah Indonesia berubah secara mengesankan. Sutowo membangun lapangan golf, memasukkan modal ke bisnis tanah dan bangunan,

membayai berdirinya Bina Graha (kantor kepresidenan di masa Suharto), membangun sebuah rumah sakit modern, merencanakan pabrik pupuk terapan dan pabrik petrokimia, membiayai pabrik baja Krakatau Steel, dan sederet kegiatan lain, termasuk mendirikan Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Al-Quran. Ia juga menjadi sumber dana bagi para perwira tinggi, pribadi ataupun institusinya mendapatkan sokongan langsung dari kantong dollar Pertamina. Dengan cepat, perusahaan negara ini berlaku seakan-akan sudah jadi tugas dan wewenangnya untuk membiayai pelbagai hal yang tak terdapat dalam Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN).

Indonesia memang tampak tumbuh semarak. Tapi, mau tak mau, kontras mena-

jam antara mereka yang kecipratan langsung petrodollar dan mereka yang ada di lapisan bawah – apalagi di Jakarta, di mana orang-orang kaya baru bermunculan sementara para tukang becak dan pedagang kaki lima tergusur.



Mungkin dalam sejarah Indonesia modern, baru saat itulah tampak perbedaan sosial yang begitu mencolok dan meluas. Memang ada usaha agar ketimpangan itu tak sepenuhnya membuat kelas jelata tersisih. YLBHI, misalnya, menyediakan bantuan tenaga bagi mereka yang miskin dalam mempertahankan hak di dalam hukum. Di dasawarsa 1970-an, bantuan itu terasa semakin urgen. Tapi bangunan politik yang ada tak memberi rakyat kesempatan untuk mengubah institusi-institusi hukum yang merugikan mereka. Tak ayal mahasiswa pun – yang selalu hidup dengan mitos tentang peran mereka dalam transformasi – bergerak. Protes pertama terdengar di tahun 1969, tak lama setelah *Indonesia Raya* mengungkapkan korupsi di Pertamina. Dalam variasi lain, itu terdengar lagi di tahun 1974 dalam Malari. Puncaknya di tahun 1978, ketika para mahasiswa, terutama dari UI dan ITB, buat pertama kalinya mengatakan – seperti tercantum dalam *Buku Putih* mereka – “mereka tak percaya dan tak menginginkan Suharto sebagai Presiden Republik Indonesia.”

Tentu saja Suharto tidak tinggal diam. Dengan cepat kampus ITB diduduki tentara, dan lebih dari 100 mahasiswa ditangkap. Heri Akhmadi, ketua umum Dewan Mahasiswa, jadi

sasaran pokok. Di UI, Lukman Hakim mengalami hal yang sama. Dan Maret 1978, Suharto dipilih kembali sebagai presiden.

Tapi keresahan dasawarsa itu tak terbatas pada protes di jalanan dan tentang kepemimpinan. Ketika ketimpangan sosial terasa tajam, mulai berkembang pertanyaan dasar: tak adakah cara lain untuk membangun Indonesia?

Sikap mempertanyakan yang gigih ini di dunia pemikiran Indonesia waktu itu dicerminkan dalam jurnal *Prisma*. Diterbitkan oleh Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES), sebuah lembaga swasta yang semula didirikan bersama Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, yayasan swasta yang berkait dengan kaum liberal di Jerman, dan kemudian dibantu oleh Ford Foundation, *Prisma* berkembang menjadi wadah ide-ide kritis yang hampir tak terdapat dalam media massa umumnya. Dari sini bisa tergambar sejarah intelektual Indonesia yang terus mencari jawab.

Di masa itu usaha mencari jawab mendapatkan sumbernya dari banyak penjur. Sumber itu bisa datang dari kritik Kiri Baru, yang sejak akhir 1960-an sedang memikat kampus-kampus Amerika dan Eropa Barat. Dalam pandangan



▲ Para tukang becak di Jakarta tergusur; becak-becaknya dibuang di Teluk Jakarta, 1985.

SARTONO KARTODIRDJO

Prof. Sartono Kartodirdjo salah satu ahli sejarah Indonesia paling terkemuka. Dia mendapatkan masternya dari Yale pada 1964 dan selesai menulis disertasi doctoral pada University of Amsterdam 1966. Disertasinya, The Peasant Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Condition, Course and Sequel: A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia, jadi bacaan klasik. Pada 1968 ia jadi guru besar Fakultas Sastra UGM. Pada 1981, selama setahun ia jadi guru tamu di Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences di Wassenaar, Den Haag, Belanda.

Pada 1957 ada seminar tentang sejarah nasional Indonesia di Yogyakarta di mana disimpulkan bahwa Indonesia memerlukan buku sejarah yang mencerminkan identitasnya. Indonesia waktu itu negara baru. Buku-buku sejarah kebanyakan masih mencerminkan kebutuhan kolonialisme Belanda. Cendekiawan terkemuka macam Muhammad Yamin dan Soedjatmoko terlibat dalam seminar ini. Tapi pembuatan buku ini masih sebatas wacana.

Pada 1970 diadakan lagi seminar nasional kedua tentang sejarah juga di Yogyakarta. Kebetulan kali ini saya jadi ketua pelaksanaannya. Hasilnya lebih kongkret. Seminar mengusulkan dibentuk satu panitia dengan pengesahan oleh Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Mashuri.

Soedjatmoko waktu itu duta besar Indonesia di Washington. Dia menghubungkan kami dengan Ford Foundation. Pada 1971 kami resmi berhubungan dengan Ford Foundation. Ada tujuh orang dalam panitia inti: Nugroho Notosusanto, Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo, Sutjipto, Oka Tjandrasasmita, Buchairi, Sujono Panji Suroso, dan saya selaku ketua. Ford Foundation bersedia membantu tim ini untuk melakukan studi kepustakaan di Amerika Serikat dan Belanda.

Saya mula-mula dikirim ke Amerika Serikat untuk mencari tempat di mana tim ini bisa bekerja. Saya pergi ke Berkeley, Yale, Wisconsin dan Cornell. Lalu saya kembali ke Indonesia dan kami memutuskan pergi ke Berkeley. Alasan utamanya sederhana saja. Oka, Sutjipto, dan Abdurrachman belum pernah tinggal di negeri dingin. Kalau kerja enam bulan dan sebagian musim dingin,

kami akan lebih sulit bekerja. Kota Berkeley di California cuacanya lebih hangat.

November 1971 tim inti pergi ke Berkeley tapi jadwalnya kurang cocok. Nugroho hanya tinggal dua bulan di sana. Sutjipto baru datang pada Januari 1972. Tiap hari pekerjaan kami sama. Pagi hari kami pergi ke perpustakaan. Sorenya pukul 18:00-20:00 kami seminar di



Sartono Kartodirdjo di UGM, 1979.

salah satu apartemen yang kami sewa. Mulanya seminar di kantor Joe Fischer, seorang ahli Indonesia yang membantu administrasi kami, tapi gerakan anti-Perang Vietnam pada waktu itu membuat banyak demonstrasi dan polisi ada di mana-mana. Kami memilih seminar di apartemen yang lebih tenang. Total kami melakukan 99 seminar di Berkeley. Kita putuskan sebagai model penulisan sejarah ini sebuah buku sejarah Belgia karangan Ari Pirenne karena sejarahnya lengkap: politik, ekonomi, budaya. Ini cocok untuk Republik Indonesia yang baru lahir.

Pada pertengahan April 1972 tim ini pindah ke Leiden, Belanda, untuk melanjutkan studi arsip di *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* (KITLV). Kami baca buku-buku dan karya-karya tentang Indonesia. Pertengahan Mei 1972 kami kembali ke Indonesia. Masih ada seminar-seminar di Indonesia yang dibiayai Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan. Seluruhnya ada enam volume dan masing-masing volume ditulis lima orang. Jadi ada 30 penulis yang menulis buku ini. Pada 1976 buku ini selesai dan diserahkan kepada Presiden Suharto. Hasilnya, diterbitkan negara.

Tapi saya merasa kok cuma begini? Kebanyakan penulisnya sibuk sehingga tak bisa menulis dengan baik. Saya berpikir seandainya, ada satu volume yang hanya dikerjakan satu penulis, dengan waktu sama tapi dia dibebaskan dari tugas-tugas lain, hasilnya akan lebih baik.

Pada 1981 saya mendapat kesempatan studi lagi di Wassenaar juga dengan sponsor Ford Foundation. Selama setahun di sana saya menulis buku *Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia* (periode 1500-1900) yang belakangan diterbitkan Gramedia. Selama di sana, saya menulis serial "Surat dari Wassenaar" dalam *Kompas Minggu* soal sejarah Indonesia yang berkaitan dengan penjajahan Belanda. Saya kira hasilnya lebih baik dari buku sejarah resmi. Pulang ke Indonesia, saya menulis dua jilid soal zaman pergerakan nasional, walau penglihatan saya mulai memburuk. Syukur bisa selesai. Tapi jilid tiga soal zaman pendudukan Jepang tak bisa selesai karena penglihatan saya makin memburuk.

CENDEKIAWAN: SOEDJATMOKO

Sejarawan, diplomat, intelektual, dan seorang visioner – Soedjatmoko bisalah dianggap sebagai “Manusia Pencerahan” Indonesia.

“Koko,” begitu ia biasa dipanggil teman-teman dan handai taulannya, lahir di Sawahlunto, Sumatera Barat pada 1922, dari sebuah keluarga berada. Ia menerima pendidikan Belanda, dan pekerjaan ayahnya – seorang dokter bedah – memperkenalkannya lebih jauh ke kesempatan bepergian, membaca buku, dan kegairahan intelektual. Pada awal 1940-an keluarganya tinggal di Surakarta. Di sana ia sangat senang menemukan “semua isi perpustakaan yang ditutup Jepang ternyata berakhir di pasar loak.”

Dari latar belakang inilah ia mengenal pemikiran Soren Kierkegaard, seorang pemikir Denmark, kemiskinan para petani, eksistensialisme versus gagasan revolusioner, pencarian kebebasan diri yang dikombinasikan dengan panggilan tugas. Kontras-kontras inilah yang membentuk intelektual Soedjatmoko seterusnya.

Mungkin bisa dikatakan bahwa ia seorang pemikir dalam laku. Seumur hidup ia selalu membaca dan berdiskusi. Pada akhir 1950-an, sebagai pemimpin redaksi majalah *Siasat* dan, seorang tokoh di belakang lembaran kebudayaan yang berpengaruh, *Gelombang*, ia mencetuskan polemik tentang sastra dan kebudayaan, yang membangkitkan wacana tentang pembangunan bangsa. Salah satu sumbangan terbesarnya dalam polemik ini adalah pemikirannya tentang toleransi dan keterbukaan. Ia begitu meyakini kebebasan dan kemerdekaan individu. Ia selalu “terlalu kosmopolitan bagi kebanyakan dari kami,” kata penyair Sitor Situmorang, tapi “ia mengilhami kami untuk berdialog – ia sungguh berarti.”

Soedjatmoko bukanlah seorang

spesialis dalam bidang apa pun. Menurut sosiolog Ignas Kleden, ia lebih merepresentasikan psikologi ketimbang epistemologi pemikiran intelektual. Sejarawan Taufik Abdullah mengatakan bahwa Soedjatmoko lebih merupakan seorang pemikir yang merenungkan sejarah ketimbang seorang yang bisa disebut sejarawan (karyanya yang dikenal: *An Introduction in Indonesian Historiography* yang disuntingnya bersama George McTurnan Kahin dan G.J. Resink). Acapkali, yang lebih memukau adalah



Soedjatmoko bersama ketua Dewan Penyantun Ford Foundation Alexander Heard di New York, Maret 1973.

rentang perhatiannya yang luas daripada kedalaman pemikirannya.

Ada yang berpendapat, bahwa Soedjatmoko sering merasa canggung menghadapi kenyataan di Indonesia, maka ia pun mencoba menggali sumber-sumber intelektualnya dari seantero dunia. Selama 20 tahun terakhir hidupnya, jelas bahwa pergaulan internasional adalah gelanggang hidupnya.

Masa aktifnya di luar negeri dimulai sejak dini. Pada akhir 1940-an ia dikirim ke Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB) di New York bersama Sumitro Djojohadikusumo dan Charles Tambu untuk

memperjuangkan pengakuan internasional atas kemerdekaan Indonesia. Saat itu Soedjatmoko baru berumur 25 tahun.

Itulah awal karier diplomatiknya. Setelah jadi *chargé d'affaires* Indonesia yang pertama di London, ia berangkat ke Washington untuk memperkuat seksi politik kedutaan Indonesia yang baru saja dibuka. Belakangan, ia ditunjuk menjadi wakil tetap Indonesia di PBB. Tahun 1968 ia diangkat menjadi duta besar Indonesia untuk Amerika Serikat.

Tidak ada cendekiawan Indonesia lain yang menerima begitu banyak penghargaan dan penghormatan internasional ketimbang Soedjatmoko. Pada 1969 ia jadi orang pertama dari “Dunia Ketiga” yang jadi anggota dewan penyantun Ford Foundation. Pada 1978 ia dianugerahi Penghargaan Ramon Magsaysay dalam bidang kerjasama internasional. Dua tahun kemudian ia diangkat jadi rektor Universitas PBB di Tokyo. Selama tujuh tahun masa jabatannya, Soedjatmoko terus-menerus menyampaikan pandangannya tentang kebebasan dan pembangunan. Dalam waktu yang sama, ia membantu meletakkan Indonesia dalam peta dunia.

Pakar antropologi terkenal Clifford Geertz dari Princeton University melihat dilema yang biasa dihadapi orang macam Soedjatmoko: bagaimana mengabdikan kepada tanah air, tanpa membesar-besarkan kelebihannya, seraya membawanya makin dekat kepada dirinya sendiri? Setelah melakukan “perjalanan untuk menemukan sikap politik bagi dirinya,” selama sembilan bulan ke Eropa Barat dan Timur, Soedjatmoko mengeluh, “Saya bukan seorang komunis, bukan pula seorang sosialis sayap kiri, dan bukan juga seorang pendukung sayap kanan; karena tidak satu pun pendekatan politik yang ditunjuk oleh label-label itu terlihat relevan dengan masalah-masalah yang dihadapi Indonesia . . .”

Bagi para pengkritiknya dari sayap kiri,



Pertemuan Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa membicarakan "Indonesian Question." Sutan Sjahrir (tengah) dikelilingi para penasehatnya: Soedjatmoko, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Charles Tambu, dan Agoes Salim. New York, 14 Agustus 1947.

ia adalah seorang PSI, sebutan lokal bagi para intelektual elite yang lebih banyak bercakap dalam bahasa Inggris atau Belanda, yang lebih suka memberi petunjuk ketimbang berhubungan langsung dengan massa. Sebutan mencemooh lain bagi kelompok ini adalah "kelompok Fabian cabang Jakarta." Hubungannya dengan PSI, juga pertalian Soedjatmoko dengan "Barat," menambah kecurigaan orang tentang motif politiknya. Di sisi lain, ia dijauhi karena kedekatan pribadinya dengan Sukarno – orang yang pada 1960 membubarkan partainya.

Soedjatmoko sering disebut "cerdas tapi naif," "intelektual kelas ringan," "penjaja ide-ide yang sedang naik daun," "pecinta truisme," dan "intelektual publik" terlalu kemana-mana. Sekalipun begitu ia selalu menjunjung martabat manusia sebagai

unsur hakiki kontrak sosial. "Kita tetap jadi manusia bila kita bisa belajar mengembangkan semacam kehidupan batin dalam diri kita. Ini memungkinkan aktualisasi diri yang lebih luas. Agama dan seni harus dirawat dan ditumbuhkan."

Sikap itu membawa Soedjatmoko ke suatu visi alternatif tentang pembangunan. Ia berpendapat bahwa "teknologi madya" seharusnya jadi pendorong ekonomi Indonesia. Pandangan ini membantah gagasan umum pada 1970-an ketika Indonesia, berenang dalam uang minyak, bersiap meluncur dengan cepat ke masa depan. Walaupun visi neo-Gandhian-nya gagal menjelaskan strategi mana yang harus dipilih Indonesia untuk menghadapi kompetisi dan kekuasaan global, para mahasiswa dan intelektual muda menyambutnya.

Pada 1974, bagaimanapun, tantangan ini kembali dan menghantui Soedjatmoko. Walau ia belum pernah mengajukan kritik terbuka kepada Suharto, ia dituduh "dalang" kerusuhan Januari 1974. Sebagai anggota dewan Ford Foundation, ia bisa menggunakan kedudukan dan pengaruhnya di dunia internasional. Tapi ia menolak melakukannya. Situasi yang dihadapinya adalah urusan Indonesia, katanya kepada Ford Foundation, dan ia ingin menyelesaikannya dengan cara "Indonesia."

Ia meninggal pada 1989. Kini, tidak banyak yang dapat merangkai gagasan yang diwariskannya. Mungkin peninggalannya yang sejati bagi Indonesia, dan mungkin bagi dunia, adalah tidak ada yang permanen selain perubahan, dan bahwa ambivalensi ternyata tidak selamanya buruk.

ARTIKEL *RAMPARTS*: GOSIP, CERITA, DAN KONSPIRASI

Pada akhir 1960-an dan awal 1970-an, “intervensi asing” adalah momok bagi negara-negara berkembang. Para “penasehat,” “konsultan,” atau “pelatih,” di mata banyak orang, bagian dari perkakas neo-imperialisme, yang “menjajah” masyarakat pascakolonial secara melalui kedok bantuan finansial dan teknologi.

Masa ini digarisbawahi oleh terpilihnya Soedjatmoko, mantan duta besar Indonesia untuk Amerika Serikat, jadi anggota dewan penyantun Ford Foundation di New York. Kritik segera timbul: dari kaum kanan maupun kiri. Pada Oktober 1970, majalah *Ramparts* memuat sebuah esai yang kontroversial, yang menggambarkan politik Indonesia selama pergolakan 1965-1966 sebagai produk sebuah konspirasi Amerika yang terpadu. Pelakunya? Ford Foundation, Rand Corporation, USAID, Council on Foreign Relations, berbagai universitas di Amerika, dan CIA. Menurut penulisnya, David Ransom, kepentingan Ford Foundation di Indonesia adalah menggulingkan pemerintahan Indonesia saat itu. Caranya? Dengan melatih para ekonom Indonesia menciptakan sebuah rencana pembangunan nasional berlandaskan aturan main yang sesuai dengan “kekuasaan tak langsung dari Amerika.”

Mulanya, artikel ini hanya mendapat sedikit perhatian dari pers, baik di Amerika Serikat maupun di Indonesia. Harian supranasionalis *Merdeka*-lah yang memperluas dampak tesis Ransom ini. Pada Januari 1974, ketika demonstrasi anti-asing di Jakarta mencapai puncaknya dan intelijen militer Indonesia butuh kambing hitam, artikel Ransom dijadikan basis untuk menuduh kaum “sosialis radikal” sebagai pihak yang bertanggung jawab atas usaha pendiskreditan pemerintah, dengan Soedjatmoko sebagai “pemikir utamanya.”

Seperti kebanyakan artikel pendulang sensasi, tulisan ini sekaligus “pedas,” asyik, dan persuasif. Tapi, ada banyak bolong dalam argumennya. Ransom, misalnya, tak begitu peduli untuk membedakan pihak-pihak yang dituduhnya. Ia juga tak menyinggung kegiatan pendidikan dan pelatihan yang telah dilakukan Ford

Foundation semenjak hari-hari pertama Sukarno berkuasa: pelatihan para guru, pendidikan bahasa Inggris, manajemen dan administrasi publik, pengembangan dan riset. Pada kenyataannya, lingkup aktivitas inilah yang menyerap dana Ford Foundation dalam bantuannya untuk Indonesia.

Perhatian Ransom terpusat pada dosen-dosen FEUI yang dilatih di Amerika Serikat, yang disebutnya “Mafia Berkeley.” Sekembali mereka dari studi pascasarjana – di Berkeley atau universitas-universitas lainnya – para ekonom ini menduduki



Sampai hari ini, artikel *Ramparts* masih dikutip oleh media Indonesia.

jabatan ekonomi kunci pada pemerintahan Suharto. Yang kemudian dianggap “konspirasi” terletak pada “peran” Berkeley dalam “melatih orang-orang penting Indonesia yang akan merebut kekuasaan untuk mempraktekkan pelajaran pro-Amerika mereka.”

Tapi sejarah tak selalu harus berliku-liku, penuh tipu daya. Bahkan, pertukaran pendidikan ini bisa jadi punya banyak awal.

Ia bisa, misalnya, bermula dari beberapa buku. Tahun 1950, enam tahun sebelum proyek afiliasi FEUI-Berkeley dimulai, organisasi mahasiswa Berkeley mengumpulkan buku-buku bekas untuk dikirim ke UGM. Karena kekurangan dana, mereka minta bantuan Ford Foundation untuk mengongkosi pengiriman.

Ia juga bisa bermula dari seorang Michael Harris, wakil Ford Foundation di

Indonesia saat proyek pelatihan dosen-dosen FEUI baru saja disetujui. Ia kenal dengan orang-orang penting di Fakultas Ekonomi di Berkeley, termasuk Thomas Blaidsell, yang pertama kali meyakinkan pihak universitas untuk menerima prakarsa Ford Foundation. Sementara, Harris adalah kawan dekat Dekan FEUI Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, orang yang menggagas kerjasama dengan universitas-universitas Amerika itu.

Sebaliknya, kenalan Sumitro yang lain, Dr. Andreas Papandreou, yang sesama sosialis dan yang sangat ia kagumi, pada saat itu juga mengajar di Berkeley.

Bagaimanapun, penekanan Ransom pada Berkeley memang terkesan ganjil, mengingat proyek-proyek yang didukung Ford Foundation juga melibatkan sejumlah universitas lain, termasuk MIT, Cornell, dan University of Wisconsin. Tujuan proyek-proyek ini, ujar Frank Miller, mantan wakil Ford Foundation, adalah “menyiapkan dosen ekonomi, bukan pejabat pemerintah.”

Pada 1957, ketika Sumitro lari dari Jakarta untuk menghindari penangkapan, dan kemudian bergabung dengan pemberontakan PRRI di Sumatera Barat, nasib proyek-proyek ini terkatung-katung. Sumber-sumber yang dekat dengan peristiwa itu menyatakan, “Keterkaitan dengan Sumitro, seberapa kecil pun, adalah suatu liabilitas.” Dalam laporannya untuk Ford Foundation pada 1965, konsultan Richard Dye secara khusus memuji Mohammad Sadli dan Subroto, dua dosen yang teguh menjaga gawang FEUI selama kepergian Sumitro.

Satu dasawarsa telah berlalu semenjak para “Mafia Berkeley” pertama kali bertolak ke luar negeri dan kembali sebagai para pakar ekonomi Indonesia – sebuah waktu yang sangat panjang, menurut banyak orang, untuk mempertahankan sebuah “konspirasi” guna menentukan nasib sebuah bangsa. Sebagaimana dikatakan Prof. Bruce Glassburner, “*We were neither that diabolical nor that clairvoyant.*”

ini, pembangunan ekonomi seperti yang dijalankan di Indonesia dianggap sebagai bagian konspirasi besar kapitalisme dunia. Majalah *Ramparts*, sebelum gerakan Kiri Baru kehilangan daya pikat, menganggap pembangunan di Indonesia hasil kerja “Mafia Berkeley” yang menjalankan agenda ekonomi liberal dari Amerika.

Sumber lain bisa datang dari tengah. Soedjatmoko, cendekiawan paling terkemuka di Indonesia masa itu, datang dengan gagasan pembangunan yang menggunakan teknologi madya. Dalam pemikiran ini, Indonesia sebaiknya menghindari jalan yang telah ditempuh negeri-negeri industri yang sudah lebih lama. Teknologi yang dipergunakan di sana telah menyebabkan kerusakan lingkungan dan ketimpangan sosial. Bagi Soedjatmoko, Indonesia belum terlambat untuk memilih

strategi yang lebih tepat, dan itu adalah dengan menggunakan teknologi yang lebih murah, bisa menampung tenaga kerja yang besar jumlahnya, dan tak merusak lingkungan.

Gagasan ini di luar negeri memang sudah mulai menarik hati. Buku *Small is Beautiful* oleh E.F. Schumacher, yang terbit di tahun 1973, dengan cepat jadi bahan yang memukau, juga di Indonesia.

Schumacher, ekonom Inggris kelahiran Jerman, menyimpulkan bahwa negeri-negeri miskin sebaiknya bukan mengambil teknologi yang maju, yang tak akan membuka banyak lapangan kerja, melainkan mengadaptasi teknologi madya ke kehidupan mereka. Schumacher mempertanyakan perlunya pertumbuhan ekonomi yang terus-menerus. Ia menganjurkan perkembangan sebuah masyarakat yang tak



▲ Empat tokoh “Mafia Berkeley” mengucapkan sumpah jabatan bersama anggota kabinet lainnya pada 1971: (mulai dari kedua kiri) Mohammad Sadli (pertambangan), Subroto (tenaga kerja dan transmigrasi), Widjojo Nitisastro (ekonomi, keuangan, dan industri), Emil Salim (perhubungan). Juga dilantik (ujung kiri) Mukti Ali (urusan agama) dan (ujung kanan) M. Panggabean (politik dan keamanan).

memilih investasi yang padat modal dan padat energi. Kapitalisme memang meningkatkan taraf hidup, tapi sumber alam harus dipertahankan dan dirawat. Kota besar dan industri besar hanya akan merusaknya. Kecil itu indah.

Hampir bersamaan, sebuah dokumen yang disusun oleh para ilmuwan MIT di tahun 1972 dengan segera jadi pencerahan baru. Dalam laporan yang mereka sebut *The Limits to Growth* – yang dipesan oleh Club of Rome, sebuah majelis internasional para pemimpin bisnis – dikemukakan sebuah hipotesis yang memproyeksikan sebuah pandangan ala Thomas Robert Malthus: naiknya jumlah penduduk, perluasan industri dan produksi pangan yang tak memadai, dan terkurasnya sumber alam, akan berlanjut dengan tingkat kecepatan yang seperti sekarang.

Untuk mencegah arus ini, diserukan “sebuah revolusi Kopernikus dalam berpikir.” Ide tentang pertumbuhan yang terus-menerus perlu ditinjau kembali. Maka pertumbuhan

penduduk harus dikurangi sampai nol. Produksi industrial tak perlu menjulang lagi. Polusi harus dikontrol. Bahan-bahan didaur ulang. Produksi diarahkan ke benda-benda yang lebih bisa awet atau bisa diperbaiki.

Di Indonesia, bagi mereka yang senang mendapatkan gagasan-gagasan baru, segar, dan mengejutkan – terutama mereka yang ingin mengubah keadaan – pandangan Schumacher dan peringatan dalam laporan *The Limits to Growth* itu amat menggugah. Ide yang termaktub di sana lebih memikat ketimbang argumen pembangunan ekonomi yang dipakai selama itu di Indonesia, yang dampaknya tampak merisaukan.

Bagi yang punya kecenderungan radikal, angin bertiup dari Amerika Latin. Sejak di pertengahan 1960-an Andre Gunder Frank, berdasarkan pengalaman Amerika Latin, mengemukakan teorinya tentang pembangunan yang berlawanan dari teori modernisasi yang dipergunakan di Barat untuk membaca negeri terbelakang. Baginya, apa yang disebut



▲ Selo Soemardjan, ketua Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial, menyambut kelompok pertama peneliti ilmu sosial di Makassar. Sebelah kirinya adalah Umar Kayam, direktur dari pusat pelatihan di Makassar, dan sebelah kanannya antropolog Clark Cunningham, 1975.

TAUFIK ABDULLAH

Taufik Abdullah, sejarawan lulusan Cornell University, pernah jadi direktur Leknas dari 1974-1978, dan bekerja untuk LIPI hampir dalam semua karier profesionalnya. Ia jadi orang nomor satu LIPI pada zaman kepresidenan Abdurrahman Wahid. Kini ia ketua YIIS dan sebelumnya ikut menjalankan pusat-pusat pelatihan ilmu-ilmu sosial di Indonesia.

Ford Foundation ingin memajukan ilmu-ilmu sosial di Indonesia dan mengundang Clifford Geertz. Setelah laporan Geertz selesai, Ford Foundation minta komentar beberapa ilmuwan sosial, antara lain Selo Soemardjan, Harsja W. Bachtiar, Daniel Lev. Ada juga diskusi terbatas yang dihadiri oleh John Bresnan dan Ted Smith dari Ford Foundation, serta Prof. Hafid (rektor Universitas Hasanuddin), Soemarsaid Moertono dan saya. Kami setuju ilmu sosial di Indonesia ketinggalan zaman, tradisi meneliti melempem, dan banyak ilmuwan sosial sibuk dengan makalah tanpa penelitian. Bagaimana memperbaikinya? Kami setuju bikin *research station*, tempat melatih orang melakukan penelitian selama setahun.

Geertz usul mahasiswa dari Amerika bersama peserta Indonesia mengikuti program ini. Kami menolak. Lev bicara keras, "Untuk apa mereka datang ke sini kalau akan buang-buang duit? Lebih baik buanglah duit ke Indonesia." Tapi usul utama Geertz diterima.

Kebetulan Departemen Pendidikan mempunyai panitia khusus yang diketuai oleh Prof. Hafid untuk mengembangkan ilmu-ilmu sosial. Ford Foundation juga minta Selo dan cendekiawan Soedjatmoko untuk merintis program yang diajukan Geertz. Menteri Pendidikan Sjarief Thayeb akhirnya membentuk YIIS dengan menggabungkan kedua usaha itu. Selo dipilih sebagai ketua.

YIIS mulai menjajaki kerjasama dengan universitas lokal. Ada tiga calon universitas lokal: Aceh, Padang, dan Makassar. Aceh menjanjikan beberapa hal. Rektor Universitas Syiah Kuala Madjid Ibrahim menyediakan dua gedung. Satu asrama dan satu tempat kuliah. Universitas lain belum menjanjikan apa-apa. Apalagi dengan dukungan Gubernur Aceh Muzakkir Walad. Pada waktu itu Aceh lagi bagus-bagusnya. Syiah Kuala sangat berpengaruh di Aceh. Gubernur dan beberapa bupati direkrut dari dosen. Jadi pusat

penelitian itu didirikan di Syiah Kuala 1974.

Persiapannya empat tahun termasuk diskusi, cari tempat, rekrutmen, dan sebagainya. Proses rekrutmen dari seluruh Indonesia. Pertama pengumuman, kemudian orang melamar. Beberapa orang diwawancara. Agak lama juga, memerlukan waktu



Taufik Abdullah berpose depan grafiti anti-sosialisme di Wisconsin, 1973.

beberapa bulan. Murid pertama didapatkan 12 orang. Mereka dari beberapa daerah.

Direktur pertama almarhum Alfian dan *expert* asingnya Stuart Schlegel, antropolog yang memperkenalkan *grounded method*. Bagus juga sebab kalau mulai teori-teori, habis waktu kita. Ini hanya perlu sebulan, dua bulan, dan langsung ke lapangan. Mereka juga belajar bahasa Aceh. Sesekali mereka mengundang orang luar ceramah. Saya tiap tahun praktis datang ke Aceh untuk ceramah.

Alfian dua tahun lalu diganti Ibrahim Alfian. Schlegel diganti Lance Castles dari Australia. Setelah Ibrahim Alfian orang Aceh

terus. Bukan Aceh pendatang tapi Aceh lokal. Mula-mula Syamsuddin Mahmud (belakangan jadi gubernur), kemudian Ali Basyah Amin (belakangan jadi rektor Syiah Kuala), lalu Dayan Dawood (rektor Syiah Kuala yang dibunuh pada tahun 2001). Orang-orangnya ternyata jadi semua ya walau sedih ingat Dayan. Setelah Castles ada juga Bill Liddle dari Amerika.

Pusat latihan kedua didirikan di Makassar. Direktur pertama Umar Kayam dengan tenaga ahli antropolog Clark Cunningham. Setelah Kayam, sempat juga selama setahun Mochtar Naim, kemudian Mattulada, sesudahnya Hasan Walinono. Ahli asing pernah juga Anthony Reid (Australia) dan Christian Pelras (antropolog Prancis, ahli Bugis). Kemudian didirikan juga di Jakarta. Strateginya ialah dua pusat untuk wilayah agraris dan peralihan serta satu untuk daerah urban. Direktur pertama adalah Prof. Koentjaraningrat dengan ahli asing Hans-Dieter Evers. Setelah beberapa tahun, pindah dari Jakarta ke Surabaya.

Saya ketika itu direktur Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan. Saya dapat ide bagaimana kalau tiga peserta terbaik tampil dalam seminar khusus di Leknas. Hal ini dilakukan sejak tahun pertama. Surabaya tak lama bertahan, tapi Makassar dan Aceh sampai sekarang masih ada, meski mereka mengubah kinerjanya. Kalau ada 12 orang tiap tahun, selama 10 tahun bisa 200-300 orang, mungkin 400 lebih. Banyak yang meneruskan jadi doktor, profesor atau rektor walau banyak juga yang tenggelam.

Pengaruh ilmuwan sosial zaman Orde Baru tak sebesar ekonom karena Orde Baru dikuasai oleh pemikiran pembangunan. Orang di luar ekonomi dianggap gangguan. Orde Baru tak sabaran dengan ilmu sosial. Jadi ilmu sosial sejak awal sudah tersingkir dalam percaturan politik. Sekarang harganya harus kita bayar. Sudah sedari dulu diberi peringatan mengenai Aceh, Timor Timur, pemerintahan desa, tapi dianggap sebagai gangguan.


keterbelakangan di Dunia Ketiga justru terjadi karena pertautannya dengan dunia kapitalis yang digerakkan oleh Eropa dan Amerika.

Di tahun 1970, terbit karya Fernando Henrique Cardoso dan Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, dengan arah pandangan yang sejajar. Teori *dependencia* menganjurkan jalan yang radikal: memutuskan kaitan dari pasar dan investasi global. Di Indonesia, Arief Budiman, pendekar terkemuka pemikiran kiri di masa Orde Baru, adalah salah seorang pendukungnya.

Salah satu model yang dikagumi adalah Cina – meskipun informasi tentang praktek ekonomi sosialis di sana sebenarnya tak sepenuhnya akurat. Cina waktu itu dalam keadaan ketika Mao Zedong belum meninggal. Bersama dia, empat sekawan

pendukungnya yang radikal, antara lain Jiang Qing, istrinya, berpengaruh. Dalam model Cina yang dibayangkan ini, kehidupan yang merata bisa diselenggarakan seperti dalam komune. Bentuk kehidupan bersama ini dikatakan berhasil memecahkan soal kesejahteraan tanpa terkait dengan pasar dunia. Juga tanpa agenda yang mengutamakan pertumbuhan ekonomi.

Kekaguman terhadap model Cina ini, yang waktu itu di Indonesia pernah tampak dalam tulisan M. Dawam Rahardjo, cendekiawan dan ekonom dari kalangan muslim, pelan-pelan mereda. Setelah Mao meninggal, Deng Xiaoping berkuasa, dan Cina justru mengambil jalan kapitalis. Teori *dependencia* pun mulai ditinggalkan, bahkan oleh Cardoso sendiri, yang kemudian jadi presiden Brazilia. Semangat kecil itu indah meredup.



▲ Sebuah perlombaan matematika yang diadakan LIPI bersama TVRI, Jakarta, 1976.

THEE KIAN WIE

Thee Kian Wie adalah staf ahli Pusat Penelitian Ekonomi, LIPI (P2E-LIPI). Ia menghasilkan berbagai buku tentang ekonomi Indonesia. Bukunya terakhir, yang ditulis bersama-sama dengan Howard Dick (Melbourne), Vincent Houben (Berlin) dan Thomas Lindblad (Leiden), adalah "The Emergence of a National Economy – an economic history of Indonesia 1800-2000," dan kini ia memimpin dewan pengurus lembaga penelitian SMERU, sebuah mitra Ford Foundation.

Saya belajar ilmu ekonomi di FEUI dan University of Wisconsin, Madison, Amerika Serikat. Setelah lulus dari FEUI pada 1959, saya bekerja sebagai staf administrasi pada Majelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (MIPI – cikal bakal dari LIPI). Pada 1962 ketika Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (Leknas) didirikan sebagai lembaga penelitian dari MIPI, saya bergabung pada Leknas sebagai peneliti junior.

Karena Prof. Sadarjoen Siswomartoyo, direktur pertama Leknas, adalah ahli pendidikan, ia membentuk "Dewan Pembina" untuk memberikan nasehat dalam pengembangan Leknas. Mereka terdiri dari Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadli, Sarbini Sumawinata, Selo Soemardjan, Koentjaraningrat, Makaminan Makagiansar, Ali Wardhana, dan Emil Salim.

Sadarjoen dan Dewan Pembina menganggap penting untuk mengirimkan para peneliti muda Leknas ke luar negeri untuk studi pascasarjana. Selo, Widjojo Nitisastro, dan Sadli mempunyai hubungan baik dengan Ford Foundation. Maka mereka menjajaki kemungkinan untuk mengirimkan staf peneliti Leknas ke AS untuk studi pascasarjana dengan biaya Ford Foundation. Pada waktu itu sentimen anti-Barat, khususnya terhadap Amerika dan Inggris, sangat kuat karena pengaruh PKI. Ford Foundation menganggap penting untuk membiayai studi pascasarjana agar hubungan dengan cendekiawan muda Indonesia dapat dipertahankan.

Dana Ford Foundation untuk membiayai studi peneliti Leknas disalurkan melalui Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS, cikal bakal Harvard Institute of International Development, HIID). Waktu itu, Harvard DAS dipimpin Raymond Vernon dan Gustav Papanek sebagai wakilnya.

Setelah seleksi ketat, gelombang pertama peneliti Leknas, termasuk Harsja

Bachtiar, Mely Tan, T.S.S. Soetanto, dan saya, dikirim ke Amerika pada 1963. Gelombang kedua, termasuk Taufik Abdullah dan Soedradjad Djiwandono, dikirim pada 1964. Gelombang ketiga dan terakhir dikirim pada 1965.

Selesai studi Ph.D. di University of Wisconsin pada 1969, saya kembali ke Leknas. Direktur Leknas yang baru, Widjojo



Thee Kian Wie di kantor Leknas, Jakarta, 1978.

Nitisastro, yang menggantikan Sadarjoen, tak bisa aktif memimpin Leknas karena sibuk sebagai pemimpin tim ahli ekonomi Presiden Suharto. Harsja Bachtiar diangkat sebagai pejabat direktur Leknas-LIPI.

Penelitian Leknas-LIPI pertama di mana saya dilibatkan adalah Survei Ekonomi Daerah Sumatera Selatan. Harsja merasa pengetahuan kita tentang ekonomi berbagai daerah luar Jawa sangat kurang. Penelitian ini diadakan dengan bekerja sama dengan Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, yang dipimpin oleh Shinichi Ichimura, dan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, yang pada waktu itu dipimpin oleh Dekan Ahmad Hamid.

Survei ekonomi itu cukup berhasil dan

menghasilkan berbagai laporan tentang ekonomi Sumatera Selatan. Pada tahun 1976-78 diadakan lagi survei ekonomi di daerah Sumatera Utara, yang kali ini melibatkan Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Sumatera Utara.

Dari dulu sampai kini, banyak ekonom Indonesia kurang berminat menghasilkan karya ilmiah. Banyak ekonom yang pintar tampil di seminar dengan menyampaikan presentasi *power-point*. Tapi sering presentasi tak dijabarkan lebih mendalam dalam tulisan ilmiah yang bisa diterbitkan dalam buku atau majalah ilmiah. Kalau menulis makalah, kita harus tunduk pada disiplin untuk merumuskan pikiran kita dalam suatu uraian yang logis dan koheren. Hal ini mungkin disebabkan karena "*opportunity costs*" dari penelitian serius terlampaui tinggi (artinya, *foregone earnings*, yaitu penghasilan yang dikorbankan untuk melakukan penelitian ilmiah, terlampaui tinggi). Sistem insentif yang dihadapi para ilmuwan di Indonesia kurang kondusif untuk mendorong mereka melakukan penelitian yang baik secara lumintu.

Saya beruntung bahwa selama tiga dasawarsa lebih setelah kembali dari AS, saya diberikan peluang luas di LIPI untuk tetap menekuni kegiatan penelitian. Saya menyadari bahwa saya bukan orang cemerlang. Saya suka memberikan dorongan dan semangat pada rekan-rekan saya di LIPI yang lebih muda dengan mengatakan: Anda tak perlu orang cemerlang (*brilliant*) untuk berhasil dalam studi pascasarjana dan karier Anda sebagai peneliti. Yang jauh lebih penting adalah ketekunan dalam membaca karya-karya ilmiah terakhir dalam bidang Anda, disiplin kerja dan stamina untuk menghasilkan karya ilmiah yang baik, dan kehandalan (*reliability*) dalam menyelesaikan pekerjaan tepat pada waktu yang ditetapkan.



▲ Seorang bidan sedang menimbang bayi di sebuah klinik dekat Bandung, Jawa Barat, 1982.



▲ Antropolog Clifford Geertz di Yogyakarta, 1984. Banyak kritik Geertz terhadap keadaan ilmu-ilmu sosial di Indonesia pada 1971 masih relevan hingga hari ini.

Tapi di pertengahan 1970-an, tetap tak bisa diabaikan pengaruh pemikiran Mahbub ul-Haq. Pakar ekonomi terkenal dari Pakistan ini berpendapat, salah bila dianggap bahwa pertumbuhan naiknya GDP (*Gross Domestic Product*) secara otomatis akan membereskan soal kemiskinan. Ia pula yang kemudian memperkenalkan konsep Indeks Pembangunan Manusia (*Human Development Index*). Di sini bukan hanya naiknya pendapatan per kapita yang jadi dasar untuk mengukur kemajuan, tapi juga tingkat pendidikan, panjangnya usia, kecilnya angka kematian bayi, dan hal-hal yang umumnya tak ditabulasi dalam analisis ekonomi.

Waktunya telah tiba, rupanya, ketika “optimisme

teknokratis” mulai mengendur, kata Clifford Geertz, antropolog terkenal dari Princeton University, dalam laporannya kepada Ford Foundation di tahun 1971.

Orang mulai sadar bahwa hitungan ekonomi bisa memecahkan satu hal, tapi juga menimbulkan hal-hal lain yang pelik. Makin dirasakan perlunya memahami realitas sosial secara lebih mendalam. Selama ini, realitas itu, kata Geertz, “digilapkan oleh mesin ekonomi modern.”

Tapi tentu saja memahami realitas sosial tidak gampang. Problem di Indonesia ialah bahwa orang tak hanya dituntut untuk memahami. Ia didesak untuk tak sekadar menafsirkan dunia, melainkan juga mengubahnya.

**BAB EMPAT:
YANG TUNGGAL, YANG TANGGAL**



YANG TUNGGAL, YANG TANGGAL

Pada 12 September 1984, sebuah panggung didirikan di Jalan Sindang, Koja, Tanjung Priok, Jakarta Utara. Daerah pelabuhan itu padat dan miskin, dan mungkin sebab itu setiap kali panggung disiapkan, orang akan berjejal. Juga panggung malam itu. Di atasnya dipasang tenda terpal. Puluhan pengeras suara diikat di tiang listrik di sepanjang jalan.

Tak ada yang tampak istimewa Rabu malam itu. Persimpangan jalan yang ditutup untuk lalu lintas itu sudah biasa untuk acara yang sama. Dalam undangan yang diedarkan oleh Remaja Islam setempat, malam itu adalah malam pengajian remaja.

Ternyata kemudian malam berakhir dengan darah dan pembunuhan. Mungkin tak ada yang menduga. Juga ketika acara dimulai pukul 20:00, dan seorang laki-laki bercambang dan janggut hitam dengan tinggi 1,78 meter dan berat 104 kilogram berbicara. Dialah Amir Biki. Ia memang punya kehadiran tersendiri di panggung itu. Amir orang berpengaruh di Tanjung Priok. Ia lebih berada dibandingkan para tetangganya dan punya kemampuan memimpin. Orang Gorontalo, Sulawesi Utara, ini sering bisa menyelesaikan konflik-konflik antarpenduduk Tanjung Priok yang terdiri dari pelbagai kelompok dan suku.

◀ *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah – taman yang sangat diimpikan bangsa Indonesia dan mendapatkan kritik pada waktu dibangun sebagai sebuah karya yang sangat mewah dan mahal.*



Amir Biki berpidato dengan kemarahan. Seorang wartawan majalah *Tempo* menggambarkan bagaimana ia membawa sebilah badik yang ditunjukkannya kepada para hadirin yang memadati tempat itu. Dengan berapi-api ia mengecam pemerintah. Sasaran utama: rancangan undang-undang yang mengharuskan semua organisasi, termasuk organisasi Islam, menempatkan Pancasila sebagai satu-satunya asas. Niat menjadikan Pancasila sebagai asas tunggal bagi semua organisasi memang telah menjalarkan rasa cemas, juga ke kawasan Tanjung Priok.

Lima hari sebelumnya, Sersan Hermanu, seorang bintang pembina desa di Kelurahan Koja Selatan, menemukan beberapa poster yang menentang gagasan pemerintah itu di mushola As-Sa'adah yang terletak di Gang IV Jalan Raya Pelabuhan. Hermanu meminta agar poster itu dicopot dari dinding mushola. Permintaannya ditolak para pemuda di sana.

Esok siangnya sang sersan datang kembali ke mushola bersama seorang prajurit. Ketika melihat poster-poster itu masih tertempel, ia mencoba melepaskannya dari tembok. Gagal, Hermanu mengambil sehelai koran, mencelupkannya ke selokan di depan mushola, dan melaburkan airnya yang hitam ke ketiga poster di dinding tempat sembahyang itu.

Melihat ini, penghuni gang yang melihat mulai marah. Desas-desus merebak: "Ada sersan masuk masjid tanpa melepas sepatu;" "Ada tentara mengguyur masjid dengan comberan;" "Sersan Hermanu orang Kristen."

Senin, 10 September, konflik terbuka meledak. Ketika ada pembicaraan lagi antara Sersan Hermanu dan pengurus masjid di samping mushola itu, kerumunan orang datang. Tiba-tiba saja salah seorang menarik sepeda motor Honda GL 100 milik Sersan Hermanu, kemudian dibakar.

Pasukan dengan cepat datang. Pada hari itu juga, kedua pengurus masjid, seorang pemimpin mushola As-Sa'adah dan seorang yang ikut membakar sepeda motor, ditangkap.

Di malam ketika Amir Biki mengucapkan pidatonya, ia dengan suara keras menuntut agar keempat orang yang ditangkap itu segera dilepaskan. Ia sebelumnya sudah datang ke pejabat sipil setempat, agar mereka dilepaskan. Tapi tetap saja pihak militer menolak.

Malam itu mungkin ia menggunakan untuk mendesak lebih jauh. Sebuah pernyataan resmi yang diucapkan Jenderal L.B. Moerdani, orang nomor satu militer Indonesia, kemudian mengatakan, Amir Biki mengirim semacam ultimatum kepada markas tentara setempat: bila pada pukul 23:00 keempat



▲ Panglima militer Try Sutrisno dan Benny Moerdani berbicara dengan media tentang peristiwa Tanjung Priok, September 1984.

AUGUSTINUS RUMANSARA

Augustinus Rumansara kini Vice President Integrated Social Strategy untuk BP Indonesia dalam operasi tambang gas di Tangguh, Papua. Dia dulu dikenal sebagai aktivis hak asasi manusia, lingkungan hidup, dan konservasi hutan. Dia pernah bekerja untuk Yayasan Memajukan Masyarakat Desa Irian Jaya (YPMD-Irja) maupun WWF di Papua. Dia juga pernah mengepalai International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI).

Saya dulu kuliah di Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, Salatiga. Saat kuliah saya ikut upaya membantu orang miskin. Lulus 1978, saya kembali ke Jayapura dan bekerja di gereja. George Junus Aditjondro, teman kuliah di Salatiga dan aktivis lingkungan hidup, tiba di Jayapura dan mendirikan Irian Jaya Development Information Service Center dalam Universitas Cenderawasih. Proyek ini didanai Asia Foundation dan bergerak di bidang penelitian serta pengembangan warga Papua. Lama-lama pihak universitas khawatir, maklum zaman Orde Baru, terhadap kegiatan kami. Mereka minta kami berdiri sendiri dan kami pun bikin YPMD.

Di YPMD saya kenal dengan Ford Foundation yang membantu kami dalam proyek *social forestry*. YPMD juga bergerak di bidang industri rumah tangga untuk membantu penduduk Papua. Pada 1986 saya menggantikan Aditjondro sebagai direktur YPMD karena dia melanjutkan studi di Cornell.

Saya sendiri belajar di Institute of Social Studies, Den Haag, selama 15 bulan. Saya belajar politik pembangunan. Pada 1991, sepulang dari Den Haag, saya diminta menjalankan sekretariat INGI di Jakarta. INGI didirikan beberapa tahun sebelumnya. Sekretariatnya ada dua: Belanda dan Jakarta. Tujuannya mendekati organisasi dan negara pemberi dana pada pemerintah Indonesia agar memperhatikan lingkungan, hak asasi, dan demokrasi.

Di Jakarta sekretariat INGI hanya sibuk menjelang persiapan sidang tahunan. Saya mengusulkan agar *lobby* juga dilakukan lumintu karena persoalannya ada dalam pemerintahan Indonesia. Para pengurus INGI setuju sehingga kami dapat dana tambahan. Tak semua pejabat suka dengan kehadiran INGI. Tapi Menteri Lingkungan Hidup Emil Salim dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Rudini mau menerima kami.

INGI memainkan peranan besar saat

peresmian dam Kedung Ombo pada 1989. INGI protes Bank Dunia karena tak memperhatikan aspek sosial. Bank Dunia menerima masukan kami. INGI juga mengusulkan pembentukan komisi hak asasi manusia sesudah terjadinya pembunuhan penduduk Dili di pemakaman Santa Cruz,



Augustinus Rumansara di lapangan golf, August 2003.

Dili, November 1991.

Pengalaman lain yang sangat berharga di INGI adalah perjuangan hak-hak perempuan. Perempuan adalah yang harus maju. Selama ini, seakan-akan hak perempuan tergantung dari “belas kasihan” laki-laki. Saya termasuk orang yang berusaha agar perempuan diberi porsi sepertiga dari jumlah kursi Majelis Rakyat Papua.

Salah satu perhatian utama saya memang Papua. Di sana pelanggaran hak asasi manusia maupun perusakan lingkungan terjadi dalam dimensi besar. Dulu bersama YPMD saya sering mengkritik Freeport

McMoRan, perusahaan tambang emas di Papua. Tapi setelah menjabat sebagai direktur WWF (1997–2001), saya mengubah strategi dengan memberi masukan dan mendorong Freeport mengadakan perbaikan masalah sosial dan lingkungan hidup. Suatu saat mereka menawari saya bekerja. Saya merasa tak pantas kalau saya rajin mengkritik tapi bergabung dengan perusahaan ini.

Pergeseran populasi antara orang Papua dan “pendatang” juga menimbulkan gesekan sosial. Kini jumlah orang Papua dan “pendatang” sekitar 50:50. Kalau kita perhatikan parlemen lokal maupun pusat perdagangan di seluruh Papua, secara disproportional dikuasai para “pendatang.” Artinya, kehidupan politik dan ekonomi tak sepenuhnya bisa menyalurkan aspirasi orang Papua.

Tapi saya tak setuju para “pendatang” dilarang datang. Indonesia negara kesatuan, dan tiap warga Indonesia berhak datang ke Papua. Kalau program *affirmative action*, terutama lewat jalur pendidikan, yang sedang diusahakan dalam kerangka otonomi khusus Papua bisa berjalan baik, saya kira problem Papua perlahan-lahan bisa diperbaiki.

Pada 1999 BP mulai mengusahakan eksplorasi gas di daerah Tangguh, Papua. Saya mengusulkan kebijakan sosial agar pengalaman buruk perusahaan lain tak terulang. Mereka tertarik dan minta saya bergabung. Saya minta bertemu dengan pembesar mereka di London dan diperlihatkan dokumen yang menunjukkan bahwa mereka serius dengan program ini.

Saya lihat BP mau mengembangkan tanggung jawab perusahaan di bidang sosial. Saya bilang saya tak mau hanya jadi tenaga pelaksana tapi ikut menentukan kebijakan. Maka saya jadi *vice president* BP khusus operasi Tangguh. Ada kritik dari teman-teman tapi saya masih bekerja. Saya ingin Tangguh bisa jadi model penerapan tanggung jawab perusahaan secara sosial.

MELESTARIKAN MASA LAMPAU: NASKAH DAN MIKROFILM

Sebelum abad ke-20, sastra Nusantara banyak berupa tradisi lisan. Tetapi ada juga beberapa bahasa yang mengenal aksara, dan dalam bahasa-bahasa tersebut ribuan naskah ditulis. Naskah-naskah disimpan dalam koleksi pribadi dan perpustakaan kraton atau istana. Para pujangga menggunakan bahan yang cepat rusak (misalnya kertas, daun lontar, kulit pohon, atau bambu), tetapi ada kebiasaan menyalin kembali sebuah naskah apabila yang lama mulai rusak. Dengan demikian, perbendaharaan sastra tertulis Nusantara dilestarikan dan diwariskan, walaupun bahan fisiknya tidak tahan lama.

Sekarang, pelestarian naskah telah menjadi masalah besar. Memelihara sebuah koleksi menuntut pengaturan iklim yang ketat, biasanya dengan pendingin ruang terus-menerus dan mesin penyerap lembab. Sehingga banyak perpustakaan yang menyimpan naskah tidak lagi mampu membiayai perawatannya. Keadaan naskah memburuk, dan yang rusak tidak lagi disalin. Sebenarnya, isi naskah juga semakin jauh dari masyarakat sekarang. Pengaruh bahasa Indonesia sebagai bahasa nasional melemahkan kedudukan bahasa-bahasa daerah, apalagi kalau ditulis dengan aksara-aksara lama (huruf Bugis, huruf Batak, hanacaraka) Dokumen-dokumen yang merekam berabad-abad sastra dan sejarah Nusantara terancam hancur punah.

Menyadari masalah ini, pada pertengahan 1980-an Ford Foundation mulai membantu usaha-usaha untuk melestarikan naskah Indonesia, baik melalui perawatan naskahnya sendiri maupun pembuatan mikrofilm. Sebagai model Ford Foundation mempelajari dua proyek: Surakarta Manuscript Project, yang dipimpin oleh Nancy K. Florida pada

awal 1980-an dengan dana dari Cornell dan National Endowment for the Humanities (sebuah lembaga pemerintah AS) untuk membuat mikrofilm naskah di kraton-kraton Surakarta; dan proyek pembuatan mikrofilm surat kabar dari zaman kolonial di Indonesia yang disimpan di Perpustakaan Nasional di Jakarta (mulai 1984). Ford Foundation, kadang-kadang bekerjasama dengan donor-donor lain, akhirnya membantu pembuatan mikrofilm dari 14.000 naskah yang dimiliki beberapa kraton, universitas, dan kolektor. Duplikat-duplikat dari mikrofilm tersebut disimpan di tempat koleksi asal, di

Riset dan penerbitan dibiayai.

Lalu, bayangkan betapa kagetnya Ford Foundation ketika Roger Tol, konsultan dari sebuah perpustakaan Belanda dengan koleksi Indonesia yang sangat besar, melaporkan (1998) bahwa mikrofilm-mikrofilm yang disimpan di Indonesia akan lebih cepat rusak daripada naskahnya sendiri! Masalahnya jelas, adalah cara penyimpanan dan perawatan: karena iklim perpustakaan dan arsip tidak dikontrol, kebanyakan mikrofilm terkena jamur. Seluruh koleksi mikrofilm naskah di Indonesia, menurut Tol, terancam rusak total.

Tetapi, rupanya ada jalan keluar: suatu proses bernama *hermetic sealing* (pembungkusan kedap udara), yang sudah lama dipakai oleh LIPI di Jakarta. Kalau sebuah mikrofilm dibungkus kedap udara, tidak perlu lagi dikontrol iklimnya. Meskipun Ford merasa pendanaan mikrofilm sudah selesai, Roger Tol menyarankan agar mikrofilm yang sudah dibuat diselamatkan, dan Ford Foundation setuju. Semua film yang telah kena jamur dicuci dan dibersihkan, dan master-nya dibungkus kedap udara. Sebelum pembungkusan, duplikat-duplikat dibuat



Sebuah naskah Jawa dari Museum Sonobudoyo di Yogyakarta.

Perpustakaan Nasional dan Arsip Nasional, dan perpustakaan di luar negeri.

Menurut Ford Foundation, pelestarian naskah bukan satu-satunya tujuan. Sebaliknya, pelestarian dianggap langkah pertama saja dalam proses meningkatkan minat masyarakat membaca, membangun, dan mengenal isi naskah. Atas dana Ford Foundation, katalog, pameran, loka-karya, brosur, dan video mengenai naskah dan pelestariannya dilaksanakan dan diterbitkan. Naskah seluruh Nusantara didaftarkan

sehingga akhirnya ada empat set mikrofilm lengkap, dua di Indonesia dan dua di luar negeri.

Rupanya, masalah melestarikan mikrofilm sudah terpecahkan, paling tidak untuk beberapa dasawarsa. Tetapi melestarikan naskah sendiri masih merupakan masalah yang mendesak. Donor-donor asing boleh membantu di sana-sini, tetapi lama-kelamaan Indonesia sendiri yang harus memikul beban ini – atau merelakan warisannya menjadi abu saja.

tahanan tak dilepaskan, Biki akan “melakukan pembunuhan dan perusakan-perusakan.”

Tak bisa dibuktikan, benarkah ada ultimatum semacam itu. Bagi beberapa saksi, yang dikatakan Biki di pengajian itu kurang lebih hanyalah bahwa mereka akan datang ke arah Selatan ke markas komando distrik militer di Jalan Yos Sudarso untuk membebaskan keempat tahanan.

Tapi ketegangan memang memuncak. Pada pukul 23:00, sekitar 1.500 orang bergerak berarak-arak ke dua arah. Salah satunya ke markas tempat tahanan disimpan. Mereka membawa bendera Merah-Putih dan bendera hijau bertuliskan kalimat syahadat.

Di tengah perjalanan, mereka dihadang sepasukan tentara. Rupanya pihak militer telah siap. Truk dan panser muncul di sana. Ada yang mengatakan bahwa sepasukan tentara yang datang dari belakang para demonstran itu mencegat mereka mundur, mungkin untuk menangkap mereka.

Dalam keadaan itu, Amir Biki, menurut kesaksian seorang yang berada di dekatnya malam itu, mengambil bendera dan berteriak “Maju!” Orang-orang bergerak lagi. Mungkin mereka tak menduga bahwa mereka tak akan dihadapi dengan


gas airmata. Tembakan menggelegar. Amir Biki rubuh. Dua saksi mengatakan ia mencoba bangun, tapi seorang tentara menusuknya dengan bayonet.

Korban lain berjatuh. Mereka diangkut ke Rumah Sakit Umum Angkatan Darat Gatot Subroto dengan truk-truk yang membawa pasukan. Jenderal Moerdani esoknya mengatakan sembilan orang mati dan 53 luka-luka. Salah seorang yang ikut berkhotbah malam itu mengatakan yang mati sampai 400 orang. Kesimpulan penelitian Komisi Nasional Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia enam belas tahun kemudian menemukan 24 mati dan 55 luka-luka.

Tapi bukan hanya itu yang menyebabkan kematian malam itu. Sebagian dari demonstran rupanya bergerak ke arah sebaliknya, ke utara. Di Jalan Jampea, mereka menyerang dan membakar Toko Tanjung Jaya, yang menjual onderdil, bahan bakar, dan minyak pelumas. Apotik Tanjung di sebelahnya urung dibakar setelah diberitahu bahwa yang empunya seorang “Cina Muslim.” Tapi api dari sebelah tak bisa dicegah. Apotik itu juga dimakan api. Esoknya, di reruntuhan toko onderdil ditemukan delapan mayat. Keluarga Tan Kio Liem dan seorang pembantunya mati terbakar.



▲ Berduka saat pemakaman Amir Biki, 1984.
 ► Memeriksa mikrofilm di Museum Sonobudoyo, Yogyakarta, 2003.





Seperti banyak cerita kekerasan lain, kekerasan di Tanjung Priok ini tak datang tiba-tiba. Ia bisa dimulai dari kemiskinan. Daerah Koja, tempat peristiwa itu meletup, dihuni sebagian besar oleh kelas buruh yang bekerja serabutan. Hampir seluruhnya tergantung pada ada atau tidaknya perbaikan kapal. Mereka hidup di jalan-jalan sempit, dalam ratusan gubuk yang saling berhimpitan, yang terbuat dari bahan-bahan bekas.

Menjelang pertengahan kedua 1984, pelabuhan ini, seperti Indonesia umumnya, ikut terpukul oleh resesi yang berpangkal di negeri industri. Proyek-proyek pembangunan pabrik dari luar negeri tertunda atau dibatalkan. Sementara itu, harga minyak dunia jatuh. Petrodollar tak menetes selancar dulu. Investasi dalam negeri merosot. Investasi langsung pemerintah dan perusahaan negara – di bidang yang umumnya menampung banyak tenaga kerja – turun sampai 17 persen.

Kesulitan tak berhenti di sini. Sejak tahun sebelumnya, harga pangan dan bensin naik, karena subsidi dikurangi, berhubung anggaran belanja negara defisit.

Orang-orang Koja yang serabutan pun kian serabutan

– sementara kontras kehidupan tak berkurang. Kelompok bisnis milik Liem Sioe Liong, yang karena hubungan dekatnya dengan Presiden Suharto menikmati pelbagai monopoli, sejak awal 1980-an kian berkibar secara spektakuler. Konglomerat ini bahkan membeli pelbagai usaha dagang dan perbankan di luar negeri.

Seperti sering terjadi, ketimpangan ini menyalakan api rasialisme anti-Tionghoa di lapisan menengah miskin dan kelas paling bawah – dan Liem telah menjadi penanda ke-Tionghoan dan sekaligus indikator ketidakadilan Orde Baru.

Ketidakadilan itu berkait dengan ketidakmerdekaan. Peristiwa Tanjung Priok merupakan insiden di mana kedua hal itu bertemu di sebuah titik api. Yang meledakkannya adalah sebuah komunitas kalangan Islam, yang seperti di daerah Koja itu, secara ekonomis terdesak. Juga tersisih, secara politis.

Maka cerita kekerasan Tanjung Priok juga bisa dilihat sebagai bagian dari cerita politik Islam di Indonesia. Presiden Suharto selalu memandang Islam dan politik dengan sikap syak.



▲ Seorang pengemis di depan klenteng di Pontianak, 2003. Keberadaan sebuah kelas warga Indonesia keturunan Tionghoa yang miskin seringkali terlupakan.

ERNA WITOELAR

Erna Witoelar dikenal sebagai aktivis lembaga swadaya masyarakat. Dia memulai kariernya di Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (YLKI) lalu Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI). Kariernya selalu dalam dunia aktivisme politik. Ketika Abdurrahman Wabid jadi presiden pada 1999, Witoelar masuk kabinet dan jadi salah satu orang kepercayaan Wabid – yang dulunya juga bergerak di dunia aktivisme. Ketika Wabid dipaksa turun, Ibu Erna langsung mengundurkan diri. Sekarang dia memimpin beberapa lembaga dan yayasan. Belakangan, Ibu Erna dilantik oleh Sekretaris Jenderal PBB Kofi Annan sebagai duta besar untuk memajukan Millennium Development Goals.

Pada 1980-an di Indonesia mulai muncul apa yang disebut LSM advokasi. Ini melengkapi LSM pengembangan masyarakat. Saya bekerja di YLKI sejak 1978. Permadi Satrio Wiwoho sebagai sekretaris yayasan dan saya menangani pengujian dan survei. Saya juga sempat jadi direktur eksekutif.

YLKI semula juga bikin program pengembangan masyarakat. Pada 1978 YLKI bikin pendidikan konsumen karena gerakan konsumen di kota-kota lemah, dan lebih lemah lagi konsumen miskin di pedesaan. Kami bekerja sama dengan pesantren-pesantren. Di sana diajarkan hak-hak konsumen antara lain soal pestisida, perdagangan yang tak bertanggung jawab, dan sebagainya. Dananya dari Ford Foundation. Kami bikin di Jombang, Tebuireng, dan Guluk-guluk (Madura). Kami pernah kerja sama dengan pesantren putri Denanyar, milik ibu Gus Dur, di Jombang.

Saya keluar dari YLKI karena perbedaan prinsip dengan Permadi. Ini biasa, tapi pada 1986 Permadi menerima saya menggantikannya sebagai ketua. Pada 1989 saya keluar dari YLKI digantikan Zoemrotin.

Saya ikut mendirikan WALHI. Maka 1980-1986 saya ada di WALHI. Ford Foundation bukan hanya mendukung program tapi juga dukungan kelembagaan, membantu sesuai yang kami inginkan. Tak pernah titip program.

Pada 1986 saya kembali ke YLKI. Konsumen yang paling rentan adalah perempuan dan anak-anak. Paling rentan ketimbang orang dewasa pria. Padahal perempuan pengambil keputusan sebagai konsumen untuk dirinya, keluarganya, dan tempatnya bekerja. *Reproductive rights* dia terganggu atau rentan karena polutan, polusi di jalanan dan polusi rokok. Rentan terhadap promosi berlebihan dari industri susu via

rumah sakit dan dokter-dokter. Waktu saya ketua YLKI ramai lemak babi dan biskuit beracun.

YLKI jadi ujung tombak masalah itu. Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan



Erna Witoelar mengunjungi sebuah tempat pembuangan sampah, Jakarta, 1992.

Keamanan dan Ketertiban Laksamana Sudomo turun tangan. Kami juga meminta Departemen Kesehatan untuk memisahkan makanan berbabi dan tak berbabi dalam penjualan. Tapi YLKI menolak ketika diminta sebagai pelaksana pembuatan label halal, karena di luar kemampuannya.

Ford Foundation mendukung WALHI untuk kampanye biogas, menggabungkan isu ling-

kungan dan konsumen. Pestisida juga masih gabungan konsumen dan lingkungan. Bianti Djiwandono dari Ford Foundation menangani WALHI. Bianti erat hubungannya dengan kami.

USAID juga sudah dapat sejak awal. Ford Foundation lebih banyak mendukung pengembangan masyarakat dan pelatihan. Advokasi lebih didukung USAID, Canadian International Development Agency, dan Asia Foundation. Ford Foundation selalu lebih *subtle*, dukungan institusi selalu lebih kuat.

Ketika saya di WALHI ada kasus pencemaran Kali Tapak di Semarang, kasus pencemaran di Surabaya, dan litigasi pengadilan Inti Indorayon di Sumatera Utara. Lagi-lagi ketika kasus pengadilan itu saya dipanggil Sudomo, “Lha Ibu ini di YLKI bikin masalah, di WALHI bikin masalah.”

Saya belajar dari organisasi konsumen sedunia *Consumers International*, untuk bikin jaringan kerjasama, seperti *Pesticide Action Network*, dan *World Alliance for Breastfeeding Action*. Jadi biasa bikin jaringan. Kami perlu aliansi. Budaya itu saya bawa ke WALHI yang terlalu luas daya jangkauannya, maka perlu dibangun jaringan untuk kepedulian yang sama. Hutan merupakan masalah sampai kami mendirikan SKEPHI, pestisida juga masalah dan kami mendirikan PAN, dan pencemaran membuat dibentuknya SKREPP.

Pada 1990-an, advokasi makin lama makin bersinggungan dengan Presiden Suharto. Banyak NGO menentang pemerintah. Mirip menjelang Presiden Ferdinand Marcos jatuh di Filipina pada 1986. Semua NGO, apapun kepeduliannya, ujung-ujungnya jenuh dengan pemerintahan Suharto. NGO bikin demonstrasi, membantu gerakan mahasiswa, litigasi pengadilan, apapun untuk melawan Suharto.

Setidaknya sampai tahun 1980-an. Ada anggapan bahwa ini karena hatinya lebih dekat ke *kebatinan*. Lahir dan besar di pedesaan Jawa Tengah, ia lebih merasa betah dengan sisa-sisa tradisi lokal yang hendak bertahan menghadapi Islam, sebuah agama yang datang “dari luar.” Soedjono Humardhani, salah satu jenderal yang sejak sebelum 1966 dekat dengan Suharto, dikenal sebagai penganut teguh kepercayaan Jawa ini.

Ada pula yang mengatakan bahwa Suharto, seperti banyak perwira segenerasinya, punya pengalaman buruk menghadapi gerakan bersenjata yang ingin mendirikan Darul Islam (DI) melalui Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII). Bagi para perwira militer, DI dan TII, yang sejak tahun 1940-an melawan Republik Indonesia di Jawa Barat, adalah pengkhianatan. Dan bagi tentara, setiap kalangan yang hendak menjadikan Islam sebagai dasar negara, meskipun dengan cara konstitusional, adalah musuh.

Apapun alasannya, Suharto di tahun 1980-an bukanlah

lagi Suharto yang hanya bicara soal pembangunan ekonomi. Ia Suharto yang terus-menerus bicara soal Pancasila.

Dalam pidato di bulan Agustus 1982 di Pekanbaru, Sumatera, ia mengajukan saran agar semua organisasi sosial dan politik, khususnya partai, menerima Pancasila sebagai asas tunggal. Ketika Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) bersidang di bulan April 1983, ide itu ditegaskannya lagi. Baginya, itulah jalan untuk menghapuskan sisa-sisa konflik, perpecahan, dan kecurigaan. Itulah jalan untuk persatuan.

Tak begitu persis jelas apa maksudnya. Hilangnya perbedaan sama sekali? Bingung dan cemas, pelbagai kalangan menampik ide itu. Bahkan cukup luar biasa: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Gereja Kristen dan Katolik, kaum Hindu dan Budha mengeluarkan sebuah pernyataan bersama. Mereka menegaskan bahwa mereka tak menampik Pancasila, tapi toh tak mungkin mengubah dasar agama untuk organisasi sosial mereka.



▲ Presiden Suharto dan Wakil Presiden Adam Malik mengumumkan Kabinet Pembangunan ketiga di Istana Merdeka, 1978.

CHARLES SURYADI

Pertemuan Prof. Charles Suryadi dan koleganya, para peneliti kesehatan masyarakat, dengan Ford Foundation, berbuah jaringan di mana institusi penelitian kesehatan publik bekerja sama. Jaringan Epidemiologi Nasional (JEN) adalah kumpulan 24 organisasi penelitian yang berusaha mencari solusi atas persoalan kesehatan masyarakat lewat pendekatan epidemiologi, ilmu sosial, dan manajemen kesehatan. Charles Suryadi percaya bahwa orang banyak sebetulnya mampu mengatur dirinya sendiri. Kerelawanan, bukan tidak ada, namun tak jarang ketika tangan pemerintah ikut serta, persoalan muncul.

Ford Foundation membantu penguatan institusi Jaringan Epidemiologi Nasional, dan mendukung kegiatan ke arah epidemiologi sosial dan epidemiologi komunitas. Epidemiologi biasanya klinis – kalau di kedokteran epidemiologi adalah ilmu yang mempelajari penyebaran penyakit, dan biasanya lebih ke arah klinis rumah sakit. Nah waktu itu diperkenalkan pendekatan epidemiologi ke arah kesehatan masyarakat dan sosial antropologi.

Kami difasilitasi membikin JEN yang kegiatannya antara lain adalah pelatihan-pelatihan dan pengembangan jaringan ke luar. Setahun sekali kami kongres, dan kongres memungkinkan pertemuan yang senior dengan junior.

Karena kami bersifat jaringan, maka kami bisa melakukan penelitian yang komprehensif. Misalnya kami melakukan penelitian AIDS yang paling komprehensif, yang dilakukan bukan hanya ke arah kedokteran tapi juga sosial, di 33 daerah penelitian di seluruh Indonesia secara serentak. Ini penelitian AIDS yang pertama yang komprehensif dan bersifat nasional.

Jurusan Kesehatan Masyarakat sendiri kini di berbagai fakultas kedokteran tidak mesti dokter walau pada 1970-an hanya punya program pasca sarjana saja. Di tahun 1980-an, jurusan itu mulai menerima lulusan sekolah menengah. Itu bagus, tapi kesehatan masyarakat di fakultas kedokteran juga mesti berkembang, bila kita menginginkan dokter yang punya pikiran ke arah kesehatan masyarakat. Sekarang ada kecenderungan untuk menghapus kesehatan masyarakat di kedokteran. Kalau itu dihapus celaka. Di fakultas kedokteran, soal kedokteran pencegahan kurang sekali. Ditambah dengan pengaruh dari industri farmasi, kedokteran di sini mengarah kuratif, tidak ke pencegahan. Ini diakui. Ilmu

kesehatan masyarakat bukan hanya melihat pencegahan, tapi juga struktur masyarakat, budayanya, segi antropologinya. Ini penting untuk negara berkembang.

Kami dulu bekerja lewat pertemuan-pertemuan organisasi masyarakat, seperti arisan – waktu itu belum ada *posyandu*. Kami bukan hanya melakukan penyuluhan, tapi



Charles Suryadi di Jakarta, 1995.

memperkuat masyarakat dan memfasilitasi ke arah organisasi, sehingga masyarakat bisa membentuk organisasi. Dengan demikian mereka bisa lihat, bisa identifikasi masalahnya, dan bisa membuat kegiatan sendiri dengan tenaga mereka. Kita, dokter dan ilmuwan lain, cuma memfasilitasi. Ya, seperti program-program pengembangan masyarakat lainnya. Ford Foundation membantu kami, peneliti, dosen di bidang kedokteran dan kesehatan masyarakat, ilmu sosial, antropologi, untuk

bekerja bersama, berpikir komprehensif dan holistik. Bahkan pada tahun-tahun terakhir ini, juga membantu kami bermitra dengan organisasi nonpemerintah dan anggota parlemen lokal.

Contoh yang terbentuk adalah dana sehat untuk orang-orang yang tidak mampu. Kalau mereka sakit, sangat susah. Kita mengajarkan mereka untuk iuran, agar punya yang namanya dana sehat, asuransi kelompok bawah. Selain itu terbentuk juga dana pengurusan balita. Ada ibu yang sukarela, kumpulkan sekitar 20 sampai 30 anak, dilatih untuk taman bermain, dengan makanan yang diperhatikan. Semua dengan dana dari masyarakat itu. Kami dari luar cuma memfasilitasi.

Dalam studi kasus dengan skala yang di bawah kelurahan, saya banyak contoh. Istilahnya, “Bonsainya saya punya tapi kalau bicara hutan saya tidak punya.” Kita lihat di tingkat RW, masyarakat Indonesia hebat sekali kerelawanannya. Tapi kalau udah harus untuk satu kota, lain lagi ceritanya. Mungkin kalau RW unsur pemerintahnya tak terlalu banyak – tapi kalau kelurahan tangan pejabat ada, jadi sering tidak jalan, dan tidak jalan karena pemerintahannya tidak siap. Karena kegiatan masyarakat mengorganisasi diri juga menyangkut kultur politik kita: apakah mereka mau memfasilitasi pembentukan forum yang nantinya selalu mungkin akan mengawasi kerja mereka? Atau, apakah mau si birokrat membesarkan anak macan jadi macan dan supaya dia tetap kuat. Padahal dalam desentralisasi, pemerintah kota harus kuat, dan karenanya forum-forum seperti Forum Kota mestinya dikembangkan. Misal di Jakarta, si gubernur mau bikin sesuatu harus bertanya dulu pada kita sebagai pemilik Jakarta. Lalu kita bisa memberi komentar.



▲ Seorang ibu, anaknya, dan sebungkus garam oralit. Ford Foundation membantu suatu pusat penelitian yang terfokus pada penyakit diare di Universitas Sriwijaya, Palembang, Sumatera Selatan, untuk membiayai kantor pemantauan, konsultan, peralatan, dan pelatihan staf.

NINUK WIDYANTORO

Sepuluh tahun setelah pemerintah Presiden Subarto bergiat menjalankan program Keluarga Berencana, Ninuk Widyantoro bersama beberapa dokter, menghidupkan kembali sebuah klinik di bawah organisasi PKBI. Klinik ini berusaha melakukan apa yang tak dilakukan oleh pemerintah: mendengarkan klien, memberi informasi, dan memberi kesempatan memilih. Ninuk percaya bahwa memilih adalah hak, bukan monopoli yang kaya atau yang berpendidikan – programnya di sebuah desa di Lombok membuktikan hal itu.

Pada tahun 1950-an, karena Presiden Sukarno tidak setuju dengan program KB, angka kematian mencapai 800 per 100 ribu penduduk. Tapi, dokter-dokter bergerak terus. Ada Ibu Soebandrio dan Prof. Hanifah. Mereka bergerilya. Saya ingat, tante-tante saya juga membagikan pil, menerangkan kepada orang di sekitar mereka.

Saat itu semangatnya ke-relawan. Tak ada yang di-bayar untuk menerangkan soal KB ke masyarakat. Ketika Su-harto berkuasa, dia mulai program KB untuk mengatur demografi dan ekonomi. Setelah itu semua diambil alih – dan yang tadinya berdasarkan kerelawanan menjadi program pemerintah. Ada BKKBN tahun 1970. Karena badan pemerintah, semua uang lalu mengalir ke sana.

Tapi pemerintah perlu target pencapaian akseptor – istilahnya saja “akseptor,” sepertinya perempuan hanya penerima. Saat itu pemerintah perlu orang untuk menerangkan, dan yang dipakai orang-orang dari PKBI, semacam pekerja sosialnya. Salahnya, dan ini yang kita kritik pada 1980, program ini tidak mendatangkan kebahagiaan bagi perempuan. Malah di tempat-tempat tertentu terjadi kekerasan karena target merekrut banyak akseptor tadi. Akhirnya semua diberi harga, tergantung kamu bisa meyakinkan orang untuk menggunakan metode KB mana: kalau pil sekian, kalau kondom segini, kalau sistem kalender tidak dapat. Makin lama makin terjadi kekerasan. Bahkan lama-lama orang malas menerangkan, yang penting meyakinkan orang supaya pakai. Perkara mengerti atau tidak, terserah. Akibatnya banyak terjadi kehamilan yang tidak diinginkan. Di masa-masa itulah saya mulai.

Belajar dari pengalaman di klinik pemerintah, saya tahu bahwa kegagalan terjadi karena hal sederhana: informasi tidak lengkap dan kadang tidak akurat. Saya tahu karena bertanya pada klien. Misalnya, “Kenapa hamil, Bu? Katanya minum pil.” Ternyata dia minum pilnya, tapi kalau suami

ada yang setuju tapi takut. Saya bilang ini melanggar hak asasi. Saya juga menulis di publikasi internasional. Di koran lokal juga, *Kompas* yang paling setia. Mulailah konflik panjang dengan BKKBN.

Sebagai konsuler saya menggunakan bahasa hak dan perspektif perempuan. Saya ingin punya pelayanan KB yang berorientasi pada kebutuhan klien. Saya psikolog, jadi saya ingin klien merasa nyaman.

Yang juga penting, kami mesti bertanggung jawab soal kehamilan yang tidak diinginkan. Kalau mereka hamil karena tidak diberi informasi yang benar, apa itu salah mereka? Karenanya kami menangani kegagalan KB – kita melakukan aborsi. Menterinya tahu, tapi diam saja. Tak ada ribut-ribut.

Klien mengambil keputusan sendiri: metode apa yang dia mau. Kita berikan informasi dan penguatan, tapi mereka yang memilih. Lalu ada orang berkomentar bahwa program ini berhasil karena kliennya

berpendidikan dan bukan orang miskin. Yang miskin dan tak berpendidikan, katanya, tak bisa memilih. Bagaimana kami tidak marah? Ini penghinaan. Saya bilang, apakah karena seseorang tak sekolah dan miskin maka seseorang tak bisa berpikir dan merasa?

Saya bikin proyek, di Lombok, untuk membuktikan bahwa orang buta huruf juga bisa memilih. Yang penting bagaimana mengajarnya. Kalau mereka disuruh baca sendiri, ya tidak bisa. Kalau diajak bicara, dengan gambar yang besar, akhirnya mereka mengerti. Kita harus belajar dari keluhan mereka. Meski kita tak bisa langsung jawab, yang penting tanya dulu, lalu kita tanyakan kepada dokter. Jadi kita mesti bikin metode pendidikan yang bisa ditangkap oleh mereka.



Ninuk Widyantoro di Klinik Panca Warga di Jakarta memperjuangkan hak perempuan untuk memilih, 1984.

tidak ada dia tidak minum. Atau minumannya sesudah “begituan” saja. Ada juga yang pakai *intrauterine device* tetapi tak pernah diperiksa.

Ini belum lagi soal mereka yang menderita. Pusing atau mual, dan tidak tahu kenapa. Atau soal susuk yang dipasang untuk lima tahun. Terkadang dipaksa, padahal itu hormonal dan tak semua orang cocok memakainya. Jadi banyak yang perdarahan terus-menerus. Di daerah-daerah Islam, di Aceh, di Lombok, mereka bilang perdarahan sedikit saja tidak “bersih” – lantas mereka tidak bisa berhubungan seks, tidak bisa salat. Malah ada yang tidak tahu bahwa setelah lima tahun mesti dicopot. Pokoknya amburadul Saya tulis soal ini. Orang-orang di BKKBN juga

Di awal Juli 1983, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, tokoh politik Islam terkenal, menulis sepucuk surat untuk Presiden Suharto. Surat itu kemudian tersebar ke beberapa kalangan. Prawiranegara khawatir bahwa pemerintah akan melarang umat Islam mendirikan perkumpulan Islam. Baginya, itu berarti sebuah usaha “membunuh Islam” melalui Pancasila. Padahal Pancasila, ciptaan manusia, bisa ditafsirkan dan diterapkan menurut kehendak dan pikiran penguasa, apalagi yang mengendalikan angkatan bersenjata.

Argumen Prawiranegara mewakili pikiran kalangan Islam yang sudah bertahun-tahun merasa terpojok sejak Masyumi dibubarkan pemerintahan Sukarno di tahun 1960. Sejak itu sebuah stigma dipasangkan ke punggung hampir siapa saja yang dianggap sealian dengan partai Islam itu. Karena dalam usaha merumuskan konstitusi sebagai hasil pemilihan umum 1955 Masyumi memperjuangkan dasar Islam bagi Republik Indonesia, maka Masyumi berarti “Negara Islam,” dan itu berarti DI dan TII. Partai ini, seperti halnya PSI, jadi musuh PKI dan sekaligus musuh tentara. Itu sebabnya ketika Suharto

memegang kekuasaan, para pendukung Masyumi yang besar jumlahnya itu dicegah untuk mendirikan kembali partai itu dalam pelbagai bentuk.

Memang di tahun 1980-an, secara diam-diam, gagasan mendirikan “Negara Islam” masih diyakini oleh pelbagai aktivis politik Muslim. Tapi gagasan itu sudah tak berada di pusat percaturan ide-ide politik generasi yang tumbuh setelah 1960-an. Setelah partai-partai Islam diharuskan bergabung di satu tempat, dan namanya sudah tak memakai Islam lagi, yakni Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), persoalan dasar negara itu seakan-akan telah di luar arena.

Bahkan di tahun 1982, Nurcholish Madjid dan Amien Rais, dua cendekiawan Islam generasi muda terkemuka, dengan jelas menolak Islam sebagai dasar legitimasi kekuasaan. “Tidak ada perintah dalam Islam untuk menegakkan negara Islam,” tulis Amien Rais dalam majalah *Panji Masyarakat* yang diterbitkan Muhammadiyah. “Bagi Muslimin Indonesia, akan sudah berbahagia kalau Pancasila yang indah itu benar-benar dipraktekkan secara konsisten.”



▲ Tentara-tentara Indonesia menggiring anggota Darul Islam di Jawa Barat, 1951.

ZOHRA ANDI BASO

Zohra Andi Baso dari Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Sulawesi Selatan belakangan makin jarang ke Jakarta. "Saya banyak ke kampung, bicara sama banyak orang," katanya. Di sana dia melibat betapa efektifnya program pemerintah yang dianggapnya membodohi warga. Kedua, yang lebih penting, mereka cepat belajar dan keluar dari pembodohan itu. Aktivistis Makassar ini cukup banyak jam terbangnya, dan jarang ada aktivis yang tak mengenalnya. Buat Andi Baso ini justru kekurangan – sebuah pertanda bahwa orang gerakan sedikit jumlahnya dan belum berhasil menumbuhkan kader baru.

Awalnya saya aktif di Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen (YLK) Sulawesi Selatan. Saya jadi peserta saat mereka punya kegiatan kesehatan perempuan yang didanai Ford Foundation. Setelah itu terpikir untuk membuat penelitian soal pelayanan dan hak-hak konsumen KB. Saya percaya bahwa persoalan hak konsumen mesti didasari bukti agar orang tahu ada masalah – bukan hanya kami yang bilang ada masalah. Semua harus digali dari masyarakat.

Dari penelitian itu kita mengetahui bahwa pelayanan KB tidak berdasarkan kebutuhan masyarakat. Selain itu, kami menemukan masih ada "safari KB" Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, yang mestinya sudah dikurangi. Lalu ternyata *provider* tidak tahu hak-hak klien KB. Jadi kalau pun ada pengetahuan di tingkat negara, itu sama sekali tidak sampai ke klien dan *provider* yang berhubungan langsung dengan warga. Kita juga mengatakan bahwa sebenarnya ada pengetahuan lokal yang mungkin bisa dikembangkan untuk menghindari kehamilan.

Banyak yang tidak paham mengapa saya di YLK mengurus KB. Orang kira gerakan konsumen tidak ada hubungannya dengan KB. Padahal dalam gerakan konsumen itu ada isu kepedulian masyarakat dan isu hak. Kita lihat ada persoalan penting yang harus diperhatikan dalam program kesehatan reproduksi. Bukan hanya di kampung, bahkan di kota, banyak orang menganggap bahwa dokter itu selalu benar. Kami mengatakan bahwa mereka punya hak untuk bilang tidak kepada dokter kalau dia pakai jarum yang sama dua kali. Pengertian-pengertian hak seperti ini masih jadi persoalan.

Apalagi kalau kita bicara hak reproduksi lainnya. Dalam salah satu kegiatan HIV/AIDS

kami mengundang Dharma Wanita. Asumsinya, mereka orang kelas menengah sehingga kalau mereka diajak bicara maka mereka bisa menularkan pengetahuan ke lingkungan yang lebih luas. Kami jelaskan soal hak menolak keinginan suami bersenggama, atau hak bertanya apakah si suami bersih. Ada peserta Dharma Wanita yang bilang bahwa itu dosa. Itulah kenyataannya.



Zohra Andi Baso, pejuang hak reproduksi di Makassar, 1995.

Di Sulawesi Selatan, bias gender dalam interpretasi agama, sangat kuat. Padahal hak bertanya ini penting bagi si perempuan agar terhindar dari bahaya AIDS.

Kemarin Gubernur Sulawesi Selatan saat peluncuran buku kenangan akhir masa jabatan, didampingi istrinya, dia mengatakan bahwa perempuan berasal dari tulang rusuk laki-laki. Dua kali dia kemukakan. Padahal baru saja pemerintah Kanada memberi banyak uang untuk pelatihan soal gender.

Banyak sekali pelatihan untuk mereka tapi saya khawatir pelatihan-pelatihan gender hanya digunakan untuk naik pangkat. Mereka perlu mendapat point untuk naik pangkat. Setelah pelatihan orang bisa dapat point, tapi tidak ada perubahan sikap.

Perjuangan masih panjang. Napas kita juga mesti panjang. Tapi tidak ada kata jera. Kadang saya tidak sabar lagi. Rasanya mau perubahan yang lebih cepat. Kita sudah melakukan dengan lemah lembut, tapi rasanya situasi tak bisa kita perbaiki lagi. Orang seperti tak punya hati untuk yang lemah lembut itu. Saya sudah terlalu tua, jadi tidak sabar lagi. Kata orang makin tua makin sabar, tapi saya tidak. Mungkin takut mati sebelum lihat ada perubahan ke arah demokratisasi.

Kelompok perempuan masih belum bisa membuat jaringan yang kuat. Secara internal kami terjebak pada persoalan personal, dan kami belum juga bisa memisahkan antara perjuangan yang lebih besar dan persoalan personal. Sumber daya manusia juga sangat kurang – yang itu-itu lagi, dan ini artinya kami tidak berhasil mendidik dan membuat kader. Selain itu, kelompok perempuan tidak mau masuk ke politik. Padahal program politik untuk perempuan itu perlu, kalau kita mau memperjuangkan keadilan gender.

Kalau bicara pemerintahan yang baik dan keadilan gender, saya percaya bahwa aktivis-aktivis perempuan harus kita dorong dan dukung untuk terjun ke politik. Siapa yang mau kita bantu – tapi kenyataannya sekarang, yang mau berpolitik malah diejek-ejek. Ini soalnya. Mereka tidak mengerti. Mereka tidak mengerti arti gerakan yang sebenarnya dan hanya memikirkan romantisme gerakan saja. Ini kelemahan.

Namun tahun 1980-an adalah masa ketika pandangan ideologis seperti dibangkitkan kembali. Bersama itu, dunia pemikiran jadi beku. Dulu, sejak 1966, Indonesia sibuk dengan persoalan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Tapi 15 tahun kemudian ternyata persoalan Pancasila atau Islam kembali kencang – dan bersama itu, kekerasan.

Kekerasan pertama bukanlah Peristiwa Tanjung Priok. Tanggal 28 Maret 1981, sebuah pesawat Garuda Airlines DC-8, dengan nama Woyla dibajak di tengah perjalanan dari Jakarta ke Medan, Sumatera Utara. Para penumpangnya, 42 orang, disandera. Pesawat dipaksa terbang melintasi batas Indonesia, diduga diminta menuju ke Kolombo, Sri Lanka, sebelum ke Timur Tengah. Tapi ketika pesawat mendarat di bandara Don Muang, Bangkok, pasukan antiteror dari Indonesia menyerbu dan membebaskan para penumpang yang disandera. Empat pembajak, kapten pilot, dan seorang anggota pasukan tewas.

Yang dianggap jadi penggerak adalah Imron. Orang muda bertubuh gempal berumur 33 tahun ini seorang pengkhotbah di Masjid Istiqamah di Bandung. Rupanya ia mendirikan Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia, yang ingin “melaksanakan syariat Islam secara murni.”

Yang luar biasa, kelompok ini juga mempersiapkan persenjataan. Beberapa hari sebelum pembajakan, mereka menyerbu sebuah kantor polisi di Bandung. Beberapa pucuk bedil direbut, dan tiga orang polisi terbunuh.

Ada dugaan bahwa tindakan ini dilakukan karena dalam kelompok Imron ada seorang yang bekerja untuk tentara, yang menjerumuskan anak-anak muda radikal itu untuk berbuat nekat dan dengan itu mudah diringkus. Dugaan ini belum pernah dibuktikan. Tapi bagaimana pun, pembajakan Woyla mencerminkan kerasnya konflik yang diam-diam berlangsung di sekitar Islam dan Pancasila.



▲ Pesawat Woyla yang dibajak berada di bandar udara internasional Don Muang, Bangkok, 1981.
 ► Perempuan Bali membawa sesaji untuk sebuah pura subak, 1985.

NYOMAN SUTAWAN

Nyoman Sutawan lebih dikenal di Bali sebagai orang yang pernah jadi rektor Universitas Udayana. Tapi dia juga dikenal karena minat dan penelitiannya tentang subak – sistem pengairan tradisional petani Bali. Dia sering mengatakan jika sistem subak hilang, maka orang Bali akan kehilangan segalanya. Subak merupakan sistem yang memiliki aspek teknologi, sosial, budaya, dan lingkungan fisik serta terkait erat dengan kehidupan adat dan upacara Bali. Sutawan juga pernah jadi rektor Universitas Marudewa di Denpasar.

Hingga awal abad ke-20 subak dijalankan dengan asumsi air adalah kepentingan bersama dan diatur bersama secara gotong royong tanpa campur tangan kerajaan-kerajaan Bali. Para petani bersama-sama membuat dam dan menggali saluran distribusi air. Subak betul-betul dari bawah. Ketika pada 1920-an pemerintah kolonial Belanda mulai memerintah Bali, mereka mulai melakukan campur tangan dalam bentuk perbaikan dam. Perbaikannya bersifat fisik dan semi permanen.

Dampak negatif terbesar terjadi sejak 1970-an ketika pemerintahan Orde Baru, dengan bantuan dana dari Bank Dunia dan Asian Development Bank, memperkenalkan apa yang disebut sebagai “proyek irigasi Bali.” Ini terjadi karena berkat rezeki minyak, pemerintah punya banyak uang, dan dari Jakarta dialirkan banyak sekali proyek-proyek pembangunan pertanian ke daerah-daerah Indonesia termasuk Bali. Maka terjadilah perubahan besar-besaran sistem pengairan sawah di Bali. Strukturnya diganti. Subak-subak digabung. Saluran distribusi dibangun sesuai dengan kebutuhan proyek irigasi pemerintah. Sejak awal proyek ini tak melibatkan para petani. Maka bangunan-bangunan sistem subak diubah. Pemerintah bukan saja membangun dam tapi juga saluran tersier.

Mereka mungkin berhasil menggabungkan subak-subak secara fisik tapi tidak secara sosial. Dampaknya bagaimana? Pembagian air jadi tidak merata. Hanya daerah hulu yang mendapatkan air. Padahal tujuan proyek irigasi di mana-mana adalah pembagian air dari hulu hingga hilir. Secara sosial proyek ini belum berhasil. Pada 1980-

an ada banjir karena pembangunan irigasi sering dilakukan di lokasi yang tidak cocok.

Para petani mengatakan sistem irigasi ini tidak cocok untuk mereka sehingga banyak yang bangunannya dibongkar. Sekarang para petani mulai menghidupkan lagi sistem subak mereka. Di Bali ada ribuan organisasi subak. Ini perlahan-lahan hidup lagi. Kecil-kecil



Nyoman Sutawan bersama seorang petani di Bali, 2003.

karena lahan pertanian di Bali ini juga tidak luas.

Subak itu intinya harmoni. Ada kesepakatan-kesepakatan bersama soal jadwal tanam, pembagian air, iuran, hak dan kewajiban para anggota subak. Tapi juga ada aspek ritual subak. Filosofinya adalah “tri hita karana” (tiga unsur kebahagiaan). Pertama, manusia harus berbahagia dengan sesama manusia. Kedua, manusia harus harmonis dengan alam. Ketiga, manusia harus berbahagia dengan Sang Pencipta.

Organisasi subak beda dengan organisasi banjar (desa). Banjar adalah organisasi administrasi penghunian atau komunitas.

Subak adalah teritori basah berdasarkan keperluan hidrologis. Sebuah subak bisa beranggotakan warga dari beberapa banjar tapi bisa juga dari satu banjar tergantung keperluan irigasinya.

Saya dulu melakukan penelitian subak dengan sponsor Ford Foundation antara 1983 dan 1999. Ford Foundation juga membiayai penelitian serupa di universitas-universitas di daerah lain di Indonesia, termasuk Sumatera Selatan dan Sumatera Barat.

Sebelum 1980-an Bali memiliki sawah sekitar 125.000 hektar. Sekarang tinggal 85.000 hektar karena banyak sawah terutama di sekitar Denpasar yang diubah jadi bangunan. Industri pariwisata berperan besar dalam perubahan ini karena kedatangan turis-turis ke Bali meningkat pesat. Pemerintah Bali berusaha menghambat alih fungsi sawah tapi tidak mudah karena berlangsung secara sporadis.

Sekarang di mana-mana orang bicara soal privatisasi berbagai perusahaan milik negara termasuk perusahaan-perusahaan air minum. Di Jakarta PAM Jaya sudah dijual kepada perusahaan Suez dari Paris dan Thames Water dari London. Kalau menurut konstitusi Indonesia, bukankah air itu harus dikuasai negara? Kalau privatisasi apa tepat? Privatisasi mengambil asumsi bahwa air adalah *economic good*. Tapi air sebenarnya, dari pengalaman dengan subak, juga terbukti sebagai *social good* sehingga perlu pertimbangan masak-masak untuk menswas-takan perusahaan air.

Kita seharusnya bisa belajar dari pengalaman perubahan subak secara besar-besaran di Bali maupun dampaknya secara sosial, budaya, ekonomi, dan lingkungan hidup.





Mungkin dengan kejadian seperti ini – meskipun bukan satu-satunya – Presiden Suharto punya alasan untuk membangkitkan lagi percaturan ideologis itu. Tapi mungkin juga, baginya, ada sebuah ancaman lain.

Februari 1980, sejumlah perwira pensiunan, tokoh politik tua, dan cendekiawan menyampaikan sebuah petisi ke Parlemen. Yang dikehendaki ke-26 warga negara yang terkemuka ini adalah sebuah perbaikan lembaga-lembaga politik di Indonesia, khususnya Parlemen. Bagi para penandatangan petisi, Parlemen harus lebih menampung suara yang representatif dari warga. Untuk itu, sebuah pemilihan umum yang benar-benar jujur merupakan satu-satunya cara untuk membentuk sebuah pemerintahan yang sah, yang diterima rakyat.

Petisi ini, bisa disebut sebagai Petisi 26, jelas mengancam cara Orde Baru mengendalikan Parlemen – lembaga yang telah lama jadi sasaran lelucon, karena para anggotanya dianggap hanya datang, duduk, diam, dan dapat duit. Juga kritik atas aliansi militer dengan Golkar, sebuah partai yang tak mau disebut sebagai partai, dan jadi mesin pemerintah untuk mendapatkan suara. Aliansi ini menyebabkan pemilihan umum tidak adil. Juga tidak jujur. Dibantu oleh militer, Golkar, dan kekuatan pendukung pemerintah bisa lebih mengintimidasi para pemilih – dan intimidasi memang meluas.

Tapi hasil pemilihan umum yang tak jujur selamanya tak bisa menentramkan. Suharto justru kian merasa posisinya goyah. Melintasi pelbagai kecaman dan tuntutan – terutama dari para mahasiswa di tahun 1978 – Suharto (ia sudah duduk



▲ *Presiden Suharto mengambil sumpah para pejabat pemilihan umum di hadapan anggota kabinet, 1980.*

SANDRA MONIAGA

Sandra Moniaga sering merasa ditantang untuk berkarya bagi sesama. Ford Foundation memberinya kesempatan untuk belajar “seumur hidup.” Dulu Moniaga dikenal sebagai aktivis WALHI, kini ia bekerja untuk HuMa (Perkumpulan untuk Pembaharuan Hukum Berbasis Masyarakat dan Ekologis), yang sebagian juga dibantu Ford Foundation. Namun dia merasa belum berhasil membawa persoalan banyak orang di pelosok negeri ini ke tetangga-tetangga rumahnya di Jakarta. Baginya, ini persoalan serius.

Saat bekerja di WALHI pada 1988, saya diajak merintis pengembangan suatu program baru. Saya mengerjakan isu hukum dan lingkungan. Program ini kemudian menjadi salah satu arena yang mempertemukan gerakan hak-hak asasi manusia dan gerakan lingkungan. Pertemuan keduanya dapat dimungkinkan karena program ini didukung ketua presidium WALHI A. Hakim Garuda Nusantara, yang saat itu juga direktur eksekutif YLBHI.

Setelah berjalan beberapa tahun kami sadar bahwa ada problem sistemik, bukan sekedar kasuistik. Saya melihat ada persoalan yang mendasar: banyak peraturan pemerintah yang tak mengakui keberadaan masyarakat adat, sementara mereka ada dan memiliki sistem-sistem hukum sendiri. Dalam isu agraria atau sumber daya alam, warga di kampung yakin dengan “klaim” hak-hak mereka atas tanah dan kekayaan alam lainnya – karena klaim tanah adat itu berangkat dari realitas bahwa mereka hidup dalam sistem-sistem hukum mereka.

Kita harus melakukan sesuatu untuk mengubah hukum. Harus ada pendidikan hukum kritis agar warga memahami bahwa hukum bukan hanya sebatas pada peraturan perundangan tertulis yang ada. Mereka perlu paham tentang politik dari hukum, filsafat dari hukum. Jangan juga mereka hanya berkutat dengan memahami hukumnya sendiri, seperti hukum adat, tapi juga hukum negara. Apa hukum negara ini?

Pada saat saya mulai masuk ke kampung-kampung, sebagian besar warga berpendapat, “Peraturannya sudah baik, Bu, pelaksanaannya yang salah.” Terus saya tanya, “Peraturan yang menurut Bapak baik itu yang mana?” Kemudian kita mengajak mereka untuk melihat pasal per pasal. Apakah rumusan bahwa “hutan adat adalah hutan negara yang berada dalam wilayah masyarakat hukum adat,” merupakan contoh

rumusan hukum yang sudah baik? Ternyata mereka jawab tidak. Kemudian kita coba pelajari kenapa sampai jadi begini. Mulailah diskusi soal bagaimana peraturan dibuat. Ini gambaran singkat dari pendidikan hukum kritis.

HuMa berusaha memfasilitasi proses yang mendorong perubahan paradigma hukum, bukan hanya dengan anggota HuMa,



Sandra Moniaga memegang sebuah publikasi dari HuMa tentang hukum adat, 2003.

tapi dengan organisasi masyarakat, jaringan organisasi hukum, akademisi dan pihak-pihak lain yang juga peduli. Jadi HuMa mencoba bekerja dengan sebanyak mungkin orang untuk menyebarkan “virus” hukum yang agak berbeda dengan “mainstream” atau arus utama. Analisis bahwa hukum tidak berpihak kepada rakyat, tidak mengakui hak-hak rakyat dan lingkungan, itu tidak terpisahkan dengan paradigma hukum yang dianut oleh para pengambil keputusan utama di negara ini.

Kami sebenarnya mencoba untuk menyebarluaskan pikiran-pikiran yang lebih responsif, lebih akomodatif terhadap keberagaman masyarakat yang ada di negeri ini. Salah satu nilai yang kami sebarkan adalah nilai tentang pluralisme. Kemudian ada persoalan kelestarian ekosistem dan juga ada perspektif tentang demokrasi.

Sejujurnya saya merasakan adanya kemajuan-kemajuan kecil yang telah kita capai atas usaha selama ini. Kalau ditanya apa yang saya anggap “gagal” adalah fakta tentang ketergantungan komponen gerakan sosial terhadap lembaga-lembaga donor. Menurut saya, kerja-kerja kita, kerja-kerja organisasi nonpemerintah itu gagal mengaitkan problem nyata di kelompok masyarakat dengan kelompok masyarakat lainnya di Indonesia. Kami juga “keseharian” sebenarnya – misalnya kalau aksi atau demo dengan orang itu-itu saja. Ketika kami berkumpul, berbicara tentang pembaruan negara ini, ya itu-itu juga. Ketika kami bicara perubahan, misalnya reformasi politik, ya itu-itu juga. Perubahan masalah lingkungan ya itu-itu juga. Lingkaran yang sama.

Tapi, dengan orang yang dekat dengan kita, tetangga depan misalnya, kami gagal untuk bisa membawa persoalan-persoalan yang kita geluti sehari-hari. Misalnya, persoalan yang dihadapi orang Dayak di Kalimantan adalah hal asing bagi orang-orang di sekitar kita. Masalah ini menjadi tantangan dan kelemahan kita. Mestinya kegiatan saya di HuMa bisa juga didanai dari orang-orang Indonesia sendiri. Kenapa saya tidak bisa mendapat dana dari orang-orang Indonesia sendiri? Kami juga seharusnya bisa menggiatkan perdagangan alternatif atau membentuk organisasi beranggota (*membership organization*) di mana orang mau membayar karena kami mengerjakan sesuatu yang mereka yakini benar tapi mereka tidak bisa melakukannya sendiri. Itu belum dilakukan, dan menurut saya itulah salah satu kelemahan kami selama ini.

di kursi itu sejak 1968), mulai melihat bahwa ia terancam akan dijatuhkan. Di pertengahan 1979, sudah terdengar suara perlunya Indonesia mempersiapkan suksesi.

Menjelang akhir 1979, Suharto menangkis. Sebuah amandemen untuk undang-undang pemilihan umum diajukan ke Parlemen. Yang menonjol dari amandemen ini adalah besarnya jumlah anggota Parlemen yang diangkat pemerintah. Bila ditambahkan dengan jumlah anggota militer di Parlemen – sebesar sepertiga dari seluruhnya – praktis mengimbangi jumlah anggota yang dipilih rakyat.

Di situlah fokus kecaman Petisi 26 di bulan Februari 1980 itu. Tapi suara 26 orang tentu tak punya kekuatan apa-apa. Bulan berikutnya, Suharto tetap membawa rancangan undang-undang itu. Tapi kali ini tidak mulus. Limapuluh anggota PPP, semuanya dari Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tak mau mendukungnya, meskipun tak hendak terang-terangan menentang.

Bagi Suharto – ia selalu merasa kurang aman bila tak mendapatkan suara bulat – sikap orang-orang NU amat mengganggu. Dan ini bukan pertama kalinya. Di tahun 1978, orang-orang NU menolak menyetujui Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P-4) diajarkan di sekolah. Bagi mereka, ini sama artinya dengan mengagamakan Pancasila. Kini oposisi NU di tahun 1980 dan ancaman terhadap jabatan kepresidenannya mendorong Suharto untuk bersikeras.

Menjelang akhir Maret, Suharto berpidato di depan rapat para panglima militer di Pekan Baru. Selesai membaca teksnya, ia melanjutkan sambutannya – dan mengutarakan sesuatu dengan nada ancaman. Ia bukan saja menegaskan kembali perlunya militer mendukung Golkar, tapi juga menyebut masih adanya partai politik yang di samping berpegang pada asas Pancasila, juga masih ada asas-asas lain. Ia mengingatkan pula bahwa sudah ada kesepakatan, Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, yang mendasari kekuasaannya, tak boleh diubah.



▲ Papan reklame Presiden Suharto dan istri, Ibu Tien, mengawali prakarsa hidup sehat.

LASO' SOMBOLINGGI'

Laso' Sombolinggi' adalah direktur eksekutif Wabana Lestari Persada (WALDA), sebuah organisasi nirlaba di bidang kehutanan, bermarkas di Lembang Madandan, sebuah desa Toraja, dekat dengan kota sejuk Rantepao, yang sering disinggahi turis. Sombolinggi' berasal dari keluarga petani Madandan. Ia mendirikan WALDA pada 1986 karena kuatir terlibat proses perusakan hutan setempat, baik oleh warga maupun pejabat, untuk diambil kayunya atau dialihkan jadi tanah perkebunan coklat atau kopi.

Pada 1986 muncul kegiatan penghijauan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah. Tapi banyak dari kegiatan ini yang mubazir karena dilakukan tidak dengan cara yang benar. Program dibuat dari pusat tanpa melibatkan partisipasi petani. Warga curiga karena program penghijauan sering disusul dengan investor-investor untuk perkebunan kopi. Pemerintah juga tak mengajak warga untuk ikut dalam perencanaan program ini.

Kami mendirikan WALDA juga untuk melakukan penghijauan sekaligus meningkatkan kesejahteraan warga lewat pendekatan agroforestri dan transformasi sosial. Kami tidak gegabah. Kami mulai dengan penelitian-penelitian, baik aspek sosial maupun ekologi, bekerja sama dengan sebuah lembaga penelitian dari Jakarta. Model risetnya *participatory action research*. Hasilnya, kami melakukan implementasi program ini lewat dua desa: Madandan dan Nanggala.

Dua desa ini ada di Kecamatan Rantepao. Pada 1987 implementasi agroforestri dimulai dengan bantuan dari Ford Foundation (Nanggala) serta HIVOS (Madandan). Madandan adalah sebuah desa, tanpa hutan, sedang Nanggala punya hutan tapi banyak yang sudah rusak.

Di Madandan kami membantu petani menanam tanaman jangka pendek (sayur-sayuran), jangka menengah (coklat dan kopi) maupun jangka panjang (pohon-pohon pelindung). Ini cocok untuk Madandan yang tak memiliki hutan. Ada juga program pembagian lahan. Mana yang dihutankan dan mana yang dipakai untuk produksi. Di sini seluruh warga desa terlibat

dalam agroforestri. Total ada 30 keluarga.

Di Nanggala kami memanfaatkan lahan di luar kawasan hutan sehingga tekanan untuk merusak hutan bisa dikurangi. Warga didorong untuk merehabilitasi lahan-lahan di luar hutan. Istilahnya *buffer zone*. Di zona



Laso' Sombolinggi', 2003

ini dibuatlah *integrated farming* di mana petani menanam coklat, kopi, sayur-sayuran, kacang-kacangan. Pada 1995 kami masuk pada tahap kedua di mana diperkenalkan tanaman vanili. Di sini ada 15 kelompok petani terlibat dalam agroforestri. Masing-masing kelompok terdiri 15 hingga 20 keluarga.

Hasilnya bagaimana? Sekarang ini Madandan adalah desa dengan produksi kopi

dan coklat tertinggi di seluruh Tana Toraja. Tiap hari pasar, seminggu sekali, Madandan bisa menghasilkan 60 ton coklat dan kopi. Nanggala jadi desa paling kaya di Tana Toraja. Hasil panen lalu ada satu rumah yang mendapat penghasilan dari vanili sebesar Rp 1 milyar. Petani paling sial di Nanggala dapat Rp 20 juta dalam kesempatan panen lalu. Panen vanili sekitar delapan bulan sekali.

Pada 1987 ketika Ford Foundation mulai membantu di Nanggala, agroforestri ini diimplementasikan di atas lahan seluas 900 hektar. Kini program ini diimplementasikan pada 5.200 hektar lahan.

Ford Foundation sendiri mulai membantu kami dari sebuah seminar di Makassar yang diadakan oleh Kantor Wilayah Departemen Kehutanan. Ada tiga daerah yang dijadikan daerah percobaan: Nanggala, Gowa dan Maros. Tapi agroforestri di Gowa dan Maros hasilnya kurang sebaik Nanggala. Mungkin karena di dua daerah itu pelaksanaannya kurang lancar.

Krisis ekonomi 1997-1998 tak terasa di sini. Jadinya agroforestri bikin hutan terpelihara dan pertanian maju. Petani senang karena lingkungan terpelihara sedang penghasilan mereka bertambah.

Cuma dampaknya adalah pencurian vanili. Sekarang banyak terjadi pencurian vanili. Para petani bikin ronda sama-sama untuk melawan pencurian. Ini tidak mudah karena wilayah Nanggala luas sekali. Secara sosial kami memperhatikan kalau ada orang yang tiba-tiba mendapat kekayaan secara mendadak maka dia bisa dicurigai mencuri vanili.

Jika perlu, untuk mengurangi jumlah suara mereka yang menyetujui amandemen, ada anggota MPR yang harus diculik.

Di pertengahan April, tampak bahwa sebenarnya ada sesuatu yang lain yang dilihatnya. Dalam sambutan untuk ulang tahun ke-28 Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus), Suharto berbicara tentang tuduhan yang sering diarahkan kepadanya dan istrinya sebagai orang-orang yang menerima komisi dan upeti. Ia menangkis. Mungkin, katanya, tuduhan itu mereka tujukan untuk menyingkirkannya. Tapi mereka (dan ia tetap tak menyebut siapa mereka itu) lupa bahwa bila hal itu terjadi pada dirinya, militer akan melawan mereka yang akan mengganti Pancasila dengan ideologi lain.

Pancasila dan Suharto – bagi Suharto, kedua hal itu tampaknya telah jadi sebuah dwi tunggal. Pada saat yang sama, ia juga melihat Indonesia sebagai sebuah negeri yang terbagi dalam dua kubu: yang menentangnya dan yang tidak. Terhadap pandangan seperti inilah di bulan Mei 1980, 50 orang warga negara – tidak lagi hanya 26 – menulis “Pernyataan

Keprihatinan” yang kemudian disebut Petisi 50. Tak ada satu penerbitan pun yang berani memuatnya. Berita tentang itu hanya muncul di media luar negeri.

Isinya sebuah kritik yang keras, jelas, dan kena. Presiden Suharto, kata pernyataan itu, telah menggunakan Pancasila untuk mengancam musuh-musuh politik. Ia juga melihat dirinya sebagai personifikasi Pancasila, sehingga bahkan desas-desus tentang dirinya telah dianggap sebagai melawan ideologi negara itu. Petisi itu disampaikan ke Parlemen. Dua bulan kemudian, 19 orang anggota Parlemen, dua dari Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) dan sisanya dari PPP, melayangkan sepucuk surat resmi ke Presiden, meminta penjelasan adanya “Pernyataan Keprihatinan” itu.

Suharto kemudian memberi jawaban pada pidato 17 Agustus 1980, tapi tidak secara langsung. Suharto menghindari kontroversi baru. Tapi langkah untuk membungkam Petisi 50 tidak berhenti.

Pemerintah tahu bahwa kelimpuluh orang itu bukan



▲ Pertemuan penandatanganan Petisi 50 bersama Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia mengungkapkan ketidakpuasan terhadap Presiden Suharto, Jakarta, 1980.

► Sesi konseling yang mengharukan di Rifka Anissa, Yogyakarta, 2003.

Organisasi ini banyak membantu korban kekerasan rumah tangga selama lebih dari 10 tahun.

NURSYAHBANI KATJASUNGKANA

Nursyabbani Katjasungkana berteriak lantang ketika seorang perempuan dicerai suaminya karena dituduh tak perawan. Banyak orang bilang urusan ini tak perlu diperjuangkan, karena semata-mata urusan domestik. Nursyabbani tak percaya pada argumentasi itu. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (APIK) pimpinannya menerima ratusan kasus yang dihadapi perempuan. Nyaris semua kasus bermuara pada satu hal: ketidaksetaraan hak antara perempuan dan laki-laki di berbagai arena domestik dan publik.

Setelah delapan tahun berjalan, sekarang APIK sudah punya jaringan dengan sembilan LBH APIK di Indonesia, walau tidak ada hubungan struktural satu sama lain. Meski menggunakan nama LBH APIK – karena mereka adalah anggota APIK – namun mereka merupakan badan hukum otonom. Sejak berdiri kami banyak menangani kasus kekerasan domestik. Berdasarkan pengalaman, sistem hukum ternyata ikut mendiskriminasi dan memarginalisasikan perempuan. Kelemahan ada pada aturan, penegakan hukum, dan juga sikap warga. Pada tiga tingkat itulah intervensi kami lakukan.

Berdasarkan pengalaman kami, kami menyusun rancangan undang-undang kekerasan dalam rumah tangga. Kami juga ikut memperjuangkan agar terdapat penanganan yang terpadu pada korban kekerasan terhadap perempuan, termasuk adanya penanganan secara terpadu di rumah sakit, adanya *women's desk* di kantor polisi, tempat korban tak saja bisa mengadukan kekerasan yang dialaminya tapi juga mendapatkan pelayanan medis dan pemulihan akibat trauma yang dialaminya. Kami juga mengadakan pelatihan paralegal terutama bagi para *survivor* dan tokoh masyarakat, termasuk ibu-ibu anggota pengajian, lewat kerja sama dengan majelis-majelis taklim.

Saya melihat, sejak jatuhnya Suharto, peluang untuk melakukan perubahan lebih terbuka. APIK bekerjasama dengan Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia, telah memberikan arah baru bagi gerakan perempuan di Indonesia terutama untuk ikut meningkatkan partisipasi perempuan dalam proses politik yang demokratis. Cara kerja pun harus mulai diubah, terutama dengan memperbanyak *lobby*, karena konfrontasi kurang efektif meski tetap perlu.

Organisasi nonpemerintah dan pe-

merintah dalam banyak hal sebetulnya bisa bekerjasama. Salah satu contoh saja, pada 2000, pemerintah bekerjasama dengan organisasi nonpemerintah menyusun sebuah rencana aksi nasional untuk penghapusan kekerasan terhadap perempuan. Tapi implementasinya masih tanda tanya besar.

Tak ada usaha untuk memantau pelaksanaannya sehingga kegiatan tersebut terkesan sebagai proyek semata yang selesai



Nursyabbani Katjasungkana di Jakarta, 2002.

setelah rencana tersusun. Padahal seharusnya rencana itu bisa digunakan sebagai dokumen untuk menuntut tanggung jawab pemerintah – dan organisasi nonpemerintah juga semestinya merujuk pada rencana itu dalam program-programnya. Kalau tidak, bermilyar-milyar dihabiskan untuk apa? Pertemuan, bayar konsultan, baik konsultan asing maupun Indonesia, untuk apa semua itu?

Sekarang organisasi nonpemerintah juga harus memikirkan isu representasi. Artinya,


kita mesti bergerak lebih untuk memperkuat legitimasi organisasi nonpemerintah atau organisasi masyarakat, karena saat ini apa pun yang kita lakukan dengan mengatasnamakan rakyat, dipertanyakan legitimasinya. Koalisi Organisasi Nonpemerintah untuk Konstitusi, dulu ditanya anggota parlemen karena mengatasnamakan rakyat atau mengatakan bahwa apa yang dilakukan DPR/MPR tidak sesuai dengan kehendak

rakyat. Mereka bertanya, “Kalian ini mewakili siapa? Kalau kalian mengkritik kami, tidak mewakili rakyat, paling tidak satu orang di parlemen dipilih 400.000 pemilih.” Artinya, kritik bahwa organisasi nonpemerintah tak berakar ke bawah juga mesti dipikirkan dengan serius.

Selain itu, ada juga soal ketergantungan pada dana asing. Soal-soal seperti ini memang sulit bahkan di beberapa tempat menimbulkan persaingan yang tidak sehat di antara organisasi. Saya pikir soal sumber dana, dari mana pun datangnya tak masalah, karena justru hal itu menunjukkan solidaritas masyarakat dunia kepada persoalan bersama. Tapi sebetulnya dana ini tak mesti selalu dari luar negeri karena kita punya potensi filantropis yang begitu tinggi. Misalnya, dengan mengurus dengan baik zakat infak. Coba lihat Dompot Dhuafa *Republika* atau Dana Kemanusiaan *Kompas*. Dalam waktu sebentar ratusan juta bahkan

milyaran rupiah bisa terkumpul. Potensi ini bisa digarap dengan baik, penggunaannya tak harus hanya untuk kegiatan karitatif atau ekonomi saja, tapi bisa juga untuk advokasi hak asasi, misalnya. Apalagi kesadaran tentang pentingnya hak asasi mulai tumbuh dan tak perlu takut dengan penguasa untuk menegakkannya. Barangkali Ford Foundation dapat memberikan stimulan untuk mendorong ini menjadi gerakan sosial dan moral.





orang biasa. Di antaranya terdapat jenderal pensiunan A.H. Nasution, bekas Gubernur Jakarta Ali Sadikin, dan dua orang bekas perdana menteri. Jika mereka ditangkap, lebih banyak heboh akan terjadi. Cara lain diambil: media tak boleh memuat apapun tentang setiap orang yang ikut menandatangani Petisi. Bila mereka punya bisnis, izin usaha mereka tidak diperbarui. Bila ada yang ikut tender dalam proyek pemerintah, namanya akan dicoret. Kredit bank ditutup.

Tiga tahun kemudian, Suharto melancarkan ofensif baru. Itulah yang menyebabkan Peristiwa Tanjung Priok meledak: ia mengharuskan semua organisasi memakai Pancasila sebagai satu-satunya asas. Seakan-akan Pancasila adalah sebuah mantera persatuan, seakan-akan rumus yang manjur untuk menghilangkan konflik adalah meniadakan perbedaan.

Mungkin dengan itu Suharto ingin menunjukkan bahwa yang terancam benar-benar adalah ideologi negara, bukan nasib politiknya. Tapi mungkin juga, tipikal bagi sebuah kekuasaan dengan semangat birokratik dan militeristik, persatuan, dan kesatuan adalah agenda awal dan akhir sebuah bangsa.

Tapi Indonesia bukanlah sebuah impian tunggal. Keragamannya tak terlarai. Perbedaan merupakan bagian hidupnya, yang sering sulit, sehari-hari. Namun perbedaan memang merepotkan bagi sebuah kekuasaan yang ingin bekerja efisien dan efektif untuk membangun, untuk “maju.” Dan ini

tak terbatas pada masalah ideologi negara.

Dengan pembangunan ekonomi yang direncanakan dari atas, hal yang beragam di tingkat lokal sering dianggap menghambat. Keharusan memperbaiki keadaan pangan nasional dengan Revolusi Hijau, misalnya, mendorong pemakaian satu jenis padi di wilayah yang berbeda-beda. Hasilnya mengesankan. Panen beras dua kali lipat meningkat

dan rata-rata kalori per kapita naik 50 persen. Tapi efek sampingnya serius. Ekosistem jadi rentan akan serangan hama, ketika satu wilayah luas mengandalkan diri pada satu jenis tanaman penunjang.

Ketika proyek Kelompok Penelitian Agro-eko Sistem (KEPAS) didirikan di tahun 1983 dengan bantuan Ford Foundation, agaknya rasa khawatir terhadap penyeragaman dari atas itu yang mendorongnya. KEPAS mendokumentasikan dan menganalisis soal-soal yang berkenaan dengan produktivitas tanah-tanah marjinal di Jawa Timur, Kalimantan Selatan, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Pantai Utara Jawa, dan Papua. Pada gilirannya, seperti kata Tony Djogo, orang

Flores yang di tahun 1980-an bekerja dalam proyek itu, para peneliti dan aktivis di lapangan itu juga belajar mengenai politik lokal. Terutama karena kebijakan pemerintah yang turun-dari-atas (*top down*) sering tak merangsang produksi pertanian. “Kekuatan masyarakat tak dibangun, partisipasi tak ada,” kata Tony Djogo.



▲ Petani di Kota Agung, Jawa Barat, 1985.

► Petugas lapangan dari Departemen Kehutanan melakukan inspeksi di Taman Nasional Gede-Pangrango, Jawa Barat, 1985.



▲ Petani membawa hasilnya ke pasar di Sukatani, Jawa Barat, 1985.

▼ Peneliti yang didanai Ford Foundation bicara dengan penyuluh pertanian di Jawa Barat, 1984.





TONY DJOGO

Di usia 27 Tony Djogo jadi direktur Politeknik Pertanian Negeri Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) yang dipimpinnya selama 13,5 tahun sampai 1997. Setelah bekerja dengan Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), sebuah lembaga penelitian kebutuhan berbasis di Bogor, kini Djogo bekerja untuk Konphalindo (Konsorsium Nasional untuk Pelestarian Hutan dan Alam Indonesia) di Jakarta. Tugasnya, mengkaji cara dan peluang pelestarian sumber daya alam dan pembangunan berbasis masyarakat.

Saya lulus dari Institut Pertanian Bogor 1980 dan memutuskan bekerja di daerah saya, NTT. Saya lahir pada 1957 di Boawae, Pulau Flores, salah satu pulau di Nusa Tenggara Timur. Di Kupang, saya jadi pengajar di Universitas Nusa Cendana, sejak 1982 sampai 2000.

Keterlibatan saya dengan organisasi nonpemerintah dimulai lewat *World Neighbors* pada 1983. Pada 1984, bekerja sama dengan Ford Foundation, mereka membuat pelatihan peneliti muda. Ini sumbangan Ford Foundation yang luar biasa: membangun dasar yang kuat di antara peneliti-peneliti untuk memberikan terjemahan hasil penelitian mereka kepada warga desa lewat pembangunan pertanian pedesaan.

Pada 1990, saya jadi salah satu perintis pendirian Konsorsium Pengembangan Masyarakat Dataran Tinggi Nusa Tenggara – kini berubah jadi Konsorsium Pengembangan Masyarakat Nusa Tenggara. Sayangnya, pola ini tak dikembangkan lebih lanjut di NTT. Dalam arti: kawan-kawan universitas dan organisasi nonpemerintah menjadi sangat spesialis dan teknis. Mereka kekurangan kapasitas serta dukungan untuk melakukan analisis terhadap apa yang mereka lakukan, untuk diterjemahkan menjadi masukan buat pemerintah.

Namun yang menjadi tantangan juga adalah tidak jelasnya mekanisme kelembagaan yang memungkinkan integrasi dan komunikasi yang produktif antara lembaga penelitian dan pengguna hasil penelitian (pemerintah dan lembaga bukan pemerintah). Akibatnya, banyak hasil penelitian terbuang percuma.

Di lain pihak, orang-orang kampus terjebak dalam penelitian konvensional. Pola pikir abstrak, yang terlalu teoritis itu,

kemudian jadi bermasalah karena mereka tak tanggap untuk mendekati diri dengan realitas di lapangan. Itu masih terjadi sampai sekarang. Kampus bahagia dengan dunianya, merasa bisa melakukan riset dengan metodologi canggih. Hal ini terjadi di berbagai



Tony Djogo di kebun pembibitan CIFOR, Bogor, 2003.

lembaga penelitian, bukan hanya di Kupang, tapi juga Jakarta. Produk penelitian yang berkualitas di lembaga penelitian tak banyak dimanfaatkan orang atau tak banyak yang menterjemahkannya menjadi strategi dan desain pembangunan serta pelestarian sumberdaya hutan.

Semuanya berhubungan: aspek ekosistem,

komunitas, sistem produksi pertanian, kebijakan pemerintah, dan ekonomi politik. Kita mesti mendapatkan pendekatan untuk membangun pertanian. Kita mesti tahu politik lokal dan politik pemerintah – karena semuanya sangat kuat pengaruhnya terhadap pembentukan faktor-faktor dalam produksi pertanian atau pelestarian sumber daya alam.

Saya selalu berusaha berpikir pragmatis dan menerjemahkan temuan riset, hasil diskusi, *workshop*, dan dialog saya dengan petani, maupun pengamatan saya. Jadi pengalaman lapangan organisasi nonpemerintah, serta masukan dari riset dan observasi, kita gunakan untuk membuat konsep: semuanya dikembalikan lagi ke lapangan, diimplementasikan untuk masyarakat, dan bisa dibuat kebijakan oleh pemerintah. Ini isu yang tak pernah berhasil diatasi sampai sekarang.

Apakah pemerintah membutuhkan riset? Saya sering berhubungan dengan kawan-kawan dari bagian penelitian dan pengembangan di Departemen Kehutanan, yang frustrasi karena hasil-hasil riset mereka tak dipakai dalam pembuatan kebijakan. Penelitian yang berorientasi nonkomersial berbeda dengan yang komersial yang dipesan oleh swasta misalnya.

Isu ini sering saya angkat dalam diskusi CIFOR atau dalam pertemuan dengan Departemen Kehutanan. Apakah riset itu bisa dipasarkan – digunakan nanti dulu deh, tapi bisakah kita meyakinkan publik bahwa ini temuan penting? Kita tak bisa hanya mengirim publikasi, ratusan disebar, biaya pun tak sedikit. Tapi bagaimana kita ciptakan situasi di mana kalau ada satu produk, semua bilang, “Wah itu ada riset baru!” Bagaimana agar hal itu terjadi, itu mesti kita pikirkan.





Atau dalam kata-kata Helmi dari Universitas Andalas, Padang, itulah pembangunan yang ditentukan oleh penyediaan (*supply-driven development*), “Pemerintah punya uang, punya staf, lalu dia laksanakan sendiri tanpa berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat.”

Pendekatan ini tidak efektif, karena perencanaannya tidak berdasarkan persoalan yang sesungguhnya berbeda-beda di satu tempat ke tempat lain. Apalagi ketika desa-desa juga, akhirnya, harus berbentuk satu. November 1979, Menteri Dalam Negeri membuat peraturan yang menyeragamkan kedudukan pemerintahan desa, “sesuai dengan sifat Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia.” Wilayah yang semula beraneka bentuknya, sesuai dengan sejarah dan adat lokal, sejak itu berubah menjadi kelurahan, seperti di Jawa.

Dengan itu aturan administrasi kenegaraan memang bisa lebih rapi. Tapi pengelolaan sumber-sumber lokal, terutama

hutan, jadi berubah. Sumber-sumber itu jadi lebih gampang diatur dari luar, dengan semua kepentingan yang datang dari luar pula. Di Sumatera Barat, penyeragaman pemerintahan desa punya akibat pada kerusakan lingkungan. Penduduk setempat tak lagi merasa perlu ikut menjaga hutan yang dulu merupakan bagian hidup mereka.

Baru di tahun 1984, Departemen Kehutanan meluncurkan program untuk mengelola wilayah hutan yang begitu luas dengan mengaktifkan partisipasi komunitas setempat. Tapi partisipasi masyarakat pada umumnya dipatok di satu wadah.

Sejak awal, Orde Baru hanya mengizinkan satu organisasi buruh, Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI), satu organisasi pegawai negeri, Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Korpri), yang harus punya satu loyalitas, yakni kepada Golkar, dan satu organisasi wartawan, yakni Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI).



▲ Acara Korpri di Stadion Senayan, Jakarta, 1981.

◀ Pengalaman warga pedesaan dalam pengelolaan sumber daya alam meningkatkan hasil pertanian mereka. Bukittinggi, Sumatera Barat, 2003.

Bagi Helmi, pengajar di Universitas Andalas di Padang Sumatera Barat, sistem irigasi melibatkan bagaimana pemakai air lokal mengatur kehidupan bersama. Dan ia percaya bahwa kebanyakan komunitas mampu melakukannya. Kerepotan terjadi begitu pemerintah mulai melakukan intervensi. Karenanya, katanya, ada perubahan yang harus didorong. Kerja sama dengan Ford Foundation memberinya kesempatan untuk mendorong perubahan itu. Irigasi adalah salah satu pintu masuk demokratisasi dan pemberdayaan ekonomi masyarakat.

Banyak penelitian dilakukan perguruan tinggi secara terpisah. Begitu penelitian selesai, baru dikomunikasikan. Tuduhan pun dialamatkan kepada perguruan tinggi yang dianggap hanya bisa mengkritik tapi tidak menawarkan solusi. Strategi yang kami anut agak berbeda. Francis Korten dari Ford Foundation banyak membagi pengalamannya di Filipina.

Kami merumuskan masalah bersama dengan Departemen Pekerjaan Umum. Kami tentukan apa masalah sebenarnya, dan apa penelitian yang diperlukan untuk menjawabnya. Terjadilah proses belajar yang sebenarnya – bukan hanya sebuah penelitian untuk penelitian.

Mereka pun merasa temuan dan interpretasi yang dibuat bukan sesuatu yang terpisah, yang dibuat hanya oleh perguruan tinggi. Memang ada kompromi. Tidak sepenuhnya ilmiah. Kami main di tengah, karena objektifnya mendorong perubahan. Keberatan-keberatan mereka diakomodasi.

Penelitian ini tidak hanya dilaporkan ketika sudah berakhir. Setiap perkembangan dibicarakan dengan Dinas Pekerjaan Umum: dari tahap merancang, penelitian dan interpretasi temuan, sampai implikasi kebijakan. Sehingga ada sesuatu yang bisa kita sepakati. Hasilnya ada. Salah satunya Kebijakan Operasi dan Pemeliharaan Irigasi pada 1987. Banyak hasil dari pembicaraan organisasi nonpemerintah, universitas, dan Pekerjaan Umum masuk ke dalam kebijakan itu.

Model kerjasama seperti ini lalu diteruskan di mana-mana, baik di Departemen Kehutanan, Departemen Pertanian, maupun Departemen Kelautan.

Pemerintah sering berasumsi masyarakat tidak mampu, sehingga pemerintah harus menyediakan kebutuhan dan pelayanan umum dalam bidang irigasi. Katakanlah membersihkan saluran. Kegiatan

yang sebelumnya dilakukan masyarakat secara gotong royong, lantas diambil alih pemerintah.

Contoh lainnya, bangunan irigasi. Di Bali ada yang namanya *tek-tek*. Itu pola pembagian air yang otomatis. Pakai kayu, lalu diberi lobang. Kalau air mengalir, setiap lahan mendapat air sesuai dengan lebar lobangnya. Ini teknologi yang rendah intensitas pengelolannya. Tidak perlu ada orang yang membuka dan menutup pintu air. Lalu



Helmi, 2003.

Pekerjaan Umum datang dengan asumsi semua yang dari warga kolot. Dipasanglah kotak pembagi air dengan pintu. Karena pakai pintu, mesti sering dikontrol, pagi dan sore. Kalau air besar dan pintu tidak dibuka, tanaman hancur. Ini teknologi yang tinggi tingkat intensitas pengelolannya. Petani tidak suka. Mereka bilang teknologi pemerintah ketinggalan. Mereka bisa mengurus ini dengan ongkos dan kesibukan yang lebih sedikit. Yang seperti ini terjadi.

Dalam teori, hal seperti itu disebut pembangunan yang ditentukan oleh penyediaan

(*supply-driven development*): pemerintah punya uang, punya staf, lalu dia laksanakan sendiri tanpa berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat. Kami berusaha mengubahnya menjadi kombinasi antara *supply-driven* dan *demand-driven*, ditentukan permintaan. Jadi pemerintah perlu paham dulu persoalannya apa, kebutuhannya apa, dan mereka merespon itu. Yang penting, sebelum pemerintah mengintervensi pembangunan, pahami dulu kondisi sosial ekonomi dan fisik teknisnya.

Kebijakan pemerintah memang menyediakan semua hal untuk warga masyarakat. Tapi sering tidak efektif dalam pelaksanaannya, karena perencanaan tidak didasarkan pada realitas persoalan yang berbeda-beda dari satu tempat ke tempat lain. Mereka mau membuat standar, “*one size fits all*,” sehingga tidak efektif.

Modernisasi irigasi perlu – tetapi tidak dengan pola *supply-driven* melainkan harus sesuai dengan kondisi fisik irigasi yang bersangkutan. Itu penting. Jadi kita bukan antipemerintah atau modernisasi. Hanya mencari yang pas.

Kami berjuang untuk mendorong perubahan, tapi dengan kesadaran bahwa perubahan tidak terjadi dalam sekejap. Ini berbeda dari mereka yang mengatakan pemerintah “zalim,” dan karenanya harus dilawan. Kalau rumusnya begitu, memang harus konfrontatif tanpa menawarkan jalan keluar. Akan lain kalau kita lihat bahwa perubahan harus kita dorong. Dengan sadar kita masuk ke persoalan, dan memikirkan bagaimana perubahan bisa kita lakukan.

Seringkali perubahan tidak bisa drastis. Kalau drastis ada pihak yang merasa kalah. Kalau ada yang merasa kalah, selalu saja resisten. Di situ pentingnya seni mendorong perubahan: bagaimana membuat orang tidak merasakan perubahan yang dilakukan.

ENERGI KOMIK: UMAR KAYAM

Pada 1980-an Umar Kayam (1933-2002) suka menjelajahi jalanan Yogya dengan Toyota butut, lalu makan sambil ngobrol dengan teman-temannya. Kayam tergolong manusia serba bisa: novelis, kolumnis, pejabat, aktivis, intelektual, aktor, kritikus seni, dan penggemar makanan enak.

Minat Kayam pada makanan adalah satu kunci daya tariknya. Rasa hormat kepadanya timbul bukan saja karena deretan karya sastranya yang mengesankan, tapi juga karena kedermawanan dan kepemimpinannya yang membumi, yang membuatnya jadi magnet kehidupan sosial. Bahkan ketika masih mahasiswa, “Kayam ada di belakang tiap peristiwa seni di Universitas Gadjah Mada,” kata Koesnadi Hardjosoemantri, mantan rektor universitas tersebut.

Bagaimana orang ini bisa aktif di mana-mana dan tetap jadi dirinya sendiri? Kayam, yang meninggal pada usia 69 tahun, tak pernah bersikap serius mengenai dirinya sendiri. Ia menerawakan kekurangannya sendiri, menikmati godaan temannya, dan membuat lelucon. Seorang dramawan Yogya ingat bagaimana ia suatu kali “dihukum” Kayam untuk suatu pelanggaran ringan – dengan menyuruhnya bermain drama.

Rendra, tokoh teater Indonesia, merasa Kayam punya bakat besar sebagai sutradara panggung, tapi “itu bukanlah nasibnya.” Nasib membawanya ke tempat lain.

Ada suatu masa ketika Kayam ingin membawa perubahan dengan bekerja di dalam sistem kekuasaan. Ia kecewa atas tendensi totaliter “Orde Lama” Bung Karno. Maka ia aktif di belakang layar me-nyiapkan jalan bagi Orde Baru. Belakangan Presiden Suharto menunjuknya sebagai Direktur Jenderal Radio, Televisi, dan Film.

Meski ia jadi figur penting dalam mesin propaganda Orde Baru, Kayam terlalu bebas jiwanya untuk hanya jadi alat. Contohnya, ia mengizinkan beroperasinya

stasiun radio swasta, dan mengizinkan stasiun radio dan televisi pemerintah menayangkan iklan, sehingga mengurangi ketergantungan mereka pada biaya negara. Ia menarik pajak bagi film-film impor guna membiayai suatu lembaga mandiri yang mendukung film Indonesia.

Sudah dapat diduga, pemerintah Orde



Umar Kayam, direktur pertama Pusat Pelatihan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial di Makassar, 1974.

Baru segera membuangnya. Belakangan, Dewan Kesenian Jakarta memilihnya sebagai ketua dan mempercayainya untuk mengatur program-program pusat kesenian Taman Ismail Marzuki. Di sinilah Kayam menciptakan apa yang oleh kritisi diingat sebagai “zaman keemasan seni pertunjukan Indonesia.” Kayam tak begitu peduli pada gengsi dan sukses ketimbang nilai kontribusinya. Barangkali inilah alasan mengapa ia terbang “dari satu sarang ke sarang lain,” resah mencari tantangan baru.

Cerita-cerita pendeknya tentang New

York ditulis selama tahun-tahun susahya sebagai mahasiswa Cornell University. Cerita-cerita pendek itu seperti kenangan, seperti laporan dari masa lalu, yang kita semua pasti memilikinya, ketika orang-orang berbagi hal-hal kecil dari sesuatu yang belum terpenuhi, barangkali bahkan sesuatu yang tak pernah berawal.

Bahasanya bersih dari kembang-kembang verbal, tokoh-tokohnya dikuliti dari sejarah pribadi dan suara batin. Tak ada khotbah, tak ada sikap sok tahu. Detail muncul hanya dalam ingatan pribadi kita.

Istrinya mengingat Kayam “mengetik cerita pendeknya di depan lemari es yang terbuka” karena mereka tak bisa membeli mesin pendingin ruang. Kayam mengatakan ia menulis cerita pendek dengan bersumberkan koran yang dibuang tetangganya. Ia lebih tertarik kepada comotan dan cabikan kecil ketimbang seluruh tubuh cerita. Dengan hanya mengungkapkan sedikit, Kayam mendorong pembaca menafsirkan sendiri teksnya. Dengan seakan-akan “tanpa teknik,” ceritanya meluncur secara literer, sebab yang tersusun adalah rentangan beranekaragam realitas yang bersinar-sinar.

Ini kunci dasar “nonteknis” sastra yang melekat dan membawa seberkas cahaya dalam begitu banyak realitas kehidupan.

Dalam novelet-noveletnya, *Sri Sumarah* dan *Bawuk*, Kayam memberi ruang yang lebih besar bagi konteks. Dengan kata lain, sang tokoh utama pun memasuki sejarah. Tapi di sini muncul masalah, karena Kayam tak hanya bercerita; ia lebih banyak menjelaskan tentang hal-hal yang berhubungan dengan orang Jawa.

Nama Sri Sumarah mengisyaratkan karakternya: ulet, tunduk, pasrah kepada nasib. Ia seorang desa yang manganut nilai priyayi, tapi bernasib sial dan miskin. Kayam ingin melihat seberapa jauh ia akan mendamaikan takdir sosialnya dengan kenyataan modern. Sri Sumarah telah banyak kehilangan



Abli ilmu politik Mochtar Pabottingi, membacakan eulogi mengenang Umar Kayam, Yogyakarta, 2003.

— suami, anak perempuan, menantu — dan ia telah berjuang melawan semuanya. Ia seorang janda kesepian yang harus merawat cucunya, seorang tukang pijat yang berjuang melawan kemiskinan dan rayuan lelaki yang tak ia inginkan. Tapi ia masih berpegang pada nilai priyayi: bangga, setia, dan suci.

Dalam *Bawuk*, berlatar belakang pergolakan di Jawa pada 1965, Kayam jadi sedikit lebih berani, meregangkan tema yang sama untuk melukiskan pemberontakan sang tokoh perempuan yang, seperti sudah dapat diduga, berakhir gagal. Tak satu pun yang dilakukan perempuan pemberani ini yang tak akan membuat gusar para dewa. *Bawuk* meninggalkan anaknya, melarikan diri bersama seorang komunis, dan hidup sebagai buronan. Ia begitu penuh teka-teki, hingga dialah prestasi puncak sang novelis: seorang pahlawan perempuan tak terlupakan.

Novel utama Kayam, *Para Priyayi*, ditulis dengan bantuan dana dari Ford Foundation — bantuan pertama yang pernah diterima seorang Indonesia untuk penulisan individual. Pada akhirnya, yang ditulisnya bukanlah sepenuhnya sebuah fiksi, melainkan lebih berupa sebuah risalah sosiologis yang difiksikan. Sang pengarang yang limpad tak terasa hadir lagi. Kayam di sini bukan lagi sebagai pencatat, tapi seorang ilmuwan sosial dan penulis sejarah aristokrasi Jawa.

Dalam menceritakan tiga generasi keluarga Sastrodarsono, Kayam dengan cermat memberikan suara yang sama kepada para tokohnya. Meski demikian, ada anasir otobiografi yang tertinggal. Kita semua kenal Sastrodarsono, seorang guru yang mengabdikan kepada pemerintah kolonial, dan keturunannya sebagai priyayi. Bencana seperti pendudukan Jepang, pemberontakan

komunis di Madiun, dan perebutan kekuasaan 1965, justru memperkuat, ketimbang mengurangi, kepercayaan mereka terhadap sistem nilai aristokratis, yang menganggap menyimpang dari norma berarti malapetaka.

Kolom Kayam, di harian *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, kemudian dikumpulkan dalam satu buku *Mangan Ora Mangan Kumpul*. Di sini tampak banyak sisi lain Kayam — suatu energi komik yang riang gembira. Ini bisa dikatakan bentuk modern dari bagian lucu pertunjukan wayang Jawa, *goro-goro*, di mana Kayam dengan lelucon dan ironi, membuat enteng pertentangan kelas. Meski ia masih menjunjung nilai-nilai tertinggi orang Jawa — keselarasan dan kedamaian — yang otentik ditemukannya dalam hal-hal sepele, dalam “keseharian,” dan ia mengundang semua orang untuk bergembira.

Perbedaan tentu saja tak dihilangkan. Tapi Orde Baru adalah sebuah birokratisasi perbedaan. Perbedaan yang ada adalah perbedaan yang telah diresmikan. Partai-partai politik dipangkas, hingga hanya dua yang lain di samping Golkar. Dalam PDI, orang-orang dari PNI harus bergabung dengan orang Partai Katolik atau Kristen. Dalam PPP, orang-orang NU antara lain harus bergabung dengan orang-orang Muhammadiyah.

Perbedaan agama juga dikendalikan. Kong Hu Cu dan kepercayaan lokal, termasuk *kebatinan* di Jawa dan *aluk to dolo* di Toraja, secara resmi ditolak, atau dijadikan sesuatu yang lain. Tapi tiap orang harus beragama. Akhirnya yang sama sekali berbeda pun mencoba menyesuaikan diri dengan yang sudah

diresmikan: suku Kodi di Sumba Barat, misalnya, mencoba mempunyai “agama” dengan menekankan apa yang sejajar antara kepercayaan itu dan praktek orang Kristen. Suku Wana di Sulawesi Tengah, yang dikategorikan sebagai “suku terasing” yang “belum beragama,” menyusun “agama”-nya dari aturan makan, pemakaman, dan pengobatan.

Kategori jadi penting, bahkan menentukan. Adat setempat “dihormati,” tapi dengan itu berarti “dikembangkan.” Ukuran pengembangan ini tentu saja diputuskan oleh kekuasaan di daerah itu. Seorang antropolog yang berkunjung ke tenggara kota Palu, Sulawesi Tengah, di tahun 1980 melihat bagaimana camat setempat mengharuskan agar “suku terasing” di desa Da’a mengiringi musik oral mereka, *lalundu dan roya*,



▲ Musisi dari Rote, Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003. Instrumennya, yang tersembunyi dalam resonator dari lontar, terbuat dari bambu dan disebut sasando.

► Para penari dari Kabupaten Belu, Timor barat, 1997. Nyanyian mereka direkam untuk salah satu CD Smithsonian/MSPI.

EDI SEDYAWATI

Ketika menjabat sebagai Direktur Jendral Kebudayaan dari Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Edi Sedyawati sering dianggap sebagai “orang pemerintah” yang bisa diandalkan bagi mereka yang di luar pemerintahan – dan ini penting, karena di zaman Orde Baru, tak mudah mencari pejabat yang bisa diajak bicara. Program museum adalah salah satu hal yang dikuasainya. Dengan gaya Jawa yang halus, ia menerangkan mengapa lembaga museum masih saja sulit dinikmati oleh banyak orang di negeri ini.

Program pendidikan museologi sudah dimulai sebelum saya menjadi direktur jenderal. Tapi saat saya menjabat, kerja sama program itu dengan Ford Foundation masih berlangsung dan masih ada orang-orang yang dilatih. Bahkan ada staf museum yang dikirim untuk program magister. Ini semua untuk meningkatkan keahlian dan memperluas wawasan calon pemimpin museum. Diharapkan mereka mendapatkan pemahaman mengenai standar perlakuan, baik terhadap koleksi maupun publik. Mereka diharapkan bisa mendapatkan gagasan untuk mengembangkan museum di sini.

Selama menjabat, saya berusaha menggenjot apresiasi masyarakat pada museum. Tapi yang pertama perlu ditumbuhkan adalah motivasi pelaku museum. Pengelola museum mesti punya kesadaran untuk melakukan sesuatu yang atraktif dan edukatif untuk meningkatkan mutu informasi. Di tempat tertentu usaha ini berhasil, namun di tempat lain tidak.

Di tiap museum ada dua urusan pokok yang berhubungan dengan pameran. Pameran tetap dan pameran khusus. Yang khusus ini sering ditunjang oleh kegiatan-kegiatan khusus pula. Cukup banyak yang sudah melakukan kegiatan seperti itu – misalnya, Museum Nasional pernah membuat kegiatan soal mainan anak-anak dengan demonstrasi, diskusi, dan sebagainya. Cuma memang rasanya kita masih butuh memperluas lingkaran penikmat yang bisa mengambil manfaat dari acara dan apa yang ada di museum. Pengembangan peminat museum itu mesti dilakukan secara sadar dengan kiat yang jelas.

Konotasi kebanyakan orang terhadap museum, jelek. Coba saja, seorang anak mengambil studi yang tidak disukai orang tuanya, misalnya sejarah. Si anak bertanya pada orang tuanya, “Kalau studi sejarah

apa ya nanti kerjanya?” Orang tua akan bilang, “Paling di museum.” Kayaknya hina sekali kalau kerja di museum.

Namun kita mesti sadar bahwa museum memang suatu institusi baru, bukan institusi tradisional. Konsep museum harus diperkenalkan pada masyarakat.

Kalau di Indonesia, usaha yang sudah



Edi Sedyawati di Jakarta, 1986.

dilaksanakan misalnya program wajib kunjung museum untuk menanamkan pengenalan museum. Kami bekerja sama dengan Kantor Dinas Pendidikan di seluruh Indonesia. Sebagai program sudah baik, tapi kualitas dari kunjungan itu yang mesti diperbaiki.

Seringkali rombongannya terlalu besar sehingga perhatian pada narasumber kurang. Sepertinya yang lebih ditekankan adalah formalitas: anak sudah ke museum, sudah menulis laporan, walau secara asal mencatat label. Jadi bukan apresiasi yang diinternalisasi. Bagaimana menimbulkan

apresiasi inilah yang masih kita usahakan. Sudah tentu perlu petugas edukatifnya dan pemahaman guru tentang apa perlunya program ini.

Ada sejumlah teman di museum yang sudah datang dulu ke sekolah sebelum kunjungan murid-murid ke museum. Mereka menemui guru dan memberi ceramah, dan setelah itu baru ke museum. Pendekatan seperti ini ternyata menimbulkan hasil yang berbeda. Jadi, saya kira, apa yang sudah dilakukan itu perlu dihargai – jangan dipikir semua museum itu jelek. Bahwa masih sangat kurang dibanding yang kita butuhkan, memang.

Saya pernah punya program yang disebut Sistem Informasi Kebudayaan Terpadu. Kita menghimpun dengan sistematis data tertentu data kebudayaan, antara lain data koleksi museum. Kita ingin punya sistem data terpadu. Jadi kalau kita hendak mencatat tentang suatu benda perlu jelas, apanya yang mesti dicatat. Jenisnya, bahannya, ukurannya. Ini penting karena sebelumnya museum punya cara registrasi sendiri, kantor purbakala punya cara sendiri, pusat penelitian arkeologi nasional punya cara sendiri juga. Informasi yang terpadu akan banyak manfaatnya. Misalnya bisa dikemas untuk Pojok Informasi di museum,

sehingga kalau orang berkunjung ke Museum Ronggowarsito, misalnya, lalu tertarik pada sebuah mahkota, dia lantas bisa mengakses berbagai data soal mahkota tersebut dan juga mahkota lain di mana saja.

Waktu itu dalam satu tahun kami sudah bisa menyelesaikan struktur data. Ini termasuk cepat. Lalu kami sudah mengemas beberapa CD-ROM dengan beberapa topik khusus. Sekarang penggunaannya belum jelas. Itu membuat saya agak kecewa. Padahal ini sebuah modal. Mungkin karena pejabat ganti dan yang baru tidak terlalu punya motivasi. Itu juga masalah.





dengan tarian agar sesuai dengan kebudayaan daerah Palu.

Di masa itu, “kebudayaan daerah” berarti “puncak kebudayaan daerah.” Namun mana yang “puncak,” yang dalam tradisi Jawa disebut *adiluhung*, tidak jelas dari mana ditentukan, dan dengan apa didasarkan. Yang *adiluhung*, yang dianggap ekspresi kebudayaan luhur yang bertahan dalam sejarah, acapkali hidup hanya sebagai mitos. Di tahun 1985, Nancy Florida, ilmuwan dari University of Michigan yang memulai proyek memikrofilmkan naskah sastra Jawa di perpustakaan Keraton Mangkunegaran di Surakarta, Jawa Tengah, terkejut melihat betapa rusaknya khasanah itu. Robek, dimakan ngengat, kotor, berdebu, dan ada yang berpuluh-puluh tahun lamanya tak pernah dibuka.

Meskipun demikian, ada kecenderungan kuat bahwa yang bukan *adiluhung* harus menyesuaikan diri, atau hilang.

Seperti kata Endo Suanda, etnomusikolog yang menyusun sebuah kurikulum untuk memperkenalkan pluralisme budaya, waktu itu “kultur-kultur yang marjinal terhapuskan dari peta. Identitas provinsi selalu mengambil yang paling “kuat,” yang paling dianggap “baik.” Ketika bicara tentang kebudayaan daerah Sumatera Barat, misalnya, ekspresi kebudayaan dari Kepulauan Mentawai tak dikemukakan.

Birokratisasi perbedaan menghapus dan menyihkannya. Apalagi yang berbeda dan tak termasuk dalam kategori. Ia menjadi terasa ganjil dan tidak sah. Terutama jika tak ada kekuatan politik yang mendukungnya. *Wayang po-te-hi*, salah satu tradisi orang Tionghoa di Jawa, hanya diizinkan untuk dimainkan di kelenteng-kelenteng yang tertutup. Penganut Kong Hu Cu harus menggabungkan diri dengan Budhisme. Tak mengherankan bila orang Tionghoa merasa



▲ Kebakaran pada huru-hara anti-Tionghoa di Solo, 1982.

ENDO SUANDA

Endo Suanda tabu betul rasanya dianggap sebagai seniman terbelakang dan kasar. Ketika masih menari, dia sering diejek saat pertunjukan di Bandung, sebagai penari dari desa. Saat ia belajar di AS, tentang nilai universal kesetaraan kebudayaan, dia cepat menangkap esensi pemikiran itu. Sedibnya, sampai kini, Endo masih melihat kuatnya pola pikir bahwa ada kebudayaan yang lebih maju dan lebih baik dari lainnya. Kini etnomusikologi ini melawan. Dia mengerjakan beberapa program untuk menimbulkan kesadaran soal pluralisme budaya.

Setelah mengambil beberapa mata kuliah di Wesleyan University, Connecticut, saya diperkenalkan dengan berbagai nilai musik. Saya lebih sadar lagi soal pertanyaan besar: “Apakah nilai universal?” Diskusi-diskusi membawa kultur yang berbeda satu dari lainnya – dan kita tidak bisa memakai nilai-nilai kita untuk mengerti orang lain.

Sekitar akhir 1970 kita jarang mengenal isu seperti itu. Di sini isunya sangat developmentalis. Orang bicara “pengembangan,” bicara “mengangkat” kebudayaan yang beratus macam. Seolah-olah kita percaya ada satu nilai yang bisa menjadi acuan untuk semua tradisi, dari manapun di Indonesia, supaya dianggap “maju.” Dalam forum-forum festival, misalnya festival koreografer muda atau komposer muda, yang dibicarakan soal “pengembangan” itu.

Yang paling menyedihkan, sejak lama orang desa diajari bahwa yang baik adalah yang di kota. Kesenian harus seragam, harus tertib; kesenian harus banyak orang, harus ramai. Itu sudah merasuk dalam-dalam, sehingga mereka tidak peka lagi terhadap nilai-nilai mereka sendiri. Kita tahu ada lomba hampir setiap tahun. Lomba menentukan arah karena ada yang menang, ada yang tidak. Yang utama, yang menjadi doktrin, kesenian harus rapi, besar, dan adiluhung. Dulu ada angklung 1.000 orang, kuda lumping 1.000 orang, talempong yang diperbanyak; musisinya yang tadinya tujuh orang dijadikan 40 orang. Artinya mereka tidak nyaman lagi menunjukkan diri sebagaimana dirinya.

Bukannya saya mencoba supaya mereka kembali pada zamannya, tapi bagaimana mereka sadar mengenai mereka sendiri. Batasan antara tradisional dan modern sangat tidak jelas. Tradisi tak bisa dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang mati. Tradisi yang hidup selalu berubah – tapi perubahan itu terjadi sebagai

hasil dinamika internal.

Metodologi kita untuk analisis itu sangat lemah. Di musik juga begitu – mungkin karena secara teknis sulit dan minat yang kurang: untuk apa sebuah nyanyian desa kita diskusikan, misalnya.

Kita pun lemah dalam metodologi kontekstualnya. Etnomusikologi bukan ilmu yang mempelajari bagaimana membuat musik untuk Anda sendiri sebagai seniman. Bicara etnomusikologi, kita bicara soal



Endo Suanda, siap mendokumentasikan sebuah pertunjukan, Jakarta, 1997.

penelitian – penelitian adalah kuncinya. Kita harus menghargai bentuk kebudayaan lain untuk bisa meneliti.

Perhatian saya pada pluralisme budaya. Instrumen apa yang kita miliki? Masuknya lewat apa? Saya pikir kesenian yang paling gampang. Kalau masuknya dari agama, susah. Kesenian berhubungan dengan agama, sistem pertanian, dan sistem komunitas. Lewat kesenian bisa masuk ke mana-mana untuk memahami budaya.

Kita merancang pelajaran kesenian untuk sekolah umum dengan pendekatan apresiasi. Pendekatan kami lebih umum sifatnya – lebih banyak memberi pemahaman berbagai kultur. Konteksnya, selama ini kultur-kultur yang marjinal terhapuskan dari peta karena tidak dianggap hebat. Jadi yang bukan tradisi aduhung hilang dari peta. Identitas provinsi selalu mengambil yang paling “kuat,” yang dianggap paling “baik.” Misalnya, kalau kita bicara Sumatera Barat, Mentawai hilang dari peta. Sama juga dengan Jawa, Batang hilang. Lihat saja Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. Atau di buku peta. Satu provinsi, satu jenis rumah, dan satu pakaian adat.

Sepuluh tahun terakhir ada gerakan mencari yang “asli.” Ini pun ekstrim dan sifatnya reaktif: karena merasa sekian lama diabaikan dan dihilangkan dari peta nasional, kemudian ingin mengidentifikasi dirinya. Jadilah misi-misi untuk mencari “kemurnian” tradisi lokal yang berlebihan dan tak realistis.

Misalnya, ada satu kesenian campuran, gambang kromong. Gambang kromong itu kesenian Cina, Melayu, dan lain-lain. Sekarang mau “dimurnikan” – dikatakan ini bukan identitas kita, pengaruh asing, dan sudah tidak asli lagi. Padahal tidak ada budaya yang benar-benar “asli.”

Ini hal kompleks. Kalau dilihat dari sisi studi tentang kultur, kita tidak bisa menjadi ekstrim – sana buruk, sini buruk. Tapi kita tidak terbiasa atau tidak dididik untuk menghadapi kompleksitas secara umum. Kita dibiasakan mencari suatu definisi yang tetap dan diakui banyak orang. Yang keabu-abuan tidak dianggap ada, padahal semua kultur ada wilayah abu-abunya. Bagaimana melihat yang abu-abu itulah yang harus kita asah. Tanpa kemampuan itu sulit mengerti pluralisme. Dan kesenian mungkin yang paling abu-abu.



▲ Pemain teater gambuh, Peliatan, Bali, 1985. Gambuh adalah fokus salah satu proyek awal Ford Foundation dalam revitalisasi seni pertunjukan tradisional.
▼ Penari dalam sebuah upacara penyembuhan pada masyarakat Benuaq, Kalimantan Timur, 1995.



diasingkan. Untuk bisa terlindung, mereka harus menjalin hubungan dengan pejabat yang berkuasa, dari presiden sampai dengan camat – dan umumnya dengan sogokan.

Keadaan ini tak menolong, ketika lapisan sosial yang tak mampu menyuap merasa tak diperlakukan adil. Di bulan November 1980, kerusuhan anti-Tionghoa berjangkit selama beberapa hari di beberapa kota di Jawa Tengah. Lebih dari 240 toko, 230 rumah, dan 23 pabrik rusak. Tak mengherankan, meskipun amat mengenaskan, bila keluarga Tan Kio Liem habis dibakar orang ramai di Tanjung Priok empat tahun kemudian.

Birokratisasi perbedaan pada dasarnya memang mengandung kekerasan. Identitas diresmikan, dipatok, dan dipatri, hingga jadi satuan kolektif yang mengeras. Orang Islam

jadi umat Islam, orang Kristen jadi umat Kristen – dan tak dipersoalkan bahwa di dalam kelompok masing-masing ada keanekaragaman, konflik, dan pergeseran terus-menerus.

Pengertian “Jawa,” misalnya, tak membayangkan adanya bahasa Tegal yang berbeda dari bahasa Yogyakarta, dan bahasa Banyumas yang tak sama dengan bahasa Solo. “Jawa” seakan-akan sebuah kesatuan tanpa ketegangan, tanpa kelas yang – seperti digambarkan Umar Kayam dalam novel *Para Priyayi* – bergulat menjaga dirinya di kancah masyarakat yang berubah, dan terus berubah.

Walhasil, “Islam,” “Kristen,” “Jawa,” dan lain-lain: masing-masing jadi tunggal. Tapi dari Peristiwa Tanjung Priok kita tahu: setiap kali yang tunggal hendak dikukuhkan, ada yang pada saat itu tunggal.



▲ Pawai pemakaman di Tana Toraja, Sulawesi Tengah, 1994.

**BAB LIMA:
SEBUAH PERJALANAN,
SEBUAH BANGSA**



SEBUAH PERJALANAN, SEBUAH BANGSA



Hanya 10 menit, dan tak ada dekorasi istimewa di Istana Negara. Tak ada barisan kehormatan yang memberi salut. Tak ada lagu kebangsaan. Tapi selama 10 menit yang tanpa warna itu, satu babakan sejarah yang penting dihentikan: Suharto, kepala negara yang paling lama berkuasa dalam sejarah Indonesia modern, hari itu mengundurkan diri. Suasananya seperti suasana di sebuah rapat antartetangga bila seorang ketua rukun tetangga menyerahkan jabatannya kepada ketua yang baru.

Pada pukul 9:05 pagi tanggal 21 Mei 1998 itu, di depan mikrofon ia mengucapkan pidatonya yang, seperti biasa, datar. Baju safarinya berwarna gelap, berlengan pendek, seperti pakaian dinas seorang pejabat di mana saja di Indonesia. Ia menyatakan ia mengundurkan diri. Lalu ia menyalami pengantinya, B.J. Habibie. Kemudian ia pergi, naik kendaraan pribadi bersama putrinya, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, biasa dikenal sebagai “Mbak Tutut.” Sejak itu ia tak pernah ke Istana Negara lagi.

Berpuluh-puluh ribu mahasiswa yang sudah lebih dari tiga hari menduduki gedung dan pelataran Parlemen – sebagai tanda pemberontakan terhadap kekuasaan Suharto – jam itu bersorak gembira. Sebagian dari mereka langsung terjun ke

◀ *Mahasiswa merayakan pengunduran Presiden Suharto, Jakarta, Mei 1998.*

kolam air mancur di halaman kompleks itu. Sebagian lain bersujud syukur. Bendera Merah-Putih yang sebelumnya mereka pasang setengah tiang, dikibarkan penuh kembali. Indonesia sejenak bernafas lega.

Anak-anak muda yang riuh, bersemangat, sebagian seperti berpiknik, sebagian seperti siap tempur, itulah yang praktis mendorong Suharto turun. Bukan sebuah junta dengan satu divisi bersenjata.

Barangkali itulah paradoks kepresidenannya: ia berkuasa begitu lama dan turun begitu lekas. Pemerintahannya yang lebih dari tiga dekade, dengan ekonomi yang maju pesat mengesankan, ternyata belum sempat menumbuhkan sebuah struktur kekuasaan dengan institusi yang kukuh. Pribadi sang presiden makin lama makin jadi pusat segalanya. Akhirnya ia juga yang jadi pusat persoalan ketika Republik Indonesia menghadapi guncangan besar di tahun 1997.

Guncangan itu kemudian lebih luas ketimbang sekadar krisis moneter. Mulanya adalah jatuhnya rupiah, yang terseret oleh jatuhnya baht di Thailand. Kemerosotannya begitu mencemaskan hingga pemerintah segera meminta bantuan

Bank Dunia dan IMF. Tapi untuk itu – untuk mengatasi krisis moneter yang seperti itu – ada satu hal esensial yang dibutuhkan: kepercayaan. Dan itulah yang saat itu tak ada lagi.

Awal tahun itu memang Suharto dipilih kembali oleh MPR untuk ketujuh kalinya. Tentu saja dengan suara bulat. Tapi di luar lembaga yang selalu patuh itu, oposisi terhadapnya kian meluas dan terbuka. Kini tak hanya terbatas di kampus.


Tapi ia bergeming. Mungkin yakin bahwa seperti sebelumnya, oposisi akan hanya menggonggong sebentar dan ia akan bisa segera membungkamnya. Begitu ia dilantik kembali, ia membentuk kabinet yang mengejutkan.

Tutut, putri kesayangannya, menjadi Menteri Sosial. Menteri Perdagangan bukan lagi seorang teknokrat, melainkan Mohammad “Bob” Hasan, orang yang menemani Suharto bermain golf tiga kali seminggu.

Bob Hasan-lah yang menjalankan kehendak Suharto untuk mengambil alih sejumlah bank dan menjalankan usaha dari pelbagai yayasan yang didirikannya. Ia – yang dijuluki “raja hutan” dan memegang hak pengusahaan hutan yang luas – mengetuai sejumlah asosiasi usaha yang berurusan dengan



- ▲ Mengucurkan uang sebanyak-banyaknya untuk bank-bank yang terkena serbuan nasabahnya, Jakarta, 1998. Banyak orang menyerbu bank dan menarik uang mereka karena timbulnya krisis kepercayaan baik terhadap pemerintah maupun lembaga keuangan swasta.
- ▶ Kayu gelondongan ilegal diapungkan lewat Sungai Kapuas, di luar kota Pontianak, 2003. Penggundulan hutan yang tak terkendali menjadi tantangan berat dalam bidang pengelolaan sumber daya alam.



MENDOBRAK TABU: KEBEBASAN BEREKSPRESI

Paruh pertama 1990-an adalah masa “kebangkitan kembali” Indonesia. Pemerintahan Orde Baru mulai mungkir dari kontrak sosialnya, dan kelompok-kelompok yang tertindas mulai bangkit dan melawan penguasa.

Pembredelan tiga mingguan berita pada Juni 1994, *Tempo*, *Editor*, dan *Detik*, memicu aksi perlawanan warga untuk mendukung kebebasan berekspresi dan berserikat. Kelompok-kelompok tertindas mulai melembagakan penolakannya terhadap rezim Orde Baru yang sudah mapan itu, dengan menciptakan sebuah “ruang publik” tandingan. Organisasi buruh, organisasi perempuan, dan aliansi mahasiswa mulai berontak dari format organisasi tunggal bikinan pemerintah. Subkultur resistensi tumbuh dengan pesat dengan menciptakan satire, grafiti, *happening art*, sindiran seksual, dan bentuk-bentuk lain budaya pop yang tak jarang terkesan anarkis. Pemerintah menanggapinya dengan sensor, pelarangan, penahanan, dan bahkan pembunuhan yang tak terjangkau hukum. Hal ini bisa dilihat sebagai tindak balas dendam, walaupun ringkih, dari sebuah rezim yang legitimasinya mulai kendur.

Upaya mencari kebebasan, demokrasi, dan hak asasi manusia terus berlanjut. Semakin banyak tabu yang terdobrak. Pada 1989 keberhasilan demonstrasi waduk Kedung Ombo, yang menentang pengambilalihan lahan petani oleh pemerintah, memperluas protes kalangan bawah. Topik-topik kontroversial, seperti undian berhadiah yang diselenggarakan pemerintah, amandemen UU pemilihan umum, keadilan bagi tahanan politik, peranan militer di parlemen, hingga pelanggaran hak asasi di seluruh negeri, mewarnai wacana ketidakpuasan publik.

Pembredelan tiga media ini – yang dituduh pemerintah sebagai “mengadu domba” sesama pejabat dan mengganggu stabilitas nasional – adalah keputusan yang sewenang-wenang. “Kebebasan pers di Indonesia terlihat sebagai masalah pribadi,

antara suka dan tidak suka,” kata Sidney Jones, direktur Human Rights Watch/Asia pada waktu itu. Pengekangan itu juga memicu pergeseran hubungan negara dengan masyarakat sipil, seperti terlihat dari merbaknya protes berskala nasional. Lebih jauh lagi, jika tahun 1990-an dilihat sebagai kebangkitan perlawanan kelas menengah, sebelumnya tak pernah ada satu penyebab tunggal yang bisa menyatukan begitu banyak ragam kelompok. Pembredelan itu mendorong wartawan untuk turun ke jalan; belakangan, ia meluas menjadi gerakan-gerakan yang melintasi garis-garis ekonomi,



Goenawan Mohamad di depan gedung Mabkamah Agung, Jakarta, 1996.

kultural, bahkan batas negara.

Sejumlah peristiwa penting menyusul. Pada 7 Agustus 1994, lebih dari 100 wartawan dari berbagai media, menandatangani deklarasi mendukung kebebasan berekspresi dan mendirikan Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI). “Sungguh suatu periode yang luar biasa,” kata Santoso, salah satu pendiri AJI. “Ada begitu banyak energi dan spontanitas. Kami praktis bekerja tanpa henti.” Delapan bulan pertama umur AJI menjadi periode yang benar-benar produktif – diskusi-diskusi publik, seminar-seminar, dan sesi-sesi pelatihan media diadakan di mana-mana.

Pada saat yang sama, banyak anggota AJI mendapat tekanan dari pemerintah. Puncaknya pada Maret 1995 ketika tiga wartawan

Independen, majalah alternatif yang populer, ditangkap dengan dalih menerbitkan media tanpa izin. Majalah ini dilarang dan mereka dipenjara dua hingga tiga tahun. Saat itu, tekanan yang dialami AJI menarik perhatian media internasional dan berbagai organisasi hak asasi dunia. Ini meningkatkan pertukaran informasi media lokal dengan internasional, dan memperkuat legitimasi bagi demokratisasi di Indonesia.

Namun, AJI terus bertahan, dan sekarang pada milenium baru ini, mesti memikirkan prioritas baru. Menurut Santoso, “Perjuangan kami kini adalah meningkatkan kesejahteraan jurnalis melalui serikat pekerja, dan memperbaiki standar jurnalisme di Indonesia.”

Ford Foundation punya pandangan sama. Selama bertahun-tahun, dalam berbagai bentuk, Ford Foundation mendukung pelatihan wartawan, misalnya, jadi sponsor wartawan yang mendapatkan Nieman Fellowship dari Harvard, maupun pusat-pusat pelatihan wartawan Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerbitan Yogyakarta (LP3Y). Wilayah lain: meningkatkan keterampilan wartawan dalam telaah kebijakan publik, seperti HIV/AIDS.

Para wartawan Timor Lorosae, misalnya, diberi bantuan dana untuk melakukan perjalanan ke luar negeri guna mempelajari pengalaman negara-negara itu melihat masalah otonomi atau kemerdekaan.

Tahun 1997, Ford Foundation juga membantu Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) menerbitkan satu seri tentang huru-hara di beberapa kota Indonesia antara lain Rengasdengklok dan Tasikmalaya. ISAI, sebuah organisasi nirlaba, berdiri hanya beberapa bulan setelah pembredelan 1994. “Kelompok ini mempromosikan perubahan dan profesionalisme media,” kata Mary Zurbuchen, wakil Ford Foundation waktu itu. Ford Foundation juga membantu majalah *Pantau*, yang mempunyai program pelatihan bagi wartawan media cetak.

pengolahan kayu. Dengan perdagangan yang dikendalikan pemerintah itu, Hasan orang yang berkuasa di atas pasar. Ia berhak menetapkan volume ekspor dan mempengaruhi harga.

Untuk jabatan wakil presiden, Suharto mengangkat B.J. Habibie. Insinyur Indonesia yang bertahun-tahun hidup di Jerman ini bukan orang asing bagi Suharto. Sejak kanak-kanak Habibie mengenalnya. Ia memanggil jenderal itu “oom.” Di tahun 1989, Habibie mendapat kekuasaan yang luas: ia membawahi 10 perusahaan negara strategis, yang tak hanya pabrik senjata, tapi juga pabrik baja, galangan kapal, telekomunikasi, satuan produksi elektronik, pabrik kapal terbang, dan perusahaan kapal laut. Ia menteri yang paling dekat ke hati Suharto. Dari sinilah Habibie diangkat sebagai wakil presiden.

Bob Hasan dan Habibie adalah lambang privilese yang datang dari Presiden Suharto berkat hubungan pribadi. Keduanya mengingatkan banyak orang tentang proyek-proyek berskala besar yang diperoleh dari hubungan khusus itu – di

mana perhitungan ongkos dan harga tak berlaku.

Tak heran ketika 14 Maret 1998 itu kabinet baru diumumkan, pasar bertambah cemas. Rupiah jatuh lebih jauh lagi: di pertengahan Maret satu dollar berkisar di atas Rp 10.000, hampir 80 persen lebih rendah ketimbang di awal krisis.

Orang lebih cemas, dan juga kehilangan kepercayaan, ketika melihat Suharto mendudukkan salah satu anak kandungnya sebagai menteri. Nepotisme yang tak malu-malu kian jelas jadi corak pemerintahan Orde Baru. Sejak itu beredar sebuah singkatan baru KKN, dari kolusi, korupsi, dan nepotisme.

Sudah lama diketahui ada hak-hak istimewa dalam bisnis yang didapat oleh anak, keluarga, dan kawan dekat Suharto. Jangkauan mereka merambah ke pelbagai usaha, dari cengkeh sampai dengan asuransi, dari plastik sampai dengan petrokimia. Sepuluh tahun sebelum krisis, diperkirakan sudah berpuluh-puluh milyar dollar aset yang mereka kuasai – praktis hanya dengan bantuan keputusan pemerintah.



▲ Pesawat N-250 buatan IPTN, salah satu perusahaan yang dikuasai Ir. Habibie, Bandung, 1997.



▲ Menteri Keuangan Mar'ie Muhammad dan Gubernur Bank Indonesia Soedradjad Djiwandono berkampanye berusaha memulihkan kepercayaan publik terhadap rupiah, 1997.

Paling mencolok tentu saja Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (BPPC), di bawah Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala Putra, putra bungsu Suharto. Ditetapkan di tahun 1991, aturan ini tak membolehkan petani menjual cengkeh mereka selain ke BPPC. Kekuasaannya begitu rupa hingga ia dapat memperoleh kredit ratusan milyar rupiah dengan bunga relatif rendah dari bank pemerintah.

Tommy (yang pada 2002 dihukum karena memerintahkan pembunuhan seorang hakim) mendapatkan perlakuan spesial lain dalam proyeknya untuk membuat “mobil nasional,” hasil kerja sama dengan perusahaan mobil KIA di Korea Selatan.

Ketika krisis terjadi, privilese seperti itu diharapkan akan dihapuskan. Ekonomi terguncang, warga terkena, maka yang diminta adalah sikap bersama-sama menjinjing berat. Tapi itulah yang tak tampak terjadi.

Di pekan terakhir Januari 1998, diumumkan bahwa tata niaga cengkeh yang dikuasai BPPC tetap diteruskan. Di awal Februari, ditetapkan bahwa perusahaan Tommy yang hendak membuat mobil nasional tetap dapat fasilitas khusus: dibebaskan dari pajak, ketika ia sejatinya hanya mengimpor

mobil sedan dalam bentuk utuh.

Tampak, Suharto tak hendak mengorbankan kepentingan yang dekat dengan dirinya. Kepercayaan IMF pun hampir patah. Bahkan bagi para pejabat tinggi kian jelas: penghambat terbesar bagi Indonesia untuk mengatasi krisis adalah Suharto sendiri.

Tapi ia tampaknya tak menyadari itu. Tanggal 4 Mei 1998, di tengah krisis ekonomi yang merisaukan, dan dengan sebuah kabinet baru yang tak meyakinkan, Suharto menaikkan harga bahan bakar minyak sampai 70 persen. Protes dan kemarahan meletus. Kerusuhan terjadi. Di Medan dua orang tewas. Gentar melihat itu, Parlemen menolak kenaikan harga itu – satu sikap yang tak pernah ada sebelumnya.

Tapi pada tanggal 9 Mei, Suharto tetap berangkat ke Kairo untuk pertemuan puncak negara-negara berkembang. Pada 12 Mei, di saat Presiden Suharto tak ada di dalam negeri itu, sebuah demonstrasi digelar di dalam kampus Universitas Trisakti di Jakarta Utara. Tapi tak lama kemudian seluruh Indonesia terkejut ketika dalam bentrokan dengan polisi, tembakan gencar dilepaskan. Empat mahasiswa tewas kena peluru.

AMNA KUSUMO

Amna Kusumo bukan seorang seniman. Dia sendiri yang mengatakannya. Tapi dia salah satu dari sedikit orang yang paham peta seni Indonesia – tentang potensinya, sekaligus peliknya mengelola potensi itu. Sekitar 25 tabunan ia bekerja mengurus “remeh temeh” produksi kesenian. Berbekal pengalaman tersebut dan dukungan Ford Foundation, pada 1999 Amna beserta sekelompok pecinta seni mendirikan Yayasan Kelola, sebuah lembaga nirlaba berjangkauan nasional, yang bertujuan mendorong pertumbuhan seni di Indonesia lewat kesempatan pembelajaran, pendanaan, dan akses informasi. Saat ini, Kelola juga didukung oleh Asialink (Australia), Asian Cultural Council (Amerika Serikat), dan HIVOS (Belanda).

Indonesia punya banyak bakat seni tapi lembaga pendukungnya terbatas. Kegiatan kesenian tak hanya perlu penonton tapi juga perlu lembaga pendukung. Ada seniman, ada penonton, dan ada lembaga yang mengelolanya. Sebagai contoh, pada 1970-an, muncul Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) sebagai institusi pengelola seni di Jakarta. Alhasil, penonton datang karena ada agenda tetap, jadwal yang jelas, dan pertunjukan yang baik. TIM memastikan bahwa semua itu terjadi. Jadi lama-lama penonton terbina. TIM bekerja sama dengan Dewan Kesenian Jakarta mendanai seniman untuk berkarya. Dana itu cukup untuk membuat sebuah produksi, tak berlebihan, sehingga seniman tak perlu kebingungan cari sponsor. Publikasi juga dikerjakan TIM, seniman tinggal menyerahkan bahan, dan semua beres, dengan standar zaman itu. Penonton dan media datang semua. Seniman bisa fokus pada produksi saja. Kalau lembaga macam ini kurang berfungsi baik, seniman harus jadi superman. Mereka harus mendatangkan penonton, harus berjualan karcis, harus mencari dana, dan harus memikirkan produksi.

Ide dibentuknya Yayasan Kelola berawal dari sebuah diskusi antara beberapa orang yang sering mengelola seni. Ada Jennifer Lindsay dari Ford Foundation, dan Rhoda Grauer, seorang *arts administrator* dari New York, yang datang untuk melihat penyelenggaraan Indonesian Dance Festival. Kami sepakat bahwa rapuhnya sisi pengelolaan seni akan berdampak pada keberlanjutan kelompok maupun lembaga seni budaya Indonesia. Ini memunculkan gagasan untuk melakukan survei terhadap sejumlah organisasi budaya. Survai ini kemudian berlanjut ke *pilot project* dan kemudian jadi Yayasan Kelola. Bisa dibilang bahwa program-program Kelola lahir

sebagai tanggapan langsung terhadap kebutuhan yang ada di masyarakat seni.

Kelola mencoba menawarkan berbagai kesempatan kepada pekerja seni Indonesia. Kesempatan belajar, misalnya, pemberian beasiswa untuk mengikuti lokakarya



Amna Kusumo di rumah, Solo, 2003.

manajemen organisasi seni, manajemen festival, disain tata cahaya panggung. Kelola bekerja sama dengan LPPM (Jakarta) untuk mengadakan pelatihan manajemen seni. Ada juga kesempatan untuk belajar melalui bekerja di organisasi seni yang berpengalaman, baik di dalam maupun di luar negeri. Untuk program magang ini Kelola bekerja sama dengan 16 mitra di dalam maupun di luar negeri. Karenanya, bila seseorang kelihatan berpotensi dalam lokakarya, kami sarankan agar melamar ke program magang. Selanjutnya, pekerja seni yang telah magang di dalam negeri, dapat melamar untuk program magang internasional. Peminat program magang kami luar biasa. Pendaftarannya sampai 300,

sementara yang bisa ditampung hanya 16 orang setahun.

Dari pengalaman melakukan lokakarya, terbukti yang paling sulit adalah meyakinkan orang tentang perlunya perencanaan. Kita tak terbiasa berencana.

Para seniman senang menggunakan istilah *nggelinding* ketika bekerja. Tapi rata-rata mereka sudah sadar akan adanya kebutuhan untuk mengatur organisasi mereka. Ini sudah sebuah langkah maju walau banyak yang belum siap untuk melakukan perubahan. Mengubah kebiasaan memang tak mudah.

Sama halnya, tak mudah untuk meniasati keterbatasan sumber dana bagi kegiatan seni di Indonesia. Dana memang sebuah persoalan klasik yang menghambat proses penciptaan seni maupun pelaksanaan pertunjukan yang berkualitas. Program Hibah Seni Kelola menawarkan sebuah sistem pendanaan alternatif yang terbuka, kompetitif, dan bisa diakses oleh seniman dan kelompok seni diseluruh Indonesia. Secara “teknis,” program hibah ini dirancang untuk membangun keterampilan manajemen para penerimanya. Jadi bukan penyediaan dana itu sendiri yang pokok, tapi juga sistem dan praktik. Di sinilah kadang ditemui hal-hal pelik yang menantang kesabaran.

Sejauh ini, mitra kerja kami kebanyakan di daerah urban. Kita tahu seni di desa sifatnya lebih kompleks, karena terkait dengan struktur sosial yang ada. Di situ seni tak terlepas sendiri. Sebagai salah satu usaha untuk memahami kesenian di desa, sebuah studi tentang pengelolaan seni pertunjukan tradisi sedang dipersiapkan. Walau mereka tak melihatnya sebagai proses manajemen, seni pertunjukan tradisi itu juga punya pengelolaan. Kearifan lokal inilah yang sedang dipelajari.

HAK-HAK PEREMPUAN: MENAFSIR-ULANG NASKAH KLASIK

Pesantren Asholihat, di sebuah desa dekat Magelang, Jawa Tengah. Terlihat di sana: rumah-rumah yang permai, sebuah mushola yang senyap, sebuah pondokan yang begitu mungil, yang entah bagaimana caranya mampu “menjejalkan” 15 santri.

Hibatun Wafiroh dilahirkan di daerah ini, sulung dari empat bersaudara. Ia tumbuh dengan menyaksikan orang tuanya mengajar para santri, kebanyakan antara empat sampai 18 tahun. Ia cermati bagaimana para kiai dan nyai dihormati murid-muridnya, bagaimana mereka dijadikan tempat berkonsultasi, dari masalah obat hingga jodoh.

Ia simak bagaimana peran perempuan dijelaskan dalam buku-buku suci Islam, khususnya dalam kitab kuning – sebutan lokal untuk berbagai teks klasik yang telah berabad-abad usianya, dan yang paling banyak dibaca di kalangan pesantren Jawa.

Ayah Hibatun, K.H. Saktulloh, pendiri Asholihat, anggota parlemen lokal dan aktivis organisasi sosial. Ibunya, Nyai Haji Fasohah, salah satu pemimpin pesantren, jauh dari kesan kolot. “Sebagai seorang guru, otonominya tidak pernah diganggu gugat,” kata Hibatun. Hasrat untuk mandiri ini jelas ia warisi: dalam soal pendidikan, paling tidak, ia berani menentang orang tua, dan memilih jalannya sendiri.

“Orang tua saya ingin saya sekolah di pesantren di Kediri,” kenangnya. Sementara, universitas merupakan hal yang terlarang baginya. Tapi Hibatun tak patah semangat. Sehabis “menangis sepanjang malam”, pada malam sebelum ia dikirim ke Kediri, ia berpura-pura sakit, untuk “membeli waktu” di rumah. Kesempatan itu ia gunakan untuk mengumpulkan informasi tentang Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) di Semarang. Setelah melalui perjuangan yang panjang, ia

diterima belajar di sana.

Hibatun kembali ke Magelang setelah mendapatkan “pencerahan” di universitas. Ia segera diserahi tanggung jawab memimpin santri perempuan di pesantrennya. Ia juga melibatkan diri dalam berbagai kelompok studi dan organisasi Islam. “Kehidupan di universitas memberi saya kemandirian dan harga diri. Saya ingin lebih banyak perempuan merasakan apa yang saya alami. Sayang, meski Quran banyak mengangkat peran perempuan, reformasi gender masih saja ditentang keras.”



Membaca kitab kuning di pesantren Krapyak, Jawa Tengah, 2003.

Minat Hibatun meruah ke segala arah. Pada saat yang sama, di Pulau Jawa, diskusi tentang kemajemukan dan gender dalam Islam sedang marak-maraknya. Berbagai diskusi, seminar, dan penerbitan menunjukkan peningkatan dalam usaha menafsir ulang teks Islam ke arah reformasi hukum dan mengurangi praktik diskriminasi terhadap perempuan. Dan lumayan berhasil: Di sejumlah pesantren di Jawa dan Madura, kesadaran akan hak perempuan terkesan meningkat.

Ini tak lepas dari upaya-upaya kepeloporan yang dilakukan oleh berbagai organisasi Islam macam Perhimpunan

Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat – yang menerima hibah Ford Foundation. Contoh lain: upaya yang dilakukan Hibatun melalui Yayasan Kesejahteraan Fatayat, yang juga didukung Ford Foundation. Katanya, “Saya sadari manjurnya pendekatan ini: mengaitkan isu-isu ketimpangan sosial, gender, dan kesehatan reproduksi perempuan dengan hukum Islam. Ini sungguh sebuah pendekatan dari bawah, terutama di pedesaan, di mana pesantren praktis satu-satunya tempat orang membentuk cara pandangnya tentang dunia.”

Fokus gerakan ini: penafsiran kembali kitab kuning, yang telah lama digunakan sebagai alat untuk mengukuhkan cara pandang laki-laki tentang peran perempuan dalam Islam. Contohnya, penafsiran ulang atas *Uqud al-lujjain*, teks yang membahas hak-hak dan kewajiban suami dan isteri, oleh Forum Kajian Kitab Kuning. Tahun 1991, hasil penelitian tiga tahun ini diterbitkan dengan judul *Wajah Baru Relasi Suami-Istri*. Meski lingkup penafsiran masih terbatas pada penilaian atas *fiqh*, proyek ini diakui sebagai sebuah “upaya penting pertama”: ia

menekankan bahwa dalam setiap peran sosial, perempuan adalah agen yang aktif, bukan sekadar obyek belaka.

Ford Foundation sendiri memandang pendekatan teologis ini berjalan secara berangsur-angsur. Penerbitan lain membicarakan antara lain poligami, HIV/AIDS, Keluarga Berencana, aborsi, dan hak-hak seksual perempuan. Semuanya bertujuan mematahkan pemikiran tradisional yang memapankan subordinasi terhadap perempuan dalam masyarakat Islam. Buku-buku tersebut rata-rata ringkas dan mudah dibaca, dan ditulis oleh orang-orang seperti Hibatun Wafiroh.

Esoknya, kerusuhan meledak di Jakarta. Toko-toko diserbu dan dijarah. Hampir 2.000 ruko, 500 buah anjungan tunai mandiri (ATM) dan bank, 40 mall, dan 12 hotel dirusak atau dibakar. Sekitar 2.500 orang tewas hangus. Tak kurang buruk, sejumlah orang yang ganas bukan saja membakar dan menyerbu rumah-rumah, tapi juga memperkosa perempuan-perempuan Tionghoa, dengan korban yang mengenaskan.

Tanggal 15 Mei, Suharto kembali ke Jakarta. Tak ada tanda-tanda bahwa ia akan mundur. Ketika gerakan protes meluas dan membesar di seluruh Indonesia – dan kompleks Parlemen di Senayan diduduki ratusan ribu mahasiswa – para pembantu dekat Presiden akhirnya memutuskan: Sang Bapak tak bisa didukung lebih lama. Pada tanggal 18 Mei, sesuatu yang tak disangka-sangka terjadi: Harmoko, ketua DPR/MPR, pejabat yang terkenal pandai mengambil hati Suharto, memintanya mengundurkan diri.

Di tahun 1998 itu, Orde Baru memang semakin menciut. Banyak dukungan yang telah hilang. Selama tiga dasawarsa, Suharto memperoleh legitimasinya melalui perekonomian Indonesia yang tumbuh dengan pesat. Di awal 1990-an, Bank Dunia mulai menyebutnya sebagai suatu “keajaiban ekonomi Asia Tenggara.” Sebuah penelitian menunjukkan, angka kemiskinan turun dari 60 persen di tahun 1965 menjadi di bawah 10 persen di tahun 1997. Tapi prestasi itu ternyata tak memperkuat tubuh Republik Indonesia: ketika krisis menghantam, manajemen Suharto gagal mengatasinya.

Pada akhirnya kelihatan bahwa manajemen itu, disebut Orde Baru, bukanlah sesuatu yang sama dan ajek. Pemerintahan Suharto berubah-ubah bersama waktu – dan merosot bersama waktu pula. Rezim yang semula berambisi menjalankan perencanaan ekonomi yang rasional, berangsur-angsur mengalami apa yang disebut Sumitro Djojohadikusumo sebagai “penyakit institusional.”



▲ Bom molotov dilemparkan ke arah polisi saat demo besar-besaran minta Presiden Suharto mundur, Jakarta, Mei 1998.

Benih penyakit itu semula tak tampak, bahkan seakan-akan mati. Mula-mula Suharto justru memulihkan institusi-institusi yang lumpuh. Ia menyelenggarakan kembali pemilihan umum yang teratur, yang sudah tak pernah ada di bawah Demokrasi Terpimpin Sukarno. Untuk memperbaiki dan menumbuhkan kekuatan ekonomi nasional, setiap lima tahun pula disusun Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Repelita). Tiap-tiap tahun, rencana itu dijabarkan dalam anggaran belanja dan pendapatan yang disusun rapi, untuk disahkan oleh Parlemen.

Dari sini pelembagaan memang terjadi. Suharto tak ingin mengambil langkah yang acak-acakan dan berdasarkan pertimbangan sesaat. Namun manajemennya, yang di satu sisi melahirkan sistem pemerintahan yang stabil dan konsisten, punya sisi lain yang mendukungnya. Ia mengandung semacam paranoia yang membuatnya rapuh.

Muncul dari kekerasan tahun 1965, pemerintahan Suharto meletakkan Indonesia seakan-akan terus-menerus

dalam keadaan darurat perang. Orang harus selalu “waspada” akan “bahaya” terhadap “stabilitas” – dari PKI, PSI, Masyumi, ekstrim kiri, atau ekstrim kanan.

Tiap suara yang berlawanan dianggap ancaman. Tiap kekuatan politik yang lain dianggap mengandung potensi tandingan, dan sebab itu dibuat untuk tak independen. Pemerintahan Suharto tak henti-hentinya campur tangan ke dalam hasil seleksi pengurus partai-partai politik. Presiden menentukan siapa yang akan berada di pucuk kepemimpinan militer dan bahkan Mahkamah Agung. Aparat keamanannya mengawasi organisasi masyarakat terus-menerus, dan sejak aksi mahasiswa di tahun 1978, mengekang aktivitas mahasiswa di kampus-kampus.

Di situlah pelembagaan tak berjalan wajar. Partai dan Parlemen tak sepenuhnya jadi penyalur perasaan dan keinginan di masyarakat. Keduanya lebih berperan sebagai penyangga legitimasi. Hubungan partai-partai dengan masyarakat di desa-desa dipotong. Di lapisan itu, hanya Golkar yang boleh



▲ Menyediakan jarum suntik bersih di sebuah klinik HIV mitra Ford Foundation di Kampung Bali, Jakarta, 2003.

MARIA HARTININGSIH

Maria M Hartiningsih adalah wartawan harian Kompas di Jakarta yang sejak awal tertarik pada isu kemiskinan dan kelompok masyarakat marjinal. Pada tahun 1987 ia mendapat penghargaan utama dari PBB berkaitan dengan tema tahun PBB, International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, atas laporannya tentang kaum tunawisma di Jakarta. Ia menerima plakat dari UN Habitat. Pada tahun 1997-1998 ia menjadi visiting scholar di Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.

Saya mulai kerja sebagai jurnalis dengan meliput persoalan kemiskinan di perkotaan. Masalah mereka rumit karena terkait dengan strategi pembangunan. Kerusakan lingkungan hidup juga terkait dengan ini semua. Setelah meliput KTT Bumi di Rio de Janeiro 1992, saya semakin mempertanyakan “pembangunan berkelanjutan” itu apa artinya dan untuk siapa? Sesudah pertemuan itu, saya terpilih sebagai anggota Cohort-1 program Leadership of Environment and Development (LEAD) dari Indonesia. Program itu dibuat oleh Rockefeller Foundation yang bermitra dengan yayasan atau universitas yang mengkaji masalah pembangunan berkelanjutan. Program itu berlangsung dari September 1992 sampai kuartal pertama 1994. Para peserta dari tujuh negara berkumpul untuk mengikuti sesi internasional di Chiang Mai, Thailand, dan Zimbabwe.

Pada 1995, saya mulai mendalami masalah HIV/AIDS dan mulai berempati lewat jurnanisme. Isu HIV/AIDS bukan sekadar isu kesehatan, tapi juga menyangkut isu sosial dan ekonomi. Persoalan HIV/AIDS dekat sekali dengan masalah kemiskinan dalam arti luas dan korban terbesarnya adalah kelompok usia produktif.

HIV/AIDS termasuk ancaman terbesar di Indonesia, apalagi tiga tahun terakhir ini jumlah infeksi baru meningkat karena penggunaan jarum suntik di kalangan pencandu narkoba. World Health Organization memperkirakan pada 2002-2003, terdapat 80.000-120.000 orang Indonesia dengan infeksi HIV. Jumlah sebenarnya bisa sampai 10 kali lipat. Saya percaya fenomena gunung es pada isu ini, apalagi karena masih

banyak yang menyangkutkannya dengan masalah moral.

Pada Agustus 1997, dengan biaya *Kompas* dan hibah dari Ford Foundation, saya melakukan peliputan mendalam mengenai dampak AIDS pada perempuan dan anak-anak di desa-desa di Thailand dan Kamboja.

Setelah KTT Bumi di Rio de Janeiro 1992,

menyusuri perkembangan AIDS di Amerika awal 1980-an.

Sejak di AS itu saya mulai mendalami isu feminisme agar bisa lebih mampu menggunakan perspektif feminis sebagai perspektif kaum tertindas. Ini saya lakukan karena pisau dari teori-teori besar tak cukup tajam untuk membedah masalah yang berkaitan dengan persoalan perkosaan, baik pada masa damai, mau pun pada situasi kerusuhan dan konflik bersenjata.

Sudah sejak lama saya melihat seksualitas perempuan sering dijadikan alat bagi negara untuk meminjam uang. Lihat saja program KB. Seksualitas perempuan juga menjadi alat untuk menundukkan pihak yang dianggap sebagai musuh. Misalnya pada Mei 1998 di Jakarta dengan pemerkosaan perempuan-perempuan Tionghoa. Seksualitas perempuan juga bagian dari strategi untuk mengalahkan lawan. Lihat saja di Timor Timur dan Aceh.

Sekarang saya banyak mengkaitkan berbagai persoalan dengan neo-liberalisme. Bagi negara berkembang dengan utang besar, sistem ekonomi neoliberalis ini men-

cekik. Kita menjadi tawanan di negeri sendiri. Sistem ekonomi neoliberal menjadikan semuanya komoditi, termasuk perasaan manusia dan kemudaan tubuhnya. Media jadi alat untuk mempengaruhi dan membentuk gaya hidup orang. Kehancuran lingkungan, kemiskinan, HIV/AIDS, penindasan manusia, termasuk perdagangan perempuan dan anak, dan segala persoalan yang bermuara pada penghambaan materi dan hal-hal yang sifatnya duniawi, berhulu pada neo-liberalisme.



Maria Hartiningsih di kantor Kompas, Jakarta, 2003.

saya juga sering dikirim *Kompas* meliput berbagai konferensi PBB lain, misalnya di Kairo 1994, Kopenhagen 1995, Beijing 1995, dan Konferensi PBB untuk Habitat di Istanbul 1996. Pada Agustus 1996 saya meliput Kongres Dunia untuk Menghapuskan Eksploitasi Seksual terhadap Anak di Stockholm.

Ketika di Seattle, saya mendapat bantuan dari Ford Foundation, \$1.000 per bulan. Lewat bantuan itu, saya mempunyai kesempatan untuk melakukan perjalanan ke New York, Atlanta, Miami, dan San Francisco,

beroperasi. Pers boleh terbit bila ada izin, dan izin itu bisa dicabut bila pemerintah menghendaki. Peradilan hanya sekadar formalitas yang dijalani, menunggu keputusan diambil sesuai dengan titah dari atas.

Mahasiswa juga akhirnya dibatasi geraknya. Di awal 1978, penguasa militer membekukan kegiatan Dewan Mahasiswa, menyusul aksi Dewan Mahasiswa di empat perguruan tinggi di Jawa yang meminta agar Suharto tidak maju untuk jadi calon presiden sekali lagi.

Di tahun itu pula Daoed Joesoef diangkat jadi Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan. Ia mencoba mengubah kehidupan mahasiswa di perguruan tinggi: mereka harus tidak ikut serta dalam kegiatan politik. Sebuah agenda “normalisasi kehidupan kampus” pun diperkenalkan. Mahasiswa, kata Joesoef, harus “membaca, menulis, melakukan riset, dan tak menghabiskan waktu di jalanan.”

Bersama itu diberlakukan pula sebuah sistem yang mengharuskan tiap mahasiswa belajar penuh antara 48 atau 52 jam tiap bulan. Kerja sama antarmahasiswa diawasi pembantu rektor. Kegiatan dibatasi hanya pada olah raga, kesenian, dan “diskusi ilmiah.”

Pada awalnya, kekangan itu memicu perlawanan. Di

Universitas Indonesia para aktivis mahasiswa menganjurkan mogok kuliah. Aksi ini berhasil selama dua bulan. Tapi setelah itu, untuk dua-tiga tahun berikutnya, desain Daoed Joesoef berhasil membuat mahasiswa sibuk. Dan jinak.

Kebetulan, keadaan memungkinkan itu. Sebagian besar mahasiswa memang lebih suka mempersiapkan diri buat karier mereka setelah lulus. Di awal 1980-an itu Indonesia menyaksikan ramainya investasi pemerintah dan swasta; usaha baru dibuka dan usaha lama diperluas lebih tiga kali lipat dibandingkan dasawarsa sebelumnya. Indikasi cukup bahwa selepas perguruan tinggi, banyak lowongan kerja yang menarik. Karier yang gemilang memanggil-manggil. Kampus tak lagi riuh rendah oleh protes dan demonstrasi.

Tapi toh agenda membersihkan politik dari kampus itu tak bisa berhasil sepenuhnya dan seterusnya. Di tahun 1982, empat tahun semenjak para mahasiswa tertekan oleh “normalisasi kehidupan kampus,” pelbagai kelompok studi pun muncul – grup kecil yang anggotanya tak tetap, yang membahas pelbagai persoalan sosial politik dengan serius. Lima tahun kemudian kelompok ini berkembang pesat di kota-kota besar. Di Yogyakarta saja ada sekitar 20 buah kelompok studi yang aktif.



▲ Udik, sebuah koran politik dan kebudayaan, terbitan PIAR di Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur, 2003.

SARAH LERY MBOEIK

Sarah Lery Mboeik adalah koordinator Perkumpulan Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat (PIAR), sebuah organisasi advokasi di Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur. Mboeik mendapat badiab bergengsi, Yap Thiam Hien Award, untuk perjuangannya bak asasi manusia pada 1999. Namanya terkenal di seantero Nusa Tenggara Timur karena perjuangannya mendampingi orang-orang yang dirugikan negara, mulai dari para pengungsi Timor Leste hingga pemeluk agama tradisional. Ketika hamil tua, Mboeik pernah ditaban tentara Indonesia. PIAR termasuk salah satu organisasi yang dibantu Ford Foundation sejak jatuhnya Presiden Subarto pada Mei 1998.

Persoalan kontemporer pulau-pulau Nusa Tenggara Timur, dari Timor, Flores, Rote, dan sebagainya sesudah Mei 1998 umumnya adalah pelanggaran hak sosial ekonomi budaya masyarakat lokal. Landasan kebijakannya dimulai pada 1974 dalam suatu simposium yang menghasilkan kesepakatan perlunya menyatakan tak akan ada tanah adat lagi di Nusa Tenggara Timur. Muncul peraturan daerah dan semua tanah adat diklaim tanah negara. Itulah yang memunculkan awal konflik di tingkat rakyat melawan negara.

Padahal 80-90 persen masyarakat Nusa Tenggara Timur adalah masyarakat adat. Definisi masyarakat adat adalah perkumpulan orang yang ada di wilayah tertentu, punya nilai, tata cara, yang dinamis dan tidak feodal. Itu persoalan paling mendasar. Persoalan lainnya, warga juga tak punya hak politik untuk masuk ke ruang-ruang politik sebab negara sering memberikan stigma bahwa itulah organisasi komunis. Mereka tak bisa menjalankan hak sipil lainnya, misalnya, menjalankan ritual agama tradisional mereka karena dianggap ateis.

Pelanggar paling besar adalah negara dan kedua adalah agama modern. Di Pulau Rote agama tradisional diberi cap sebagai *halaiik* yang artinya ateis. Masuknya agama modern pertama kali di Nusa Tenggara Timur terjadi di Rote. Stigmatisasi paling besar terjadi di sana. Saya sendiri Kristen Protestan dan kakak saya pendeta. Tapi itu dampaknya luas hingga rumah adat pun dibakar. Bapak saya kepala suku. Rumah adat kami dibakar oleh keluarga besar karena dianggap ateis. Kalau

di sana disebut *manenito* artinya raja setan. Padahal dia yang mampu melakukan doa-doa adat untuk merumuskan semua peraturan adat. Tapi itu sekarang disebut sebagai *halaiik*, menyembah berhala. Itu penting untuk diperhatikan karena satu-satunya media untuk sebuah organisasi masyarakat adat menjadi kuat adalah melalui rumah-rumah adat. Setiap saat mereka mengambil keputusan lewat media rumah adat. Kalau



Sarah Lery Mboeik di kantornya di Kupang, 2003.

mediannya dihancurkan, bagaimana legitimasi pengambilan keputusan masyarakat adat?

Di Nusa Tenggara Timur banyak suku. Orang di sana mengklaim *klan*. Jadi misalnya ada klan Rote dengan 18 komunitas. Di bawah klan ada *manggi*, dan di bawah manggi ada *fam*. Saya fam Mboeik. Jadi sangat struktural sekali. Nusa Tenggara Timur sendiri orang mengenal suku Timor, Flores, Alor, Sumba. Tapi Timor sendiri ada banyak sekali yang tak

bisa diidentifikasi dengan baik.

Orang luar sering mengatakan bahwa orang Nusa Tenggara Timur selalu identik dengan kemiskinan. Itu kadang-kadang politis untuk menggaruk keuntungan sebesar-besarnya. Ada orang miskin supaya bisa utang banyak. Tapi itu juga terjadi karena pola pembangunan kita yang tak tepat. Model pengembangan di sini sangat sentralistik dan sistem ekonominya kapitalis dengan konsep pasar, bank, dan sebagainya. Sistem itu tidak tepat. Nusa Tenggara Timur itu harus dikembangkan sistem ekosistem pulau. Tidak bisa sektoral, di mana kabupaten A bikin ini, kabupaten B dan C bikin itu. Tidak bisa karena ekosistemnya adalah pulau-pulau. Misalnya, kamu bikin sesuatu di Pulau Timor, misalnya di Soe, itu akan berdampak pada Belu dan Kupang karena struktur tanahnya patah. Kalian bikin dengan alat-alat begitu kuat, dengan tanah rentan, itu erosi dan bencananya terjadi di tempat lain. Itu tak menolong orang Timor. Bisa nggak rakyat diberi peluang yang besar untuk mengelola sendiri sumber daya alam dengan diberi batas, mana batas ruang negara mana ruang rakyat?

Saya bukan ekonom. Saya orang kampung yang belajar dari masyarakat kampung. Banyak hal yang dideskripsikan atau direkomendasikan para ahli sebenarnya sangat tidak tepat dengan komunitas dan sistem ekonomi lokal yang sangat berbeda antara wilayah satu dan wilayah lainnya. Ekonom memasukkan rakyat ke dalam sebuah sistem kapitalisme. Misalnya hutan, orang kehutanan melihat itu adalah gelondongan kayu, tapi orang kampung melihat itu sebuah ekosistem di mana dia berada dalam bagian hutan itu.

SERI MUSIK INDONESIA: CD-CD SMITHSONIAN/MSPI

Menurut Philip Yampolsky, petualangan ini dimulai pada 1989 ketika ada persiapan festival Kebudayaan Indonesia di Amerika Serikat (KIAS), yang sebagian dananya didukung oleh Ford Foundation.

Ketika itu, Smithsonian Institution, lembaga yang mengelola banyak museum di Washington DC, baru saja mengambil alih Folkways Records, suatu perusahaan rekaman yang memfokuskan pada musik rakyat dan etnik. Diusulkan oleh Alan Feinstein, *program officer* di Ford Foundation, agar Smithsonian memproduksi “dua album baru tentang musik Indonesia,” berhubungan dengan KIAS. Feinstein juga menyarankan supaya melibatkan Yampolsky, seorang etnomusikolog yang telah meriset berbagai genre musik Indonesia dan pernah ikut membangun program etnomusikologi di Universitas Sumatera Utara di Medan (atas dana Ford Foundation).

Tanggapan Yampolsky agak mengejutkan: dia menolak. Sampai sekarang ia masih bangga karena berani mengambil sikap hanya mau membantu proyek itu jika ia boleh merancang 12 CD, bukan dua. Untungnya, Ford Foundation menerima. Kemudian, 12 menjadi 15, dan akhirnya *Seri Musik Indonesia* mencakup 20 album.

Proses rekaman dimulai pada 1990 dan lama-kelamaan dilaksanakan di 23 provinsi. Proyek itu merupakan kolaborasi dengan Masyarakat Seni Pertunjukan Indonesia (MSPI) dan melibatkan banyak mitra Indonesia: dosen dan mahasiswa etnomusikologi, antropolog, dan pengamat kebudayaan lokal. Bersama beberapa tim kecil perekam dan peneliti, Yampolsky melakukan rekaman selama kira-kira enam bulan setiap tahunnya hingga 1997, melompat dari pulau ke pulau. Pekerjaan editing, penyusunan materi, dan penulisan komentar dilakukan di Amerika.

Jabatin Bangun, seorang dekan Institut Kesenian Jakarta, yang waktu itu sering ikut tim rekaman, mengatakan salah satu tantangan utama adalah menemukan materi di lokasi-lokasi yang belum pernah diselidiki. Ia kadang-kadang dikirim untuk memeriksa daerah baru dan melakukan kontak awal.

“Flores Tengah adalah salah satunya. Kami tak punya informasi tentang tempat itu. Dan di sana juga ada salah paham.”

“Suatu kali,” kenanganya, “kami duduk di bawah pohon lontar, melakukan rekaman. Kami sedang merekam suatu nyanyian yang sangat indah tetapi sulit direkam dengan baik. Sudah gagal dua tiga kali. Beberapa pengunjung mendekat, kaki mereka menginjak daun-daun lontar kering yang berserakan di tempat itu, sehingga timbul gangguan suara. Yampolsky mengangkat tangannya untuk minta mereka berhenti. Isyarat tangan ini membuat penyanyi bingung sehingga mereka berhenti mendadak. *Take*-nya rusak lagi.



Poster menggambarkan ke-20 album dalam *Seri Musik Indonesia*.

“Kami harus membujuk mereka mulai satu kali lagi, dan akhirnya berhasil,” kata Yampolsky.


“Sebenarnya,” menurut Yampolsky, “tujuannya bukanlah untuk mencapai sesuatu yang lengkap, karena tak mungkin mewakili setiap pulau dengan semua kelompok etniknya. Tujuannya, membuat rekaman yang menggambarkan – secara serius, bukan asal

jadi saja – keragaman jenis dan gaya musik Indonesia.” Prinsip editorialnya bukan “apa saja yang ada di suatu tempat, masing-masing jenis dua menit,” melainkan memilih dua atau tiga jenis yang memiliki kekuatannya sendiri dan memabarkannya dengan rekaman yang lebih panjang dan uraian yang lebih mendalam.

Dan keragaman pun muncul. Album 8 dan 9, misalnya, memperkenalkan beberapa jenis nyanyian yang sangat kontras satu sama lain, semuanya dari satu pulau yang relatif kecil, Pulau Flores. Indonesia terkenal akan gamelannya, tetapi jarang ada orang yang kenal juga jenis-jenis musik alat dawai yang terdapat di Kalimantan (album 13) atau Sulawesi Selatan (album 15). Dan gamelan dan wayang pun beragam: album 14 berisi *wayang Sasak* dari Lombok, *gamelan Banjar* dari Kalimantan Selatan, dan *dbalang jemblung* dari Banyumas (sebuah komentar dari pinggiran terhadap tradisi *adilubung*, dengan hanya menggunakan empat aktor-penyanyi, tanpa instrumen atau wayang).

“Rekaman-rekaman kami,” kata Yampolsky, “ditujukan bagi pendengar yang berpikiran terbuka, bukan spesialis, orang-orang yang kalau melihat sebuah album musik dari Timor atau Mentawai akan penasaran dan berpikir, ‘Wah, saya ingin tahu bagaimana musik ini!’” Disinilah etnomusikologi jadi berguna, baik sebagai disiplin akademis maupun sebagai sebuah model pendekatan pada kebudayaan Indonesia. Etnomusikologi mulai sebagai sebuah “gerakan” dalam musikologi yang ingin menjauhi dominasi musik Barat dengan jalan menggabungkan analisis musikal dengan pengetahuan etnografis. “Ini membawa kita kepada penafsiran baru tentang bagaimana bunyi musikal bermakna bagi kebudayaan tertentu,” kata Endo Suanda, etnomusikolog Indonesia yang tinggal di Bandung.

Seri Musik Indonesia, bisa dikatakan, menunjukkan kepada kita sesuatu yang selalu misterius: pengalaman orang lain. Sebuah cara yang berbeda untuk memadukan suara akhirnya mencerminkan sebuah cara berbeda untuk memahami kehidupan.



▲ *Merekam Seri Musik Indonesia. Searah jarum jam dari kiri atas: seorang perempuan Kayan Mendalam dengan alat semacam gonggong, Kalimantan Barat, 1995; penari dan penyanyi dari Biak, Papua, 1994; pemain gonggong Batak, Sumatera Utara, 1990; musisi Toraja, Sulawesi Selatan, 1996; penyanyi dari Kabupaten Belu, Timor barat, 1997; pemain kulintang Mongondow, Sulawesi Utara, 1997.*

Di situlah para mahasiswa berdiskusi, dan dengan itu mereka membangun kemampuan untuk menganalisis keadaan sekitarnya. Kajian kritis tentang Orde Baru dengan bebas dilakukan di sudut-sudut yang agak tersembunyi ini.

Bersama itu, di tengah kemakmuran yang tumbuh waktu itu, terbit keinginan untuk mendekati diri kepada lapisan masyarakat yang tertinggal. Ada yang mengajar baca tulis anak-anak kelas bawah di Salatiga. Ada yang melakukan advokasi dan menyusun program pendidikan bagi para tukang becak.

“Kita semua mulainya dari kiri,” kata Rizal Mallarangeng, mengenang masa itu. Ia kini direktur Freedom Institute yang membawakan gagasan liberalisme, tapi di tahun 1980-an ia aktivis kelompok studi di celah-celah kampus UGM di Yogyakarta yang tak lepas dari semangat kiri – tradisi yang memang kuat di dalam sejarah pemikiran politik Indonesia. Mallarangeng sendiri kemudian meninggalkan paham kiri, setelah ia mengikuti perubahan yang terjadi di Uni Soviet ketika Mikhail Gorbachev memimpin negeri itu: di sanalah, sosialisme yang meletakkan kekuasaan negara di atas mekanisme pasar hanya menghasilkan kemacetan.

Tapi tak berarti mereka yang liberal tak ikut dalam oposisi terhadap Suharto. Terutama ketika menjelang tahun 1990-an, kekuasaan Presiden menjadi semakin otokratik dan, seperti dalam kasus BPPC dan proyek “mobil nasional,” intervensi negara identik dengan intervensi keluarga Cendana. Di situlah program liberalisasi perdagangan dan penghapusan monopoli – yang disyaratkan IMF dan didukung para teknokrat seperti Widjojo Nitisastro – merupakan upaya menampik Orde Baru yang telah berubah.

Basis dukungan Suharto memang kian mengecil.

Legitimasinya praktis habis. Bahkan kalangan militer, yang sudah mulai dipimpin generasi yang jauh lebih muda, mulai menerimanya sebagai seorang yang tak mereka kenal dengan dekat.

Tapi apa yang harus dilakukan? Indonesia tak punya lembaga yang siap dan pengalaman politik yang cukup untuk mengganti kepala negaranya. Cara lama pun berulang: para mahasiswa turun ke jalan, menjebol batas kampus, dan menuntut

– seperti di tahun 1978 – Suharto mundur. Tapi berbeda dari tahun 1978, mahasiswa kali ini tak sendirian. Juga aksi protes tak hanya di Jakarta dan kota-kota besar Jawa: di Denpasar, Mataram, Makassar, Palu, Manado, Samarinda, Bali, di Sulawesi Selatan, Tengah dan Utara, puluhan ribu mahasiswa turun ke jalan. Tentara dan polisi tak bisa menghalangi mereka. Beberapa bentrokan terjadi, meskipun tak sampai ada yang tertembak seperti dalam kekerasan di Universitas Trisakti.

Dalam keadaan tak ada partai politik oposisi yang menghimpun perlawanan, sebuah gado-gado pun muncul sebagai pendukung. Se-

bagian besar adalah organisasi nonpemerintah yang bergerak di bidang-bidang khusus. Ada juga kelompok yang datang dari kelas menengah yang mulai meluas, kaum profesional. Tak kurang dari itu, buruh-buruh pabrik. Selebihnya orang ramai.

Di saat-saat yang menentukan itu, kekuatan politik gado-gado ini – yang unsur-unsurnya terkadang bersaing dan bertengkar – berusaha membuat jaringan dan aliansi. Dengan koordinasi yang sering kacau, mereka itulah yang akhirnya menggantikan peran sebuah *civil society* yang di Indonesia praktis tak ada.

Dengan itu sebuah pergerakan politik oposisi yang cukup acak-acakan muncul. Tapi dengan itu pula Suharto jatuh.



RIZAL MALLARANGENG

Ketika kuliah di UGM, Rizal Mallarangeng akrab dengan dunia diskusi. Seperti rekan-rekannya, ia sepakat dengan paham sosialisme – tapi tak lama setelah Uni Soviet bubar, dia pun beralih pada paham yang sering disebut “kanan.” Paham ini direguknya saat belajar di AS, negara yang dikaguminya. Dia menyelesaikan disertasi Ph.D. dengan bantuan Fulbright Scholarship, Ford Foundation, dan barian Kompas. Kini ia memimpin Freedom Institute dan sesekali menulis pidato Presiden Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Pertengahan 1980-an saya mahasiswa di Yogyakarta. Saat itu isunya belum soal pemerintahan yang baik atau pemberdayaan. Bahkan saya tak ingat apakah istilah masyarakat warga (*civil society*) sudah digunakan. Organisasi nonpemerintah belum populer. Kalau ada orang organisasi nonpemerintah ikut diskusi dianggap, “Ah, orang LSM tahu apa?” Organisasi pemerintah juga ada jeleknya. Misalnya, tiba-tiba satu-dua pengurusnya beli mobil atau rumahnya bagus. Saat itu zaman diskusi mahasiswa didominasi pribadi-pribadi yang populer: Goenawan Mohamad, Umar Kayam, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, Arief Budiman.

Akhir 1980-an organisasi nonpemerintah mulai populer sebagai sebuah nama yang identik dengan perjuangan melawan rezim Presiden Suharto dan membantu rakyat sadar terhadap hak-haknya. Majalah *Prisma* banyak berperan dengan tulisan-tulisan dari Dawam Rahardjo dan Abdurrahman Wahid.


Gus Dur masuk pertama ke kalangan aktivis bukan sebagai ketua Nahdlatul Ulama tapi sebagai pemimpin NGO. Gus Dur dipilih sebagai ketua NU tahun 1980 dan salah satu programnya adalah membuat NGO kecil-kecil di banyak daerah NU.

Pada awal 1990-an aktivis mahasiswa dan organisasi nonpemerintah menyatu. Inilah elemen pergerakan yang sebenarnya. Momentumnya waduk Kedung Ombo. Kata *civil society* mulai muncul. Banyak aktivis mahasiswa Bandung, Yogyakarta, dan Jakarta, yang selesai kuliah, masuk organisasi nonpemerintah, atau bahkan mendirikannya. Aktivis Kedung Ombo banyak yang kemudian membentuk Partai Rakyat Demokratik.

Umumnya organisasi-organisasi aktivis ini kiri dalam beberapa variasinya. Ada kiri keras – komunis dalam identifikasi ideologis

– tapi umumnya kiri sosial demokrat. Mereka curiga pada perdagangan, selalu melihat perdagangan bebas membuat orang kecil tersisih. Kalau ekonomi kanan justru melihat sebaliknya. Mereka percaya perdagangan bebas juga membantu orang miskin.

Kita semua mulainya dari kiri. Kalau mau jadi aktivis, baca karya Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Tan Malaka, atau Sjahrir. Mereka sosialis. Jadi yang memotivasi idealisme pemuda, sejarah Indonesia, memang sosialisme. Tradisi intelektual Indonesia juga



Rizal Mallarangeng, Jakarta, 1992.

begitu: semua kiri dalam spektrum yang berbeda. Indonesia tak punya tradisi intelektual kanan dari awal.

Apalagi teori-teori populer yang dibawa oleh orang-orang yang baru pulang belajar dari luar negeri adalah paham-paham kiri yang sudah dimodifikasi. Di pertengahan 1980 ada Arief Budiman, Amien Rais, dan Nurcholish Madjid. Mereka pulang dan membawa suasana intelektual yang segar. Jangan lupa, sosialisme bukan hanya karena ada tradisi, tapi juga untuk melawan Suharto, karena cap Suharto adalah cap Widjojo

Nitisaastro, dan Nitisaastro itu kapitalis.

Di kalangan aktivis mahasiswa praktis yang kanan dalam pengertian percaya pada perdagangan bebas hanya saya. Teman-teman, apalagi senior kita seperti Arief Budiman dan Y.B. Mangunwijaya, dalam kerangka ideologi kiri dengan variasinya.

Saya ingat begitu Amien Rais baru pulang dari Amerika. Waktu itu buku Arief baru terbit, *Jalan Damai ke Sosialisme*. Saya ketua panitia diskusi buku itu. Arief Budiman kita undang dari Salatiga. Pembahasnya Amien Rais. Waktu saya beri tahu, Amien bilang, “Iya, saya suka ini, sosialisme.”

Hanya, tahun 1986, ada Mikhail Gorbachev di Uni Soviet. Saya salah satu di antara teman-teman aktivis yang belajar politik secara sistematis. Fakultas saya politik, yang lain kan ada yang filsafat, hukum. Jadi saya belajar bagaimana Gorbachev naik dan Uni Soviet kesulitan. Dalam pengamatan pribadi saya, pasti ada yang salah dengan sosialisme. Kawan-kawan bilang bahwa yang salah prakteknya. Saya tak percaya. Saya beralih ke liberal sejak itu. Umumnya kawan-kawan tetap saja kiri.

Sekarang isunya sudah beda lagi. Sekarang fungsi organisasi nonpemerintah diambil alih oleh partai politik. Tantangan terbesar sekarang menginstitutionalisasi demokrasi. Kita mesti meningkatkan kualitas partisipasi sosial dan politik. Partai politik adalah pemain kunci. Kalau mau pemerintahan yang baik, harus ada konsolidasi partai politik. Partai politik harus memperkuat dan membangun dirinya. Pertanyaannya bukan kita percaya pada mereka atau tidak, tapi selain itu pilihannya apa? Tanpa partai politik tak bisa ada demokrasi – itu kenyataan. Jalan keluarnya, partai politik mesti diperbaiki. Caranya bagaimana, itu pertanyaannya.

Begitu bersendirinyakah dia pada akhirnya? Di malam sebelum ia meletakkan jabatan, Presiden Suharto bertemu dengan sembilan orang laki-laki di sebuah ruangan di Istana Negara. Semuanya tokoh-tokoh Islam – agaknya petunjuk tentang makin besarnya pengaruh kalangan Muslim dalam politik Indonesia ketika itu. Di antaranya tampak dua cendekiawan terkemuka Nurcholish Madjid dan Abdurrahman Wahid alias Gus Dur. Beberapa ulama Nahdlatul Ulama juga ada di sana. Yang tak tampak secara mencolok adalah Amien Rais, ketua umum Muhammadiyah – orang yang waktu itu telah terang-terangan menentang Suharto.

Di ruang itu, Presiden menjelaskan tujuannya bertemu: seperti dituntut para mahasiswa, ia akan mengadakan reformasi. Ia bersedia mengundurkan diri. Langkah itu nanti akan diambilnya setelah sebuah pemilihan umum yang akan diselenggarakannya sesegera mungkin. “Saya telah kapok menjadi presiden,” katanya, seperti diceritakan Nurcholish Madjid.

Ia memberi kesan bahwa ia bersedia mengalah. Tak disangka-sangka Nurcholish Madjid memberikan pendapat yang sama sekali lain. “Reformasi,” kata Madjid dengan sopan tapi jelas, berarti, “Pak Harto harus turun saat ini juga.”

Tak diketahui bagaimana hadirin yang lain bereaksi. Hanya Gus Dur yang membantah Madjid. Ia menganggap, demikianlah diutarakannya di pertemuan itu, dengan ide itu Madjid akan menghancurkan Suharto. Baginya, rencana Suharto patut diterima. Sehabis pertemuan, melalui televisi, Gus Dur yang duduk di kursi roda, kurus, dan setengah buta, sisa-sisa akibat stroke yang dideritanya beberapa bulan yang lalu, menyatakan agar mahasiswa menghentikan aksi-aksi mereka.

Tapi akhirnya saran Madjid-lah yang dituruti Suharto. Malam itu ia sadar, ia sendirian. Bahkan Harmoko telah mengingkarinya. Ia merencanakan menyusun kembali kabinet, tapi 14 menteri menolak untuk ikut. Ketika ia meminta Nurcholish Madjid agar memimpin “Komite Reformasi” yang dirancangnya, permintaan itu ditolak.

Di pucuk kekuasaannya, Suharto rupanya tak tahu lagi sejauh mana ia didukung rakyat. Parlemen yang dibentuknya adalah perwakilan yang palsu. Para mahasiswa yang menyemut di Senayan itu jelas melawannya. Juga sejumlah individu dan organisasi masyarakat yang mengimbaunya untuk berhenti.

Dalam keadaan seperti itu, seperti kata pepatah, “karena tak ada elang, belalang pun bisa tampil sebagai elang.” Hari-



▲ Presiden Suharto berunding dengan tokoh-tokoh Islam di Istana Merdeka pada 20 Mei 1998, sehari sebelum ia mengundurkan diri. Di antara hadirin terdapat Abdurrahman Wahid (di kursi roda) yang kemudian jadi presiden.

STEPANUS DJUWENG

Pada 1990 ada beberapa pemuda Dayak merasa prihatin dengan terpinggirnnya kebudayaan orang Dayak di Kalimantan Barat. Mereka membuat kelompok studi di bawah naungan Yayasan Pancur Kasih, sebuah organisasi sosial di Pontianak, dan mulai mengadakan penelitian dan publikasi. Kelompok studi ini adalah cikal bakal Institut Dayakologi – sebuah lembaga nirlaba yang bergerak di bidang revitalisasi dan advokasi kebudayaan Dayak. Mereka memperjuangkan identitas Dayak dalam Indonesia yang multikultural ini. Salah satu pemuda itu bernama Stepanus Djuweng.

Pada awal 1990-an itu kami melihat orang Dayak di Kalimantan Barat itu *single majority*, 40-43 persen dari jumlah populasi, tapi *minority in roles*, tak ada warna kebudayaan Dayak yang patut ditonjolkan. Dari segi penelitian antropologi, budaya, sosial sama sekali tak pernah disentuh. Mereka dianggap primitif, perambah hutan, ladang berpindah, suku terasing. Beda dengan penghormatan terhadap keberadaan Dayak di Sarawak, Malaysia.

Kami tak menyalahkan siapa-siapa. Bila orang Dayak mau dikenal nilai-nilai budayanya dan mau dihormati tradisinya, maka mesti ada lembaga yang spesial dalam penelitian dan publikasi kebudayaan Dayak. Ini akan memungkinkan pengambilan keputusan yang sesuai dengan aspirasi dan keinginan orang Dayak. Warga Dayak selama ini tanahnya dirampas. Penindasan selama berabad-abad. Perampasan terhadap sumber daya alam tercermin dari proses diskriminasi legal terhadap warga Dayak. Pada masa Orde Baru ada empat undang-undang, dengan kira-kira 200 peraturan turunannya yang diskriminatif terhadap orang Dayak, antara lain UU Pokok Agraria, UU Pokok Kehutanan, UU Pertambangan, dan UU Pokok Pemerintahan Desa.

Selain mahasiswa, saya juga sekretaris eksekutif Yayasan Pancur Kasih. Saya berkumpul dengan anak-anak muda dan mendirikan lembaga advokasi dan publikasi kebudayaan Dayak. Dimulai dari studi kecil Yayasan Pancur Kasih lalu dilakukan diskusi dan diterbitkan di surat kabar. Salah satunya, analisis saya tentang situasi politik di Sabah

dan Sarawak, diterbitkan harian *Kompas*. Dari situ kita berbicara di bawah payung Pancur Kasih untuk riset dan pengembangan. Pada 1992 Institut Dayakologi Research Development berdiri sendiri. Pada 2002 ia berubah bentuk dari yayasan menjadi



Stepanus Djuweng di Pontianak, 2003.

perkumpulan dengan nama baru Institut Dayakologi.

Kita berdiri 1990 dan pada 1994 sudah ada konflik Dayak-Madura di Pontianak. Tahun 1996-1997 ada konflik Dayak-Madura yang sangat besar di Kalimantan Barat. Tahun 2000 terjadi lagi di Kalimantan Tenggara. Itu meremuk-redamkan perasaan dan hati kita. Itu pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Pembunuhan sama sekali tak bisa dibenarkan.

Kalau kita baca sejarah Kalimantan Barat, konflik memang sejarah provinsi ini dan sebagian memang direkayasa para politisi, militer maupun sipil. Misalnya konflik Tionghoa dan Dayak tahun 1967. Itu rekayasa militer dalam rangka menumpas suplai logistik gerakan Paraku/PGRS (Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara/Pasukan Gerilya

Rakyat Sarawak). Orang-orang Dayak dipakai untuk mengusir warga Tionghoa dengan pembunuhan sehingga orang Tionghoa tak lagi tinggal di pedesaan. Ternyata dari seluruh agresi itu tak hanya semata-mata karena pertikaian berdimensi etnik. Dari statistik, konflik Dayak-

Madura pertama terjadi 1950.

Lalu terjadi lagi konflik Dayak-Tionghoa 1967. Jadi ada selang 17 tahun. Sejak tahun 1967, konflik Dayak-Madura ada 14 kali dan terjadi selama 32 tahun. Jadi intervalnya 2,6 tahun per konflik. Kalau dibandingkan dengan periode sebelumnya yang hanya 17 tahun, berarti suatu peningkatan yang maha-dahsyat.

Konflik itu terjadi dengan maha-dahsyat karena memang terjadi suatu konspirasi dalam manajemen bernegara, yaitu membuat konflik di mana-mana supaya pihak militer bisa mengambil kekuasaan dan menjadikan dirinya *the balance of*

power. Buktinya banyak.

Institut Dayakologi melakukan rekonsiliasi dan *peace building* untuk mengatasi konflik ini. Itu terutama dilakukan tak hanya dengan cara-cara yang konvensional, seminar, lokakarya, dan segala macam, tapi juga dengan tindakan-tindakan nyata lewat pemberdayaan ekonomi rakyat yang sifatnya menyeluruh. Menurut dugaan kita konflik akan segera berakhir.

Kami kerja dengan banyak lembaga tapi Ford Foundation yang paling berkesan. Kami tak hanya dapat bantuan program tapi juga *endowment fund*. Mula-mula diberi \$100.000 pada 1997. Kami dinilai mampu mengembangkannya. Pada 2001 kami diberi lagi \$500.000. Sekarang total sudah jadi Rp 7 milyar karena kami bungakan.

hari itu, para mahasiswa dan sejumlah aktivis organisasi nonpemerintah muncul sebagai sebuah kekuatan oposisi yang galak, yang tampak bersatu padu. Aliansi dan jaringan itu sebetulnya rapuh. Satu dasawarsa sebelumnya, para mahasiswa umumnya menjauhi perkumpulan-perkumpulan ini, yang di antaranya didirikan pemerintah untuk membantu mengatasi problem-problem pembangunan. Ketika di tahun 1983 sebutan *non-governmental organization* (NGO) berubah menjadi “lembaga swadaya masyarakat” (LSM), orang-orang yang aktif di dalamnya memang menunjukkan sikap terlampau berhati-hati: kata NGO atau organisasi nonpemerintah seakan-akan mengambil posisi menolak. Sebaliknya, kata LSM tak memberikan kesan konfrontatif. Tapi lebih dari satu dasawarsa kemudian hal itu berubah. Justru konfrontasilah yang jadi coraknya.

Organisasi nonpemerintah ini, diniatkan atau tidak, pada gilirannya terdorong untuk ikut mempengaruhi kebijakan publik. Berangsur-angsur, politik jadi bagian penting dalam hidup mereka. YLKI akhirnya tak selesai hanya dengan

memberi informasi kepada warga. Pada suatu saat ketika lembaga ini berusaha melahirkan sebuah undang-undang perlindungan konsumen, ia harus berhadapan dengan sebuah Parlemen yang lemah dan acuh tak acuh. Sebuah bangunan kekuasaan menghendaki demikian. Bangunan itulah yang harus digedor.

Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI) adalah contoh lain. Didirikan untuk ikut menjaga kelestarian dan perbaikan mutu lingkungan melalui kampanye, studi, dan pelatihan, Walhi pada akhirnya harus menantang pemerintah. Di pertengahan 1994, para aktivisnya ikut menuntut pemerintah ke pengadilan. Dituduhkan bahwa pemerintah Suharto telah mengambil dana penghijauan hutan Rp 400 milyar untuk membantu IPTN yang didirikan oleh Menteri Riset dan Teknologi B.J. Habibie.

Konfrontasi yang lebih sering terjadi di YLBHI. Organisasi yang semula berdiri untuk memberi bantuan orang miskin dalam perkara hukum, dengan segera menyadari bahwa proses hukum di Indonesia sangat tergantung pada kekuasaan. Sebaliknya, para pejabat juga mulai berang. Di beberapa daerah,



▲ Pemilik toko VCD di Surakarta, Jawa Tengah, 2003. Ia dibantu oleh Yayasan Talenta, lembaga yang bekerja membangun rasa percaya diri dan keterampilan para difable.
 ▶ Petani, ketua adat, dan staf Eltayasa mengobrol. NGO ini memperjuangkan partisipasi warga dalam pemerintahan setempatnya.



ZOEMROTIN K. SUSILO

Pasca rezim Suharto, Zoemrotin K. Susilo memasuki dunia yang dianggap kotor oleh kebanyakan aktivis perempuan: dunia politik. Ia bahkan ikut mendirikan Partai Amanat Nasional bersama Amien Rais. Zoemrotin percaya pentingnya peran partai politik dalam sebuah sistem demokrasi dan tak boleh ada orang yang menganggap dirinya terlalu suci untuk masuk ke partai politik. Dia kini pening memikirkan bagaimana kuota perempuan 30 persen akan terisi dengan orang yang berkualitas. Zoemrotin juga sibuk sebagai anggota Komisi Nasional Hak-hak Asasi Manusia. Sebelumnya dia lebih dikenal sebagai pemimpin YLKI.

YLKI awalnya sebuah organisasi yang mengandalkan semangat volunterisme para aktivisnya yang tinggi. Mayoritas kami adalah ibu-ibu yang sedikit mapan, yang ingin mengisi waktu untuk melakukan sesuatu yang bermanfaat bagi kaum lemah. Manfaat lembaga ini kemudian dirasakan banyak warga. Ford Foundation lembaga donor pertama yang membantu untuk program. Friedrich Naumann Stiftung memberi dana untuk pengembangan institusi.

Ketika Suharto mau jatuh, organisasi macam YLKI, makin getol melakukan advokasi karena ingin segera terjadi perubahan politik. Banyak aktivis seperti Nursyahbani Katjasungkana dan Karlina Leksono, di akhir kekuasaan Suharto, bekerja sama, bahu-membahu mendukung gerakan mahasiswa untuk mendorong jatuhnya rezim Suharto. Bahkan seperti barteran: aku bantu Mbak Nur di tempatnya, dia pasti bantu di tempatku. Salah satu persoalan kita memang masalah kekurangan orang yang benar-benar mau melakukan sesuatu untuk menguatkan masyarakat sipil.

Waktu itu ada alternatif pemikiran, apakah kita akan tetap berteriak di luar atau masuk ke dalam? Ada diskusi dengan Koalisi Perempuan, mengatur strategi untuk berbagai peran. Saya memutuskan masuk ke dunia politik. Ternyata akhirnya tak ada dukungan. Terkucilkan. Yang sudah masuk ke dunia politik dianggap aneh oleh teman-teman sendiri. Itu membuat saya merasa sendiri dan kesepian. Bekerja itu menyenangkan kalau ada kebersamaan. Saya masuk partai dengan pikiran mau membuat sinergi antara teman yang di dalam dan yang di luar. Ternyata

begitu masuk di dunia politik, bila ketemu kawan, ditertawai, “Wah ini orangnya Amien Rais.” Kelihatannya sederhana, tapi berdampak menekan.

Padahal saat mau jadi calon legislatif, saya harus kirim surat ke organisasi tempat saya bekerja untuk mengundurkan diri: YLKI, International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, agar organisasi-organisasi tersebut terjaga independensinya dan tak partisan. Berat rasanya menulis surat itu.



Zoemrotin K. Susilo dengar pendapat di Parlemen, 2002.

Ikatan batin saya dengan YLKI selama 25 tahun begitu kuat. Waktu mau kampanye di Cilacap, saya naik kereta sendiri. Saya berpikir, “Apa yang saya cari? Organisasi nonpemerintah yang membesarkan saya harus ditinggalkan, sementara di dunia politik tidak jelas siapa teman dan siapa lawan.” Saya merenung dalam perjalanan.

Awalnya ada semangat untuk membangun partai yang idealismenya tinggi. Apa tak bisa pengalaman di organisasi nonpemerintah dipakai untuk membangun partai baru yang berlandaskan keadilan dan kebenaran? Ternyata tidak mudah, karakter NGO yang mempunyai konsistensi tinggi dalam memperjuangkan suatu kebenaran, harus

berbenturan dengan karakter partai politik yang tujuannya lebih untuk memperoleh kekuasaan dan kemenangan. Tapi kita juga konyol kalau tak mau bekerja sama dengan orang partai atau pemerintah karena masih ada orang partai dan pemerintah, yang berpikiran benar dan bersih. Sebaliknya, saat ini organisasi nonpemerintah ada juga yang nakal dan korup.

Sekarang ada sesuatu yang menyedihkan di kalangan perempuan. Perempuan mengkampanyekan kuota 30 persen di Parlemen untuk mendapatkan posisi strategis, termasuk di partai politik, dan berhasil. Tapi realitasnya, untuk memperoleh perempuan yang punya potensi, kualitas dan bersedia duduk di Parlemen atau partai tidak mudah. Para perempuan yang berpotensi, banyak yang ragu, tak bersedia.

Bisa jadi ini karena suasana dunia partai masih belum menunjukkan demokrasi atau belum terbentuk sikap yang menjunjung kebenaran. Tokoh-tokoh partai bisa memutarbalikkan banyak hal untuk memenangkan kelompoknya. Saya tahu demokrasi memang mesti diperjuangkan, tapi harus ada etika dalam memperjuangkannya. Etika ini tak terlihat dalam partai politik.

Jadi, saya malah khawatir orang-orang yang mengkampanyekan kuota sebetulnya tak siap. Ini harus menjadi satu renungan bagi para perempuan. Kita bicara 30 persen tapi siapa yang masuk di dalamnya? Akhirnya karena perempuan yang berpotensi dan berkualitas tidak bersedia, 30 persen dalam jumlah tercapai, tapi yang masuk jang-jangan yang tidak berkualitas. Ini mengkhawatirkan.

FARHA CICIEK

Kecewa pada organisasi kemabasiswaan zaman ia sekolah, Farha Ciciek memutuskan untuk tak pernah bergabung dengan organisasi kemabasiswaan di IAIN Yogyakarta, tempat ia belajar filsafat, yang dinilainya tak Islami. Ini tak berarti Ciciek tak aktif memperjuangkan apa yang diyakininya penting: kesetaraan perempuan. Kini Ciciek, memimpin organisasi perempuan Rahima, bekerja sama dengan Ford Foundation, menggunakan pendekatan agama dalam menjawab persoalan perempuan.

Kenapa kami pakai pendekatan agama, itu ceritanya jauh ke belakang. Berangkat dari realitas Yogyakarta, saya dan kawan-kawan sebagai mahasiswa bikin diskusi-diskusi. Ini biasa karena Yogyakarta dan dunia mahasiswa adalah tempat diskusi. Kami pun mengadakan diskusi dengan isu-isu perempuan. Waktu kami adakan diskusi, ramai sekali yang datang. Di perpustakaan sampai berdiri-diri, walau ruangnya itu *sumuk* dan panas. Mungkin karena ada kebutuhan.

Pada 1987, kami mencoba memasukkan persepsi perempuan dalam melihat realitas ekonomi dan politik. Isu-isu perempuan diangkat secara khusus. Sudah tentu kami diserang, dengan dalih agama. Sementara, teman-teman tak ada yang punya basis itu. Saya sendiri, walaupun sekolah di IAIN, pada saat itu digelari “kiri luar” karena saya lebih banyak bicara pada isu-isu kerakyatan dan ekonomi. Skripsi saya berjudul “Kemiskinan Berdasarkan Perspektif al-Quran.”

Tapi, teman-teman pada saat itu *true believers*, orang yang betul-betul percaya. Kami percaya bahwa Tuhan tak mungkin tidak adil. Kami juga tahu saat itu bahwa penafsiran berkembang sesuai dengan pola pikir si penafsir. Dari situlah dimulai penggalian dan tafsir-tafsir yang properempuan. Strategi kami kemudian adalah mencoba untuk membedah konteks ini. Mengkaji kenapa ada dua banding satu dalam soal pembagian warisan; kenapa poligami diperbolehkan. Dengan segala keterbatasan, kami menerjemahkan buku tentang hak-hak perempuan dan Islam. Hal itu memunculkan diskusi yang berimbang.

Ketika di Rahima, saya lihat ada berbagai perkembangan. Baik perkembangan kawan-kawan sendiri, lalu ada juga perkembangan sosial-politik-ekonomi yang lebih kompleks, ada radikalisme agama,

tapi tidak ada jembatan antara kelompok perempuan dengan latar belakang tradisional dan yang “modernis.” Kami lalu berpikir bagaimana kalau kami mengedepankan hak-hak perempuan secara umum serta merangkul lebih banyak kelompok perempuan yang Islam. Jadi bukan hanya kelompok dengan basis Nahdlatul Ulama, tapi juga yang lainnya



Farha Ciciek bicara di seminar Madura, 2002.

seperti Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Persewaan Islam.

Rahima punya mitra di beberapa tempat. Kami ingin membantu mitra kami dan menunjang kemampuannya untuk menyebarkan apa yang sudah dia dapatkan. Ini program penguatan jaringan. Jadi orang-orang yang sudah ada diharapkan bisa menyebarluaskan perspektifnya di kalangan lokal, di lingkungan mereka. Dengan menggunakan kekuatan mereka masing-masing.

Soal kampanye syariat Islam, dalam situasi bangsa Indonesia seperti ini, pluralisme adalah suatu situasi yang niscaya. Di *Suara Rahima*, kami terbitkan isu-isu yang strategis. Salah satunya syariah Islam. Kami cari dananya dari Ford Foundation. Tapi tak cukup karena hanya untuk konstituen terbatas. Padahal kelompok-kelompok agama yang lain, juga butuh informasi: syariat Islam itu seperti apa sih? Kok menakutkan. Kan banyak orang lain tidak tahu? Lalu kami cari dana. Kemudian kami cetak dengan jumlah 3.500 eksemplar. Hasilnya, dibagikan kepada jaringan teman-teman yang ada dalam kelompok agama lain. Misalnya untuk Biro Wanita Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia, dan segala jaringan mitra perempuan.

Syariat Islam muncul sebagai isu panas. Ada kelompok-kelompok yang berjuang keras untuk mengaplikasikan syariat Islam dalam versi mereka, ke negara Indonesia. Kira-kira model yang ingin diterapkan dalam istilah, adalah bentuk “syariat Islam yang beku” – mohon maaf bagi teman-teman yang sealiran dengan itu. Ya, model syariat Islam yang berasal dari produk abad ke tujuh atau delapan atau ke berapa gitu ya?

Kami pada dasarnya tak menentang apa yang dinamakan syariat Islam. Tapi apa isinya? Kami tak setuju klaim teman-teman bahwa syariat Islam itu merupakan satu paket yang tak bisa diutak-atik. Syariat Islam tergantung zaman, tempat, dan waktu. Ia bersifat luwes. Bukan sesuatu yang mati. Nah dalam hal inilah kita sedang “bertarung.”

Saya sendiri tak setuju jika agama dijadikan sama dengan negara atau negara sama dengan agama. Secara normatif hal ini akan memangkas nilai-nilai tinggi agama. Dan kemudian agama akan menjadi alat politik. Dia kehilangan kesucian dan kesakralannya. Saya lebih memilih agama sebagai pribadi. Urusan dunia? Coba kita kelola dengan akal yang baik.







mereka kian sering menjumpai orang-orang miskin yang jadi berani menggugatnya, karena LBH mendampingi mereka.

Akhirnya, pelbagai LSM pun berkembang menjadi gerakan perlawanan. Seperti dikatakan Zoemrotin Susilo dari YLKI, ketika setiap advokasi yang dilancarkan LSM dianggap perlawanan, maka tak ada pilihan lain. Dalam kata-kata Widji Tukul, penyair pembawa suara kaum miskin itu, “Hanya ada satu kata: Lawan!”

Oposisi itu mula-mula menemukan teladannya di sebuah dusun miskin di Jawa Tengah, di tahun 1986. Sebuah waduk besar akan dibangun di wilayah Kedung Ombo, untuk membendung Sungai Serang, 90 kilometer di tenggara Semarang. Petani yang bertahun-tahun hidup di wilayah seluas 37 desa itu harus dipindah. Wilayah baru disediakan, juga janji untuk bertransmigrasi. Tapi tak semua penduduk mau. Tanah pengganti dianggap tak cukup luas, uang ganti rugi tak memadai atau dikorupsi para petugas.

Menghadapi penolakan itu, penguasa setempat memakai cara yang bagi mereka efektif: memaksa. Samadi, warga Dukuh Nglanji yang berumur 60 tahun, adalah salah satu contohnya. Ia mula-mula tak hendak menyentuh uang ganti rugi. Ia pun digiring ke kantor petugas militer setempat. Di hadapan camat, muka orang tua itu digampar. Ia menyerah. Ia membubuhkan cap jempol persetujuan, dan melepas pekarangannya yang seluas 2.700 meter persegi untuk ditukar dengan uang Rp 1,5 juta.

Ia memang masih menyimpan sepetak sawah dan sebuah gubuk. Majalah *Tempo*, dalam sebuah reportase panjang tentang Kedung Ombo menceritakan bagaimana di depan gubuk itu Samadi memasang bendera Merah-Putih di tiang setinggi 10 meter. Dengan memandang bendera itu, katanya, “Saya masih bisa *ngrumaosi nggadhahi nagari* (merasa punya tanah air).”

Tapi di tanah airnya, Samadi dan para tetangganya terpojok. Beberapa penduduk ditangkap dengan tuduhan mencuri kayu hutan milik negara. Belasan orang mendapatkan



- ▲ Para petani setempat mengklaim tanah mereka yang dulu direbut jadi lapangan golf di Jawa Barat, 1998.
- ◀ Perahu nelayan terdampar di dasar sungai karena air dialirkan ke waduk Kedung Ombo, 1992.
- ◀◀ Belajar di pesantren Krapyak di Jawa Tengah, 2003.

kartu penduduk yang diberi kode “ET,” tanda yang ditakuti, sebab itu berarti mereka termasuk “Eks Tahanan (Politik)” atau PKI. Kepada mereka dikatakan bahwa bila mereka bersedia ikut transmigrasi, tanda itu akan dihapus.

Akhir Agustus 1986, sejumlah penduduk mengadu ke LBH Yogyakarta. Ketika pemberian ganti rugi makin seret, di pertengahan Februari 1987 mereka datang ke Parlemen lokal Jawa Tengah di Semarang. Ketika tak ada hasil, enam bulan kemudian mereka mengadu ke YLBHI Jakarta.

Sejak itulah sejumlah LSM terlibat, meskipun tak selamanya mantap. Pendorong yang militan adalah para mahasiswa. Bersama mereka ada Y.B. Mangunwijaya, pastor dan sastrawan terkenal, yang dengan segera jadi sosok utama gerakan ini. Dengan segera aksi membela petani yang menolak digusur itu mendapatkan publisitas luas.

Pemerintah mencoba menahan publisitas itu. Pers dikekang, sengketa di Kedung Ombo tak boleh disiarkan. Tapi keadaan berubah. Para aktivis memperoleh sekutu baru yang tak bisa diremehkan pemerintah: sejumlah LSM luar negeri. International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI), pimpinan Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, merupakan penggerak dukungan untuk petani Kedung Ombo di forum internasional. Dukungan itu terutama untuk mengingatkan Bank Dunia. Lembaga internasional pemberi pinjaman berbunga lunak



inilah yang membiayai sebagian besar dana pembangunan waduk. Bank Dunia kali ini terpaksa mendengarkan.

Seperti dikatakan aktivis dan cendekiawan Arief Budiman, “Kasus Kedung Ombo merupakan kasus pertama di Indonesia di mana kerja sama antara NGO Indonesia dan NGO luar negeri bisa menghasilkan sesuatu yang nyata.”

Dalam arti tertentu, teladan Kedung Ombo sebenarnya belum sebuah perlawanan politik yang kemudian merebak satu

dasawarsa kemudian. Betapa pun kerasnya kritik mereka, umumnya LSM masih ingin mengubah keadaan secara bertahap, tanpa mengubah bangunan kekuasaan yang dihadapi. Meskipun demikian, dari pengalaman Kedung Ombo makin tumbuh keyakinan diri LSM dalam menghadapi pemerintah. Mereka mendapatkan dukungan politik, dan juga dana, dari negeri-negeri donor yang memberi utang kepada pemerintah Indonesia atau dari badan swasta di negeri-negeri itu. Orang-orang Suharto memang menuduh

mereka tidak patriotik, tapi kali ini tak mudah bagi pemerintah untuk menindak LSM yang tak mereka sukai. Di masa ketika pemerintah tak lagi bisa mengandalkan petrodollar, tekanan pendapat internasional jadi makin diperhitungkan.

Pengalaman Kedung Ombo juga memberikan sesuatu yang lain: dari sini orientasi yang lebih radikal makin tampak. Sebagian mahasiswa yang terjun membela para petani di desa-

LIES MARCOES-NATSIR

Lulus dari IAIN pada 1986, Lies Marcoes-Natsir memasuki dunia penelitian dengan bekerja bersama beberapa peneliti Belanda. Minatnya pada antropologi agama makin terpupuk. Ia mulai terlibat isu kesetaraan gender lebih seksama. Dia percaya, untuk mengabdikan resistensi kelompok agama terhadap isu gender, pembongkaran sekaligus pembenaran harus dicari dari sumber yang sama: agama.

Awal pendekatan ini dari Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES) zaman Dawam Rahardjo. Mereka punya program pengembangan masyarakat untuk kelompok Islam terutama pesantren. Mereka percaya bahwa kalau bicara soal akar rumput, pesantren tak bisa ditinggalkan.

Singkatnya, LP3ES percaya pada komunitas pesantren sebagai basis. Ini beda dari program yang dilakukan organisasi non-pemerintah besar, seperti Bina Swadaya. Mereka juga ke pesantren tapi hanya “kula nuwun” untuk masuk ke desa. Pada 1987 lahir Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M) yang didirikan orang-orang LP3ES. Beda dengan induknya, P3M masuk ke wacana teologis pesantren. Bicaranya langsung pada seluruh tata cara pikir pesantren lewat kitab, kultur pesantren, dan menggunakan kharisma kyai.

Tapi setelah beberapa tahun, perubahan di pesantren tak terlalu terlihat. Ini karena kawan-kawan mengalami semacam romantika, seakan-akan pesantren mewakili masyarakat bawah yang “asli,” terbuka, dan lugus. Ternyata dunia pesantren bisa hierarkis, otoriter, dan resisten terhadap perubahan. Problemanya tak sederhana.

Mengiringi maraknya isu gender di era 1980-an, kita menghadapi kuatnya resistensi. Pendeknya, bahkan orang yang getol teriak demokrasi pun ikut menolak gender, minimal curiga. Pangkalnya, mereka percaya relasi lelaki-perempuan adalah adil, kekal, dan sudah digariskan Tuhan. Jadi, meski gender sebenarnya menggugat relasi lelaki-perempuan yang ditimbang akal sehat sebagai kurang adil, tanggapannya langsung ke isu agama. Saya dan teman-teman mulai berpikir menggunakan pendekatan agama, tapi ketika itu tak bisa. Pertama, kajian soal gender dan agama masih langka. Kedua,

mungkin karena wadah saya saat itu Kalyanamitra, di bawah bendera feminis sekular. Jadi susah meskipun saya lulusan IAIN dan moyang saya dari pesantren. Tak ada legitimasi dari institusi. Sejak itulah saya bergabung dengan P3M. Meskipun mereka juga tak tahu-menahu soal keadilan gender.

Di P3M kami mulai dengan kesehatan reproduksi menggunakan perspektif gender dan Islam. Pilihan tema itu jelas berkaitan dengan trend internasional pasca

2000 Wahid mengeluarkan Instruksi Presiden agar gender menjadi arus utama dalam seluruh rancangan pembangunan dari perencanaan sampai pelaksanaan. Jadi minimal ada pedoman dan alokasi bujet.

Teman-teman para feminis dari negara-negara Islam merasa iri. Kita memang paling progresif di antara seluruh negara Islam dalam percakapan soal gender. Lihat Malaysia, apalagi Timur Tengah. Di sana kata “gender” saja tak boleh disebut. Dibanding

mereka, kita luar biasa, mana ada kyai dan nyai bicara keadilan gender di negara lain. Ini jelas membantu banyak pihak, misalnya Komisi Nasional Perempuan, dan teman-teman aktivis pemberdayaan dalam bidang kesehatan reproduksi.

Menurut saya, keberhasilan gerakan kesadaran gender di Indonesia berpangkal pada kesediaan kelompok Muslim untuk rendah hati mengakui adanya tafsir keagamaan yang bias gender yang merugikan perempuan. Kemudian mencari solusinya dari Islam sendiri. Jadi perdebatan dalam Islam soal ini menjadi sangat kaya.

Dalam sebuah pertemuan soal gender dan Islam pada 2000, kita berusaha mengenali masalah

yang dihadapi gerakan perempuan di Indonesia. Kesimpulannya, ada ketakberdayaan dalam mengontrol pemerintah karena kita tak masuk ke sistem politik. Kita tak mau karena kita merasa jijik. Kita merasa suci.

Sekarang ada sedikit perubahan. Misalnya, tuntutan kuota 30 persen perempuan. Terlepas dari mutu, orang minimal mau berdebat soal gender. Memasukkan perspektif keadilan gender bagi Indonesia ke depan sebenarnya sangat menguntungkan. Minimal pemerintah bisa sensitif kepada kelompok marginal lain. Misalnya kelompok suku, ras, agama, kaum cacat fisik yang aksesnya rendah.



Lies Marcoes-Natsir bicara pada sebuah aksi perempuan, Jakarta, 1998.

Konferensi Kependudukan di Kairo tahun 1995. Sejalan dengan itu, saya pun dikirim ke Universitas Amsterdam untuk mendalami antropologi kesehatan (1999-2000).

Menurut saya, dibanding seluruh program yang pernah masuk ke pesantren, tak ada yang berhasil macam program penyadaran keadilan gender ini. Efeknya membantu penyelesaian problem yang dihadapi kelompok feminis nonagama dalam mensosialisasikan isu gender. Saat itu penolakan terhadap kelompok feminis besar sekali, dan kelompok feminis tak berdaya menghadapi argumen agama. Program ini juga menolong pemerintahan Abdurrahman Wahid untuk mengutamakan gender. Pada

desa itu kemudian bergabung dengan Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) – partai politik pertama yang dibentuk dan menantang langsung Orde Baru.

Beberapa tahun kemudian, 22 Juli 1996 malam, di ruangan kantor YLBHI Jakarta yang dikenai cahaya neon yang terbatas, Budiman Sudjatmiko, aktivis berumur 26 tahun, memimpin upacara deklarasi partai baru itu. Dengan mengenakan saputangan merah di leher, anak muda bertubuh kurus itu terang-terangan melanggar undang-undang Orde Baru yang melarang dibentuknya partai politik lagi. Posisi PRD memang tak diikuti oleh kelompok-kelompok lain. Tapi partai ini – meskipun terkadang dipandang dengan jengkel oleh pelbagai kalangan – telah menularkan keberanian ke sekitarnya.

PRD juga menyodorkan sebuah argumen bahwa untuk menumbangkan Orde Baru dan menegakkan demokrasi, yang dibutuhkan adalah program politik yang jelas dan organisasi yang rapi. Dengan kata lain, bukan lagi LSM. Harus hadir partai-partai politik. Dari partai-partai itulah kelak sebuah kehidupan politik yang hidup bisa dibangun – tanpa institusi-institusi yang sakit, yang akhirnya, seperti pada hari terakhir Suharto itu, tak bisa dipergunakan.

Tapi pada suatu hari di bulan Agustus 1996, Budiman Sudjatmiko ditangkap. Bersama beberapa temannya, ia

bersembunyi di sebuah rumah di Bekasi. Seorang rohaniwan Katolik muda menyembunyikan pemuda-pemuda itu di sana. Tapi tempat itu ketahuan, dan mereka ditangkap.

Sudah 10 hari badan intelijen militer memburu mereka. Menteri Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan Soesilo Soedarmanto mengumumkan bahwa PRD bertanggung jawab atas kerusuhan yang melanda Jakarta pada tanggal 27 Juli. Presiden Suharto sudah tahu hal ini, katanya. Presiden bahkan menjelaskan perkara PRD di sebuah sidang kabinet. Suharto berpendapat partai ini seperti PKI.

Tapi seperti kemudian tersingkap, tak ada hubungan PRD dengan kerusuhan di tanggal 27 Juli itu. Hari itu, lewat pukul 6 pagi, tujuh truk berhenti di depan kantor PDI. Dari dalamnya puluhan orang – dengan bantuan militer dan polisi – turun membawa pentungan dan batu. Mereka melempari kantor di Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta itu, dan kemudian menyerbu masuk. Puluhan orang yang bersiaga di dalam melawan. Mereka kalah. Kekerasan pun ke luar. Beberapa gedung di wilayah itu, termasuk kantor pemerintah, dibakar para pemuda yang marah.

Kemarahan hari itu seperti ledakan protes yang lama ditahan. Berhari-hari sebelumnya kantor itu jadi lambang perebutan antara dua faksi dalam partai itu – antara faksi



▲ Ketua Partai Rakyat Demokratik Budiman Sudjatmiko dalam mobil polisi setelah disidang, Jakarta, 12 Desember 1996.

IRID AGOES

Dr. Irid Agoes adalah direktur Indonesia International Education Foundation (IIEF), yang mengelola beberapa program beasiswa yang dibiayai Ford Foundation termasuk International Fellowships Program (IFP). IFP merupakan program beasiswa terbesar dalam sejarah Ford Foundation. Dia kini memimpin seleksi tabunan 45 mahasiswa dari 6.000 pendaftar yang akan mendapatkan beasiswa untuk memperoleh master atau Ph.D. di luar Indonesia. Melalui program ini dia berharap dapat mewujudkan impiannya tentang dunia yang lebih damai.

Hubungan kerja pertama saya dengan Ford Foundation terjadi ketika saya menjadi direktur IIEF pada 1999. Ford Foundation adalah donatur terbesar kami dalam memberikan kesempatan beasiswa bagi banyak orang. Program yang saya kerjakan pertama berkaitan dengan “budaya dan masyarakat.” Program ini ditawarkan kepada orang Indonesia, yang telah diterima belajar di tingkat pascasarjana, memiliki nilai yang baik dan punya komitmen besar pada pendidikannya, tapi mereka memerlukan bantuan finansial.

Pada tahun 2000, kami melihat kesempatan lain untuk membantu para mahasiswa dari Timor Timur, yang setelah referendum, tidak bisa menyelesaikan studinya. Waktu itu banyak orang Timor Timur belajar di Indonesia dan mereka terpisah dengan orang tuanya. Jadi kami melihat hal ini sebagai kesempatan, bukan hanya untuk membantu individu-individu itu, melainkan juga membantu membangun negara baru Timor Loro’sae. Maka kami memulai Program Beasiswa Timor Timur bagi orang Timor Timur yang masih belajar di universitas-universitas Indonesia dan ingin menyelesaikan studinya. Setelah Ford Foundation dan IIEF memulai program itu, banyak donor lain mulai turut membantu. Ketika Timor Timur sepenuhnya merdeka, 200 dari mahasiswa yang kami bantu telah lulus.

Program terbesar kami pada saat itu adalah mengatur porsi orang Indonesia pada program IFP Ford Foundation. Ini adalah program pertama di mana Ford Foundation mencantumkan namanya. Program ini memberikan kesempatan kepada individu-individu yang terpilih [dari Indonesia dan negara-negara lain di Asia, Afrika dan Amerika Latin, dan Rusia] untuk melanjutkan studi pascasarjananya. Yang saya maksud terpilih bukan hanya yang terbaik dan terpandai, tapi khususnya juga yang paling terpinggirkan. Semua kandidat program ini haruslah berasal dari masyarakat

terpinggirkan. Di Indonesia masyarakat seperti ini kebanyakan berada di luar Jawa. Program ini dimulai pada 2001 dan dalam satu tahun terdapat 6.000 pelamar untuk 45 kesempatan.

Program ini berbeda dengan program-program beasiswa lainnya karena di Indonesia saat ini jumlah lulusan Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) hanya 1,4 persen dari populasi. Perempuannya hanya 0,5 persen.



Irid Agoes mewawancarai seorang pelamar beasiswa, 2003.

Kami mencari mahasiswa yang mempunyai pengalaman kepemimpinan dalam komunitasnya. Mereka bisa yang aktif di kegiatan-kegiatan akademis maupun di lembaga swadaya masyarakat. Tidak ada batasan usia. Hal ini penting terutama bagi perempuan karena biasanya mereka mulai bekerja, mulai berkeluarga, dan kemudian mulai pendidikannya lagi.

Dari pengalaman kami menangani program ini kami tahu bahwa banyak donor selain Ford Foundation mesti dilibatkan karena kebutuhannya sangat jelas dan besar. Salah satu anggapan orang

Indonesia, terutama yang berasal dari latar belakang yang terpinggirkan adalah sulitnya menemukan orang berkemampuan berbahasa Inggris seperti yang disyaratkan program studi pascasarjana di luar negeri – atau bahkan di Indonesia sendiri, seperti UI yang telah menetapkan standar nilai TOEFL 550. Kami berusaha menyelesaikan masalah itu dengan memberikan pelatihan bahasa Inggris bagi mahasiswa sebelum keberangkatan mereka. Masalah lainnya adalah kesulitan mereka menulis makalah akademis. Ford Foundation dan IIEF berusaha membantu universitas-universitas di luar Jawa untuk menyelenggarakan pelatihan, tapi menurut saya masih banyak pekerjaan berat yang tersisa. Kita harus menemukan masalah-masalah nyata sistem pendidikan Indonesia.

Keterlibatan saya dengan beasiswa Ford Foundation lebih dari sebuah impian yang menjadi kenyataan. Saya dididik sebagai seorang interkulturalis, gelar kesarjanaan saya adalah sebagai seorang interkulturalis, dan harapan saya sebagai seorang interkulturalis adalah mewujudkan dunia yang damai. Orang-orang yang terpinggirkan di seluruh dunia mempunyai kesempatan untuk mencapai tingkat pendidikan tertinggi.

Mereka akan kembali ke daerah asalnya, ke lingkungan asalnya, ke desadesanya, dan membantu sesamanya. Jika beberapa program lain memfokuskan diri pada penciptaan dunia yang lebih baik melalui para elit, Ford Foundation berusaha mengambil cara lain untuk membuka jalan yang lebih besar kepada keadilan melalui mereka yang terpinggirkan. Banyak dari kami yang terlibat menangani program ini tahu bahwa bukan hanya mereka yang terpinggirkan yang belajar dari kita tapi kita pun belajar pada mereka. Ini adalah sesuatu yang seharusnya dikembangkan oleh siapa saja sehingga di masa depan dunia bisa menjadi tempat yang lebih damai.

MENGGERAKKAN BUKU: PROGRAM PUSTAKA

Pada 1998, setahun setelah krisis ekonomi Asia menghancurkan ekonomi Indonesia, dan beberapa saat setelah kejatuhan Suharto, Ira Suharno, seorang periset ilmiah, seorang yang penuh harapan pada anak-anak, terkesan pada sebuah buku Prancis tentang pendidikan lingkungan untuk anak-anak usia lima hingga 12 tahun. Ia menenteng buku itu ke mana-mana selama berminggu-minggu, hingga akhirnya ia memutuskan duduk dan menerjemahkannya, “untuk iseng-iseng.” Empat bulan kemudian, karya itu rampung.

Awalnya, ia tak begitu peduli pada penerbitan hasil terjemahannya. “Saya sudah cukup bahagia kalau bisa memakainya sebagai bahan mengajar,” katanya. Tapi, tak urung, ia menunjukkan terjemahannya kepada beberapa penerbit. Kebanyakan berpendapat sama: buku itu bakal susah dijual.

Kecuali satu. Penerbit Djambatan, salah satu penerbit tertua di Indonesia, tertarik. Setelah mengalami proses panjang, pada Oktober 2001, Ira Suharno melihat namanya tertera di sampul depan. Buku itu diberi judul *Belajar Mencintai Alam*. Peluncurannya dihadiri beragam kalangan. Sebentar lagi, buku itu akan ‘diselipkan’ ke dalam kurikulum sekolah dasar nasional.

Belajar Mencintai Alam hanyalah satu contoh penerbitan yang didukung Program Pustaka. Mulanya, program yang didirikan pada 1998 di bawah ampuan Yayasan Adikarya, afiliasi dari Ikatan Penerbit Indonesia, dan dibiayai oleh Ford Foundation ini bertujuan menyelamatkan industri buku di saat krisis. Kala itu, keadaan sungguh suram. Hanya dalam beberapa

bulan harga kertas meningkat hingga 250 persen. Banyak penerbit di Indonesia gulung tikar.

Gagasan di balik Program Pustaka adalah untuk mensubsidi penerbit agar bisa terus berproduksi. Sasarannya bukan buku populer, tapi lebih karya bermutu tinggi dalam ilmu-ilmu sosial dan humaniora. Aturan-aturan main yang relatif longgar juga dimaksudkan untuk mendongkrak penerbit kecil dan membangkitkan gairah penulis lokal. Akhir 2002, Yayasan Adikarya menerima sekitar 1.800 naskah dari 100-an penerbit.

Ford Foundation sendiri hanya menentukan struktur hibahnya. Ia tak mengambil peran dalam pemilihan buku. Tugas ini di tangan sebuah tim lokal yang dipilih oleh Adikarya yang, meski terlalu sedikit jumlah anggotanya (hingga tak jarang lambat kerjanya dan terbatas wawasannya), menurut banyak kalangan bekerja secara jujur.

Sejak awal Program Pustaka I hingga akhir Program Pustaka III pada 2002, sebanyak 445 judul buku telah disubsidi. Proyek ini juga memberi perhatian kepada terjemahan dan penerbitan ulang, dan rajin mempromosikan bakat-bakat baru. Contoh: pertumbuhan pesat industri buku di kota Yogyakarta, di mana penerbit-penerbit kecil bergairah memburu naskah baru dan menggali yang lama, misalnya tesis mahasiswa yang acap kali tenggelam dalam tumpukan arsip di perpustakaan kampus.

Hasil lainnya adalah budaya baru perwajahan buku. Pelopornya Benteng Budaya, yang berbasis di Yogyakarta. Penggunaan karya seni yang bermutu – tradisional maupun kontemporer – sebagai

sampul buku telah membentuk minat komersial baru terhadap buku-buku sastra dan humaniora. Tiba-tiba, buku menjelma sesuatu yang atraktif - dan terjangkau.

Sistem pengawasan yang longgar, bagaimanapun, menyisakan banyak kelemahan. Banyak kiat penerbit “nakal” mengambil keuntungan: mereka membesarkan ukuran huruf dan melebarkan batas tepi halaman, menggelembungkan harga jual, dan mengabaikan distribusi. Di Indonesia, distribusi adalah nemesis bagi penerbit; dalam kasus yang terburuk, distributor bisa mengeruk 50 sampai 70 persen dari harga jual. Praktek ini diperburuk oleh mitos bahwa buku-buku yang disubsidi sama dengan buku-buku yang tidak laku. Tak heran, penerbit tak merasa butuh distribusi, dan membiarkan saja stok mereka menumpuk di gudang ketimbang melihatnya dipajang di toko buku.

Untungnya, Ford Foundation menyadari kelemahan ini. Pada akhir 2002, mekanisme pengawasan dan peninjauan diperketat, prosedur aplikasi lebih dicermati. Kini diberlakukan panduan baru mengenai penentuan harga jual dan biaya cetak, dengan syarat baru bahwa persetujuan penulis harus selalu disertakan.

Kini Program Pustaka lebih diarahkan ke daerah, dengan contoh-contoh keberhasilan yang layak dicatat di Makassar dan Pontianak. Bantuan tambahan termasuk kerja sama dengan pusat-pusat kebudayaan lokal, pembacaan puisi dan galeri buku. Sekarang, 20 persen dari buku yang diterbitkan harus disumbangkan ke perpustakaan, klub buku, dan galeri buku di seluruh Indonesia.



LILIS N. HUSNA

Dulu petinggi NU umumnya orang politik. Keluarga Lilis N. Husna juga dari NU sekaligus Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. Lilis aktif di partai dan jadi anggota parlemen Bekasi pada 1987-1992. Pada 1992-1997, dia jadi anggota Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. Lalu dia ikut mendirikan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa dan sempat jadi wakil ketua Lembaga Pemenangan Pemilu PKB pada pemilihan umum 1999 dan wakil sekretaris jenderal DPP PKB hingga Januari 2002. Kini dia staf Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia (Lakpesdam) NU. Lakpesdam bekerja sama dengan Ford Foundation melaksanakan program Forum Warga untuk menciptakan ruang politik bagi warga.

Salah satu fungsi organisasi dalam masyarakat adalah menggerakkan demokratisasi, tapi di Indonesia, mereka lemah di tingkat metode untuk membangun gerakan. Misalnya, di NU ada Majelis Taklim atau institusi lain di pedesaan. Apa isi Majelis Taklim? Kebanyakan hanya pengajian. Padahal sebagai institusi, ia juga bisa melakukan fungsi negosiasi dan bisa menciptakan ruang publik agar masyarakat punya posisi tawar. Ini semua terganggu saat Orde Baru. Organisasi keagamaan seolah berhenti hanya jadi organisasi ritual, bukan untuk mengubah masyarakat.

Proses ini yang sedang kami hidupkan. Contohnya soal isu tanah di mana Lakpesdam mendampingi proses advokasi Forum Warga. Lawannya, ya pemerintah, perusahaan, dan militer. Gaya NU yang lebih konservatif biasanya ingin menjaga harmonisasi antara NU, pemerintah, dan elemen lain. Padahal dalam isu ini ada risiko berhadapan. Isu tanah juga sering dianggap isu kiri. Kawan-kawan muda menagih yang tua-tua, minta dibuatkan “fatwa” lewat lembaga yang sudah menjadi tradisi NU, yaitu “Bahsul Masail.” Mereka bertanya apa legitimasi agama bila hak-hak dasar masyarakat dirugikan? Jadi institusi agama didorong agar lebih rasional dan kritis serta tak menjadi alat untuk melanggengkan kekuasaan. Bahwa para kiai masih dibukakan pintu dan dicium tangannya oleh santri, itu mungkin tak berubah.

Forum Warga adalah strategi gerakan demokrasi lokal. Inspirasinya banyak dari luar, terutama India. Forum Warga semacam *regrouping* di mana kelompok masyarakat kami fasilitasi menjadi komunitas baru yang bisa mempengaruhi pengambilan keputusan di tingkat lokal. Programnya kebanyakan soal pemerintahan yang baik dan desentralisasi – dua isu penting setelah jatuhnya Suharto.

Lakpesdam membantu tiga daerah;

Jepara, Wonosobo, dan Cilacap. Kami mulai dengan lokakarya desa sebagai *entry point*. Ini penting karena dengan otonomi, desa berhak bikin anggaran sendiri dan punya “DPR” sendiri yang tak mungkin bisa demokratis dengan sendirinya. Yang ikut lokakarya wakil-wakil warga dan hasilnya adalah usulan Program Desa “versi” warga.



Lilis N. Husna di kantornya di Jakarta, 2003.

Mereka juga sepakat membentuk Forum Warga dengan tingkat agregasi vertikal. Ada Forum Warga Desa, Forum Warga Kecamatan dan Forum Warga Kabupaten.

Ada contoh menarik di Cilacap. Saat lokakarya, warga membicarakan nasib lokalisasi di desa mereka: Apa yang akan dilakukan? Ada yang usul dibakar karena dianggap meresahkan. Tapi akhirnya orang dari lokalisasi diajak bicara. Tercapai kompromi. Mucikari bersedia mendirikan pagar antara lokalisasi dan lingkungan perumahan. Ini sebuah liberasi – mereka yang selama ini dikucilkan diajak bicara. Walau banyak pihak sadar kompromi ini

ibarat menyimpan “bom waktu” karena bagaimana pun pelacuran tak bisa diterima secara sosial, agama, dan moral.

Namun hal menarik terjadi satu tahun berikutnya. Desa membuat Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Desa. Warga mempelajari dari mana sumber dananya. Sumbernya macam-macam dan ada “sumber dan lain-lain” yang diambil dari lokalisasi tadi. Ada dua sumber: mucikari, yang dibagi mucikari kelas satu, dua, dan tiga, serta pelacurnya yang dibagi tiga kelas juga. Warga geger.

Isunya diambil alih pemerintah desa. Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD) mau melihat apakah anggaran itu digunakan sebagaimana mestinya: apakah untuk dibuat pagar? Warga masih tak bisa menerima. Ada tiga argumentasi. Pertama, dari segi agama, pelacuran tak dibenarkan. Kedua, ada peraturan daerah yang mengatur penutupan lokalisasi. Ketiga, yang paling mendasar, argumen kemanusiaan. Mereka bilang pelacur adalah orang yang secara sosial disudutkan, tapi mengapa dimintai uangnya lewat pemerasan terselubung? Ini luar biasa ketika warga memperoleh ruang publik untuk menyampaikan pikiran kritis seperti itu. Padahal BPD itu juga ada ustaz. Kasus ini belum selesai.

Ada banyak inisiatif lain dengan isu dan pengalaman yang beragam di lokasi lain, seperti Forum Warga Troso yang mengadvokasi kebijakan order Kain Tenun Troso Jepara melawan monopoli (agar berpihak bagi pengrajin kecil). Usulan pemisahan dusun Jehan dari desa Kunir Jepara karena seumur-umur mereka merasa didiskriminasi. Solidaritas untuk memperkuat ekonomi dan *fundraising* warga di Wonosobo serta solidaritas nelayan desa Panggung, Jepara. Sebuah wacana baru sudah berkembang. Warga sudah tahu bahwa mereka punya ruang politik dan posisi tawar.

Soerjadi yang didukung pemerintah dan faksi Megawati Sukarnoputri yang hendak disisihkan. Merasa diri lebih sah, dan memang lebih banyak didukung, faksi Megawati menduduki kantor partai.

Tindakan itu tentu saja menantang pemerintah. Yang tak disangka-sangka, ribuan penduduk Jakarta dan kota-kota lain menunjukkan simpati mereka: sumbangan dan kunjungan tak putus-putusnya mendatangi pendukung Megawati yang bertahan di dalam dan di halaman gedung itu.

Kantor itu pun segera jadi pusat perlawanan. Spanduk dan poster berjejer. Sebuah panggung didirikan. Di sana orang berpidato keras mengecam Orde Baru.

Dengan pusat itu, pelbagai kalangan yang selama itu aktif dalam gerakan prodemokrasi memobilisasi dukungan untuk Megawati. Presiden Suharto, yang ingin menyingkirkan putri Bung Karno itu dari PDI, kini malah melihat bahwa simpati membanjir buat orang yang hendak dijatuhkannya.

Presiden pun memerintahkan tentara untuk merebut kantor PDI. Dan kerusuhan 27 Juli meledak.

Kali ini, Suharto tampak kehilangan kemampuannya untuk memainkan kartunya dengan sabar. Ia menggebrak untuk alasan yang sebenarnya tak perlu. PRD adalah sebuah gerakan yang militan tapi kecil. Megawati saat itu belum merupakan ancaman bagi dirinya.

Tapi memang ada tanda-tanda sesuatu yang lebih berbahaya bergerak. Kelompok-kelompok prodemokrasi yang biasanya centang perenang mulai saling bekerja sama. Ada yang sudah bergerak beberapa tahun. Ada yang baru, seperti AJI yang didirikan setelah mingguan *Tempo*, *DeTik*, dan *Editor* dibredel.

Di tahun 1996, pelbagai anasir ini membentuk Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (KIPP). Tujuannya menghadapi pemilihan umum di tahun berikutnya. Niat mereka adalah menjaga agar pemerintah tidak lagi leluasa memanipulasi pemungutan suara.



▲ Polisi, tentara, dan milisi menyerbu markas Partai Demokrasi Indonesia di Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta Pusat, 27 Juli 1996.

DEDE OETOMO

Dede Oetomo punya banyak kebiasaan. Salah satunya menjadi disc jockey. Salah seorang yang pernah memintanya memainkan lagu saat pesta adalah Benedict Anderson, pakar politik yang terkenal, antara lain karena bukunya Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Dede cerita bahwa kelompok kegemaran Anderson tak lain adalah Jackson Five. Tampaknya kota kecil dan dingin Ithaca, tempat Anderson mengajar dan Dede belajar di Cornell, sangat hangat memperlakukan Dede. Di sana ia sering dibekali brownies istimewa oleh Sidney Jones, yang belakangan dikenal sebagai aktivis hak asasi manusia. Beralaskan kasur sederhana di ruang tamunya, seorang Gus Dur pernah bermalam di rumahnya. Semua itu adalah "bonus" yang ia dapatkan saat belajar di AS. Selain doktor linguistik, Dede dikenal sebagai pioner dunia gay yang mendorong keterbukaan di masyarakat.

Wacana publik tentang HIV/AIDS di Indonesia kurang membahas secara rinci penyakit ini, penyebab, dan pengobatannya. Yang terjadi adalah kebingungan, misinformasi, atau kelengahan yang mengkhawatirkan. Padahal kajian epidemiologi telah menemukan peningkatan pesat infeksi HIV di kalangan tertentu, misalnya pengguna narkotik suntik dan waria atau wilayah tertentu, seperti Riau dan Papua.

Pembicaraan kita mengenai penyebab AIDS, yang berkaitan dengan hubungan seks misalnya, tak merinci bahwa jalur yang rentan infeksi adalah hubungan seks vaginal dan anal, bahwa yang melakukan hubungan seks suka-sama-suka malah lebih rentan. Ini karena pengetahuan kebanyakan orang tentang penularan HIV dangkal. Akibatnya, pengambilan keputusan untuk melindungi diri menjadi asal-asalan.

Tidak membantu juga cara-cara pencegahan yang diwacanakan tidak realistis misalnya, menganjurkan tak berhubungan seks di kalangan pekerja seks dan gay/waria atau menganjurkan setia kepada pasangan, padahal tak ada kaitan langsung antara kesetiaan dengan penularan HIV atau kalau pun lumayan realistis, hanya terfokus pada kondom tanpa membeberkan berbagai strategi seks yang lebih aman dan belum tentu memerlukan kondom. Ketika membicarakan kondom pun, khususnya di kalangan gay dan waria, lupa menyebutkan pelicin berbahan dasar air, dan hingga belakangan ini. Program-program penanggulangan HIV/AIDS tak menyediakan pelicinnya. Debat berkepanjangan yang melelahkan, yang tak perlu, dan yang tak cerdas, dan kompleks pada 1990-an, ikut

mbingungkan publik.

Dugaan saya, orang risih bicara seksualitas secara eksplisit dan terbuka. Asumsinya, "Ini bukan adat ketimuran." Tapi ini sebenarnya nilai-nilai elit yang memang



Dede Oetomo di konferensi di Surabaya, 1987.

cenderung munafik. Di kalangan kelas pekerja, pembicaraan mengenai seksualitas lebih terbuka dan lepas.

Ford Foundation telah dan sedang mengembangkan program-program yang meningkatkan pendidikan dan pembicaraan mengenai seksualitas yang terbuka, mengakui keanekaragaman, dan memberdayakan usaha pembongkaran kemunafikan yang mematikan itu.

Soal bahasa yang jadi bidang saya, mula-mula saya belajar bahasa Inggris di SMP

dengan buku *Student's Book: English for the SLTP* yang merupakan hasil proyek yang didanai Ford Foundation. Sebagian dosen saya dididik di IKIP Malang, yang jurusan pendidikan bahasa Inggrisnya didirikan dengan dana Ford Foundation. *Travel grant* saya untuk berangkat ke Cornell saya dapat dari Ford Foundation (1978, 1984). Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, di mana saya belajar mengenai Indonesia dan sekaligus mengajar bahasa Indonesia, dirintis oleh almarhum Prof. George McT. Kahin dan Prof. John M. Echols pada awal 1950-an dengan dana Ford Foundation. Beasiswa penelitian disertasi saya dari Social Science Research Council (1983-1984) berasal dari Ford Foundation di New York. Sesudah saya lulus saya banyak terlibat dalam program-program di bidang kajian Indonesia maupun kemudian gender, seksualitas, dan HIV/AIDS yang didanai Ford Foundation hingga kini.

Yang pernah jadi murid bahasa Indonesia saya: Robert Hefner, Joseph Errington, Joel Kuipers, Daniel Fietkiewicz, Yoshiko Yamamoto, Margaret Wiener, Abby Ruddick, Suzanne Siskel, John McDougall, Jeffrey Winters, Jeff Hadler, Audrey Kahin, Greg Acciaioli, Matthew Cohen, Jan Mrázek, Brenda Yanni, Anne Schiller, Suzanne Brenner, Karl Heider, Leslie Morris, Frances Gouda, Tim Jessup, Barry Drummond, Terry George, Peter Slomanson.

Saya masih tetap kontak dengan mereka, baik untuk hal-hal yang profesional maupun pribadi. Bahkan kemudian, mereka mengirim mahasiswa mereka kepada saya apabila penelitiannya berkaitan dengan Jawa Timur, golongan etnis Tionghoa, atau gender, seksualitas, dan HIV/AIDS.

Jika ini berhasil, diperhitungkan kemenangan Golkar tak akan sebesar dulu lagi. PDI yang menampilkan Megawati akan punya lebih banyak kesempatan. Setidaknya untuk menunjukkan bahwa Suharto tak akan dipilih oleh sebuah Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat yang selalu setia dan patuh. Tapi tak kalah penting adalah kehendak untuk membuktikan bahwa pemilihan umum bukanlah sebuah ritual yang dipaksakan.

KIPP, tentu saja, punya agenda lain. Komite ini juga disiapkan sebagai kerja latihan untuk membangun sebuah front persatuan menentang Suharto secara makin terbuka. Setelah KIPP terbentuk, di kantor YLBHI Jakarta – yang semakin sering jadi tempat pusat pergerakan prodemokrasi – 30 LSM dan organisasi pendukung Megawati mendirikan Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (MARI).

Majelis ini belum setahun berdiri ketika Peristiwa 27 Juli meletup. Tapi sejak mula pemerintah tampak sudah bersiap menghajarnya. Dua hari sebelum kerusuhan itu, Suharto memperingatkan akan bahaya “setan-setan gundul” yang ikut dalam ketegangan politik saat itu. Dan “setan gundul” itulah

yang kemudian disapunya.

Di akhir Oktober, Menteri Soesilo Soedarmanto mengumumkan bahwa dari enam ribu LSM di Indonesia, ada 32 di antaranya yang “bermasalah.” Dan ia mengancam. “Jangan kaget,” katanya, “kalau suatu ketika pemerintah tiba-tiba menindak 32 LSM itu.” Ia tak menawarkan daftar. Tapi jumlah itu kira-kira sama dengan jumlah mereka yang bergabung dengan MARI. Dari kalangan inilah lebih dari 30 orang ditangkap.

Sejak itu, para aktivis pun merunduk dan tiarap.

Dalam keadaan itu, Suharto berhasil menyelenggarakan pemilihan umum 1997 untuk memilih dia ketujuh kalinya. Ia bisa menunjukkan bahwa KIPP, MARI, dan lain-lain tak punya dampak; hanya sederet suara singkat pembangkangan. Namun ia sudah terlambat sebenarnya. Makin meluas represi, makin luas pula kesepakatan, bahwa Indonesia memerlukan perubahan rezim.

Krisis moneter yang bermula bagaikan sebuah gempa yang jauh ternyata membuka kesempatan itu. Tanpa disangka-sangka. Dan Suharto pun jatuh, tanpa pendukung.



▲ Bukan majalah dan surat kabar saja yang dibredel, teater – di sini Opera Kecoa dari Teater Koma – ikut dilarang.

RATNA RIANTIARNO

Anak Sekolah Menengah Umum (SMU) sekarang biasa menggenggam handphone dan mengenakan sepatu bermerek. Tapi saat Ratna Riantiarno menggiring mereka ke Gedung Kesenian Jakarta atau TIM untuk nonton pertunjukan, biasa terdengar ucapan, "Gile, gue baru sekali ini ke sini." Sebagai seniman teater yang umur kariernya nyaris dua kali lipat umur anak-anak itu, Ratna merasa terbaru. Bersama Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, dia membuat program untuk anak SMU agar bisa mengapresiasi kesenian.


Ini bermula dari keprihatinan kami terhadap menurunnya minat dan apresiasi seni di kalangan masyarakat, seni masih dianggap sebagai sekedar hiburan yang boleh ada dan boleh tak ada. Seni belum dilihat sebagai bagian integral dari kebutuhan normal hidup manusia. Untuk "menghidupkan" minat dan apresiasi seni pertunjukan tersebut, saya dan beberapa teman di Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, sejak 1998 melaksanakan "Program Apresiasi Seni Pertunjukan untuk Siswa-siswi SMU."

Kegiatan ini terbagi dua. Pertama, secara khusus kami memboyong seniman dan karya seninya ke sekolah untuk dinikmati para siswa dan guru secara langsung. Kedua, agar mereka memiliki gambaran yang lebih utuh tentang seni pertunjukan, siswa dan guru juga diboyong untuk melihat pertunjukan kesenian langsung di sebuah gedung pertunjukan yang berstandar internasional. Untuk memperlihatkan kepada mereka keadaan belakang panggung, set, properti, kostum, *lighting*, dan sebagainya.

Selesai menonton pertunjukan, baik di sekolah maupun gedung pertunjukan, ada sesi tanya jawab dari siswa kepada seniman atau pelaku seninya.

Kegiatan ini telah membawa berbagai pertunjukan dari kelompok seni ternama maupun kesenian tradisi dari berbagai wilayah Indonesia. Antara lain dari Papua, Nias, Bugis, Minang, Jambi, Badui, Cirebon, Betawi, Batak. Sejumlah seniman, misalnya WS Rendra, Gusmiati Suid (almarhumah), Putu Wijaya, Boi Sakti, Teater Koma, Teater Payung Hitam, Teater Kubur, Dalang Suket, Teater S'Mas, monolog Agus PM Toh, Sena Didi Mime, juga terlibat dalam kegiatan ini.

Kenapa orang mesti punya apresiasi seni? Saya melihatnya begini. Menonton kesenian adalah salah satu proses dalam "mengalami seni." Betapapun pasifnya posisi penonton dalam proses "mengalami seni" tersebut, tak bisa tidak, mesti "menyediakan hatinya" sehingga apresiasi dan penghargaan terhadap seni pun terjadi.



Ratna Riantiarno (kiri) dalam Tenung, saduran karya Arthur Miller The Crucible, produksi Teater Koma, Jakarta, 1992.

Proses lebih jauh lagi adalah bagaimana menjadi "pemain" dalam sebuah pagelaran seni, sehingga terjadi "peralihan fungsi" dari posisi pasif sebagai penonton menjadi aktif sebagai pemain. Untuk ini dibutuhkan "kekuatan hati dan waktu" menjalani proses penciptaan sebuah karya seni.


Waktu kecil, saya melihat orang menari Bali indah sekali. Saya langsung belajar dan

merasa senang. Ketika latihan menari di TIM, saya melihat orang latihan pertunjukan teater. Saya pikir, karena sudah biasa menari di panggung, tentu teater lebih mudah. Ternyata setelah ikut latihan Arifin C. Noer (almarhum) banyak hal yang harus saya pelajari. Jadi keseluruhan proses "menonton" dan "memainkan" berlangsung terus pada diri kita, bisa memperluas cakrawala "mengalami seni."

Proses yang menyeluruh itulah yang kini kami laksanakan. Pengenalan dan apresiasi pada seni pertunjukan memang dapat dilakukan dengan menonton lebih sering. Satu hal lain yang juga penting untuk meningkatkan apresiasi dan pengetahuan seni adalah melibatkan atau mengajak siswa secara aktif berlatih dan mengadakan pertunjukan sendiri.

Ini berawal dari tanggapan-tanggapan yang hangat dan positif dari siswa-siswi dan tuntutan untuk dapat dilatih memainkan alat musik, menari, berakting. Tegasnya: memainkan sebuah seni pertunjukan itu. Karena itu program apresiasi seni pertunjukan ini pun dilengkapi dengan Program Pelatihan Seni Pertunjukan ke beberapa SMU sebagai kegiatan ekstrakurikuler.

Siswa SMU yang tak pernah menonton kesenian mengatakan mereka tak pernah mendapat informasi mengenai tempat-tempat pertunjukan: tak pernah diajak orang tuanya atau sekolah. Jadi bukan karena tak punya dana. Program-program dari pusat-pusat kesenian pun tak sampai ke mereka. Kurikulum kesenian bisa dianggap tak ada di sekolah. Harapan kami melalui program ini, siswa memiliki gambaran dan pemahaman yang lebih utuh terhadap kesenian yang dilihat, dipelajari atau dilakoninya.



▲ Lukisan dinding di jalanan Yogyakarta, 2003, diciptakan dalam suatu program pertukaran seniman. Beberapa seniman dari Apotik Komik di Yogyakarta mengunjungi San Francisco dengan bantuan Ford Foundation, dan Clarion Alley Mural Project dari San Francisco datang ke Yogyakarta. Masing-masing kelompok menciptakan lukisan jalanan dan instalasi di kota tuan rumah.

FRED WIBOWO

Fred Wibowo dari Studio Audio Visual Pusat Kataketik di Yogyakarta masygul melihat kecenderungan televisi memperlakukan seni tradisi. Televisi komersial memandangnya sebelah mata. Televisi pemerintah menggunakannya untuk propaganda. Dia dan kawan-kawannya berusaha menciptakan ruang agar seni tradisi bisa hadir di media massa. Maraknya seni tradisi di televisi komersial sekarang adalah tanda bahwa yang “kuno” pun bisa mendongkrak peringkat.

Saya mulai terlibat proyek siaran seni tradisi pada 1996. Sebelumnya saya sering diskusi dengan Jennifer Lindsay, *program officer* Ford Foundation, tentang kegelisahan saya terhadap dua macam televisi di Indonesia. Pertama, *TVRI* yang merupakan corong pemerintah. Kedua, televisi swasta yang orientasi serta sikapnya sangat komersial. Keduanya kurang menghargai kesenian tradisi dan nilai-nilai lokal.

Banyak seniman merasa selera warga Indonesia hendak diseragamkan atau diselaraskan untuk kepentingan propaganda rezim dan gaya hidup global yang komersial. Saya dan kebanyakan seniman merasakan suatu tertindasan budaya dan khawatir nilai-nilai lokal, nilai-nilai tradisi yang tercermin dalam adat, tata cara, dan kesenian, hilang. Kalau ini terjadi, berarti kepunahan suku-suku, kelompok etnik, dan eksistensi manusia dalam konteks pribadi dan komunitas. Bagi saya ini pembunuhan terhadap suatu lingkungan atau komunitas kehidupan.

Saya mengatakan kepada Lindsay, kuncinya adalah media. Radio dan televisi tidak memberi peluang seni tradisi untuk ikut memberikan referensi kepada kehidupan global dan gaya hidup manusia. Karena itu perlu upaya menyajikan seni tradisi di media.

Masalahnya, pemilik radio dan televisi swasta tidak yakin bisa mendapatkan keuntungan komersial, sementara *TVRI* hanya memerlukannya sebagai propaganda pembangunan. Untuk mengubah pandangan itu dibutuhkan sedikitnya lima tahun dalam proses yang intensif. Pendekatan dengan membuat seminar sehari dan bincang-bincang di radio atau televisi satu-dua kali tidak ada gunanya.

Kita mesti melibatkan mereka dan seniman dalam suatu lokakarya. Hasil

interaksi yang berupa eksperimen-eksperimen kemudian ditayangkan. Apabila memperoleh peringkat tinggi, niscaya mereka mau senang hati menyiarkannya.

Mungkinkah radio dan televisi yang lahir dari entitas ekonomi dapat terlibat dalam proses perubahan budaya yang dilandasi semangat keberagaman yang berasal dari komunitas atau suku berbeda? Mungkinkah media menjadi jembatan dalam rangka silang budaya yang pada



Fred Wibowo (berdiri) di studionya di Yogyakarta, 2003.

akhirnya memberikan penghargaan kepada eksistensi setiap kehidupan manusia dan lingkungannya? Masalah ini niscaya akan muncul ke permukaan ketika media terlibat secara intensif.

Sekarang prosesnya telah sampai pada keyakinan bahwa seni tradisi mampu memperoleh peringkat memadai. Itulah sebabnya lahir wayang kulit gaya *Indosiar*, Kethoprak Humor gaya *RCTI*, Ludruk Glamour gaya *SCTV*, *Lenong Rumpi*, dan sebagainya. Seni tradisi di televisi atau di radio akan memperoleh bentuk lain. Ini terjadi karena interaksi media. Menurut Roger Fidler, penulis buku *Mediamorfosis: Memahami Media Baru*, media selalu membuat perubahan-perubahan sementara media sendiri juga selalu berubah. Ia

menamakan proses itu sebagai “*media-morfosis*,” mengacu pada terminologi biologi dari binatang yang berubah bentuk dalam kehidupan yang disebut *metamorfosis*. Hasil perubahan ini menjadi semacam format baru yang sah terjadi dalam proses kebudayaan dan menjadi adil karena berinteraksi secara seimbang antara seni dan teknologi.

Kekurangannya, untuk televisi, yang berproses masih seni pertunjukan dari Jawa. Dari luar Jawa, kecuali *Drama Gong Bali*, belum ada yang menggarap secara intensif. Sementara musik tradisi di radio lebih cepat melibatkan musik-musik etnik dari berbagai daerah.

Selain itu, seni tradisi biasanya berkaitan erat dengan komunitasnya. Seni pertunjukan yang hanya sepotong tidak cukup untuk menyajikan secara utuh dan holistik seluruh aspek seni tradisi, termasuk nilai-nilainya. Inilah tantangan yang masih kami olah. Dalam format dokumenter sangat besar kemungkinan untuk menyajikan hal tersebut. Tapi ini belum populer. Meskipun berkat interaksi intensif, sekarang *SCTV* punya program dokumenter seni tradisi dengan nama rubrik *Potret. Indosiar* dan *Antv* mulai coba-coba.

Saya percaya industri adalah pasar. Tapi pasar dapat dikembangkan dengan mengikuti selera dan menciptakan pasar. Pilihan banyak orang tentu menjadi suatu pertimbangan. Tapi bagaimana menciptakan sebuah program agar menjadi kegemaran dan minat banyak orang itulah permasalahan yang terus kami cari di dalam interaksi. Kami tidak sedang menangi seni tradisi yang tidak berkembang dan mati. Kami berusaha memberdayakan nilai-nilai dalam seni tradisi untuk menjadi referensi di dalam membangun kebudayaan sejagad secara utuh dan beragam.

Dasawarsa 1990-an pun dengan terguncang-guncang berakhir tanpa Suharto. Sejak itu, sebuah eksperimen demokrasi berlangsung. Mencemaskan, tapi juga mengagumkan.

Semuanya dimulai setelah upacara 10 menit yang tanpa warna 21 Mei 1998 itu. Habibie menjadi presiden ketiga dalam sejarah Republik Indonesia, di tengah-tengah keraguan banyak orang.

Bahkan Suharto sendiri tak begitu yakin; ia memilih Habibie sebagai wakil presiden, tapi sebagaimana wakil presiden sebelumnya, posisi itu hanya sebuah ornamen. Habibie adalah ornamennya yang mutakhir.

Seperti banyak yang lain di dalam Orde Baru, pejabat ini tak punya pengalaman menjadi pemimpin politik. Ia punya keterbatasan lain. Di masa mudanya ia lama sekali hidup di Jerman, hingga ia sering tak begitu bisa membaca gerak politik di Indonesia yang acapkali rumit.


Bisakah dia bertahan? Tapi ia bertahan. Setidaknya sampai ia menyelenggarakan pemilihan umum setahun kemudian: sebuah pemilihan umum yang paling bebas sejak 1955, tapi juga sebuah pemilihan umum dengan hasil yang

mengakhiri kepresidenannya.

PDI di bawah Megawati, yang kemudian menyebut diri PDI-Perjuangan, langsung bangkit dari pinggiran. Pamor Megawati malah naik setelah Peristiwa 27 Juli. Orang melihatnya sebagai seorang anak Bung Karno yang pernah dianiaya. Dan dalam pemilihan umum 1999 itu, partainya menang.

Yang tak disangka-sangka ialah bahwa kemenangan itu tak serta-merta membawa Megawati ke kursi presiden yang dulu diduduki ayahnya. Mungkin terpuakau oleh kemenangan sebagai No. 1 di kotak suara, partai itu tak mencoba membentuk koalisi di Parlemen. Ketika Gus Dur maju mencalonkan diri, Megawati kalah pendukung. Dan Gus Dur pun – yang duduk di Parlemen sebagai wakil golongan yang tak dipilih dan ada di sana dalam keadaan separuh buta – menjadi presiden baru.

Habibie turun. Tapi di upacara pelantikan presiden yang menggantikannya, ia datang. Dunia pun menyaksikan sebuah pergantian kepala negara yang belum pernah terjadi dalam sejarah Indonesia. Yang baru tidak mengucapkan janji yang muluk. Yang lama tak bersungut-sungut. Dalam pidato terakhirnya sebagai presiden, Habibie hanya meminta dikenang



▲ Presiden Suharto diambil sumpah jabatannya untuk masa jabatan ketujuh dan terakhir, 11 Maret 1998.

RIBUT SUSANTO

Riau adalah salah satu provinsi yang kaya minyak. Hasil penjualannya kebanyakan dialirkan ke Jakarta pada zaman Presiden Suharto. Kebijakan ini membuat banyak warga Riau, terutama orang Melayu yang turun-temurun tinggal di sana, merasa diperlakukan tak adil. Mereka protes tapi tak didengarkan. Jatuhnya Suharto pada Mei 1998 membuka peluang melebarnya penguasaan orang Riau terhadap hasil minyak. Ribut Susanto dari Yayasan Riau Mandiri adalah salah satu tokoh Riau yang menuntut keadilan dari Jakarta.

Turunnya Presiden Suharto membawa keberuntungan pada Riau karena lahirnya UU Otonomi Daerah. Daerah bisa mengatur keuangan lebih baik. Uang dari bagi hasil sumber daya alam dan hutan membuat Riau cukup banyak pemasukan. Dulu Riau mendapat anggaran Rp 400 milyar per tahun. Sekarang mendapat hampir Rp 8 triliun. Ini membuat pemerintahan kabupaten dan kota membangun lebih baik. Pembangunan jembatan, rumah sakit, jalan, dan sekolah, lebih cepat.

Tapi perubahan undang-undang itu tak memasukkan peran warga dalam proses penyusunan perencanaan pembangunan. Ini yang coba dimainkan Yayasan Riau Mandiri yakni bagaimana warga bisa berpartisipasi. Intinya, bagaimana otonomi bisa lebih dekat ke warga. Dalam bentuk perencanaan desa, misalnya. Desa A mau membangun sendiri. Mereka tak tahu apa yang mesti mereka perbuat. Sejauh mana peran mereka? Tak ada aturan main. Di lapangan yang ada selebaran pemerintah atau Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah sampai ke lurah untuk mengisi daftar usulan. Tanpa keterlibatan masyarakat. Dua atau tiga tahun belakangan ini masyarakat mulai ikut menggagas. Pada 1999 Riau Mandiri dengan 13 organisasi lain melakukan gugatan terhadap pemerintah karena Anggaran Penerimaan dan Belanja Daerah (APBD) tak berpihak kepada masyarakat.

Program Riau Mandiri cukup banyak. Tentang hutan, Riau Mandiri membuat Jaringan Hutan Riau untuk mengantisipasi kerusakan hutan dan sumber daya hutan Riau. Lainnya, soal pencemaran lingkungan, kasus-kasus warga yang tertindas, serta pernyerobotan tanah, yang daerah-daerahnya sulit dijangkau. Kita memberikan pendidikan dan mengembangkan kapasitas lembaga-lembaga di Riau. Perkembangan organisasi nonpemerintah di Riau sangat

cepat. Pada Juni 1998 ada lima organisasi nonpemerintah dan sekarang ada 400-an, yang membuat mereka terpuruk karena euforia.

Riau Mandiri didirikan oleh kawan-kawan yang dulunya berbasis pecinta alam dari Mahasiswa Pecinta Alam Universitas Riau. Tapi mereka merasa tak bisa ke



Ribut Susanto di kantor Riau Mandiri, 2003.

mana-mana kalau memakai baju universitas. Maka mereka mendirikan Riau Mandiri tahun 1989. Pada 1999 baru mulai melakukan hubungan dengan Ford Foundation dalam mengembangkan masyarakat untuk bisa berpartisipasi dalam proses perencanaan dan penyusunan APBD. Sekarang program ini berkembang dari satu kota jadi tiga kabupaten. Pertama dengan Ford Foundation itu hanya di kota Dumai.

Belakangan ada pernyataan bahwa Riau sebaiknya merdeka dari Indonesia. Ini

wacana saat kita merasa sangat dizalimi pemerintah. Ini juga untuk menaikkan nilai tawar Riau. Teman-teman melihat bahwa begitu kayanya Riau tapi menjadi provinsi termiskin kedua di Sumatera setelah Lampung. Ini sangat ironis. Sumbangan Riau lewat pendapatan minyak ke Jakarta pada 1970-an dan 1980-an sekitar 60 persen dari devisa Indonesia.

Kenaikan hingga Rp 8 triliun per tahun itu masih dianggap tak adil. Hitungannya, misalnya perusahaan minyak Caltex menyerahkan ke Pertamina Rp 17 triliun setahun. Pertamina menyumbangkan ke Departemen Keuangan hanya Rp 6,2 triliun. Riau hanya mendapat Rp 1,2 triliun dari Rp 6,2 triliun itu. Jadi dari Rp 17 triliun hanya Rp 1,2 triliun yang kembali ke Riau dan ini yang dilihat masyarakat tidak adil.

Riau juga punya persoalan identitas – sesuatu yang juga terjadi di Papua atau Aceh dalam menuntut kemerdekaan. Misalnya, putra daerah harus menjadi orang pertama di tiap kabupaten kota dan provinsi. Sekarang semua kepala daerah putra daerah, tapi dari pihak luar itu cukup banyak dan beragam, dari berbagai etnik dan suku. Kalau tidak salah sekitar 45 persen populasi Riau itu dari pendatang. Saya sendiri campuran, Jawa dan Melayu.

Selama ini “pendatang” jadi tuan rumah di Riau. Maka saya berpikir radikal. Saya memahami bagaimana orang-orang daerah merasa disaingi. Misalnya ada satu perusahaan sawit, pendatang mendapat dua hektar, sementara warga yang melepaskan lahan malah tak mendapatkan sama sekali. Ketidakadilan ini dilakukan oleh pemerintah Suharto. Sekarang warga cenderung merebut kembali aset-aset yang selama ini tanpa ada kejelasan. Maka terjadi gejolak hampir di semua daerah soal perebutan lahan dan ini sering terjadi antara pendatang dan warga setempat.

sebagai seorang yang memulihkan demokrasi di Indonesia.

Tapi tentu saja demokrasi tak pernah dipulihkan hanya oleh satu orang, apalagi seorang yang pernah bertahun-tahun begitu dekat dengan Suharto, seorang yang tak pernah tercatat sebagai pendukung kebebasan. Tapi sejarah akan mencatat bahwa di bawah Habibie pers menjadi merdeka, partai politik dengan leluasa dibentuk, daerah-daerah mendapatkan otonomi. Di samping itu, meskipun dengan tergesa-gesa dan menimbulkan korban, Timor Timur merdeka, setelah 20 tahun oleh Suharto dijadikan wilayah Indonesia.

Sangat mungkin bahwa Habibie tak punya desain reformasi seperti itu. Tapi ia harus. Ia tetap dianggap sebagai “orang Suharto.” Diserang terus-menerus oleh mahasiswa dan gerakan prodemokrasi – pemenang sebenarnya dalam kejatuhan Suharto – posisi Habibie seperti militer: sebuah faktor yang tak diikutkan, bahkan dicurigai, dalam gelombang perubahan.

Ia harus menyesuaikan diri.

Dan dalam masa kepresidenannya yang pendek itulah, Indonesia berhenti ketakutan. Militer, yang selama bertahun-tahun menggertak setiap suara yang berbeda, tak memperoleh posisinya yang dulu. Ketika kalangan prodemokrasi melawan dengan sengit rencana undang-undang Keadaan Darurat, Habibie tak meneruskannya. Republik Indonesia tak lagi berbaris dengan satu derap. Dengan riuh-rendah, acapkali kacau, acapkali menakutkan, Indonesia mencari pluralismenya kembali.

Keadaan ini tentu saja berlanjut di bawah kepresidenan Abdurrahman Wahid. Ia mungkin bukan seorang eksekutif yang cakap. Tapi ia, sebagai pemimpin Nahdlatul Ulama, bukan orang asing untuk memeriahkan perbedaan.

Pancasila pun berhenti menjadi satu-satunya asas bagi organisasi sosial. Pemerintahan desa tak lagi satu corak.



▲ Abdurrahman Wahid mendapat ucapan selamat dari B.J. Habibie. Inilah pertama kali Indonesia menyaksikan pergantian kekuasaan presiden dengan damai. Jakarta 1999.
 ► Pancur Kasih adalah satu dari banyak organisasi nirlaba di Indonesia yang membantu penduduk desa membuat peta guna melindungi tanah adat dari penjarahan. Pontianak, 2003.

YAYAH KHISBIYAH

Muhammadiyah, organisasi Islam terbesar kedua di Indonesia, dengan sekitar 30 juta pendukung, sering disebut sebagai tempat yang tak nyaman untuk budaya lokal. Ini dirasakan Yayah Khisbiyah, psikolog sosial lulusan University of Massachusetts, yang jadi dosen Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta sejak 1997 dan sejak 1999 menjadi direktur Pusat Studi Budaya dan Perubahan Sosial (PSB-PS). Khisbiyah percaya soal intoleransi harus diatasi bersama oleh segenap elemen masyarakat. Melalui Muhammadiyah, ia merancang program untuk menjembatani organisasi Islam tersebut dengan budaya lokal untuk mempromosikan pluralisme dan multikulturalisme.

Saya memandang mismanajemen pluralitas budaya dengan rasa kuatir. Berbagai kelompok masyarakat, termasuk kelompok-kelompok keagamaan, masih memiliki intoleransi kuat terhadap kemajemukan budaya. Ini memberi andil pada timbulnya friksi, segregasi sosial, bahkan kekerasan yang meruyak akhir-akhir ini. Nampaknya, seperti organisasi keagamaan lainnya, yang lebih mengedepankan *truth claim* daripada dialog intersubjektif, Muhammadiyah juga kurang memiliki apresiasi otentik terhadap multikulturalisme. Jati diri warga Muhammadiyah misalnya, lebih merujuk ke budaya ke-Arab-araban, yang dianggap budaya Islam, ketimbang ke budaya tempat sendiri yang dianggap warisan animisme dan paganisme yang menodai “kemurnian Islam.”

Pandangan arus utama Muhammadiyah cenderung menghakimi format dan ekspresi budaya lokal sebagai takhyul, sesat (*bid'ah*), menyimpang (*khurafat*), dan bahkan haram, sehingga ditolak atau disingkirkan. Dalam fatwa Muhammadiyah mengenai hukum (*fiqh*) seni, disebutkan bahwa seni bersifat dibolehkan (*mubah*), sepanjang tak mengarah pada kerusakan (*fasad*), bahaya (*dharar*), maksiat (*ibsyah*), dan menjauhi Tuhan (*ba'id 'anillab*). Berbekal fatwa ini, sebagian kalangan merasa memiliki keabsahan memberangus kesenian lokal atau tradisional yang dianggap tak sesuai dengan nilai-nilai Islam, padahal definisi yang dipakai adalah definisi Islam yang literal, tercerabut dari konteks sosial-budaya yang terus berubah.

Muhammadiyah sebenarnya telah meninjau ulang paradigma lama tersebut. Paradigma baru yang lebih bersahabat terhadap multikulturalisme, dilontarkan

pada Musyawarah Nasional Majelis Tarjih di Banda Aceh 1995. Ini pergeseran pemikiran yang penting, tapi belum cukup. Diperlukan kajian berperspektif multidisipliner dan dialog intersubjektif untuk menjadikan perubahan paradigma ini memiliki pijakan yang lebih kontekstual dan valid. Selain itu, juga diperlukan strategi transformatif pada tataran praksis sosialnya, agar ada kesinambungan antara



Yayah Khisbiyah di Surakarta, 2001.


wacana dengan implementasinya dalam kehidupan nyata. Namun sayang, pembaruan itu berjalan lambat dan fragmentaris, padahal persoalan-persoalan akibat intoleransi agama terhadap pluralitas budaya Indonesia terus mengganggu kehidupan masyarakat Indonesia, sejak tumbangnya Orde Baru pada 1998.

Kegelisahan saya ini saya salurkan melalui PSB-PS dengan mendesain program “Dialektika Agama dan Budaya Lokal” dan kini berlanjut dengan “Islam Multikultural” bekerjasama dengan PP Muhammadiyah dan Ford Foundation. Program ini bertujuan agar persyarikatan dan warga Muhammadiyah khususnya dan Muslim umumnya,

dapat menghargai pluralisme budaya lokal, termasuk ekspresinya dalam kesenian.

Lewat program ini, saya dan rekan-rekan di PSB-PS memfasilitasi *balaqah-balaqah* (diskusi intensif) berskala nasional, sebagai arena pertukaran pemikiran bagi para pemikir Islam di Majelis Tarjih dan pelaku dakwah di Majelis Tabligh, bersanding dengan ahli-ahli ilmu sosial serta pelaku budaya dan seniman sendiri. Upaya ini dilakukan agar cara pandang terhadap seni dan budaya lokal menjadi lebih arif dan kontekstual. Saya ingin fatwa tentang seni tak dihasilkan dari ruang vakum agama. Dari *balaqah-balaqah* yang telah diselenggarakan sepanjang 2001-2002 muncul pendapat bahwa pelabelan *mubah* sebetulnya kurang tepat diterapkan pada masalah-masalah seni-budaya yang bersifat empirik-sosiologis. *Halaqah* juga antara lain menyimpulkan bahwa seni adalah keniscayaan alamiah atau kehendak Allah (*sunnatullah*) dan bersifat baik (*ma'ruf*).

Hasil *balaqah* ini telah kami terbitkan dalam dua buku yang banyak dirujuk pengurus Muhammadiyah dalam peristiwa-peristiwa penting tingkat nasional, seperti Sidang Tanwir (sidang tertinggi di bawah Muktamar) di Bali pada Januari 2002, Sidang Tanwir di Makassar pada Juni 2003, dan Musyawarah Nasional Tarjih di Padang Oktober 2003. Wacana ini juga memancing diskusi hangat di berbagai kalangan Muhammadiyah. Ini positif karena program ini paling tidak telah menggugah kita untuk berpikir ulang mengenai hakikat, dinamika, dan tantangan pluralisme dan multikulturalisme dalam rangka menuju masyarakat yang lebih berkeadilan, sejahtera, dan damai.





Masyarakat adat tak lagi terancam untuk dicerabut dari akarnya. Buruh, seperti halnya wartawan, bisa membentuk organisasinya sendiri yang beragam. Islam tidak lagi hanya berarti satu umat dengan suara dan interpretasi tunggal. Orang Indonesia keturunan Tionghoa tak lagi takut mementaskan wayang *po-te-hi* di kelenteng-kelenteng Kong Hu Cu. Perempuan tak lagi diletakkan sebagai pendukung birokrasi. Mereka bahkan aktif membuka ide-ide progresif – dari soal hak-hak reproduksi sampai dengan soal tafsir Kitab Suci.

Tak semuanya tanpa kesakitan. Di Papua dan Aceh, keinginan untuk memisahkan diri dari Republik Indonesia tak surut. Di Kalimantan Barat, bentrokan yang mengerikan antara orang Dayak dan Madura kembali kambuh. Di awal 1999, konflik baru meledak di Ambon antara penduduk Muslim dan Kristen – sebuah sengketa yang menjalar, bengis, dan sulit diredakan.

Ketika lembaga hukum masih tetap korup, ketika aparat keamanan dengan gampang menawarkan tubuh dan senjata untuk dibayar siapa saja, penyelesaian konflik cenderung dilakukan di luar pengadilan. Bahkan dengan kekerasan. Di banyak tempat, terutama di kota-kota besar, bermunculan barisan berseragam yang menodong masyarakat dengan ancaman. Tak ada lagi sarana yang diterima oleh masyarakat untuk membuat orang berunding dan kompromi.

Dalam puing-puing institusi itu, partai-partai politik yang menang dalam pemilihan umum ternyata tak mampu jadi penggerak perbaikan. Melalui sebuah pemilihan umum yang disiapkan cuma dalam waktu setahun, Parlemen diisi oleh orang-orang yang baru dalam karier politik. Mereka tak punya teladan yang bermutu dari sejarah tiga dasawarsa Orde Baru. Sistem yang memilih mereka juga sistem yang lama: para

legislator itu duduk karena ditunjuk partai, bukan karena dipilih dari bawah. Tanpa kewajiban mempertanggungjawabkan posisi mereka di depan pemilih, para legislator praktis bisa berbuat apa saja – termasuk berjual beli suara.

Akhirnya Indonesia menemui kenyataan bahwa demokrasi, sebuah jalan untuk mengelola perbedaan, bukan sebuah lorong yang necis. Banyak sekali lobang yang dalam, paku yang tajam, juga najis, dan orang-orang jahat sepanjang itu. Tak semua orang bisa tahan di sana.

Dan agaknya itulah persoalan yang dihadapi mereka yang, sebelum Suharto jatuh, memperjuangkan demokrasi yang kini mereka dapat. Mereka tak ingin masuk ke dalam lorong politik yang tak necis itu. Masuk ke politik bahkan sebuah langkah yang sering dicemooh. Ada sikap yang dianggap oleh Zohra Andi Baso, aktivis dari Makassar, sebagai “romantisme saja.” Dengan kata lain, sebuah posisi yang sebenarnya lemah, tapi menarik dan tampak bersih dari partai dan Parlemen.

Tapi keragaman yang marak setelah Orde Baru juga menyediakan keragaman cara. Di luar partai dan Parlemen, Lilis N. Husna, seorang aktivis dari kalangan Nahdlatul Ulama, misalnya, membentuk “forum warga.” Agendanya adalah secara konsisten membangun pengaruh ke dalam lembaga-lembaga politik. Dengan cara ini – yang bukan satu-satunya cara – barangkali ada harapan bahwa carut-marut demokrasi yang jadi ciri dasawarsa pasca-Suharto akan menemukan bentuknya.

Dalam arti itu, demokrasi adalah sebuah eksperimen besar. Di ujungnya tak ada janji tentang sebuah masyarakat yang sempurna. Yang ada hanya sebuah perjalanan terus-menerus untuk memperbaiki, mengubah, membentuk secara teratur, tanpa kekerasan. Yang ada hanya sebuah proses yang menuntut kerendahhatian. Dalam kisah ini, proses itu bernama Indonesia.



APPENDIX

DAFTAR SINGKATAN

ADC	Agricultural Development Council	IGGI	Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists)	IIE	Institute of International Education
APIK	Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan (Indonesian Women's Association for Justice)	ILO	International Labor Organization
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Planning Board)	IMF	International Monetary Fund
BKKBN	Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Planning Coordinating Board)	INGI	International NGO Group on Indonesia
BPN	Badan Perancang Nasional (Central Planning Bureau)	IPB	Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Institute of Agriculture)
BPPC	Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (Clove Support and Trading Board)	IPTN	Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Indonesian National Aircraft Industry)
BPS	Badan Pendukung Soekarnoisme (Sukarnoism Support Group)	IRRI	International Rice Research Institute
BPTRI	Balai Perguruan Tinggi Republik Indonesia (National Center of Higher Education)	ISAI	Institut Studi Arus Informasi (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information)
CGMI	Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Students Movement Center)	ISEI	Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Economists)
CIFOR	The Center for International Forestry Research	ITB	Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
CIO	Congress of Industrial Organizations	JEN	Jaringan Epidemiologi Nasional (National Epidemiological Network)
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies	KEPAS	Kelompok Penelitian Agro-eko Sistem (Agro-Ecosystem Research Group)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)	KIPP	Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (General Election Monitoring Committee)
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration	Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Human Rights Commission)
FEUI	Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia (Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia)	Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army Special Forces Command)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)	Kopkamtib	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
HSI	Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Scholars)	Leknas	Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional (National Institute for Economics and Social Research)
HKBP	Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (Indonesian Batak Protestant Church)	LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students Federation)	LKEN	Lembaga Kajian Ekonomi Nasional (National Institute for Economic Research)
IAIN	Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies)	LP3ES	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial (Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information)
IFP	International Fellowships Program		

LP3Y	Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerbitan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Institute for Research, Education, and Publications)	PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
LPEM	Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat (Institute of Economic and Social Research)	PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
LPPM	Lembaga Pengembangan dan Penelitian Manajemen (Institute for Development and Management Research)	PRD	Partai Rakyat Demokratik (Democratic Peoples Party)
LSM	Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Community Self-help Organization)	PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic)
Malari	Malapetaka Limabelas Januari (The January 15 th Incident)	PSI	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
MARI	Majelis Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian Peoples Council)	Repelita	Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Development Plan)
Masyumi	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians)	Seskoad	Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Staff College)
MIPI	Majelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Science and Learning)	Sticusa	Stichting Culturele Samenwerking
NICA	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration	TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army)
NIGO	Nederlandse Indische Guerilla Organisatie (Dutch Indies Guerrilla Organization)	TIM	Taman Ismail Marzuki
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama	TMII	Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature)
P3M	Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (Indonesian Society for <i>Pesantren</i> and Community Development)	TRIP	Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar (Republican Youth Army)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)	UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)	UI	Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)
Permesta	Perjuangan Semesta (Universal Struggle)	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
PIAR	Pengembangan Inisiatif dan Advokasi Rakyat (Association for the Development of Initiative and Community Advocacy)	USIS	United States Information Service
PKBI	Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association)	WALHI	Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (Indonesian Environmental Forum)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)	WALDA	Wahana Lestari Persada (Movement for Preservation of Homeland)
PMKRI	Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Catholic Students Association)	YIIS	Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial (Social Sciences Foundation)
		YLBHI	Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)
		YLKI	Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (Indonesian Consumers Association)
		YPMD	Yayasan Pengembangan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Advancement Foundation)

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STAF DAN KONSULTAN DI INDONESIA

Banyak sekali orang yang bekerja untuk Ford Foundation Jakarta dalam 50 tahun terakhir. Nama jabatan dan syarat kerja juga berubah sesuai perjalanan waktu. Daftar nama ini dikumpulkan dari arsip Ford Foundation. Bantuan dari para karyawan, dulu maupun sekarang, dalam mengingat nama dan jabatan juga membantu kami dalam penyusunan daftar ini. Kami harap daftar ini sudah akurat dan lengkap namun kami mohon maaf apabila ada kekurangan dan kekeliruan dalam penulisannya.

STAF ADMINISTRASI DAN PENDUKUNG

Daftar ini mencakup berbagai karyawan Ford Foundation termasuk sopir, bagian umum, akuntan, resepsionis, sekretaris, asisten eksekutif, maupun administrasi hibah. Nama karyawan yang masih bekerja dicetak tebal.

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Berikut ini adalah daftar nama Representative (Wakil) atau kepala kantor Ford Foundation Jakarta (namanya dicetak tebal), Program Officer (mereka yang mengembangkan dan menangani hibah bersama tim administrasi dan staf pendukung), dan mereka yang bukan karyawan langsung namun banyak membantu Ford Foundation sebagai konsultan atau staf program.

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KONSULTAN

Dalam 50 tahun terakhir, banyak orang yang telah bekerja untuk Ford Foundation dengan posisi sebagai penasehat, konsultansi, dan administrasi. Beberapa konsultan bekerja untuk waktu yang lama, tapi ada juga yang bekerja untuk penugasan jangka pendek. Bagi sejumlah kecil karyawan internasional, hanya nama keluarga mereka yang dicetak di sini. Kami telah mencoba untuk memasukkan semua nama, namun kemungkinan ada yang terlewatkan.

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